

Critical Essays on Pūrvamimāṃsā

Author

Mahāmahopādhyāya

Rāshtrapati Prashasti Puraskrita, Darśanakalānidhi

Prof. K.T. Pandurangi

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Preface

This volume contains 82 critical essays on Pūrvamīmāṃsā. These essays represent the lectures delivered in Andhra University and Karnatak University and other centres of studies. Some of these essays are large (6-8 pages) while others are small (2-4 pages). This depends upon the topic concerned.

There are very few works on Pūrvamīmāṃsā in English. Mīmāṃsā Darśana published in the series of Indian Philosophy of Benaras University gives some topics of Pūrvamīmāṃsā. Mahāmahopādhyāya Ganganath Jha's English translation of Śabarabhāṣya and Ślokaṽrtika are useful only to study the texts. These do not make a critical assessment with an interdisciplinary approach.

In this volume a critical and disciplinary study of all major issues of Pūrvamīmāṃsā is made. It is hoped that this volume will be useful to research students and research scholars.

Mahāmahopādhyāya

Rāshtrapati Prashasti Puraskrita

Darśanakalānidhi

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1. The Perspective and the Scope of Pūrvamīmāṃsā

The world view of Pūrvamīmāṃsā

Sacrifice is a Socio-religious institution in Vedic culture. It represents the world view envisaged by Pūrvamīmāṃsā. According to Pūrvamīmāṃsā,

- (i) the world is neither created nor it will be destroyed. It is ever present.
- (ii) the language particularly, the Vedic language has no beginning nor the end.
- (iii) For the sacrificial activity also no beginning can be traced in historical term.

In the very first hymn of R̥g Veda, Agni is described as R̥tvik and Hotā. Prayers are offered to him by sages in the past and will be offered by the sages in future.

Agniḥ pūrvebhiḥ ṛṣibhiḥ idyaḥ nūtanaiḥ uta

In Puruṣa sūkta, it is stated that,

*yajñena yajñam ayajanta devāḥ tāni
dharmāṇi prathamāni āsan.*

The deities performed the sacrifices, these were the earliest sacrifices. The Gīta also informs us

saḥa yajñah prajāḥ sṛṣtvā purovāca prajāpathiḥ

From this it is clear that sacrificial activity was also ever present. These were not ever present in an isolated way. These make an impact on one another.

In Vedas there is an important concept designated as Rta. This is the source of the natural law of non-sentient entities and the moral law of the sentient beings. The first one is designated as satya. The second is designated as dharma. These are not exclusive to each other. These are the two sides of the same coin. Dharma is primarily a sacrificial activity in the context of Pūrvamīmāṃsā. The sacrificial activities, though are physical activities, these are elevated as dharma on two grounds.

(i) These are enjoyed by vedic injunction

(ii) These lead to trans-empirical results.

The sacrificial activities are conveyed by vedic language. The vedic language also describes the nature and the presiding deities of different aspects of nature. The sacrificial offerings are offered to the deities. In fact, dravya, the sacrificial offering, and devatā, i.e. deities form the core part of the sacrifice. The hymns reveal dravya and devatā. Thus the scope of the sacrificial activities includes the vedic injunctions and the deities also. For this reason sacrifice is considered as the support or the foundation of the entire world.

Taittirīya Āraṇyaka states that Dharmo Viśvasya Jagataḥ Pratiṣṭhā (धर्मो विश्वस्य जगतः प्रतिष्ठा).

(Tai.Ā. 10-63-7)

The sacrificial activity leads to the welfare of not only the performers, not only the sentient beings, but of the entire world. Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa states Śreyo rūpam atyasrjat dharmam (श्रेयो रूपं अत्यस्रजत् धर्मम्) (Śata.Bra.14-4-2-26)

Jaimini defines dhama as codanā lakṣaṇaḥ arthaḥ dharmah (चोदनालक्षणः अर्थः धर्मः). Here the word arthaḥ states that the dharma, i.e., sacrificial activity leads to the welfare. As stated above it leads to the welfare of men and also the welfare of all others, including the deities. This is made clear in Gīta.

- (i) *Devān bhāvayatanena te devā bhāvayantu vaḥ
Parasparam bhāvayantaḥ śreyaḥ
paramavapsyatha* (Gīta - 3-11)

देवान् भावयतानेन ते देवा भावयन्तु वः ।

परस्परं भावयन्तः श्रेयः परमवाप्स्यथ ।

- (ii) *Anena prasaviṣyadhvam eṣavo-
stviṣṭakāmadhuk* (Gīta -3-10)

अनेन प्रसविष्यध्वं एषवोऽस्त्विष्टकामधुक् ।

Gīta further explains the role of sacrifice in the form of yajña cakra.

*Annād bhavanti bhūtāni parjanyaḍanna sambhavaḥ
yajñātbhavati parjanyo yajñāḥ karmasamudbhavaḥ*

अन्नाद्भवन्ति भूतानि पर्जन्यादन्न सम्भवः ।

यज्ञाद्भवति पर्जन्यः यज्ञः कर्मसमुद्भवः ॥ (Gita 3-14)

Since the sacrificial activity leads to the welfare of all it has to be carried on for ever, generations after generation.

Īśāvāsya Upaniṣad advises to undertake the activities all along the life.

Kurvannevch karmāṇi jijīviśet śatam samah

कुर्वन्नेवेह कर्माणि जिजीविशेत् शतं समाः ।

Gītā declares that no one can remain without any activity even for a moment.

Na hi kaścit kṣaṇamapi jātu tiṣṭhati akarmakṛt

न हि कश्चित्क्षणमपि जातु तिष्ठत्यकर्मकृत् । (Gita 3-5)

Sacrificial activities constitute the Śrauta religion. However Jaimini has accepted smṛtis also as the authorities for dharma. Dharmasūtras, smṛtis and later nibhandha works constitute the source of smārta dharmās. These prescribe varṇa and āśrama duties and the moral duties. These also have to be observed generation after generation for ever. Thus the performance of sacrificial activities and other religious activities have to go on. Mīmāṃsakas do

not accept the moksha liberation of the type of vedānta and also do not accept knowledge as a means of it. They do not accept the God who causes sṛṣṭi, sthiti and laya.

For Mīmāṃsakas the sacrificial and other Religious and ethical activities are the means as well as the ends of human welfare. Their world view is quite distinct from that of Vedānta and Itihāsa purāṇa.

The Sources of Śrauta Sacrifices

Śrauta sacrifices are described in Taittiriya Samhita of Kṛṣṇa Yajurveda, Śatapatha Brahmaṇa of Śukla yajurveda, Aitereya Āraṇyaka of Ṛg veda and in Taittiriya Brahmaṇa. There are two texts of Taittiriya Śākhā, viz, Sarasvata Pāṭha and Arṣeya Pāṭha. In Arṣeya Pāṭha there is subject-wise arrangement. In five sections viz, Prājāpatya, Saumya, Āgneya, Vaiṣvadeva and Svāyambhuva. This helps us to comprehend Ṛṣi, Devata, hymns and rituals. In these texts of Samhita and Brāhmaṇa the sacrifices are described. The main sacrifices, the subordinate rituals. the anxiliries, and the hymns are stated.

As the performance of the sacrifices was actively going on, there was no need to describe the whole procedure step by step at that time. This task was

done by Śrauta Sūtras. There are ten Śrauta Sūtras related to Yajurveda. Among these Baudhāyana Śrauta Sūtra is the oldest and gives the detailed description all major sacrifices. Āpastambha Śrauta Sūtra is quite elaborate. Kātyāyana Śrauta Sūtra is a little revolutionary. In many instances it departs from other Śrauta Sūtras.

Only two Śrauta Sūtras namely, Āśvalāyana and Sāmkyāyana are related to Ṛg Veda. As many as eighteen Śrauta Sūtras are related to Sāma veda. In addition to these, there are fourteen Piṭṛmedha Sūtras and eight Paṛiśiṣṭas.

Apart from Śrauta Sūtras there are Śulba Sūtras. In these the construction of yajña mantapa, the construction of sacrificial altars, Garhapatya etc. sacred fire places are described. These are a kind of geometrical works, and the foundation of Vedic Mathematics and Vedic Vāstu. The word Śulba means a cord. By this the various fire places and altars are measured.

The number and nature of Sacrifices

The sacrifices are analysed in three groups viz., (i) Pāka yajñas (ii) Havir yajñas and (iii) Soma yajñas. Among these Pāka yajñas are the Gṛhya rites.

Havir yajñas and Soma yajñas are Śrauta rites. Seven Havir yajñas are enumerated as under:

(i) *Agnyādheya* (ii) *Agnihotra* (iii) *Darśapūrṇa māsau* (iv) *Agrāyaṇa* (v) *Cāturmāsyaṇi* (vi) *Dākṣāyaṇa yajña* (vii) *Kuṇḍa-pāyinām ayanam*.

According to Baudhāyana Sūtra (B S's 24-4) seven Soma Yajñas as enumerated as under :

i) *Agniṣṭoma*, ii) *Atyagniṣṭoma* iii) *Ukthya*, iv) *Ṣoḍaśī*, v) *Vājapeya*, vi) *Aptoryāma*, and vii) *Atirātra*.

In the above Soma sacrifices, the soma is pressed and its juice is offered to the deities, during only one day of the sacrifice. Hence these Soma sacrifices are called *ekāhas* i.e., having the duration of one day.

The Soma sacrifices in which Soma is pressed and its juice is offered for two to twelve days are named *Ahīnas*.

The Soma sacrifices in which Soma is pressed and its juice is offered for twelve days or more are termed as *satras*.

However, twelve days Soma sacrifice with some variations has the characteristics of both *Ahīna* and *Satra*.

A Soma sacrifice extending for one full year i.e., when the Soma juices offered on all the days of the year is known as *Ayana*.

Nitya, Naimittika and Kāmya Sacrifices

The sacrifices are also classified as nitya (obligatory) naimittika (occasional) and Kāmya (utilitarian). For example : Agnihotra and Darśapūrṇamāsa are nitya (obligatory).

The Agnihotra is enjoined by the injunctive sentence Yāvaj Jivam agnihotram juhōti (यावज्जीवं अग्निहोत्रं जुहोति). One should perform Agnihotra all along his life. Here the word Yāvat, i.e., all along is the ground to perform it all along the life. This sacrifice is obligatory.

Kārīryā Vṛṣṭikāmo yaieta (कारिरीया वृष्टिकामो यजेत ।) is an instance of Kāmya karma. If the house of a sacrificer is burnt, a sacrifice to ward off the ill-effects is prescribed.

This is naimittika. This classification applies to Gṛhya rites and Varṇāśrama dharmās also. For example, for a householder Pancamahāyajñās are prescribed. These are (i) Brahma yajña (ii) Devayajña (iii) Pitṛyajña (iv) Bhūta yajña (v) Atithiyajña. Studying Vedas is Brahmayajña. This is intended to preserve the literary heritage. Devayajña is performing sacrifice. This is intended to preserve the tradition of sacrifice. Pitṛyajña is for securing the progeny. It is intended to preserve the race. Bhūta yajña is offering food to all other living

beings. This is intended to preserve all other living beings. Atithiyajña is entertaining the guest. It is called manuṣya yajña also offering food to fellow living beings. These are obligatory for a householder. This reveals the social consciousness of our ancient people. This social consciousness is not confined to human beings only but extends to other living beings also.

The priest, sacred fires, utensils of the sacrifice

The śrauta ritual procedure requires four types of priests related to four vedas. (1) Adhvaryu belongs to Yajurveda (2) Brahma belongs to Atharva veda (3) Hota belongs to Rg veda (4) Udgāta belongs to Sāma Veda. There are three others who assist each of the above main priests. Thus the total number of priests is sixteen. Ten Camasa adhvaryus are also employed in the Soma sacrifice.

The Brāhmaṇa Khṣatriya and Vaiśya class are entitled to perform sacrifices. Rathakāra is allowed to perform a special ritual, so also Niṣhada sthapati.

A sacrifice consists of four items. (i) Dravya i.e., oblation material, (ii) devatā (iii) tyāga i.e., the renouncing the ownership of Dravya by the sacrificer and investing it with the ownership of the

deity. (iv) Prakṣepa i.e., putting the Dravya in the sacrificial fire.

It should be noted here that the tyāga stated here is Dravyatyāga but not phala tyāga stated in Gītā.

The sacrificer should set up three fires at Agnyādhāna rite. The three fires are named as (1) Gārhapatya (2) Āhavanīya and (3) Dakṣina.

The pit for the Gārhapatya fire is circular in shape, situated to the west of the altar. The pit of the Āhavanīya fire is square in shape, situated to the east of Gārhapatya. The pit of Dakṣiṇāgni is semicircular in shape. It is constructed to the south of Gārhapatya.

For the sacrifice as many as forty seven utensils are required. Among these (1) sphya (2) kapālāni (3) Agnihotrahavaṇī (4) Śūrpa (5) Kriṣṇajina (6) Śamyā (7) Ulūkhala (8) Musala (9) Dṛṣat (10) Upalā (11) śṛk (12) śruva are important. Araṇī and Yūpa are major instruments.

For preparing Araṇī Yūpa and other utensils the wood of the following trees is used. Aśvattha, Udumbara, Khadira, Nyagrodha, Palāśa, Pippala, Vāraṇa, Vaikantaka and few other trees are utilized. For a particular item, a particular wood is required.

Puroḍāśa (cooked rice), Ājya (ghee), Soma plant are primarily used for offering. Dadhi (curds), madhu (honey) etc others occasionally used.

The nature of Soma plant is described in Suśruta Samhita as under :

Soma plant is a mixture of bitterness and sweetness in taste, royal blue in colour, cool. It has fifteen leaves. These grow during bright half of the month and drop out during dark half of the month. On the full moon day, all the fifteen leaves will be present. On new moon day of the month all leaves drop out.



2. Avestan Yāsna and Vedic Yajña

Among the surviving old religions, Zoroastrian religion is practised by Parsees in India. Avesta is the sacred scripture of this religion. Avesta literature is divided into five groups. The first group is Yasna-Yajña. There are broad similarities between Avestan Yasna and Vedic Yajna.

1. The Agni has a prominent place in both vedic rituals and Avestan rituals.

2. The offerings of dron and homa of Avestan ritual may be compared with the vedic Puroḍāśa and Soma respectively.

3. In vedic sacrifice, the Soma is offered in three sessions namely prātaḥ, mādhyandina and Sāyamsavana. In Yasna ceremony also offerings are made three times.

4. The Avestan rituals are accompanied by mantras as in Vedic rituals. The names and functions of some of priest resemble. Eg.: Zot=Hotā.

5. Brahma is expected to supervise the entire sacrifice and advise expiations like the Śraośāverez in Avesta. Agnīdhra as the name itself suggests is one who tends fire is similar to Avestan Ātarevaxs' who also tends fire.

Agnyādheya

As a preliminary for performing subsequent rituals, a sacrificer should setup three sacred fires viz. Gārhapatyā, Āhavanīya and Dakṣiṇā fires. According to some schools Sabhya fire has also to be setup. The Āvasathya fire has to be setup at the time of marriage. It is also called aupāsana or Vaivāhika.

The vedic texts have prescribed certain rituals for setting up these fires which the sacrificer has to perform.

Before the performance of the rituals for setting up the fires, the sacrificer has to get prepared the araṇis i.e., churning logs from the Aśvatha tree grown in the womb of Śami tree. He should also get prepared the instruments like Sṛk i.e. ladles. sruva i.e. spoons, sphya i.e., wooden sword, camasas i.e. square vessels, antardhānakata i.e., small curtain etc. all from the wood.

He should collect the sticks of following viz. Aśvatha, udumbara, Paṇa, Śami, Vikaṅkata, the tree struck by lightening, leaf of lotus etc. The sacrificer should get the shade prepared with the bamboos, its roof pointing to the east. He should also prepare the altar and fix the places for Gārhapatyā fire, Āhavanīya and Dakṣiṇa fire. To north of Gārhapatyā fire he should keep a spotted goat.

The sacrificer should shave his hair and beard. He and his wife should trim their nails and take a bath.

The Adhvaryu should take a portion of the fire from the Āupāsana fire and place it on the place fixed for Gārhapatya, to prepare Brahmaudana rice. He should cook that rice and offer a portion of it on that fire. He should pour the clarified butter on the remaining cooked rice and give it to the four priests. He should then take three sticks of Aśvatha and besmear them with Brahmaudana - rice and offer them in fire. The four priests should consume the Brahmaudana rice. The cows should be given to the priests. The priests should keep on offering kindling sticks on that fire through out the night.

Next morning the araṇis should be heated on Brahmaudanika fire and the fire be extinguished. The Adhvaryu should sprinkle water over the places fixed for the fires and place materials i.e., Sambhāras over them. He should also place the pieces of gold over the materials. He should churn the fire from the araṇis, and place that churned fire in Gārhapatya. He should place the enkindling sticks of Aśvatha wood on it and let it flame up. He should lift up that burning stick and place it in a pan. He should lift up the pan and make the sacrificer recite the formulae called 'Agni-tanu' (Apśs 5.10.7) in the ear of the horse kept aside.

He should carry the pan towards the east. The horse, should also walk towards the east. He should make the horse setup his right foot upon the materials deposited in the Āhavanīya firepit and should place the fire from the pan in the pit of Āhavanīya. Brahma priest should rotate the chariot-wheel from the Gārhapatya to Āhavanīya pit. The Āgnidhra should place the fire, either churned out or brought from the common-fire-place and deposit in the Anvāhārya fire pit. The Adhvaryu should offer Agnihotra libations without employing any formula.

Thus the fires are setup and the sacrificer has to take care to keep all of them burning, or at least the Gārhapatya, continuously.

The dice play takes place near Sabhya fire. The sacrificer wins in the dice game. The sacrificial fees are distributed.

The Adhvaryu thereafter proceeds to perform the Pavamānahavīmṣi. He offers cakes to Agni Pavamāna, Agni Pāvaka and Agni, Śuci baked in eight potsherds. He also offers Pūrṇāhuti offering on the Āhavanīya fire. This is a model for all sacrifices with suitable changes here and there.



3. The eligibility to perform the sacrifice

The eligibility for performing the sacrifice is briefly stated as Arthī Samartho Vidvān adhikriyate (अर्थी समर्थो विद्वान् अधिक्रियते) i.e., a person who desires to obtain the result of the sacrifice, who has the necessary resources and the knowledge is eligible to perform the sacrifice.

In respect of eligibility, the first question that arises is, whether the persons who have defective senses such as blind, deaf, dumb are eligible or not. There are certain items in the sacrifice that have to be performed utilising these senses. For instance ājya avekṣaṇa i.e. seeing the ājya, mantroccāraṇa i.e. reciting the hymns, Viṣṇukramana i.e. walking cannot be performed by the blind, dumb, lame persons. It cannot be argued that since such persons cannot perform these items, the injunctions above these items do not apply to these persons. They can be treated as exempted from these acts and they can get the result of the sacrifice without performing these items. This position cannot be accepted. These are Kṛtvartha items, that is to say these are the part and parcel of the sacrifice. If these are not performed, the performance of the sacrifice itself becomes incomplete and does not lead to the result. Hence such persons are not

eligible to perform sacrifices. These persons do not satisfy the criterion of Sāmarthya for the eligibility.

An interesting question is raised in the Bhāṣya whether the birds and animals are eligible to perform sacrifice. The birds and animals also are interested in obtaining happiness. They also have the feelings of happiness and sorrow. This is clear from the fact that they move under the shade of the tree when there is heat of the sun and move under the sun when the weather is chill. Further dogs observe fast on fourteenth day of the month. The Śyena birds observe fast on the eighth day of the month. It cannot be considered as due to some health problem, since such fast is observed regularly. Therefore, it seems these also can be considered to undertake the sacrifice.

However these acts of animals and birds are not based on their knowledge of these as dharma. An act can be decided as dharma or not, only by the perusal of veda. Birds and animals have no access to veda. Further these do not have any dravya of their own to offer. It is true that certain areas in the forest are earmarked for various birds and animals. However the ownership of these is not granted to them. Hence the birds and animals do not satisfy two eligibility conditions viz. 'Samartha' and 'Vidvān.'

The eligibility for deities

The question whether the deities and sages are eligible for undertaking sacrifice is also raised. The statement 'devā vai satram āsata' (देवा वै सत्रमासत) gives an impression that deities and sages are also eligible for undertaking the sacrifice. Further there is a sacrifice that has to be performed for a thousand years. The deities only can perform such long sacrifices. However the Bhāṣyakāra rejects the eligibility for the deities on the ground that the sacrifices are performed addressing the deities. If deities themselves undertake the sacrifice, then they have to think of another set of deities to address. This is ridiculous. In the case of sages also, they have to envisage another set of sages. Moreover, the deities have no forms. Hence they are not eligible.

The question of eligibility for deities is discussed in Brahmasūtras under devatādhikaraṇa, Śrī Śaṅkarācārya is not particularly interested in defending the eligibility for the deities for Karmānuṣṭhāna. He argues in favour of the eligibility for Brahmajñāna and establishes it. However certain observations made by him in this context are helpful to support eligibility for Karmānuṣṭhāna also. He says that the deities have form i.e. Vighraha. They have the capacities to

assume many forms. They can be conveyed by veda without affecting the eternity of veda.

Śrī Rāmānuja also supports the eligibility for Brahmajñāna for deities on the same line. Śrī Madhvācārya goes a step ahead and establishes the eligibility for both Karmānuṣṭhāna and Brahmajñāna for the deities. The arguments in favour of eligibility for Karmānuṣṭhāna are stated as under :

- i) The statement 'devah agnim ādhatte' states agñyādhāna for the deities.
- ii) Indra, Varuṇa etc are the offices of the deities. There is some-one or the other all along. Hence, the vedic words can convey them without effecting the eternal relation between the word and meaning.
- iii) The deities have the form and can be simultaneously be present in many places. Moreover it is not necessary that they should be physically present at the sacrifices.

In view of these, the deities have eligibility for both Karmānuṣṭhāna and Brahmajñāna.

Eligibility of Women

After disposing of the question of eligibility of deities and sages, the question of the eligibility of women is taken up for discussion. Aitiśāyana an

early Mīmāṃsaka, argues that the expression Svargakāmaḥ is in masculine gender. Therefore it seems the intention is to convey that only male are eligible to perform the sacrifice.

Another argument to deny the eligibility for women is the lack of resources with them. The sacrifice requires various kinds of grain, ghee etc. The woman does not own these. In fact, she herself is purchased at the time of her marriage by offering to her father the cows, chariots etc.

The above arguments are not sufficient grounds to deny eligibility to women. The masculine gender in the expression svargakāmaḥ does not exclude women. The desire for the result of the sacrifice is the ground of eligibility. This is stated by the expression svargakāmaḥ. The desire is common to both male and female, hence, both are eligible. In this context, we may note that the statement Brāhmaṇo na hantavyaḥ (ब्राह्मणो न हन्तव्यः) i.e. a brahmin should not be killed does not mean only the male brahmin be not killed but even female brahmin be not killed.

Offering some present to the parents of the bride does not amount to the purchase of the bride. It is only a custom.

At the time of the marriage the bridegroom

makes a promise that he will not transgress her in respect of dharma, artha and Kāma. This clearly indicates that they enter into a kind of partnership in respect of pursuing these ideals of life. One is not the master of the other. The expression Dampati is explained as patīśca patnī ca dampati. The word 'dama' means sacrificial fire. Dampati means the husband and wife associated with the sacrificial fire. The word patni also means the wife associated with the husband in the programme of sacrifice. (Patyur no yajña samyoge पत्युर्नो यज्ञसंयोगे). Hence women are as much eligible to undertake the sacrifice as men.

The next question is whether the husband and wife can undertake the sacrifice individually, separately or it is a joint programme. The singular in yajeta gives an impression that it has to be undertaken separately. However there are certain items like ājya aveksana and anvārambha, that have to be done by both. This will not be possible if each one of them undertakes the sacrifice separately. Only one of them attending to these items will result in incomplete performance of the sacrifice. It cannot be argued that the items that are to be performed by wife may be performed by the husband in the sacrifice undertaken by him. These items relate to the sacrifice and not to the person.

Hence person-wise allocation will not satisfy the requirement of the programme of the sacrifice. This will result in the absence of Sarvāṅgopasamhāra i.e., implementing all the details of the sacrifice. Hence both have to undertake the sacrifice together. The singular number in the expression yajeta indicates only the agency of undertaking this act present in the two is one and joint i.e., Vyāsajya Vritti. It does not indicate that the agent is only one. It only indicates that the agency is one.

There are certain other acts such as 'yoktrena patnim sannahyati' (योकत्रेण पत्निं संनहति) 'mekhalayā yajamānam' (मेखलया यजमानं) which confirm that both of them participate in the programme together. It is also stated that they attain prosperity together. 'Sam patni sukṛtena gacchatām (संपत्नी सुकृतेन गच्छताम्).' All these confirm that the two together have to undertake the sacrifice.

Śudras do not have eligibility for performing sacrifice

The right of Śudras for performing the sacrifice is strongly argued in the Jaimini sūtras and Śabara bhāṣya, though ultimately it is not granted.

(i) Mere interest in obtaining the result of the sacrifice will not entitle one to undertake it. It is only one of the criteria. The other criterion, particularly, the knowledge of Veda is not found in Śudras.

(ii) Studying Veda without upanayana is a wrong procedure. Such study and recitation of hymns at the sacrifice without proper study will not help to obtain the result of the sacrifice.

The institution of sacrifice is a programme of achieving welfare not only for the individual but for the whole society. It is even more. It is for the welfare of the entire world consisting of all living beings and the nature around. It is also a sacred programme. Therefore, it has to be executed with competent persons with necessary discipline. The persons are meant for the programme. The programmes are not meant for persons. In view of this, if any individual or a group of persons are denied to participate in the programme, the intention is to accomplish the programme perfectly and faultlessly but not to deny the opportunity to participate to that person or group of persons. The programme is more important than the persons.

The concepts of perfection of socio-religious programmes and procedures go on changing, suitable social changes also go on. We have to understand their validity in the context in which they are practised and preached. In due course, the changes take place whether one likes it or not.

The eligibility of Rathakāra

Rathakāra is a subcaste. A person born from the mother of Karaṇī caste and the father of mahiṣya caste is of Rathakāra caste. A woman born from Śudra caste mother and a Vaiśya caste father is a Karaṇī. A person born from the mother of Vaiśya caste and the father of Kṣatriya caste is māhiṣya.

With reference to a person belonging to rathakāra subcaste, it is stated that he should perform Agni ādhāna during the rainy season. The name rathakāra could be applied to brahmaṇa who is engaged in preparing a chariot. However, it would be a forced application when the word refers to a particular caste by usage. Hence, agni ādhāna as stated here has to be undertaken by a person of rathakāra caste.

Another exception is that of Niṣādasthapati. Here the word can be taken to mean as a master of Niṣādas or a person belonging to niṣada clan. It is taken in the latter sense. This is another instance of a person not belonging to the first three varṇas being granted eligibility to a particular sacrifice.

The two instances serve more than sacrificial purpose. These are evidences for the intercourse among Kṣatriyas, Vaiśyas and other castes. Such intercourses do not seem to have been in the case

of a few individuals. In that case, a new sub-caste would not have emerged. Such persons seem to have adapted to different vocations and later indentified with those vocations. The progeny of such intercourse must have acquired a social status by adapting some or other vocation.



4. The concepts of Apūrva and Svarga

The sacrifices are enjoined by vedic injunctions. Certain results to be realised by these are also stated. For instance, the injunction 'darśa pūrṇamasābhyam svarga kāmō yajeta' (दर्शपूर्णमासाभ्यां स्वर्गकामो यजेत) enjoins the performance of darśapūrṇamāsa sacrifice to realise svarga. Now this act of the sacrifice comes to an end as soon as all the items of it are completed. However, the result svarga does not immediately emerge. The cause should immediately precede the effect. When this does not happen some intermediary to maintain the continuity has to be envisaged. Hence, apūrva is envisaged as an intermediary between the the sacrifice and the result i.e. svarga.

This concept is envisaged by arthāpatti pramāṇa. Whenever there is a conflict between the two facts both of which are supported by appropriate prāmaṇa, a third fact has to be envisaged to resolve the conflict. Here, performing sacrifice is enjoined by śruti. A result for it is also stated in śruti. These statements imply the cause and effect relation between the two. This cannot be worked out unless the two are connected. This difficulty is resolved by envisaging apūrva by arthāpatti. Since, this arthāpatti emerges out of śruti statements, it is designated as śrutārthāpatti.

This apūrva arises when the main sacrifice is successfully completed. It is designated as paramāpūrva. The subsidiary acts generate their own apūrvas. These are designated as avantarāpūrva. For instance, at darsāpurnamāsa sacrifice agñeya etc three subordinate acts are performed on darsāa and purnamāsā each. From these three utpattyapūrvas arise. Since, these two sets of three acts are performed on separate days a samudāya apūrva arises from each set of three acts. Ultimately these lead to paramāpūrva or phalāpūrva. This leads to the final result.

This apūrva is a kind of trans-empirical power. It remains with the performer of the sacrifice. Ordinarily the power of an entity remains with that entity only and ceases to exist when that entity ceases. It produces the result for that entity only. However this is the position in the case of empirical power. Apūrva is a trans-empirical power. Hence, its way of functioning is quite different from empirical power. The sacrificial act is empirical. Its continuity until the result arises could not be envisaged. However, as dharma it could generate a trans-empirical power and could lead to the result. In Indian philosophical and religious tradition the concept of non-empirical power i.e. adṛṣṭa is accepted by all in some or other form at some or

other stage. It remains with the persons concerned. However, it is not cognised by him like his cognition of joy or sorrow.

The Concept of Svarga

There are three kinds of injunctive statements viz. i) The injunctive statements that specifically state svarga as the result to be realised by performing the sacrifice ii) The injunctive statements that mention something other than svarga such as paśu, indriya i.e. the strength of senses, etc., as the results. iii) The injunctive statements that do not state either svarga as the result or any other particular result.

In connection with these results two questions arise i) what is the nature of svarga ii) whether these are realised here only or in some other world or some other birth.

The nature of svarga is discussed in svarga kāmādhikaraṇa. Jaimini and Śābara do not seem to be particular in identifying svarga with another world. They use the expression prīti i.e. delight, to convey the meaning of the word svarga. This is its primary meaning. But secondarily it is also used in the sense of the means of delight. For instance, the expressions 'candanam svargaḥ' i.e. the sandal wood paste is heaven. Kauśeyāni svargaḥ the silka

garment is heaven and so on. However, Śabara cautions that these are not always delightful nor these are delightful to all. Therefore, the word svarga should be taken in the sense of the delight that is not mixed with even an iyota of sorrow. Since, such a delight is not available here, if people envisage a world on the basis of a reference in Purāṇa and the statements of Siddhapuruṣas such a place also has to be taken as a means of delight. Even the kāmya sacrifices are undertaken, because, the results obtained from them provide the delight.

In viśvajit adhikaraṇa a more fundamental question is raised. Where is the need to conceive such a result such as svarga ? Why not say that the sacrifices, at least such sacrifices for which no result is stated have no result at all and need not be performed. Once, this argument is conceded, then, this argument could be extended to other sacrifices also the result of which is not empirically realised and do not lead to any observable result. The only answer to this objection is that these are enjoined by vedic injunctions. Since, the vedic injunctions have enjoined these, we must envisage appropriate result for these, wherever the result is not mentioned. Otherwise people will not undertake the performance of these sacrifices. The result svarga whether stated or not has to be envisaged.

From this it is clear that the concept of svarga is introduced to induce the undertaking of sacrifice.

The concept of a sacrifice has a larger dimension. It is not meant for the welfare of the individual performer only. It is meant for the welfare of the whole mankind, the whole living being, the whole Nature. In view of this one will derive immense delight by successfully performing this programme. It is belived that it will manifest the transempirical power apūrva and lead to the welfare of all.

The concept of svarga has psychological, ethical and spiritual dimensions. It is a complex concept. Such complex concepts when put into concrete situations take a concrete form in the context of a particular cultural tradition. In the context of Indian cultural tradition it has aquired the form of another world i.e. heaven. However, Jaimini and Śabara have not given much importance to this concrete form. This is clear from their remarks in svargakāmādhikaraṇa.

The concept of rebirth, and prārabdhakarma also have played their role in clarifying the situation of the result not following immediately after the kāmya sacrifice. Prārabdhakarma is supposed to have prevented the presence of the result immediately

and rebirth has provided the scope for its occurrence in the next birth. The concept of apūrva has provided a link. Sacrificial act is quite distinct from prārabdhakarma. It does not lead to any chain of Karma.

It is interesting to note that Śabara remarks that since the svarga in the sense of other world is not observable it has to be envisaged by arthāpatti. Since, the delight unmixed with sorrow is stated to be the result of the sacrifice, and since, such delight cannot be realised in this world, the other world i.e. svarga has to be envisaged. However, even then, it will only be a means of svarga but not svarga in its primary sense viz delight. It should be noted that the two important concepts of Pūrvamīmāṃsa viz. apūrva and svarga are conveyed by Arthāpatti.



5. Key-note Address at the Summer Institute on Pūrvamīmāṃsā

Firstly, it is most ancient among six systems. The expressions *mīmāṃsā*, *mīmāṃsante* occur in *Taittirīya samhitā*, *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*, *Upaniṣads* and such other early literature. Jaimini wrote his *Sūtras* in about 300 B.C. He mentions early *Mīmāṃsakas* such as *Ātreya*, *Bādari*, *Aitiśāyana* and *Kāmukāyana*. By the time of Jaimini, *Mīmāṃsā* was a well developed branch of learning.

Pūrvamīmāṃsā has three important aspects :

i) Firstly, it is a *Vākyaśāstra* or science of interpretation. While *Vyākaraṇa* deals with the structure of the language such as etymology, syntax etc. *mīmāṃsā* deals with the psychology of the language. It concerns itself with the intentions and implications of the language. While *vyākaraṇa* deals with the words and sentences in isolation, *mīmāṃsā* deals with them in a functional context. That is why it is known as *वाक्यशास्त्र*. This aspect of *mīmāṃsā* has been fully utilised in law, literature and philosophy in ancient India.

ii) Secondly *mīmāṃsā* deals with the rituals and sacrifices. It is *Karmamīmāṃsā*. It fixes the purpose, procedure, eligibility and full programme of rituals and sacrifices. Here again it is not merely a

mechanical process but an ethical and religious process. While kalpasūtra viz. Śrauta, Gṛhya and Dharmasūtras deals with the structure of rituals, sacrifices and social and ethical duties, the mīmāṃsā deals with the psychology and philosophy of these rituals and code of conduct. Mīmāṃsā holds the view that just as the laws of Nature are self-governing, the laws of conduct are also self-governing. Your Karma is your God. Pūrvamīmāṃsā is unique in that it makes the call of duty an inherent element in the nature of man and in the nature of universe. While discussing the philosophy of duty the instances are drawn from the rituals and sacrifices that were in vogue in ancient India. Therefore modern mind may think that it is a useless exercise to study this aspect of Mīmāṃsā. But, we will be losing a wealth of fundamental thought on the philosophy of duty by neglecting Pūrvamīmāṃsā. Scholars know how deep Pūrvamīmāṃsā has gone into the philosophy of duty, long before Kant thought of his categorical imperative.

iii) In addition to being vākyaśāstra, Karmamīmāṃsā, the Pūrvamīmāṃsā is a Darśana.

The problems of epistemology, and theory of knowledge etc. are thoroughly discussed in Pūrvamīmāṃsā. Kumāriḷa the greatest exponent

Pūrvamīmāṃsā had to fight a double battle; with Buddhists on the one hand and the Vedāntins on the other. By denying the Ātman or self the Buddhists wanted to sacrifice the sacrificer and by rejecting Karma treating it as opposed to knowledge, the Vedāntins wanted to sacrifice the sacrifice itself.

Kumāriḷa Bhatta had to save both Ātman and Karma, sacrificer, and sacrifice. He did by building a strong system of Mīmāṃsā Darśana.

It is proposed to deal with the aspects of Mīmāṃsā, viz. i) Mīmāṃsā and language ii) Mīmāṃsā and ethics, and iii) Mīmāṃsā and epistemology in the course of this three weeks summer institute.

I am happy to inform our chief guests that 40 participant scholars from Kashmir to Kerala has assembled here. We have Dr. Kausalya Valli from Kashmir and Dr. Karunakaran from Kerala. Participant scholars from Allahabad, Lucknow, Jabalpur, Nagapur, Poona, Osmania, Tirupathi, Karnatak and Mysore Universities are present here. Participants from Darbhanga, Calcutta, Punjab and Baroda Universities on their way. Originally we proposed to have only twenty. UGC suggested to raise it to fifty. Thinking that we may not get so many scholars interested in this branch of learning, we restricted it to forty now, to my surprise.

I have not only full quota of scholars but very senior and eminent scholars have come. Eminent scholars like Dr. Guha, Dr. Kali Prasad Simha have agreed to come (and they are on their way).

On the staff side, I am lucky to have a few eminent traditional and modern scholars. Sri Ramadhandra Shrauti of Gokarna who has conducted several sacrifices and had recently organised a Garuda Chayana sacrifice has agreed to give us a full description of a Prakṛti Yāga and Broad outline of the seven major yāgas. This is something marking the field before we start the play of cricket or hokey. Unless the layout of a Prakṛti Yāga is known, no discussion of Mīmāṃsā can be followed. Then, Pandita Martanda Shastry of Dharwad, an eminent Mīmāṃsā scholar, will give us a complete gist of twenty-seven hundred Pūrvamīmāṃsa sūtras arranged into a thousand topics. This is a programme that will be held all through the course.

Eminent scholars like E.S. Varadachar of Mysore, Ramanuja Tatachar of Tirupati, Sri Bala Subrahmanya Shastri of Madras have agreed to handle different Mīmāṃsā problems.

Some Modern scholars viz., Dr. K. Kunjanni Raja, Madras University, Dr. E.R.K. Sharma of Tirupati

Venkateshwara University, Dr. S.D. Joshi of Poon and Dr. Bhide will give us critical exposition of these Pūrvamīmāṃsā topics, More than we propose to concentrate on the discussions by the participants. In the course of summer Institute like Lord Kṛṣṇa who revealed his vast Viśvarūpa through his small mouth to Yaśodā we are trying to reveal this vast Mīmāṃsā śāstra Brahmāṇḍa through the small medium of a three week course. However, I am quite confident of success with the blessings of his holiness Sri Swamiji of Pejawara Mutt a great devotee of Lord Kṛṣṇa at Udupi. Precisely for this reason that I requested him to grace this occasion and bless us.

In Sri Pejawara Swamiji we have a unique personality. He is a golden combination of our ancient values and modern approach. Something becomes ancient only when it loses its relevance to the modern times. Sri Pejawara Swamiji continuously and ably interprets our ancient values in such a way that they are relevant to modern times. The values are ancient but their application can be modern to put it in Pūrvamīmāṃsā language, their Utapatti may be ancient, but their Viniyoga can be modern. Sri Swamiji is not interested in teaching God to a man who is already locked in the temple, but he teaches God to a man

is in the factory, in the field, in the office and that is to one who is surrounded by matter and thus very much needs God. By God Swāmiji means Godly conduct. He is an embodiment of ancient values and modern application, he is a treasure of ancient wisdom and modern approach. I respectfully welcome him.

I have already informed you that we got the sanction from U.G.C. for this institute through the good-offices of Dr. Satchidananda Murthy, Vice-Chancellor of Venkateswara University, our Chief Guest this evening. He was Professor of Philosophy at Andhra University for a long time. I knew him through two of my close friends i.e. late Prof. Nikam of Mysore University and Prof. K.J. Shah of Karnatak University. More than this I knew him through his learned edition of Śaḍ-darśana samuccaya. We are fortunate to have such learned scholar to inaugurate our summer Institute. I offer a warm welcome to him.

Our beloved Vice-Chancellor Sri T.R. Jayaraman is a true representative of a Karmayogin of Bhagavadgīta. The motto of the University where I studied viz. Annamalai University was 'with courage and faith.' I do not know whether Sri Jayaraman was also a student of Annamalai University or not, but his motto is with courage and faith? welcoming

him I welcome these two virtues that are very essential for us to preserve our Śāstras and Sanskrit literature. Like Pūrvamīmāṃsā being challenged by Buddhism and Vedānta in historical times, we Sanskritists are challenged by the Scientists and Social Scientists today. We have to take these challenges academically and re-assert the ancient values that are fundamental.

Finally, it is my pleasure to welcome all the participants representing nearly twenty University scholars who have come to lecture and guide discussions and you all.

Thanking you.

(Key-note address delivered by Prof. K.T. Pandurangi at the Summer Institute organised by Dvaita Vedanta Studies and Research Foundation, Bangalore)



6. The epistemology of Pūrvamīmāṃsā

I

The field of epistemology is very wide and complicated. It is full of controversial issues. However, we will touch only such aspects of epistemology on which Mīmāṃsā has something special to say. Mīmāṃsā is specially interested in śabdapramāṇa. It discusses other pramāṇas only to show that these are not of any help to comprehend Dharma-- the main theme of Pūrvamīmāṃsā. For upholding śabdapramāṇa, i.e. Vedas, mīmāṃsā has developed the concept of svataḥ-pramāṇya i.e. intrinsic nature of the validity of cognition. When cognition is produced by appropriate means it is produced as valid only. No additional means are required to make it valid-- jñānasāmagrīmātrādeva pramotpattiḥ (ज्ञानसामग्रीमात्रादेव प्रमोत्पत्तिः). When cognition is comprehended by appropriate means its validity also is comprehended. Pramātvajñaptirapi jñānajñāpaka sāmagritah eva jāyate (प्रमात्वज्ञप्तिरपि ज्ञानज्ञापकसामग्रीतः एव जायते). Both in utpatti i.e. origination, and jñapti i.e. comprehension of the validity of cognition does not require any additional means than the appropriate means to produce and comprehend the cognition. This concept of svataḥ pramāṇya is a unique contribution of Pūrvamīmāṃsā to Indian epistemology. The concept of Arthāpatti

and Anupalabdhi as two more pramāṇas is also a contribution of Pūrvamīmāṃsā to Indian epistemology. Arthāpatti is utilised to prove the concept of apūrva which is very vital to Pūrvamīmāṃsā. Anupalabdhi is utilised to prevent the rejection of the entities that are beyond sense perception on the ground that these are not perceived. Only such objects that are capable of being perceived but not perceived in the appropriate situations could be denied on the ground that these are not perceived. The ethical entities like dharma, adharma etc cannot be denied on the ground that these are not comprehended by senses. The anupalabdhipramāṇa restricts the scope of the denial of only such entities that are comprehended by the senses. The epistemic purpose and the logical tenebility of these two pramāṇas will be discussed later.

The perspective and the areas of epistemology

A presentation on epistemology has to cover the following areas : The nature of cognition, the forms of cognition, the means of cognition and the result of the cognition. (jñānasvarūpa, jñānaprakāra, jñānasādhana, jñānaphala i.e. pravṛtti).

In the context of Indian epistemology there is another important item viz. bhrama i.e. error. In Western epistemology the expression cognition

stands for valid cognition only. But in Indian epistemology the expression jñāna which is taken as equivalent to cognition covers both pramā i.e. valid cognition, and bhrama i.e. false cognition. In the Prābhākara system only all cognitions are analysed as pramā and bhrama situations are explained away as vyavahāra only. In Buddhist epistemology the savikalpaka cognition is considered as bhrama. In Advaita vedānta the cognition at vyāvahārika and pratibhāsika level i.e. empirical level, is considered as bhrama. In view of this, the concept of bhrama i.e. error, and different theories of bhrama have become a part of Indian epistemology.

The epistemology, though a discipline by itself, has intimate connection with metaphysics and ontology on the one hand and it has to satisfy the logical consistency on the other. Each school of Indian philosophy formulates its epistemology keeping its metaphysics and ontology in mind. It is stated that 'mānādhinā meya siddhiḥ' (मानाधीना मेयसिद्धिः) i.e. the establishment of an entity depends upon the pramāṇas. However, it also happens that the pramāṇas are formulated to suit the doctrines already envisaged i.e. meyādhina manasiddhiḥ (मेयाधीना मानसिद्धिः). Such adjustments between the metaphysical and ontological doctrines and epistemological formulations are not necessarily

laboured attempts. These are made to maintain consistency and build a logical base to the doctrines conforming to the epistemic and logical norms to the best possible extent. In view of this the presentation of the epistemology of a school of philosophy has to keep in mind i) The metaphysical and ontological doctrines of that school (ii) The epistemic norms and the adjustments made in the epistemology of the school concerned (iii) The extent to which logical norms are satisfied or compromised.

Another important point is the reference made to experience i.e., *pratīti* or *anubhava*, while explaining the epistemological process. In Indian philosophical tradition psychology is not developed as a separate discipline. However, psychological factors are frequently taken into account in explaining the epistemological process, ethical doctrines, and religious practices like meditation. While explaining the epistemological process, sometime, experience i.e. *pratīti* is referred to as final authority and surer ground. It is stated that just as *prayoga* i.e. common usage, is the final authority for grammarians, the *pratīti* i.e. experience is the final authority for the philosophers : 'Prayoga śaraṇāḥ vaiyākaraṇāḥ' (प्रयोगशरणाः वैयाकरणाः) 'Pratīti śaraṇāḥ darśanikāḥ' (प्रतीतिशरणाः दार्शनिकाः). Therefore,

reference to experience is also taken into account in the presentation of epistemology.

There are broadly three approaches to metaphysics viz. (i) Idealism of Buddhists, (ii) Realism of Jaina, Sāṃkhya, Nyāya-vaiśeṣa, Pūrvamīmāṃsā, Dvaita and Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta, (iii) The Advaita approach cannot be classified strictly either as Idealism or as Realism. In fact grouping of Indian systems of philosophy in terms of western philosophical classification itself is not quite appropriate. However, to give a broad idea of the approaches of these systems this grouping is suggested. If these metaphysical approaches are kept in mind, it becomes easy to comprehend the basis of their epistemological formulations. With this background the major epistemological concepts, issues and procedures will be discussed with special reference to Pūrvamīmāṃsā.



7. Apauruṣeyatva of Veda and Svatastva of Prāmāṇya

In the very second sūtra of Jaimini it is stated that codanā i.e., Vedic Injunction conveys dharma. Pratyakṣa etc. other Pramāṇās are not able to convey dharma. On this Śābara raises a small objection by way of pūrvapakṣa that the vedic injunction is of the nature of words. There is no guarantee that the words always provide valid knowledge. For instance the statement : 'There are fruits on the bank of the river.' It may be true or may not be true. Raising this objection Śābara points out that it may be so in the case of the statement of ordinary people. If the speaker is reliable and if he has the correct knowledge, his statement would be true. Otherwise it is not true. However, vedic statements are not made by any person. These are apauruṣeya.

To sustain the apauruṣeyatva, the nature of Vedic statements. Mīmāṃsa develops two important concepts viz. Apauruṣeyatva of Veda and Pramāṇya svatstva.

i) The relation between the word and the meaning is natural. It is not made by any human agency. When a word arises its meaning also arises. However the meaning is comprehended through

elders conversation generations generation after generation. Each generation inherits it from the previous generation. It is not fixed by any particular generation. No human involved in working out the being is relation between the word and the meaning.

ii) Varnas, i.e. the syllables of a word are eternal: these are manifested. A group of syllables forms a word. When the syllables of this group are manifested one after the other, these leave a samskara -- the impression on the mind. The last syllable in co-operation with the impressions of the previous syllables, forms a word. Hence here also, there is no intervention of human agency. The śabda is eternal. It is manifested by the efforts of the vocal organs.

iii) The sentence is also not formulated by human Agency. In a sentence, the words are employed to convey the meaning as connected with an action. These are not arranged by any human agency. Hence at this level also the vedic statement is impersonal. Since Vedic statements are impersonal, there is no question of these being not true. Veda consists of such impersonal statements. Therefore, it is apauruṣeya. The names such as Kāṭaka and Kalāpaka are given to vedic śākhās or the names of the teachers of these śākhās. These persons are not the author.

The knowledge provided by Vedas is intrincically valid. Infact all cognitions that are generated by the appropriate means are intrincically valid. It is only, some or the other drawback that makes this invalid. To gererate the valid cognition, apart from its bonafide means, no additional means are necessary. Validity of a valid cognition, is generated by the same means by which the cognition is generated. This validity is also comprehended by the same means by which the cognition is comprehended. Thus the validity of a cognition is intrinsic both at the level of generation and the level of comprehension.

However invalidity of cognition is due to some or other drawback such as the defective eye-sight, inattentiveness of the mind, the distance etc. Hence invalidity of the cognition is not intrinsic at the level of generation.

As a result of the invalidity of the cognition, it fails to lead to the required results. Then the observer tries to verify it and traces the drawback. Hence comprehension of the invalidity is also not intrinsic.

The concepts of the Vedāpauruṣeyatva and pramāṇya svatastva are two distinct contributions of Pūrvamīmāṃsa to Indian epistemology.



8. Pūrvamīmāṃsā technique of programme organisation

Pūrvamīmāṃsā has evolved a systematic method of programme organisation. Though it is developed for the organisation of sacrificial programme, it can be applied to any other programme organisation. The rules laid down here are a kind of meta-rules designated in Sanskrit as paribhāṣā. Pūrvamīmāṃsā has also developed a method of debate on philosophical issues and on programme organisation models.

In Indian philosophy two distinct methods of philosophical debates are developed.

i) Pañcāvayava - Five stepped argumentation method developed by Nyāya school.

ii) Adhikaraṇa - method developed by mīmāṃsā and Vedānta.

1. The Pañcāvayava method arranges the arguments in five steps viz. (i) pratijñā - the statement of the proposition (ii) hetu - the reason (iii) Udāharaṇa - example (iv) upanaya - the application of the reason to the present case. (v) nigamana - the conclusion.

The adhikaraṇa method is also arranged in five stages, viz. (i) viśaya - the subject under discussion

(ii) Samśaya - the doubt or the two sides of the issue (iii) Pūrvapakṣa - the prima-facie position of the issue. (iv) siddhānta The final position (v) prayojana - the purpose served by the siddhānta.

Pūrvamīmāṃsā follows the adhikaraṇa method of presentation. Within pūrvapakṣa and siddhānta there will be ākṣepa - some tentative objections and samādhāna - a clearing of this tentative objections.

In Jaimini sūtra it is not clear which sūtra is pūrvapakṣa sūtra and which sūtra is siddhānta sūtra. These are not arranged in pūrvapakṣa-siddhānta order. In Śābara bhāṣya the position is made a little more clear. However even here it is not very clear where the ākṣepa ends and where its clarification begins. Kumārila's Tantravārtikā is more a Vāda-grantha than a Vyākhyāna grantha. It is a large work. It is only Śāstradīpikā that gives a clear picture of pūrvapakṣa and siddhānta. Even here the wordings of every sūtra are not explained. There is no work that gives word-by-word meanings of all the sūtras of Jaimini. However, the themes of all the adhikaraṇas are presented well, in works like Śāstradīpikā in detail and in Jaiminīya nyāyamālā vistara briefly. Bhāṭṭa Saṅgraha of Śrī Rāghavendra tīrtha is neither as large as Śāstradīpikā nor as brief as Nyāyamālā-vistāra. The pūrvapakṣa and siddhānta are presented in a compact way. A

special feature of this work is the word-by-word interpretation of Viśaya-vākyas of each adhikaraṇa is given. The word by word interpretation of pūrvapakṣa sūtra and siddhānta sūtra is also given. The meaning of the technical terms of pūrvamīmāṃsa is also given. Wherever Bhāṣya and Vārtika differ, the views of Bhāṣya and Vārtika are separately given under the title Bhāṣyakāraṇaka and Vārtikakāra Varṇaka.

Bhāṭṭadīpika of Khaṇḍadeva differs from Śāstradīpika in many places. He interprets the Vārtika statements also differently. Bhāṭṭarahasya of Khaṇḍadeva is a scholarly exposition of Pūrvamīmāṃsā hermeneutics. All these works have richly contributed to the development of the pūrvamīmāṃsa technique of programme organisation.

In connection with the organisation of a sacrifice, three questions are raised. Kim bhāvayet, what is to be achieved, kena bhāvayet - by what means it is to be achieved and katham bhāvayet - what are the others aids i.e. auxiliaries to it? In respect of darśapūrnamāsa these questions are answered as Svarga is to be achieved by means of darśapūrnamāsa yāga with the performance of the auxiliaries prayāja etc. Infact for the organisation of any other programme, these questions and the identifying the answers to these questions is essential.

For Vedic sacrifice the answers to these questions are provided by three types of vedic injunctions, viz.

1) Utpatti Vidhi - the injunction that enjoins the sacrifice or its auxiliaries.

2) Viniyoga vidhi - the injunction that enjoins the association with the main sacrifice of auxiliaries.

3) Adhikāra Vidhi - the injunction that states the result.

The organising of the sacrificial programme as per these injunctions is designated as prayoga vidhi.

A large number of sacrifices and rituals and their auxiliaries are stated in Brāhmaṇa literature. These are codified in Śrauta-Sūtras. However, the rationale behind the arrangement of these is not stated in these works. This is worked out by Jaimini in pūrvamīmāṃsa sūtras.

So far as the main sacrifices are concerned these could be identified without any difficulty by their very names and the injunctive statements in respect of them. However, it is difficult to distinguish between main and sub-ordinate rituals. For this purpose six criteria Śabdāntara, abhyāsa etc. are laid down. Similarly to work out the relation between the principal and auxiliaries also śruti, liṅga

etc six criteria are worked out. Whenever there is conflict between two criteria the ground for preferring one of them is discussed in respect of each of these criteria. Normally among these six criteria the earlier has a preference over the later. However, in a few places, exceptions are made on valid grounds. In connection with the arrangement of the sequence of various items of the sacrifice also, six criteria are laid down. The items are also identified in two ways viz. Kṛtvārtha - the items meant for achieving the sacrifice. Puruṣārtha - the items meant for the benefit of the person - i.e. the sacrificer.

The sacrifices are grouped as Prakṛti and Vikṛti. The sacrifices that are self-sufficient in all respects are called prakṛti and sacrifices that need the borrowing of certain auxiliaries from the prakṛti sacrifices are designated as Vikṛti.

In this respect two interesting procedural concepts are developed viz. Ūha and Bādha.

Ūhā means substitution. In the hymn employed at Prakṛti the deity Agni is addressed. When this hymn is adopted in Vikṛti yāga, the deity addressed has to be Sūrya. Therefore the name Agni is substituted by Sūrya.

Bādha is exclusion. For instance in the Prakṛti

yāga, cutting of Kuśa grass is prescribed. But in Vikṛti yāga it is stated that the kuśa grass that have fallen by themselves have to be used. Therefore the auxiliary cutting is excluded. Another example for this is, in Kāmyeṣṭi Kāṇḍa in Prakṛti yāga caru is to be prepared by rice. For this purpose, pounding of paddy is prescribed. While in Vikṛti yāga offering of gold pieces are prescribed. Pounding the gold pieces is not feasible. Therefore the auxiliary, i.e., pounding is excluded.

In the course of performing the sacrifice, economy of the effort also is kept in mind. For this purpose two interesting concepts, namely, Tantra and prasanga are developed. The nature of tantra is explained as Sakṛt kṛtam bahūnām upakāri (सकृत् कृतं बहूनां उपकारि). One item performed helping many. For instance at daṣapūrṇamāsa there are two sets of three pradhāna yāgas at darśa and pūrṇamāsa respectively. For these, prayāja etc. a number of auxiliaries are prescribed. These need not be performed for each pradhāna yāga separately.

The performance of these at the first pradhāna yāga serves the purpose of all. This is the technique of tantra.

The process of auxiliaries performed for one serving the other is prasanga like a lamp put to light the building also serving to light the road.

Another example of this process, the sweets prepared for the son-in-law also served to the guest.

From the above guidelines for the organising of the sacrificial programme, it is clear that the very process of organisation is worked out systematically. These guidelines could be applied for all secular programme organisation also.



9. Contribution of Pūrvamīmāṃsā to Indian epistemology and semantics

In addition to *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna*, *śabdapramāṇa* and *upamāna*, *mīmāṃsa* has envisaged a fifth *pramāṇa* i.e., *Arthāpatti*. This *pramāṇa* is utilized to establish the category of *Śakti* in general and *apūrva* in particular. This *Apūrva* is envisaged by *Śrutārthāpattipramāṇa*. By the injunction *darśapūrṇa māsābhyām svarga kāmo yajeta* (दर्शपूर्णमासाभ्यां स्वर्गकामो यजेत) the *yāga* is enjoined as *Karaṇa* and *Svarga* is enjoined as the result. However, as soon as the *yāga* is completed the result *svarga* does not arise.

A cause is required to immediately precede the effect. However, in the case of *yāga* and *svarga*, this is not found. Whenever there is a conflict between the two facts provided by *pramāṇas*, it has to be resolved by envisaging a third fact. In the present instance, *yāga* and *svarga* are stated by *śruti* as the cause and effect. To justify this an intermediate namely, *Apūrva* is envisaged. Since both performance of *yāga* and the result *svarga* are stated by *śruti* envisaging *apūrva* as an intermediary is an instance of *śrutārthāpatti*. This process is designated as *Arthāpatti*. This *pramāṇa* is accepted both by *Bhāṭṭas* and *Prābhākaras*.

The *Bhāṭṭas* envisage one more *pramāṇa* viz. *Anupalabdhi* - the absence of cognition. By this

pramāṇa the absence of the objects is cognised. When an object cognisable by *pratyakṣa* etc. *pramāṇas*, is not cognised even when these *pramāṇas* are appropriately applied, the absence of that object is cognised by *Anupalabdhi* - the absence of cognition. It is interesting to note that the absence of the cognition is a means for the cognition of the absence of the object. Here both the cause and the effect are of negative nature. This *pramāṇa* is intended to prevent the denial of *dharma*, *adharma* etc. ethical entities, that are not cognisable by *pratyakṣa* etc. Only such objects that are cognisable by *pratyakṣa* etc can be denied when they are not cognised by *pratyakṣa* etc *pramāṇas*.

Dharma *adharma* etc are beyond these *pramāṇas*. Hence these cannot be denied on the ground that these are not cognisable by *pratyakṣa* etc.

Anupalabdhi *pramāṇa* is not acceptable to *Prābhākaras*, since they do not accept the very category of *Abhāva*.

Another interesting point made by the *Bhāṭṭas* in the context of epistemology is that the cognition is an activity of the knower's self and it is inferred by the revelation of the object. Every object has a capacity to be revealed. This capacity is activated by the cognition. From this it can be inferred that

the cognition of that object has taken place. The capacity mentioned above is designated as Prākāṭya.

Prābhākaraś consider the cognition as Svapraakāśa - self revealing. Every cognition consists of three elements viz. the knower, the known and the knowledge. This concept is designated as Tripuṭīkaraṇa. The concept of Prākāṭya and Tripuṭīkaraṇa are formulated to meet the objections of the Buddhists that there are no objects outside the cognition. When we say that this is blue, there is no blue object outside this cognition. We have no way out to reach the object without the cognition. This gives scope to deny the object. The presence of the object depends upon the presence of the cognition. However, according to Prākāṭya theory of the Bhāṭṭas, it is the presence of the object that enables us to infer the presence of its cognition. Hence the presence of the object is not dependent on the presence of the cognition. It is the other way round. Hence there are the objects outside the cognition.

According to the theory of tripuṭīkaraṇa every cognition has three elements viz. the knower, known and the knowledge. Without the object, no cognition can arise. Neither cognition depends on the object nor the object depends on cognition. So there is no scope for the denial of the outside objects.

Prābhākara's theory of Akhyāti is another

important contribution of Pūrvamīmāṃsā to the Indian epistemology.

The semantics, considering the language, autonomous at word and meaning level and sentence level is an important contribution of pūrvamīmāṃsa. This is envisaged to sustain, the concept of Apauruṣeyatva of veda. There are a few other linguistic concepts that constitute the contribution of Pūrvamīmāṃsā. These are the concept of (i) Lakṣaṇā vṛtti (ii) Ākāṅkṣ - as a requirement for the semantic organisation of a sentence. (iii) The admissibility of foreign words and meaning in certain circumstances.

Besides these linguistic concepts a number of other linguistically important points such as 'under what circumstances the attribute of the subject be taken into account, the gender or the number to be taken into account etc. are discussed. The two theories of sentence meaning viz. Abhihitānvayavāda and Anvitābhīdhānavāda are the most important contributions of pūrvamīmāṃsa to the linguistics. All other systems of Indian philosophy have adopted one of these two theories with some modifications.

The import of the injunctive suffix is discussed in detail. The concepts of Bhāvanā and kārya are developed by the Bhāṭṭas and the Prābhākaras respectively.



10. Maxims of Pūrvamīmāṃsā

In Pūrvamīmāṃsā more than a hundred maxims are developed crystallising the guidelines for the interpretation. We notice only a few of them.

(i) Sāmānya-viśeṣanyāya : As per this maxim a general statement is restricted to a particular. The injunction Agnīṣomīam paśum ālabheta (अग्नीषोमीयं पशुमालभेत) mentions the animal in a general way. This gives an impression any animal can be offered at this sacrifice. However, in the hymn stated in this connection chāga goat is mentioned. Therefore, it is concluded that only chāga, a goat is to be offered at the sacrifice.

(ii) Utsargāpavāda nyāya : The maxim of the general statement and the exception to it. Eg. māhimṣyāt sarvabhūtāni (मा हिंस्यात् सर्वाभूतानि). No living being be killed is a statement generally applicable to all living beings. For this statement an exception is made by the statement Agni Ṣomīyam paśum ālabheta (अग्नीषोमीयं पशुमालभेत).

An animal be offered at the Agnī Ṣomīya sacrifice. Under this exception an animal is killed at the sacrifice. The difference between Sāmānya Viśeṣa maxim and Utsargāpavāda maxim is that, under the first a particular is observed, under the second a particular is excluded.

(iii) **Śruti prābalyādhikaraṇanyāya** : As per this maxim wherever there is a conflict between Smṛti and Śruti, the Śruti statement be preferred to Smṛti statement. Example : the Śruti states Audumbarīm sprṣtvā udgāyet (औदुम्बरीं स्पृष्ट्वा उद्गायेत्). The hymn be recited touching the audumbarī pole. On the other hand smṛti states 'audumbarī sarvā veṣṭayitavyā - the entire audumbari pole should be covered by the cloth. Here there is a conflict between the śruti statement and the smṛti statement. If the whole pole is covered then it cannot be touched. Therefore, smṛti is to be set aside and śruti statement should be followed.

To give a modern example, Śruti statement is like the constitution and the smṛti statements are like the laws made. Whenever there is contradiction between the constitution and law, the law has to be declared as ultra vires. Moreover the statement that the entire pole be covered smacks of the greed on the part of the priests. This is a mala fide intention. For this reason also, the smṛti statement has to be set aside. In the modern example also if the law smacks of any mala fide intention, then it has to be declared ultra-vires.

iv) **Bāhulyanyāya** : As per this maxim, in a group of rituals, if many auxiliaries are prescribed, for many rituals in that group and only one or two

auxiliaries are prescribed to the remaining the auxiliaries prescribed to majority of them be applied to others also. Example : In the Kāmyeṣṭi kāṇḍa the offering of curds, honey, ghee, water to prajāpati is prescribed. Among these curds, only is prescribed on amāvāsyā and honey, curds ghee and water are prescribed on pūrṇamāsī. Here the question is raised whether the amāvāsyā hymns are to be recited or pūrṇamāsī hymns are to be recited. It is concluded that, as there are many items at pūrṇamāsī, pūrṇamāsī hymns have to be recited.

v) **Upakrāmādhikaraṇanyāya** : As per this maxim when there is a conflict between what is stated at the commencement and what is stated in the end, the statement at the commencement may be preferred, and the statement at the end has to be reconciled with appropriate interpretation.

vi) **Yogādrūḍhir baliyāsī nyāya** : As per this maxim, the meaning of a word by usage, be preferred to that of etymological meaning. Example : A special sacrifice is prescribed for a Rathakāra. Here the question whether the word Rathakāra be taken in the sense of a person of Rathakāra caste, which is its meaning by usage or the etymological sense, one who prepares a chariot. It is concluded that the person of Rathakāra caste be taken as the sense of this word by usage.



11. Utilisation of Pūrvamīmāṃsā nyāyas in Vedānta

In the three schools of Vedānta, the pūrvamīmāṃsānyāyas are frequently used for the purpose of interpreting Śrutis and supporting the respective doctrines. The Advaita claims the Mithyātva of the world on the basis of certain Śruti passages. The Viśiṣṭādvaita and the Dvaita oppose this and affirm this on the basis of Pratyakṣa. Here there is a conflict between Śruti and Pratyakṣa. The Pūrvamīmāṃsa maxims are utilized to resolve it and to support their respective contention.

Similarly, there is a conflict between Saguna Śrutis and Nirguṇa Śrutis. Advaita prefers Nirguṇa Śrutis and explains away the Saguna Śrutis. On the other hand, Viśiṣṭādvaita and Dvaita prefer Saguna Śrutis and explain away Nirguṇa Śrutis. In support of their respective interpretations and doctrines, Pūrvamīmāṃsā maxims are utilized.

In Dharmaśāstra Pūrvamīmāṃsānyāyas are utilized to explain the religious programmes. In Manusmṛti and Yāgñavalkya Smṛti, there are two important sections viz. Vyavahāra Kāṇḍa - i.e. Jurisprudence, Rājanītikāṇḍa - i.e. the constitutional duties of a king.

A sound judicial system is developed in Vyavahārakāṇḍa section. Property rights, inheritance of property, debts and clearance of debts, the remuneration to be paid to laborers in different fields, the code of conduct for persons of different vocations are discussed in detail. In Kautilyas artha śāstra also these topics are discussed under the section Dharmasthānīya.

Utilization of Mīmāṃsā Nyāya in Vedānta

The expression Mīmāṃsā is used in the sense of Vedārtha vichāra, i.e. investigation into the import of Veda. Pūrvamīmāṃsā has undertaken such investigation in the area of organizing sacrifices and rituals while Vedānta has undertaken in the area of discovering the nature of Brahman. Therefore, these two schools of Indian philosophy are designated as Karmamīmāṃsā and Brahma Mīmāṃsā respectively.

In order to identify the details of the sacrificial programme accurately, the language of the Veda had to be correctly analysed and interpreted. It was a two-way effort : (i) The sacrificial programmes were to be organized coherently and purposefully. (ii) The Vedic language was to be interpreted to provide such an organized sacrificial programme. A kind of coordination between the language and activity was to be achieved. A set of common guidelines to interpret the Vedic language,

particularly, the language of the Brāhmaṇa portion of Veda and to organize the sacrificial programme, relating the subordinate items and main items, prescribing the responsibilities and duties of the sacrificer and priests, identifying the purpose served by different items, the nature and the role of the injunctions, and the final goal were to be formulated. This is carefully done in Pūrvamīmāṃsā. These guidelines are given in the form of rulings in different adhikaraṇas of Pūrvamīmāṃsā sūtras. These are designated as Pūrvamīmāṃsā nyāyas.

Vedānta also has to investigate into the import of the Vedic language in the area of Brahmanavidyā. It is also a two-way effort : (i) The nature of Brahman, the nature of Jīva, the nature of the world, the process of creation, various kinds of upāsanās, the the final goal that are described in the Veda, particularly, in the Upaniṣads have to be correctly understood. (ii) The Vedic language has to be interpreted to provide this knowledge consistently. Vedānta utilizes the Pūrvamīmāṃsā guidelines to interpret the Upaniṣadic texts.

An interesting development in Vedānta is that different schools of Vedānta utilize the Pūrvamīmāṃsānyāyas to interpret the same passages of the text and arrive at different conclusions.

Sometimes, one school takes one nyāya and the other school a different nyāya to interpret the same text. The applicability or inapplicability of certain nyāyas is also discussed. The very nature of the nyāya is differently explained. In a way, Vedānta further elucidates the Mīmāṃsā nyāyas. Therefore, a study of the utilization of Pūrvamīmāṃsā nyāya in Vedānta is quite rewarding. The utilization of Pūrvamīmāṃsā nyāya in Vedānta is made in following ways :

- (i) To support the interpretation of śruti text offered by the respective schools;
- (ii) To reject the interpretation of śruti text by other schools;
- (iii) To clarify the nature of the doctrines and concept of the respective schools.

Keeping these guidelines in mind, the utilization of Pūrvamīmāṃsā nyāya in Advaita, Viśiṣṭādvaita and Dvaita is briefly presented.

Vāchaspati Miśra, Vedānta Deśika and Vyāsātīrtha utilize the Pūrvamīmāṃsā nyāyas to interpret śruti texts and brahmasūtras in their commentaries, viz., Bhāmati, Śrutiprakāśikā and Tātparya Chandrikā in support of their respective schools. In some cases, they also utilize these to justify the formulation of the pūrvapakṣa and

siddhānta of adhikaraṇas. To settle the preference of Saguṇa śruti or Nirguṇa śruti a number of Pūrvamīmāṃsā nyāyas are quoted.

In Dvaita-Advaita polemics on the concept of mithyātva, the relative position of perception and śruti in comprehending reality, the relative position of abheda śruti and bheda śruti, the Mīmāṃsā nyāyas are profusely quoted in Nyāyāmṛta and Advaita siddhi. The commentaries on these two quote the full texts of the respective adhikaraṇa of Pūrvamīmāṃsā and work out their applicability or otherwise in detail. A study of this is a kind of inter-disciplinary study of Vedānta and Mīmāṃsā. As it is neither possible nor advisable to undertake an exhaustive study in the present context, a selective study is presented in the following articles.



12. Utilisation of Pūrvamīmāṃsa nyāya in Dvaita Vedānta

Utilisation of Pūrvamīmāṃsa nyāyas in Advaita and Viśiṣṭādvaita is explained by Dr. Veezhinathan and Prof. Devanathan respectively. These are included in the Mīmāṃsa volume of Project of History of Science, Philosophy and Culture - a project undertaken by Prof. D.P. Chattopadhyaya. The Utilisation of Pūrvamīmāṃsa nyāyas in Dvaita Vedānta is explained by Prof. K.T. Pandurangi and included in the same volume which is reproduced here.

1-1) In Dvaita Vedānta classics like Nyāyāmṛta and Tātparya chandrikā Pūrvamīmāṃsā nyāyas are utilised to develop two important doctrines.

i) Brahman is saguṇa. He is not nirguṇa. The saguṇa śrutis cannot be set aside by nirguṇa śrutis.

ii) The reality of the world is ascertained by perception. The śruti cannot set aside the reality of the world cognised by perception.

The following Pūrvamīmāṃsa (PM.) maxims are utilised to support these two doctrines.

i) Upakramaprābalyanyāya (asanjātavirodha nyāya).

- ii) Śrutiliṅganyāya (śīghragāmitvanyāya)
- iii) sāvakāśa-niravakāśa nyāya i.e. the maxim of that which has no other scope prevailing upon that which has other scope.
- iv) Bāhulya nyāya i.e. the maxim of that which supports many prevails over that which supports one or two only.
- v) Upajīvyanyāya i.e. The maxim of that which is the basis or source of something prevailing over that which is dependent on it.
- vi) Paśu-chaga nyāya (The maxim of a class word being taken in the sense of an individual of that class.)
- vii) Upāśunyāya
- viii) Yuktiyuktanyāya

It is not feasible to give full details of these nyāyas developed in Pūrvamīmāṃsā.

Therefore, the ruling given under each nyāya and its application in the Vedānta will be presented.

1-2 Upakrama prābalya nyāya i.e. The maxim of 'asañjātavirodha'

This nyāya is developed in upakramādhikāraṇa (Vedadharmatādhikāraṇa) of PMs. It is also stated in vāruṇeṣṭyadhikāraṇa.

Rgveda, Yajurveda etc entire texts of Veda are mentioned at the commencement i.e. at upakrama. At the close i.e. at upasamhāra, Ṛk, Yajus etc individual hymns are stated to be recited loudly, and slowly. Here, the question is raised whether the entire text of the respective Veda is to be taken for the purpose of such recitation or the individual hymns are to be taken. It is ruled that it applies to the entire text. The ground for this ruling is that when one reads the first statement, he comprehends it without any restriction or limitation. There is no opposition to this statement at that stage. The later statement restricting the scope to the individual hymns has to be reconciled with the earlier statement and the difference between the two has to be resolved. The underlying principle of this ruling is that there was no opposition when the earlier statement was comprehended (asanjāta virodha).

This nyāya is also illustrated by Vāruṇestyadhikaraṇa. In this adhikaraṇa, prajāpati who gave horses to Varuṇa is stated to have performed Vāruṇestī. This statement occurs at the commencement i.e. upakrama. However, later it is stated that vāruṇestī be performed by the receiver of the horses. This has resulted in a conflict between upakrama and upasamhāra. Since these two statements form a part of the same discourse,

there has to be agreement (ekavākyatā) between the two. Hence, it is suggested that the word pratigrhitā i.e. receiver occurring in upasamhāra passage be taken as pratigrāhayitā i.e. he who makes someone to receive, that is to say, the giver and be reconciled with the upakrama statement. In this way the upakrama is preferred to upasamhāra.

This maxim is utilised by Dvaita to support the preference of saguṇa śrutis to nirguṇa śrutis. Before one proceeds to comprehend the implication of nirguṇa śrutis, he has to comprehend the saguṇa śrutis. The denial of attributes is not possible unless these are known. Therefore, the attributes are to be comprehended earlier. When these are comprehended through the relevant śrutis, there was no presentation of the opposite position. It was asanjāta virodha position. Hence, by the so called nirguṇa śrutis later have to be reconciled with saguṇa śrutis. This can be managed by conceding that nirguṇa śrutis deny only heyaguṇas i.e. prejudicial attributes. The śrutis apahatapāpmā etc. bring out this fact.

1-3 Śrutiliṅgādhikaraṇa nyāya i.e.

Śighragāmitva nyāya (PMS III-3-14)

The śruti 'Aindryā gārhapatyam upatiṣṭhate' (ऐन्द्र्या गार्हपत्यं उपतिष्ठते) states that 'with the hymn of Indra, gārhapatya be attended.' Here, a question is

raised whether Indra be attended by this hymn or gārhapatya. The accusative case suffix expressly states that gārhapatya be attended. However, since the hymn mentions the name of Indra and thereby indicates that Indra be attended the direct expression is designated as śruti while indication is designated as liṅga. As soon as the import of the accusative suffix is comprehended it is comprehended that gārhapatya is the object to be attended here. In the case of Indra, he has to be inferred as the object to be attended on the ground that he is mentioned in the hymn. This is a slow process. Therefore, it is concluded that gārhapatya be attended by Aindri hymn. The instrumental case suffix in the word Aindryā also expressly states that the hymn is subsidiary to gārhapatya. So far as Indra is concerned he is revealed by the hymn, when it is recited. Here, gārhapatyopasthāna is expressly stated by accusative suffix is preferred to that of Indropasthāna indicated by liṅga. The underlying principle of this maxim is, that which proceeds to provide the required comprehension earlier be preferred to the other which is slow.

Dvaita utilises this maxim to support the fact that saṁgha śrutis be preferred to nirṅgha śrutis, since these are comprehended directly by śrutis earlier. Without the comprehension of the attributes to be

denied, the nirguṇa śrutis cannot play their role. Therefore the comprehension of nirguṇa śruti is slow like that of liṅga. Hence, saguṇa śrutis prevail over nirguṇa śrutis. The latter have to be suitably interpreted to reconcile them with the former.

1-4 Sāmānyaviśeṣanyāya i.e. the maxim of general and particular

This Nyāya is evolved in vartmahomādhikaraṇa (वर्त्महोमाधिकरण) of PM. (X-8-8) In the context of proceeding to purchase the Soma plant at the jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice, the statement 'pade juhoti' enjoins that an offering be made in the foot step of the calf to be given for purchasing Soma plant. However, there is a general injunction that all sacrificial offerings be made in āhavanīya. Therefore, the conflict between these two injunctions needs to be resolved. It is resolved by giving a ruling that the injunction relating to the particular prevails over that which is of a general nature. This ruling is applied to many other instances like 'vartmani juhoti' 'patnīsamayājan juhoti' etc. The particular is preferred to general on two ground.

i) The general injunction has to be ultimately applied to particulars only. Therefore, when there is a particular injunction in certain cases, the general injunction has to be applied to other particulars

only excluding such particular for which there is a special injunction.

ii) The particular injunction has no other scope i.e. it is niravakāśa while the general has scope in other cases for which there is no special provision.

This maxim is utilised in Dvaita Classics to support the preference of saguṇa śruti over nirguṇa śrutis. The saguṇa śrutis enjoin the particular attributes like sarvajñatva. Satyakāmatva, satyasamkalpatva etc. while nirguṇa śrutis deny the attributes in a general way. In view of these saguṇa śrutis, the total denial of all attributes by nirguṇa śruti is not desirable. This general injunction has to find its scope in denying the prākṛta attributes satva, rajas and tamas and also heyaguṇas. This procedure of preference of particular is found in the instances like 'purodāśam caturdhā karoti.' There is a general statement 'purodāśam caturdhā karoti' but also there is a special statement 'āgneyam caturdhā karoti.' This is an instance of the preference of particular.

1-5 Sāvakāśa-niravakāśa nyāya i.e. The maxim of the availability of scope and absence of scope

In the context of the recitation of hymns at dikṣaṇiyā ritual it is stated that 'yāvatyā vācā kāmāyīta tāvatyā dikṣaṇiyāyām anubruyāt' (यावत्या

वाचा कामयीत तावत्या दीक्षणीयायां अनुब्रूयात्) i.e. the hymns to be recited at dikṣaṇīya may be recited as one likes i.e. loudly or slowly. The dikṣaṇīyā is a preliminary ritual of jyotiṣtoma as a saṅskāra for the sacrificer.

In the context of jyotiṣtoma there is another statement that for the items before Agniṣomiya, the hymns be recited in a low voice i.e. yatkinsit prācinam agniṣomiyāt tena upāṃṣu caranti (यत्किञ्चित् प्राचीनं अग्नीषोमीयात् तेन उपांशु चरन्ति). Here is a conflict between the two statements. This is resolved by applying the maxim of sāvakāśa and niravakāśa. The expression sāvakāśa means that which has some other scope. A śruti statement cannot be totally rejected. Between the two conflicting śrutis, if one of them could be suitably interpreted to avoid the conflict, then, that śruti is sāvakāśa while the other śruti which cannot be explained in any other way, is niravakāśa. The latter has to be preferred and former be explained away. In the example given above the recitation of hymns in low voice, can be implemented in case of other preliminary item than dikṣaṇīya. Therefore, it is sāvakāśa while the option given as loudly or slowly is intended only for dikṣaṇīya. Therefore, it is niravakāśa.

Dvaita utilises this maxim to prefer the saṅguṇa śrutis and explain the nirguṇa śrutis differently. In

other words the *sagūṇa śrutis* are considered as *niravakāśa* and *nirguṇa śrutis* as *sāvakāśa*.

On behalf of *advaita* it is argued that the *tātparyaliṅgas viz. upakrama, upasamhāra* etc. support the preference of *nirguṇa śrutis*. However, *Dvaita* claims that the *upakrama* etc support the preference of *sagūṇa śrutis*. The application of these criteria is worked out in detail in *Dvaita* classics.

1-6 Bahubādhānyaya, i.e. The maxim of preference of that which serves many purposes than that which serves few

In the context of *kāmyeṣṭi* seven rites are prescribed. Two of these are *vikṛtis* of *amāvāsyā* and five are *vikṛtis* of *paurṇamāsyā*. The *ājyabhāga* has to be performed for all these together once only. For *amāvāsyā vṛdhanvati* hymns are prescribed. For *paurṇamāsi vārtṛghnī* hymns are prescribed. Since all five rites are to be performed together, one of the hymns has to be selected for all. Under the circumstances it is ruled that the hymns prescribed for *paurṇamāsi* be preferred and recited for all seven rites. The underlying principle of this maxim is that which serves the purpose of many is to be preferred. It is not proper to set aside many and favour the few.

Dvaita classics utilise this maxim to support the

preference of saṁgha śrutis which are in large number. These mention a large number of attributes while nirṁgha śrutis are few. The saṁgha śrutis provide the knowledge of attributes necessary for meditation, provide the knowledge of rituals, the knowledge of creation of the world etc. In this way, these provide a wide knowledge, while nirṁgha śrutis are negative. Hence, saṁgha śrutis have to be preferred to nirṁgha śrutis.

2-1 It is interesting to note that Dvaita utilises these very maxims to establish the superiority of perception in respect of the comprehension of the reality of world and to reject the concept of mithyātva i.e. projection of the world over Brahman. Since the nature of maxims is already explained above their application in respect of perception is briefly noticed here.

Upakramādhikaraṇanyāya, The reality of the world is comprehended by the perception 'saṁghataḥ' i.e. the jar exists. Though this comprehension relates to the present time, there is no evidence to prove the absence of its reality in the past or future. The validity of perceptual cognition is intrinsic. In fact, the validity of all cognitions is intrinsic. The inference and śabdapramāṇa cannot set aside the cognition of the reality of the world duly obtained by perception.

When a perceptual cognition arises there was no other cognition opposed to it. If any cognition arises later by inference or scripture it cannot set aside the valid perceptual cognition. Perceptual cognition is superior to that of inference or scripture in the area that primarily belongs to perception. It arises earlier. Therefore, it is *asanjāta virodhi*. In this way, the *upakramanyāya* i.e. the maxim of *asañjātavirodha* is utilised to establish the superiority of perception and the reality of the world. Consequently, the *mithyātva* of the world is rejected.

2-2) On behalf of *advaita* it is argued that *upakramanyāya* is applicable only when the evidences on both sides are equal and a reconciliation is required. In the case of perception which is supposed to establish the reality of the world and the *aikyaśruti* that implies the *mithyātva* of the world, the *śruti* is superior to perception. The perception is prone to be erroneous. Therefore, the two cannot be treated on equal footing. Hence, *asanjātavirodhanyāya* cannot be applied here.

Dvaita rejects this claim. No doubt can be entertained in the case of such perception that is duly scrutinised. The perception '*saṅ ghataḥ*' is such a valid perception. The purport of the so called *mithyā śruti* is yet to be determined. It

cannot be taken for granted that the perception of the reality of jar etc. is Brahma.

2-3 Śrutilingādhikaraṇa nyāya i.e. the maxim of Śighragāmitva also supports the superiority of perception and the reality of the world.

The perception provides the cognition directly and immediately while the inference and śabda are slow. Therefore, neither the inference of mithyātva nor aikyaśruti can set aside the cognition of the reality of the world obtained by perception.

On behalf of advaita it is argued that though the inference, and śruti are slow, when the purport of śruti is duly determined, it can set aside the cognition obtained by the perception. However, Dvaita points out that advaita interpretation of śruti is not valid.

2-4 The sāmānya viśeṣa nyāya i.e. the maxim of the preference of particular statement to that of a general statement also supports the superiority of perception and the reality of the world. The perception comprehends particular objects, jar etc as real while the aikyaśruti denies them in a general way.

On behalf of advaita it is argued that this maxim is applicable to only such instances where in both

general and particular are based on equally valid evidences. However the perception and śruti cannot be treated on equal footing. The perception is likely to be erroneous while śruti is absolutely valid.

The untenability of this explanation is already pointed out from Dvaita side.

2-5 Sāvakāśa-niravakāśa nyāya i.e. the maxim of availability of scope in other ways or the absence of it, also supports the superiority of the perception and the reality of the world.

The perception has no other scope than conveying the objects as they are while śruti can be differently interpreted and reconciled with the cognition provided by the perception. Therefore, perception is niravakāśa while śruti is sāvakāśa. According to this maxim niravakāśa has to be preferred to sāvakāśa. Hence, the perception that conveys the reality of the world is superior to śruti in this respect.

2-6 Bahubādhanyāya i.e. the maxim of preference of that which serves many purposes than that which serves a few purposes.

This maxim also supports the superiority of perception and the reality of world. The perception which comprehends the reality of the world serves

many purposes. The inference itself is based on it. It enables the performance of rituals by conveying the reality of the world, and enables to undertake meditation etc. Therefore, advaita śruti should not be interpreted as denying the reality of the world but should be differently interpreted.

2-7 On behalf of advaita it is argued that in the illustration given for this maxim the contingency of setting aside many items is stated as the basis of this maxim but the Dvaita claim of superiority of perception is based on many references. Therefore, this maxim cannot be utilised to support the superiority of perception. *Dṛṣṭānte bahu viśaya bādhaḥ* (दृष्टान्ते बहुविषयबाधः).

Dvaita points out that the basis of this maxim is the contingency of setting aside many. Whether these are items or evidences is a matter of detail. *Nahi dṛṣṭānte sarva-sāmyam*. An example need not be exactly the same in all respects.

This debate on the reality or otherwise of the world, and saguṇa or nirguṇa nature of brahman is carried on making finer and finer points by the commentators of Nyāyāmṛta and Advaita siddhi generation after generation. Very subtle points of epistemology, logic and linguistics are presented. It is an intellectual treat. However, the above

presentation of the utilisation of Pūrvamīmāṃsā maxims by Dvaita and Advaita has a limited purpose of drawing attention to the utility of Pūrvamīmāṃsā nyāya for vedānta.

3-1 Apacchedanyāya - The maxim of later setting aside the earlier. This nyāya does not help to set aside perception by śruti.

The discussion of apacchedanyāya is spread over four adhikaraṇa in PMS. It gives rise to quite interesting points.

At jyotiṣtoma sacrifice the priests adhvaryu, prastotā etc are required to proceed from havirdhāna place to bahiṣpavamāna place holding the waist cloth of the next priest in a line. If the waist cloth held is left, then, different expiations are prescribed in the case of different priests for this lapse. When one of them commits this lapse then, the expiation prescribed in his case has to be observed. If two of them simultaneously commit the lapse, then, there is an option to observe one of the expiations. However, when two of them commit the lapse one after the other the question arises whether the expiations prescribed for the former is to be observed or the latter. It is ruled that the former cannot prevent the latter, since, it is prescribed by a direct śruti. When the expiation

prescribed for the latter is comprehended, the observation of the expiation for the former is set aside. Upakramanyāya i.e. asanjātavirodha nyāya applies to such instances where in the later depends upon the earlier and their status as earlier and later is fixed. Apacchedanyāya applies to such instances where in the earlier and later position is not fixed.

Advaita utilises this maxim to establish that the perception of the reality of the world is set aside by the mithyātva śruti. Since, perception takes place earlier than the cognition provided by śruti. The later sets aside the earlier.

The question involved here is not so simple. To comprehend the full implications of this maxim, the details that have given rise to this maxim have to be fully studied. The expiations prescribed for the lapse are as under :

i) If pratihartā commits the lapse - The entire wealth set for the sacrifice be given as dakṣiṇā.

ii) If Udgāta commits the lapse - The sacrifice should be completed without giving dakṣiṇā and it should be performed again. Whatever was to be given as dakṣiṇā in the first performance, the same should be given in the repeated performance.

iii) If Udgāta and Pratihartā commit the lapse simultaneously - There is an option to choose one of the expiations.

iv) If Udgāta commits the lapse earlier and then Pratihartā - The expiation prescribed for the latter viz. the entire wealth be given.

v) If Pratihartā commits the lapse earlier and then udgāta - The expiation prescribed for pratihartā viz. offering the entire wealth be observed.

3-2 From these details it is clear that in the fourth alternative the expiation prescribed for the earlier is set aside by the later. This ruling of earlier being set aside by the later is utilised in advaita to claim that the reality of the world cognised by perception which occurs earlier is set aside by the mithyātva śruti that occurs later.

In this context it is to be noted that the expiation prescribed for pratihartā is not totally set aside. It has scope when pratihartā alone commits the lapse, or the two simultaneously commit the lapse or pratihartā commits the lapse later. Such a scope is not available for perception. Therefore, the perception is niravakāśa while śruti is sāvakāśa since, it could be interpreted suitably.

Further, apaccheda nyāya applies to such instances only where one being earlier and the other later is not fixed, if the earlier is not totally invalidated and the conflict is not clear. The case of perception is quite different from this. The position of earlier and later is fixed between perception and śruti, the earlier i.e. perception will become invalid if it is set aside as there is no other scope, and the conflict between the reality conveyed by perception and so called mithyātva śruti is clear. Hence, apacchedanyāya has no scope in this case. Śruti cannot set aside the perception as per this Nyāya merely on the ground that the perception is earlier.

On the same grounds it may also be stated that nirguṇa śrutis cannot set aside the saṁguṇa śrutis.

3-3 On behalf of advaita it is argued that the perception is also sāvakāśa. Its scope can be explained as conveying empirical reality. The śruti (व्यावहारिक सत्ता) is superior to the perception since its import is firmly determined by upakrama, etc. can't be of interpretation. It is absolutely valid as it is not contradicted by any other pramāṇa. However, Dvaita points out that the concept of empirical reality is yet to be established. The very concept of Mithyatva which is the basis of empirical reality i.e. (व्यावहारिक सत्ता) is yet to be established. Upakrama, upasamhāra do not support the advaita interpretation of śruti.

Therefore the validity of śruti has to be maintained by suitable interpretation. In view of this śruti cannot set aside the perception by the application of apacchedanyāya in respect of the reality of the world.

Moreover, there is upajīvyā-upajīvaka position between perception and śruti in respect of the objects that belong to the area of perception. The apacchedanyāya applies only to such cases wherein the earlier and later position is not based on upajīvyā-upajīvaka position.



13. Instances of secondary meaning of Śruti

4.1 Dvaita Vedānta takes the firm stand that the reality of the world cognised by the perception as 'san ghaṭaḥ' i.e. the jar exists, cannot be set aside by śruti. Wherever there is a conflict between the perception and śruti, the śruti has to be suitably re-interpreted. In support of this point a few PM. instance are quoted. These are noticed here :

i) In Arthavadādhikaraṇa under the sūtra 'śāstradr̥ṣṭa virodhāt' (PMS I-2-2) the śruti 'tasmād dhumah eva agneḥ divā dadṛṣe na arcīḥ, tasmād arcireva naktam dadṛṣe na dhumah' (तस्माद् धूम एव अग्नेः दिवा ददृशे न अर्चिः, तस्माद् अर्चिरेव वक्तं ददृशे न धूमः ।) is quoted and it is argued that this śruti cannot be taken as valid since it is opposed to the cognition of perception. This is replied under the sūtras 'guṇavādaḥ' and 'dūrabhūyastvāt' (PMs I-2-10,12) by pointing out that the above śruti should not be taken literally. It should be taken in the secondary sense. It is intended to glorify the two deities Agni and Sūrya.

In this instance it is clearly stated that wherever, there is a conflict between perception and śruti the śruti be suitably interpreted and reconciled. The perception is to be preferred.

4-2 In Mantrādhikaraṇa, under the sūtra 'artha vipratishedhāt' (PMs I-2-36). The śruti 'aditiḥ dyauḥ, aditiḥ antarikṣam sa mātā sa pitā' (अदितिः द्यौः अदितिः अन्तरिक्षं स मात स पिता) is quoted and it is argued that one and the same cannot be present in two distant places and cannot be both father and mother. It is against the cognition of perception. Therefore, this śruti is not valid. This is replied under the sūtra 'guṇādapratishedhaḥ' (PMs I-2-39).

This is replied by stating that 'the import of this śruti should not be literally taken. The opposite attributes are stated here to glorify the deity aditi. This is another instance, wherein the perception is not set aside by śruti but śruti itself is reconciled.

4-3 In a group of five adhikaraṇas known as tatsiddhipetīkā (PMs I-4-23) it is stated that vedic words may be taken in the secondary sense on the following five grounds.

i) Tat-siddhi - performing the functions of one by another e.g. yajamānaḥ prastaraḥ the sacrificer is called prastara in the sense that he sometimes performs the functions of prastara such as holding the sṛg etc sacrificial instruments.

ii) Jāti - possessing the same characteristic i.e. both are born from the mouth of the God.

iii) **Sārūpya** - similar form. e.g. Ādityo yūpaḥ i.e. both have similar form such as brightness.

iv) **Praśamsā** - praise e.g. 'apaśava vā anye go-aśvebhyaḥ' (अपशव वा अन्ये गो अश्वेभ्यः) the animals other than cow and horse are not animals at all. Here, by denying the usefulness of other animals, the usefulness of cow and horses is praised.

v) **Bhūmā** - presence in many, e.g. Sṛṣṭiḥ upadadhati. The word sṛṣṭi occurs in this context. Therefore, even those hymns that do not contain the word sṛṣṭi should be recited at upadhāna i.e. placing the bricks. Here, the word sṛṣṭi is taken to mean both the hymns that contain the word sṛṣṭi and those that do not have that word, since the majority of hymns in that context contain the word sṛṣṭi. Thus bhūmā is the ground here.

Liṅga samavāyaḥ

Liṅga samavāyaḥ presence of the attributes e.g. Recitation of a group of hymns containing the attribute prāṇabhṛt. The attribute prāṇabhṛt is expressly found in the first hymn only. The other hymns in the group contain the word prāṇa only. However, these are also to be recited on the ground that these are associated with the hymn that has the attribute prāṇabhṛt.

In all these instances, literal meaning of the word concerned is not adopted. A meaning based on some or other attribute connected with the literal meaning is adopted. From this it is clear that the śruti is not always taken in the strictly literal sense whenever there is some or other difficulty to take it that way. Therefore śruti cannot set aside the cognition of the reality of the world obtained by perception.

4-4 On behalf of advaita it is argued that the conflict between perception and śruti presented in the above instances quoted from PM. is in respect of the empirical reality i.e. vyāvahārika sattā comprehended by perception and the conflict with it at that level. However, the advaita śruti rejects the pāramārthika reality to the world. The import of the advaita śrutis is duly established by upakrama, upasamhāra etc canons of interpretation while the reality conveyed by the perception as 'san ghataḥ' is not duly scrutinised.

The acceptance of lakṣaṇā in the case of tat-tvaṃ asi not so much to avoid a conflict with the perception but to sustain akhaṇḍārthatva. Therefore, this cannot be cited as an example of reconciliation of śruti to avoid the conflict with perception. Further, resorting to lakṣaṇā has not resulted in giving up the primary meaning here. The primary

meaning of sāmānādhikaranya is aikya i.e. reference to a common entity. This is not given up here.

The Dvaita replies back to say that upakrama etc do not support the akhaṇḍārthatva of śruti. The concept of empirical reality is not yet established. Therefore, these concepts cannot be utilised to invoke śruti to set aside the reality of the world cognised by the perception.



14. Use of Upakrama, Upasamhāra etc. criteria to interpret śruti

In Vedānta six guidelines are utilised to determine the purport of a text. These are designated as tātparyaliṅgas. It is interesting to note that both Dvaita and advaita utilise these guidelines to interpret the same text and arrive at different results. While applying these guidelines PM. maxims are also applied. This is explained here by one such interpretation.

Dvaita takes up the discourse in Atharvaṇa upaniṣad to demonstrate that the six guidelines upakrama, upasamhāra etc support the distinction between Jīva and īśvara.

Upakrama i.e. the statement at the commencement of the discourse viz. 'Dvā suparṇā' two birds Īśvara and Jīva supports their distinction.

Upasamhāra i.e. the statement at the conclusion viz. 'paramam sāmyam upaiti' (परमं साम्यमुपैति) i.e. the jīva attains similarity with Īśvara' supports the distinction of the two. Similarity is always between two distinct objects.

Abhyāsa i.e. frequent mention viz 'tayoh anyah' 'anyam īśam' 'anaśnan anyah' etc frequently state the distinction between the two by the expression 'anyah'.

Apūrvatā i.e. presentation by a unique evidence. The distinction between Jīva and Īśvara is not conveyed by perception etc ordinary evidences. It is conveyed by veda only.

Phala i.e. statement of the benefit viz puṇyapāpe vidhūya i.e. jīva gets rid of puṇya and pāpa.

Arthavāda i.e. eulogy viz 'asya mahimānam' attains the glory.

Upapatti i.e. reason viz the reason to distinguish the two viz one enjoys the fruits of the deeds and the other watches.

By presenting the above analysis of the application of upakrama etc criteria Dvaita establishes the distinction between Īśvara and Jīva.

The Advaita demonstrates upakrama etc differently in the same discourse

In the Śruti 'yat tat adreśyam agrāhyam' (यत्तत् अद्रेश्यं अग्राह्यम्) etc abheda concept is initiated at upakrama. In the śruti 'puruṣa eva idam sarvam' (पुरुष एव इदं सर्वम्) abheda is mentioned in the middle of the discourse. In the śruti 'pare avyaye sarve ekibhavanti' (परे अव्यये सर्वे एकीभवन्ति) abheda is affirmed at upasamhara. This is the purport of the total discourse, while 'dvā suparṇā' etc quoted by Dvaita is a part of the discourse that occurs in the middle.

Therefore, that portion has to be treated as avāntara prakaraṇa and it has to be interpreted in tune with mahāprakaraṇa. In view of this the śruti 'paramam samyam upaiti' (परमं साम्यमुपैति) has to be taken as conveying abheda. The distinction between jīva and Īśvara indicated by one enjoying the fruit and the other only watch should not be taken as final and real.

5-3) Dvaita disagrees with the above approach. According to Dvaita in the first section the supremacy of Akṣara is described but not abheda. In the second the fact of Akṣara being the cause of all is brought out. In the third section the distinction between Īśvara and Jīva is stated by 'dvā suparṇā' śruti to affirm the supremacy of Īśvara. Therefore, there is no question of any mahāprakaraṇa and avāntara prakaraṇa. The śruti passages 'puruṣa eva idam sarvam' (पुरुष एव इदं सर्वम्) 'pare avyaye sarve ekibhavanti' (परे अव्यये सर्वे एकीभवन्ति) do not convey abheda at all. This is explained while discussing the import of such śrutis.

The application of upakrama etc criteria is worked out in antaryāmi brāhmaṇa and in many other instances both by Dvaita and advaita.



15. Use of Pūrvamīmāṃsā nyāya to clarify Dvaita interpretation and Dvaita doctrine

1-1 Justification of the injunctive nature of Jijñāsā

In Jijñāsādhikaraṇa the question whether the śruti texts i) śrotavyo mantavyo nididhyāsitavyaḥ (श्रोतव्या मन्तव्यो निदिध्यासितव्यः) ii) tad vijijñāśasva (तद्विजिज्ञासस्वा) iii) ātmani eva ātmānam paśyet (आत्मनि एव आत्मानं परयेत्) etc could be taken as injunctions that enjoin the enquiry into the nature of Brahman or these śrutis are not of the nature of injunction is raised.' A number of Pūrvamīmāṃsā (PM.) maxims are utilised to present pūrvapakṣa. These are appropriately explained in siddhānta to arrive at the conclusion that these śrutis are of the nature of injunction.

i) Pūrvapakṣin argues that though the suffix 'tavya' in the expressions mantavya, and nididhyāsitavya ordinarily conveys an injunction, certain exceptions are made in PM. For instance, in the context of enjoining upāśmūyāga the expression yaśtavya occurring in the passage, 'viṣṇuḥ upāśmu yaśtavyaḥ prajāpatiḥ upāśmu yaśtavyaḥ' (विष्णुः उपांशु यष्टव्यः प्रजापतिः उपांशु यष्टव्यः) etc is not taken as an injunction but the tavya suffix is taken in the sense

of desirable i.e. arhārtha. Similarly the expressions mantavyaḥ nididhyāsitavyaḥ have to be taken as desirable but not in the sense of an injunction.

(PMs II-2-9)

ii) The expressions 'paśyet' 'vijijñāśasva' also do not convey the injunction of the enquiry into the nature of Brahman.

The primary meaning of these expressions is cognition and will. These two cannot be enjoined. The secondary sense vicāra i.e. enquiry, cannot be assigned to these expressions. Taking an injunction in the secondary sense is not justifiable. Such a course is prohibited by Śabara. The śruti passages containing these expressions are intended to describe Brahman. Therefore, the injunctive role of these is prevented i.e. vidhiśakti pratibandha (विधिशक्तिप्रतिबन्ध) such prevention of injunctive role is supported by quoting the maxim of traiyambikādhikaraṇa (PMs. X-5-8) of PM.

In Traiyambikādhikaraṇa, in the passage 'yadabhighārayet rudrāya' (यदभिघारयेत् रुद्राय) the expression abhighārayet is in injunctive suffix. But still this statement is not taken as an injunction. It is taken as arthavāda. Its role as injunction is prevented by the fact that it is intended to glorify the injunction of abhighāraṇa stated in the passage.

Similarly, the śruti passages containing the expression 'paśyet' 'vijijñāśasva' with injunctive suffixes are intended to just describe Brahman. Hence, these cannot be taken as enjoining the enquiry into the nature of Brahman. (TC. 69,72)

1-2 Siddhāntin points out that on a proper examination, the PM. maxims quoted by pūrvapakṣin do not come in the way of considering the above passages as injunctions.

i) There is a difference between 'upāṃśu yaśṭavyaḥ' and 'śrotavyo mantavyo nididhyāsi-tavyaḥ.' In the first case it is a part of a sentence starting from the mention of jāmitā i.e. laziness and ending with the warding off laziness. If the statement viṣṇuḥ upāṃśu yaśṭavyaḥ (विष्णुः उपांशु यष्टव्यः) etc. are taken as injunctions, it will result in vākyabheda i.e. splitting one sentence into two. Therefore, the tavya suffix in these statements is taken in the sense of desirable i.e. arhārtha. In the case of 'śrotavyaḥ, mantavyaḥ' etc there is no such contingency. Hence, this can be taken as injunction. It can be further connected with the sentences that describe Brahman as in the case of the injunctions of prayāja etc with the sentence that describes Darśapūrṇamāsa.

ii) The expressions 'paśyet' and vijijñāśasva that

refer to cognition and will can be taken in the secondary or extended sense vicāra i.e. enquiry. An injunction can be taken in the secondary sense if there is the difficulty in taking it in the primary sense. In the instance of 'somena yajeta' the expression somena is taken in the extended sense Somavatā by resorting to matvartha lakṣaṇā.

(TC. pp.79-80)

In this discussion not only the inter-action between Vedānta and Mīmāṃsa is found but also vedānta putting the mimāṃsā maxims in the right perspective is found.



16. The word Jijñāsā conveys the meaning vichāra by Rūḍhi

In the expression Brahmajijñāsā the word jijñāsā conveys the desire for cognition as its primary meaning. However, the desire cannot be enjoined. Nobody can be forced to desire in a certain way by an injunction. Therefore, the meaning vicāra i.e. enquiry, is assigned to this word. In this context a question is raised whether this meaning is obtained by lakṣaṇā or by rūḍhi. Śrī Vyāsātīrtha holds the view that it is obtained by rūḍhi.

In the instances of lakṣaṇā, the unsuitability of the primary meaning is taken into account and then, a secondary meaning is assigned. However, in the case of rūḍhi the meaning is directly comprehended. In the case of such words that have a primary meaning based on etymological grounds but by a long usage have developed a conventional meaning the latter becomes its meaning by rūḍhi. This prevails over the etymological meaning. For instance, the word pravīṇa etymologically conveys the meaning 'an expert in playing vīṇā' but by long usage it has come to mean an expert in general. The word kuśala etymologically means skilled in cutting the grass but by usage it has come to mean a skilled person. The word maṇṭapa originally meant a place where the scum of the boiled rice i.e.

maṇḍa is served, has come to mean an arched place in general. All these are the instances wherein rūḍhi prevails over the etymological meaning. These are not considered as instances of lakṣaṇā. Similarly the word jijñāsā has come to mean vicāra by rūḍhi. There is no need of any lakṣaṇā. In this connection PM example of the usage of the word aparimita' in the sense of plenty is given. (PM VI-7-10)

The status of 'Om' in Brahmasūtra

In Dvaita Vedānta tradition, 'Om' is added before and after brahmasūtras. This addition is made by way of adhyāhāra i.e. introducing an additional word. This Om is considered as avayava i.e. a constituent part of the sūtra. It continues in the following sūtras also. This is called ūha here.

The term ūha has a special meaning viz. substitution, in PM. Certain guidelines are laid down for introducing ūha. In the present case of ūha of Om in Brahmasūtra, it has to be examined whether PM. guidelines are satisfied. This is discussed in TC. (pp.82-92) quoting the relevant PM. guidelines and the examples.

i) In PM Ūha means substitution. For effecting Ūha a sthāni i.e. a word that is to be substituted is necessary. For instance the word 'agni' is sthāni in prakṛti yāga which is substituted by the word sūrya

in the vikṛti yāga while reciting the hymn concerned (PM IX-3-1). No such word is found in the Brahma-sūtra which is required to be substituted by Om.

ii) Even if the term Ūha is taken in the sense of adhyāhāra i.e. introducing an additional word, Om cannot be introduced as additional word. To introduce an additional word ākāṅkṣā i.e. the need or expectancy of such an addition is necessary. For instance, in the instance of 'sam yajñapatiḥ' (सं यज्ञपतिः) there is a need of adhyāhāra (PM.II-1) Similarly, in the instance of 'Iṣe tvā Ūrje tvā' (इशे त्वा ऊर्जे त्वा) also there is a need of adhyāhāra (PM. II-16) In both these instances there is a need of a verb. In the present case there is no such need.

iii) The substituted word is not to be considered as a constituent of the hymn. According to the guidelines laid down in PM in respect of the status of a substituted word it is clearly stated that ūha, pravara, nāmadheya are not a part of the hymn. (PM II-1-10) Therefore, Om cannot be considered as avayava i.e. a constituent of the sūtra.

iv) If the 'Om' has a meaning and it is a constituent of the sūtra, it has to get syntactically connected with the word brahman. This is not possible. The word brahman is not a separate unit in the sūtra. It is a part of the compound word

brahmajijñāsa. Therefore the word 'Om' cannot get connected with it.

v) If the word 'Om' is continued in other sūtras also by way of anuṣaṅga, then, its meaning has to be taken into account in those sūtras also and get syntactically connected with the other words in the sūtra. However in PM it is clearly stated that the words taken in a sentence by way of anusanga do have meaning and get connected with the relevant other word. This is found in the instances of 'acchidreṇa pavitreṇa' (अच्छिद्रेण पवित्रेण) 'tanuḥ varṣiṣṭha' (तनुः वर्षिष्ठ) etc (II-1 and II-1-17). stating these difficulties in respect of introducing the word 'Om' in the sūtra by way of ūha, chandrikā offers solutions for these difficulties.

i) The term Ūha is not to be understood in the sense of substitution. It has to be taken in the sense of adhyāhāra i.e. introducing an additional word. Therefore, there is no need of any 'sthāni' a base word for substitution.

ii) The ākāṅkṣā i.e. the need, to add this word by way of adhyāhāra is necessitated by the śruti 'śravati anumkṛtam brahma' (श्रवति अनोक्तम् ब्रह्म) etc which states that 'Om' must be added before and after a sūtra.



17. Om is both dṛṣṭārtha and adṛṣṭārtha

An important point to be noted in this connection is that Om is both adṛṣṭārtha and dṛṣṭārtha. It helps to retain the sūtra and its meaning in the mind firmly. This is adṛṣṭārtha. It conveys meaning. This is dṛṣṭārtha. In PM. such a position of both adṛṣṭārthatva and dṛṣṭārthatva is accepted in respect of mantra and prakṣepa, and adṛṣṭārthatva in respect of tyāga. (PMs IV-2-7).

i) The employment of 'Om' at the end of sūtra and continuation of 'Om' in other sūtras is for adṛṣṭārtha only. Such a position of an item being dṛṣṭārtha in some respect and adṛṣṭārtha in other respect is found in PM in the instance of recitation of hymns. The recitation of hymn in a sacrifice is dṛṣṭārtha since the dravya or devatā is reminded by it. However the recitation of the hymn as japa i.e. repeated recitation, is adṛṣṭārtha (PMS. I-2).

ii) Though the word Om appears to get syntactically connected with jijñāsā on closer observation it will be found that it has to get connected with the word brahman as it is not possible to get connected with the word jijñāsā. For this purpose angāvatāra maxim of PM has to be applied. This maxim is developed in connection with

the measurement of Yūpa. In vājapeya sacrifice a measurement of seventeen fore-arms is mentioned. The question whether this is a measurement of some item connected with vājapeya sacrifice directly or that of an item connected with a sub-ordinate item i.e. paśu is raised. It is concluded that it is a measurement of yūpa that is connected with paśu, instead of conceiving such a length to an item like śoḍaśi which is directly connected with the sacrifice. This is an instance of angāvatāranyāya i.e. applying a point to a sub-ordinate item which prima facie appears to be connected with the main item (PM III-1-8). This maxim is to be utilised to connect Om with the word brahman. In PM there are few other instances also wherein certain items get connected with upasarjana i.e. sub-ordinate items than the main. Prāśastya conveyed by arthavāda, Daṇḍa in the instance daṇḍi praiśān anvāha etc. are such instances.

Adhyayana is both dṛṣṭārtha and adṛṣṭārtha

1) The injunction 'svādhyāyo adhyetavyaḥ' serves two purposes. (i) It enjoins the study of veda in order to comprehend its meaning which enables him to perform the sacrifices. This is dṛṣṭārtha. (ii) If it is not studied it leads to pratyavāya, since its study is obligatory. This is adṛṣṭārtha. This injunction of the study of veda necessitates the enquiry into the import of the entire veda.

In support of the contention that adhyayana is both dṛṣṭārtha and adṛṣṭārtha a number of PM instances are quoted in Nyāyāmṛta (Nmṛ).

i) A purodāśayāga is prescribed as a subordinate item of agniṣomiya paśu. This is dṛṣṭārtha as it is a sanskāra for dravya and devatā. However, in respect of tyāga it is adṛṣṭārtha (PMs IV-3-7)

ii) In connection with Agnihotra, two injunctions are found 'dadhnā juhōti' and 'dadhnā indriyakāmasya juhuyāt.' The dadhi mentioned in the first injunction is kṛtvārtha and that stated in the second injunction is phalārtha. This is another instance of ubhayārtha. This position is designated as samyoga pṛthaktva. Here two purposes served by one item are stated by two statements (PMs IV-4-3).

iii) In the context of Darśapūrṇamāsa two injunctions are found viz. i) He who desires svarga should perform darśapūrṇamāsa (ii) One should perform darśapūrṇamāsa all along his life.

Here the former states the kāmya status and the latter states the obligatory status of darśapūrṇamāsa. This is another instance of one act serving two purposes (PMs. II-4-1)



18. Justification of dual number referring to one

In Guhādhikaraṇa (BSB I-2-3) of Brahmasūtra bhāṣya the śruti 'Rtam pibantau sukr̥tasya loke' (ऋतं पिबन्तो सुकृतस्य लोके) etc is interpreted as refering to the two forms of brahman viz. ātmā and antarātma and it is concluded that brahman present at the heart receives the fruits of the good deeds of the jīva. The dual number does not refer to Jīva and Īśvara but refers to the two forms of brahman according to Dvaita interpretation. In this context a question is raised whether the dual number is justified if brahman is taken as referred to here. This is justified by quoting a number of Pūrvamīmāṃsa instances. In these instances the number viz. singular, dual or plural is not strictly taken into account on various grounds.

i) In Darśapūrṇamāsa sacrifice it is prescribed that the hymn 'patnīm sannahya' be recited. The word patnīm is in singular. However, when there are more than one wife, the question arises whether the singular of the word patnīm be substituted by the dual or plural number as the case may be. It is ruled that the singular number need not to be substituted by dual or plural. The recitation of the hymn is not confined to only such performance where in only one wife participates.

The reference to the wife is more important than the number. Therefore, the number need not be substituted.

This ruling is applied here to point out that the dual in the word *pibantau* does not come in the way of considering *brahman* as conveyed by this śruti (PMs.IX-3-6) (TC II-77).

ii) In connection with *Agñiṣomīyapaśu* the hymn to be recited viz. 'aditiḥ pāśān pramumuktā' (अदितिः पाशान् प्रमुमुक्त्वा) has the word 'pāśān' in plural. Since, there is only one *pāśa* in *prakṛtiyāga*, the question arises whether this hymn be recited in *vikṛti* viz. *paśugaṇa* where in there are many *pāśas* or it should be recited in *prakṛti* only ignoring the plural. It is ruled here that it should be recited in *prakṛti* only. The ground for this ruling is that reciting the hymn with reference *pāśa* is more important than the number of it. This ruling is also utilised to point out that the śruti that contains the word *pibantau* in dual may be taken to refer to *Brahman*. PMs IX-3-5 (TC.II-77)

iii) In the statement *Agnīn ādadhīta* the plural is taken into account even though it is an attribute of *uddeśya* i.e. the subject. In the statement *udavasāya prṣṭasāmna yajeran* (उदवसाय पृष्टसाम्ना यजेरन्) the plural is not taken into account even though it is an

attribute of vidheya i.e. predicate. From this it is clear that it is not the fact being an attribute of the subject or predicate that is the ground for not taking it into account or for taking it into account but the fact of its being opposed to a known attribute. This ruling is the basis for not taking into account the singular in 'grhaikatvādhikaraṇa.' In the statement 'daśa etān adhvaryuḥ grṇhāti' (दश एवान् अध्वयुः गृह्णाति) the plural number of grhas is already known. Therefore, the singular of grham in 'grham sammārṣti' is not taken into account. In the present case of 'ṛtam pibantau' the singular nature of brahman is already stated in the previous statement 'yasya brahma ca kṣatram ca' (यस्य ब्रह्म च क्षत्रं च) by yasya. Therefore, the dual of pibantau need not be taken into account.

iv) In the hymn 'medhapataye medham medhapatibhyām medham' (मेधपतये मेधम् मेधपतिभ्यां मेधम्) the word medhapati refers to the pair of agniṣoma deities. Here as deity these two are one but they have the two names as per their adhiṣṭhāna. Hence, they are referred both by singular and dual. Similarly brahman also can be referred in dual taking into account his two forms ātmā and antarātma and in singular taking into account his very nature.

The above references to Pūrvamīmāṃsā instances not only support an interpretational point of vedānta but also bring out the meticulous approach of Pūrvamīmāṃsā for the interpretation of Vedic texts. A fresh approach to the interpretation of PM. instances as in the case of ḡham sammārṣti is also found.



19. Justification of the word aditi belonging to Viṣṇu prakaraṇa

i) In attrādhikaraṇa of BSB. Pūrvapakṣin argues the word Aditi need not be taken in the sense of Viṣṇu though the context is that of Viṣṇu. In support of this the ruling given in paṣṇa peṣaṇādhikaraṇa is quoted. In the context of darśapūrṇamāsa, by the statement 'pūṣā praviṣṭabhāgaḥ' peṣaṇa i.e. grinding for the deity of Puṣā is stated. However, no deity of this name is available at darśapūrṇamāsa. Therefore, the question arises whether the name Puṣā be interpreted as applicable to Agni or the item of peṣaṇa be shifted to vikṛtiyāga wherein the deity puṣā is available. It is ruled that the item of peṣaṇa is to be shifted to vikṛtiyāga. Vākya is a stronger evidence than prakaraṇa.

Pūrvapakṣin quotes this ruling and argues that the name Aditi be taken to mean Aditi but not Brahman i.e. Viṣṇu, on the ground that the context is that of Viṣṇu and he is 'attā' in the sense of samhārakartā i.e. destroyer. The name Aditi be taken out of the context of Viṣṇu and a context of Aditi be envisaged as in the case of puṣā (PMS III-3-18). Siddhāntin points out that an item is taken out of context when it cannot be implemented in that context. In the case of the name Aditi there is

no such difficulty. On the contrary the import of the expression aditi viz. sarvasamhāra kartṛtva i.e. destroying all, applies to Viṣṇu more appropriately than Aditi. (TC II-56,59)

ii) In the context of darśapūrṇamāsa the statement 'abhikrāman juhōti' is found. Here, a question is raised whether this abhikramaṇa is to be undertaken by the performer of the entire darśapūrṇamāsa or prayāja only.

It is ruled that it is to be undertaken by the performer of prayāja only. For this purpose prayāja is considered as a sub-context. This ruling is utilised by pūrvapakṣin to claim that a sub-context be envisaged for Aditi and separated from the context of Viṣṇu. But siddhāntin points that the statement in respect of abhikramaṇa is between two other statements related to prayāja. Such occurrence is technically known as sandamśa. Such a position is not found in the case of aditi (PMs. III-1-10) (TC II 56-59).



20. Justification of the presence of opposite attributes

In Akṣaradhikaraṇa (BSB I-3-3) while discussing the import of the śruti 'asthūlam anaṇu' etc to justify the presence of opposite attributes such as aṇutva and mahatva, a number of PM. instances are quoted. Some of them are noticed here.

i) In Darvīhomādhikaraṇa (PMs. VIII-4-2) the status of darvīhoma is discussed. It is stated that it cannot be a vikṛti of either somayāga or nāriṣṭha homa. It has to be treated as a separate homa. It is also not a prakṛti, since, no other homa is derived from this. Therefore, both prakṛtitva and vikṛtitva are absent in it. Similarly prakṛta aṇutva and prakṛta mahatva are absent in Brahman.

ii) Darśapūrṇamāsa is prakṛti only. Paśugaṇa etc are vikṛti only. But Agñiṣomiya is both prakṛti and vikṛti. Just as these opposite attributes are present in one, aṇutva and mahatva are present in Brahman.

iii) Avaghāta i.e. grinding the rice is dṛṣṭārtha only. Prokṣaṇa sprinkling with the water is adṛṣṭārtha only. However sviṣṭakṛt rite is both dṛṣṭārtha and adṛṣṭārtha.

iv) The adhikāra for kāmya rites and Nitya rites

normally vest in different persons but in the case of jāteṣṭi, it is vested in the same person.

v) The vṛihi is 'kṛtvartha' only, godohan is puruṣārtha only, but 'dadhi' is both.

The above instances of PM. are not quoted to state the opposition of these pairs in their very nature. These are quoted to point out that the attributes that are normally not found together are found together in certain cases. In each case there is a ground for it. Similarly, aṇutva and mahatva that are not found together in prakṛta objects are found together in brahman. Śruti some times states the presence of opposite attributes in Brahman and sometimes states the absence of these. When the presence is stated, then, these should be taken as aprākṛta i.e. non-material attributes, but when the absence is stated, it should be taken as the absence of prākṛta attributes. In this way the presence of opposite attributes is justified. The above PM. instances are quoted to show that the attributes that are normally not present together are present in some special cases. (TC, Vol.II 288)



21. The maxims that support the distinction of Īśvara and Jīva

In PM six criteria are laid down to distinguish the rituals. These are utilised in Dvaita Vedānta to support the distinction between Īśvara and Jīva. These criteria are stated as (i) śabdāntara (ii) sāmkyā (iii) abhyāsa (iv) guṇa (v) prakaraṇāntara (vi) samjñā.

The application of these criteria is illustrated as under :

i) Śabdāntara i.e. the presence of different verbs indicating distinct actions, e.g. Eṣaḥ eva jīvam prabodhayati etasmāt jīvaḥ uttiṣṭhati. (एष एव जीवं प्रबोधयति एतस्मात् जीवः उत्तिष्ठति) 'God awakens the jīva and jīva becomes active from God.'

ii) Sāmkyā i.e. number e.g. Dvā suparṇā i.e. two birds i.e. Īśvara and Jīva. Here, the number two indicates the difference.

iii) Abhyāsa i.e. repeated reference e.g. nityaḥ paraḥ anityo jīvaḥ, (नित्यः परोऽनित्यो जीवः) i.e. Īśvara is non-eternal, jīva is eternal. Here the repetition of the predicate brings out their difference.

iv) Guṇāntara i.e. distinct attributes, e.g. the attributes atti i.e. enjoys anaśnan i.e. does not enjoy distinguish jīva and Īśvara.

v) Prakaraṇāntara i.e. different contexts. e.g. yato vāco nivartante, (यतो वाचो निवर्तन्ते) i.e. all words return from him. This is the context of Īśvara and this does not apply to jīva.

vi) Samjñā i.e. different designations e.g. Īśvara and Jīva.

These criteria are utilised in PM to interpret the text to identify the distinct rituals. Similarly Vedānta also can utilise these to interpret the text to identify the distinction between Īśvara and Jīva. -
Nmr. Vol.III-482.



22. Utilisation of the Mīmāṃsa Maxims in the Dharma Śāstra Literature

Application of the Mīmāṃsa rules of interpretation to the domain of Dharma Śāstra has almost become the common feature of the writers on Dharma Śāstra right from the eleventh century A.D. to the modern times. It is due to this feature that one is almost tempted to observe that the study of Dharma Śāstra can not be said to be adequate or even complete without the proper knowledge of the Science of Pūrvamīmāṃsā which is more known as the science of Vedic interpretation to the pundits who are well-versed in diverse disciplines of Sanskrit learning. It is further remarked that the proper application of the Mīmāṃsa rules of interpretations helps one to remove contradictions in the mutually contradictory texts of Dharma Śāstra and also to assign proper scope to the texts. Over the above, the austerity of the discussion is said to be softened by the application of the Mīmāṃsā rules of interpretation (which make the inclusion of Mīmāṃsā technical terms, Mīmāṃsā maxims and also the popular maxims). In the following pages, an attempt is made to show the utility of the Mīmāṃsā maxims in the domain of Dharma Śāstra by the application of about twenty Mīmāṃsā maxims.

1) Aṅgaguṇavirodhaeca tādarthyaṭ : This maxim means that when there is a conflict between the subordinate part of the quality of the principal, the quality of the principal is to be maintained, otherwise the thing that is subordinate may attain to the position of the principal. The dikṣeṇīyesti is subordinate to the Soma yāga. Somayāga is to be performed on the new moon day or the full-moon day. And the dikṣeṇīyeṣṭi is also to be performed on the Parva day. (Parva day means the days of four changes of the moon i.e. the 8th and 14th day of each half month and the days of the full-moon and new moon). Now a doubt arises as regards the priority of the two. This is removed by giving priority to the performance of the Somayāga falling on the Parva day, setting aside the performance of the 'dikṣeṇīyeṣṭi' falling on the same day. Aparārka has employed this maxim in his commentary on the Yājñavalkya-Smṛti I.154. While discussing the topic of the vow of a Snātaka, he is asked to perform the Darśapūrṇamāsa sacrifice. This sacrifice is to be started either on the darśa day or the full-moon day. Later on, Aparārka quotes the view point of the authors of the Kalpasūtras that a Snātaka should observe fast either on the 15th day of the fortnight or on the first day of the fortnight. Now the doubt arises as regards the priority of the time for the observance

of fast and performance of the Darśapūrṇamāsa sacrifice. This doubt is removed by Aparārka by resorting to the above maxim. Here he points out that just as in a conflict between the subsidiary and the quality of the principal, the quality of the principal is to be maintained. In the similar manner when there is a conflict between the selection of the day for the performance of the Darśapūrṇamāsa-yāga and the observance of the fast, the priority is to be given to the performance of the sacrifice over the observance of the fast which is subsidiary to the sacrifice and which is to be done subsequently.

2) Aveṣṭi Yāga Nyāya - The Aveṣṭi is a composite sacrifice that occurs in the context of the Rājasūya sacrifice that is to be performed only by the Kṣatriyas. Now the question arises whether the Aveṣṭi sacrifice is a part of the Rājasūya sacrifice or an independent sacrifice and whether it should be performed by a Kṣatriya person or any other persons belonging to the first three Varnas. The prima facie view is that it should be performed by a person who is appointed to protect the people and who administers all the affairs of the kingdom. The etymological meaning of the word 'Raja' is to be made applicable in the present case. Here the view point of the siddhāntin is that Aveṣṭi is an

independent sacrifice and as such it could be performed by any one of the three higher Varnas. It would be interesting to see how this principle is used by Dānavabhaṭṭa in his digest work known as Smṛtichandrikā. While discussing the duties of a king in the Court, the question arises as regards the exact meaning of the word 'Raja.' Our author Devaṇṇabhaṭṭa quoting the texts of Manu and Bṛhaspati, thinks that the word Raja refers to any one performing the duties of a king and as such protecting the people etc. and not a Kṣatriya, following the principle laid down in the Aveṣṭi nyāya. Just as any one belonging to the first three Varnas perform the Aveṣṭi in the similar manner, any one of the first Varnas, appointed by the people, may carry out the duties of a king.

3) Bhūyasām Nyāya : This nyāya is relied upon by Śabara in his comments on Jaimini's Pūrvamimāṃsā Sūtra XII.2.22. This nyāya simply means that when there is a composite - sacrifice comprising several rites, the various details of which present conflicts, the procedure to be adopted is such as to secure the performance of the details common to the largest number. In the fifteen days sacrifice, the first day consisted of one-day sacrifice, and the three days' sacrifice, and the three days' sacrifice consists of Jyoti, gauh and āyuh and the

remaining eleven days are the modifications of arche type known as Dvadaśāḥ. When there is a conflict among the details of those eleven day sacrifice and the one day-sacrifice, the question arises as regards whose details are to be adopted. The Subrahmanya verse at the Agniṣṭuti sacrifice is Āgneyī and that of the other days is Aindrī. Here the *prima facie* view is that we should follow the details of one day's sacrifice and hence the Subrahmanya mantram should be Āgneyi (that is having Agni as the deity). Here the Siddhāntin points out that when there is a congregation, the course to be adopted should be such as to secure the details common to the largest number. It automatically follows that we have to accept the details of the sacrifice of 11 days and the Subrahmanya verse at all other days should be Aindri and not Āgneyi. While discussing the two modes of Śraddha - the Ekoddiṣṭa and the Pārvaṇa - Devaṇṇabhaṭṭa quotes the texts of Jātukarṇya, Sumantu and Yāgñavalkya - to show that the Pārvaṇa alone is to be accepted. Devaṇṇabhaṭṭa further refutes the view of Sumantu that the Pārvaṇa mode alone is the best. He also refers to the views of others who think that Ekoddiṣṭa mode is to be followed. Now the point arises as to whose view is to be treated as acceptable. Devaṇṇabhaṭṭa in this very context, relies upon the above

Mimāṃsā maxim and decides the point on the strength of the majority of the views in the present case. In conclusion, one has to accept the Pārvaṇa mode of the Śrāddha because here the majority has force of the law.

4) Guṇalopa Nyāya - This maxim is used by Śabara on Jaimini's Pūrvamīmāṃsā Sūtra X.2.63. In connection with the Ādhāna sacrifice the Pavamaneṣṭis are laid down. In this, the offering of cakes are made on eight pans by means of the sacrificial Agnihotra ladle. In this Adhāna sacrifice, the sacrificial vessel is used. In the Pavamāneṣṭi, the offering of cakes by means of the Agnihotra ladle becomes available by the rule of transfer. But it must be remembered here that in the Pavamāneṣṭi, there is no scope for the Agnihotra offerings. Now the question arises whether the said cooking be done or not done as the Agnihotravanhi is not available. Here the view point of the objector is that there is no scope for cooking in the said Pavamāneṣṭi, as the vessel by which the offerings are made is not available in the Pavamāneṣṭi. The reply of the Siddhāntin is that the cooking must be done. In this respect, the offering of the cooked things is the principal thing and the vessel by which the cooked offerings are made, is to be treated as subsidiary. In this context, the principle that is to

be made applicable is that even though the subordinate element is dropped, yet the principal thing is not thereby dropped. So, even though the vessel by which the offerings are to be prepared is absent, yet the offering of the cooked things can take place. The principle of this nyāya is employed by Devaṇṇabhaṭṭa in his Smṛtichandrikā. At the time of performing the Śrāddha ceremony, sesamums are to be used. Devaṇṇabhaṭṭa further quotes the texts strongly recommending the use of Jarṭilas for the śrāddha ceremony. He further holds that if, however, the Jarṭilas are not available, then the sesamums may be used. Here he applies the principle of the above maxim. By the above principles, on the omission of the subordinate thing, the principal thing is not omitted. In the similar manner on account of the unavailability of the jarṭilas, the śrāddha ceremony is not to be dropped. But in the place of jarṭilas, the sesamums may be used in the śrāddha ceremony.

5) Graham Sammārṣṭi Nyāya : This nyāya occurs in Jaimini's Pūrvamīmāṃsā Sūtra III 1.13.15. In the Jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice, a number of cups (Grahas) filled with Soma are offered to the deities and drunk at the three Savanas (pressings of Soma). There is a śrutivākya to the effect that he cleanses the cup with the strainer made of white

wool. The question here is whether one should cleanse only one cup or as many cups as are available in the sacrifice. The *prima facie* view is that only one cup is to be cleansed. The established conclusion is that all the sacrificial cups are to be cleansed. Here the singular number is not intended to be stressed. Medhātithi has employed the principle of this *nyāya* in his ceremony on the *Manu smṛti* II.165. Here the text of the *Manu* lays down that the entire *Veda*, along with the esoteric treatises should be learnt by the twice-born persons, by means of various kinds of austerities and observances prescribed by the rules. The question here arises whether the expression *Veda* in the above quoted texts is to be understood as having a reference to one *Veda* or all the four *Vedas* as per the principle laid down in this maxim. Medhātithi appears to show his disagreement with some commentators who hold that the expression *Veda* refers to all the four *Vedas*. Medhātithi categorically points out that the principle of the above maxim can not be applied to the present case and hence one should study only one *Veda* and not the four *Vedas*. This may be treated as a negative example where the principle of the above maxim is not followed by the commentator Medhātithi on the above mentioned place of the *Manu-Smṛti*.

6) Hetunān nigadādhikaraṇa nyāya :- Here Nigada means a sentence or a sacrificial formula and the word hetumat means containing a word or words indicative of the reason. This nyāya is introduced in Jaimini's Pūrvamīmāṃsā Sūtras. I.2.26-30. In preparing food from the grains, the Śūrpa is required for winnowing them to free them from the husk etc., and the pen or the pot for boiling the grains and a ladle for stirring the grain when they are being boiled, are necessary. The Śruti passage provides that with the help of the Śūrpa, the homa is made Karmbhapātras (pots full of husked grains of yava slightly fried on the Dakṣiṇa fire, ground and mixed with curds). If, however, the latter part of the passage contains a reason for the first part, then it would follow that the pot or ladle may equally be used instead of Śūrpa. It may be remembered that the object of the Vedic text is not to state the reason but to recommend and praise Śūrpa as the means of making the homa. So it follows that in the present case, nothing but Śūrpa can be enjoined in the making of the offering. The established conclusion is that as the Veda is the final authority for any sacrificial matter, it never assigns any reason for any act but induces the people do the same by simply praising the particular act. Hence this nyāya does not assign any reason for the use of the

Śūrpa for the sacrificial purpose but it simply eulogizes the same and induces the people to do the same. While discussing the topic of the milk to be avoided by the persons for the Śrāddha ceremony. Devaṇṇabhaṭṭa quotes the text of Hārīta which lays down that one should not drink the milk of the cow whose calf is dead. By reason of her being immersed in grief and also the reason of the menses of the cow has recently delivered, the milk of such cow is avoided. Here the question arises whether the text of Hārīta mentions the reason for not drinking the milk of such a calfless cow or whether this is a glorification (Arthavāda). Devaṇṇabhaṭṭa gives his considered opinion that this is not mere Arthavāda condemning a particular thing but it emphatically states the reason. Here one can casually note that the principle of the above maxim can not be applied in the present case. In the case of Vedic test, it is not necessary to assign any reason for any act and hence the prescription of the Śūrpa is merely glorificatory and not laying down the reasons. But in the present text of Hārīta, the reasons are specifically mentioned for not drinking the milk of a calfless cow. Hence in the opinion of Devaṇṇabhaṭṭa, the principle of the maxim known as 'Hetumān' nigadadhikaraṇa nyāya' cannot be applied to the case of the milk of a calfless cow. This also can be

treated as a negative example where the principle of the nyāya under discussion is not at all followed.

7) Kapinjala Nyāya : This nyāya is fully explained in the Jaiminiya-Nyāya-Mālāvistara XI.1.38-45. In the context of the Aśvamedha sacrifice, there is the text of the Vājasaneyi Samhitā XXIV.20 which states that they shall immolate Kapinjalas. Here the question arises as regards the plural number which is left indefinite by the above text. The prima facie view is that any number at will from three onwards should be understood by the plural in Kapinjalān in the text. The Siddhāntin concludes that as the purpose of the Śāstra is served only by the figure three, the Śāstra enjoins the immolation of three Kapinjalas. Nilakaṇṭha in his commentary on the Yājñavalkya-Smṛti III.254 makes the judicious use of this principle. Here the text of Yājñavalkya enjoins that a drinker of wine should eat ground grains of rice for many years at night. Here the word samāh i.e., years is in the plural number. Nilakaṇṭha makes the proper application of the principle of Kapinjala Nyāya and points out that a wine drinker should undergo this expiration for three years and eat the ground grains of rice only for three years. This discussion is introduced by Nilakaṇṭha in the Prāyaścitta Mayūkha.

8) Hotṛcamasanyāya :- This maxim is used by Śabara on Jaimini's Pūrvamīmāṃsā sūtra III.5.22. Here the priests Hotṛ, Udgāṛ, the Yajamāna and the Sadasyas are actually asked to drink the cup of Soma. The question arises whether the casting of the Soma is to be done by these cup-owners or not. The prima facie view is that the priests should not resort to the eating or drinking of the cup of Soma. The view point of the Siddhāntin is that the priests must drink the cup of Soma. He further points out that by Samākhya, we have to understand that the word Camasah indicates the vessel by which the Soma is drunk. The expression Hotṛa camasah will not serve any purpose, if the priests do not drink the Soma in the cup. The act of Hotṛ is to be followed by other priests. The principle is utilised by Devaṇṇabhaṭṭa in his Smṛticandrikā. While discussing the procedure about the ordeal of fire, he quotes the text of Pitāmaha stating that about 9 circles should be formed for worshipping the gods. Yājñavalkya-Smṛti II.106 states the measurement of 16 fingers for the circle to be formed. Further, the presiding deities for these circles are also pointed out. Now the question arises whether the several deities mentioned as presiding over the circles should be offered any worship or not. Our author answers this question by stating that following the principle of

Hotṛcamasanyāya the drinking of the Soma in the cup is to be made by the priests, in the same manner, in the case of worship to be offered to the presiding deities of the circles, it will have to be admitted that they must be offered worship by the Yajamāna himself.

9) Na Vidhau Paraḥ Śabdārtha nyāya :- (न विधौ परः शब्दार्थ न्याय) Śabara has employed the principle of this maxim on Jaimini's Pūrvamīmāṃsā Sūtra IV.4.19. Here it is laid down that Piṇḍapitṛyajña is to be performed on the next day of Amāvāsyā Yāga which is a darśayāga. Now the question is whether the Piṇḍapitṛyajña is subsidiary to the Amāvāsyā Yāga or it is a Pradhāna Yāga. The prima facie view is that the Piṇḍapitṛyajña is a subsidiary yāga of the Amāvāsyā yāga, since it is laid down in the context of the Amāvāsyā yāga. The Siddhāntin, however, holds that there is no authority to hold that it is an aṅga of the Amāvāsyā yāga. Moreover, in the Āmāvāsyā yāga, there is a reference to the time factor and in the darśayāga, there is only an indicative reference to the Piṇḍapitṛyāga. The conclusion is that the Piṇḍapitṛyajña is a principal yāga meant for the beneficial interest of men. Śabara's comments further show that the word Piṇḍapitṛyajña cannot be understood in the primary and secondary sense

at one and the same time and in one and the same sentence. Hence the primary sense alone is to be accepted. Besides, the Pīṇapitṛyajña is the proper name of the yāga. The principle of this maxim is utilised by Devaṇṇabhaṭṭa in the Aśauca Kāṇḍa of the Smṛticandrikā. While discussing the topic of the performance of the Ekoddists Śrāddha (एकोद्दिष्टश्राद्ध) during the period of impurity on account of the death of a person, our author Devaṇṇabhaṭṭa quotes the text of Marīci laying down that it should be performed by the persons of all the castes only after the period of impurity is over. He further supports this view by quoting the view point of Viṣṇu. Then he quotes the text of Śaṅkha enjoining that even though a person meets with another impurity during the first period of impurity, he is supposed to be pure on the eleventh day after the first impurity. For the performance of the Śrāddha only, he is pure and later on he again becomes impure on account of the second impurity. In his comments on the expression 'Ekādaśāh, in the text of Marīci, Devaṇṇabhaṭṭa points out that if by implication it be understood as referring to the period i.e. a day after the period of impurity, even then it will not be correct. The expression 'Ekādaśāh' is not to be understood in two different senses particularly when the primary sense is quite possible. He simply gives his decisive opinion that

Ekoddiṣṭa Śrāddha should be performed even by the Kṣatriyas on the eleventh day (after the impurity of ten days is over). Thus, it is evident that the principle of the above maxim is correctly applied by Devaṇṇabhaṭṭa in interpreting the word Ekādaśāh in the text of Marīci.

10) Niṣādashapathi nyāya :- The principle of this nyāya occurs in Jaimini's Pūrvamīmāṃsā VI.1.51-52. Here the lord of Niṣādas is asked to perform the Raudreṣṭi. Niṣāda means a person born of the union of a brahmin and a śūdra wife. Now the question arises whether the lord of the Niṣāda caste is qualified to perform the Raudreṣṭi. Here the view point of the objector is that the term niṣādashapathi refers to a person belonging to the first three castes and who also happens to be the chief of the niṣādas. Such a type of niṣādashapathi is qualified to perform the Raudreṣṭi. Here the objector dissolves the compound as ṣaṣṭhī tatpuruṣa i.e. niṣādanām sthapatih. As in the case of the persons belonging to the first three communities the knowledge of the Vedic lore is possible and such a type of person alone is to be treated as qualified to perform the Raudreṣṭi. The Siddhāntin, however, adopts the following position. He points out that as the niṣādashapathi is expressly permitted by the Vedic injunction to perform the Raudreṣṭi, he can

perform the same. Even though in the normal course, the vedic knowledge is not possible in his case, however, he can acquire the same. He further dissolves the compound *niṣadasthapati* as the *Karmadhāraya* compound i.e. *niṣadaśca asau sthapatiḥ* and further shows that a person who belongs to the community of the *niṣādas* and who also happens to be the chief of this community, such a type of person is expressly permitted by the Vedic injunction to perform the *Raudreṣṭi*. *Nilakaṇṭha* has utilised the principle of this maxim in his *Vyavahāra Mayūkha*. While discussing the topic of the gift and acceptance of the thing in the case of a *Śūdra* person, *Nilakaṇṭha* shows that even though a *Śūdra* has, ordinarily no right for gift and acceptance, yet he must be understood as being given this right for this purpose by the *Smṛti* text such as *Śūdrānām śūdrajātiṣu*, (शूद्रानां शूद्रजातिषु) following the principle of the *niṣadasthapati nyāya*.

11) Phalavat sannidhau aphalam tadaṅgam iti nyāya (फलवत् सन्निधौ अफलं तदङ्गं इति न्याय) :- *Śābara* in his comments on *Jaimini's Pūrvamīmāṃsā Sūtras* IV.4.7, 19 and 34 has fruitfully employed this maxim. This maxim means that whatever is mentioned in the proximity with an action that has a separate reward or result, but has no independent or special result of its own, is subsidiary (*Aṅga*) to

what is declared to have a reward. The proper example of this can be given as below. The person desirous of heaven is asked to perform the Darśapūrṇamāsa yāga. In the context of this principal sacrifice, the two sacrifices - prayājas and Anuyājas - having no independent result are laid down. The performance of the principal sacrifice can not be said to be complete without the performance of the Prayāja and Anuyāja. Here it is concluded that whatever is the result of the Darśapūrṇamāsa yāga, the same is declared to be the result of the prayājas and Anuyājas. Moreover, as these two sacrifices - prayāja and Anuyāja - are laid down in the context of the Darśapūrṇamāsa yāga, they become subsidiary to the Darśapūrṇamāsa Yāga; otherwise one will be compelled to imagine independent result even for these rites. Nīlakaṇṭha has made a judicious use of this nyāya in the Acāra Mayūkha. While discussing the topic of the Sandhyāvandana, Nīlakaṇṭha makes as reference to the Arghya-dāna, which occurs in the proximity or contiguity of the Sandhyāvandana. No independent result is laid down for the Arghya-dāna, whereas the Sandhyāvandana has an independent result in the form of the destruction of sin. This application of the above maxim to the present case makes it quite clear that Sandhyāvandana is a principal karma and Arghya-

dāna is its subsidiary, because it is laid down in the context of the Sandhyāvandana.

12) Rātrisatra nyāya :- Satra means a sacrificial session lasting for 12 days or even more days. Here the sacrifice is laid down for that man who wishes to get some stability or fame in this world. It is important to note that even though in the 'pratitiṣṭhanti ha vai ya etā rātrirūpayanti,' the expression pratitiṣṭhanti does not show any sign of a Vidhi, yet the adhyāhāra of the Vidhi is to be made here. The Rātrisatra nyāya is on par with the Viśvajit nyāya, because in both the sacrifices the independent result is not stated that is not laid down in the context of any principal sacrifice to show its subsidiary character. The Rātrisatra looks like a mere praise of the performance of the Rātrisatra, but really it is a Vidhi about the reward of the Rātrisatra and states an exception to the rule that heaven is the reward or a result for a rite which has no independent result laid down for it. Devaṇṇabhaṭṭa has made proper application of the principle of this maxim in his work Smṛticandrika. While discussing the nature and time for the performance of the Kāmya Śrāddha, he quotes the text of Viṣṇu Purāṇa to show that the Kāmya Śrāddha should be performed on a solstice, upon equinox, on the vyatipatha day, the constellation of

the birth day and the eclipse of the sun and the moon. He also points out that the Samkrānti period is also capable of securing the desired result. The question naturally arises as regards the proper result for the performance of the Kāmya Śrāddha. Here Devaṇṇabhaṭṭa points out that the extreme satisfaction of the manes is the proper result for the performance of the Kāmya Śrāddha. Just as the stability is the result for the performance of the Rātrisatra, following the principle of the Rātrisatrananyāya, in the similar manner, the extreme satisfaction of the manes is also regarded as the result for the Kāmya Śrāddha performed either on the Samkrānti day or the days mentioned by the text of Viṣṇu Purāṇa.

13) R̥tvig nyāya :- Śābara has used this maxim on Jaimini's Pūrvamīmāṃsā Sūtra III.7.32.33. Here the important point is whether all the persons mentioned in connection with the Jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice are to be treated as priests or some of them are to be treated as priests. Here the prima facie view is that as all the persons take part in the sacrifice, all the persons are to be considered as priests. But the accepted conclusion is that all the persons taking part in the sacrifice are not to be treated as priests. Only 17 persons are to be treated as priests. Here it should be noted that the

etymological meaning of the word is not to be applied but only the conventional meaning of the word is to be applied. It is further clear that the conventional meaning is more powerful than the etymological meaning of the word. In connection with these priests, the question arises as regards the fees to be accepted by them. The *prima facie* view is that all the priests should get equal fees. But the accepted conclusion is that there should be an inequal division of fees, as this division becomes available in the *Vikṛti yāga* from the *Prakṛti yāga*. The sentence, in this respect of fees, from the *Prakṛti yāga*, are explicit and solve this problem. This principle is applied by Devaṇṇabhaṭṭa in his *Smṛticandrika*. While discussing the topic of the gains that can not be divided at the time of partition of the property, Devaṇṇabhaṭṭa quotes the text of *Kātyāyana* and also the view point of *Bṛhaspati*. The wealth earned by the Brahmin from the pupil by way of tuition fees and also by acting as a priest for the sacrificial session is not to be divided at the time of partition of the property. In this respect, our author Devaṇṇabhaṭṭa makes the application of this maxim under discussion. Just as in the *Rtvig nyāya*, the priests get inequal share in the fees as per the statements available in the *prakṛti yāga*, so also in the present case, the wealth obtained by the brāhmin from the pupil and

sacrifices, become his property and hence is not subject to division.

14) Sārasvatau bhavatah nyāya :- Śābara has used his maxim on Jaimini's Pūrvamīmāṃsā Sūtra V.1.14. Here there is a reference to the two sarasvata offerings to be offered in the honour of Sarasvati and Sarasvan. The question arises as regards the anteriority and the posteriority of the offerings of oblations in the case of these deities. The *prima facie* view is that as there is no rule to determine the definite order of sequence, there should not be any restriction as such. Hence one may do as one likes. The *siddhāntin*, here points out that the order is the subsidiary sacrifice, is to be determined on the basis of the order laid down in the principal sacrifice. In the *Hautrakāṇḍa*, the *Yājñanuvākya* mantras give a preference to the performance of the sacrifice by offering an oblation in the honour of the female deity Sarasvati. This is also supported by the mantra 'prāṇo devī sarasvatī vājebhih vājinīvatī.' (प्राणो देवी सरस्वती वाजेभिः वाजिनीवती) Hence the accepted conclusion is that the offerings in the honour of the deity i.e. Sarasvatī are to be offered first and then the offerings in the honour of Sarasvān. Devaṇṇabhaṭṭa has correctly applied this principle to decide the complicated case in the *Dharma-Śāstra*. While discussing the right of the

mother to inherit the property of a sonless man, the question arises whether the preference should be given to a mother or a father. According to Vijñāneśvara as the text of the Manu-Smṛti IX.217 makes a room for the mother, a room must be made for her in the compact series of heirs to succeed the property of a sonless person. Vijñāneśvara - further argues for giving a preference to a mother in that she bears the child in the womb and every person is having more veneration for the mother. In the ekaśeṣa Dvandva compound, the preference is always given to a female member. He (the author of the Smṛticandrika) disagrees with Vijñāneśvara and gives the Mimāṃsa ruling. He shows that just as in the sarasvatau bhavataḥ nyāya, the proper order is shown, in the similar manner, in the matter of showing any preference to a mother or a father, there is no authoritative text available to us. In short, Devaṇṇabhaṭṭa does not think it proper to apply the above principle of the maxim to the present case under discussion. This may be treated as a negative example where the principle is not applied.

15) Sarvaśākhā nyāya - This nyāya occurs in Jaimini's Pūrvamīmāṃsā Sūtra II.4.32. Here the important question is when in any Vedic texts in

respect of any sacrificial activity, the different conflicting views become available, how to resolve this conflict. Here the view point of the objector is that on account of the difference in name, form branch etc., there should be a difference in the sacrificial action. There is a difference in the branch such as Kaṇva, Kāthaka etc. It is further pointed out that those who study Kariri vākyas, take their meal on the ground, while the persons belonging to other branches do not take food on the ground. The persons belonging to one branch recite the mantra 'iṣe' etc. From the branch of Palāśa, it is clear they perform actions such as chedādi. Moreover, it is not possible for man, having a short life, to study all the branches in order to perform all the sacrificial activities. On account of the grounds mentioned above, the view point of the prima facie is that the different branches are mainly responsible for the difference in sacrificial activities. Here the view point of Siddhāntin is that on account of the absence of form, there should be one and the same Karma. There is the same name. Even in other respects besides, as regards the mantra of taking food on the ground, it may be said that is a physical activity of the study. By making the restriction of the different branches, one can perform the sacrifices even if one is having a very short life. Therefore the conclusion arrived at

by the Siddhāntin is that on account of the difference in the name, form, mode of action, there should not be a difference in the sacrificial activities. Nīlakaṇṭha has utilised this principle in the Samaya Mayūkha. While discussing the topic of the Upākarma, Nīlakaṇṭha quotes the opinion of Madhava, the author of the Nirṇayāmṛta, that with reference to the Upākarma, the month alone is prescribed. Even though there is a difference as regards the time during which the said Upākarma is to be performed, yet it can be concluded that with reference to all the branches, there should be one and the same sacrificial action, following the principle laid down in the above maxim. When there is a direct conflict in the Smṛtis, one should stick to one's own Sūtra (Gr̥hyasūtra) or the branch, because the sacrificial action is one and the same in all the Sūtras.

16) Yogasiddhi - Adhikaraṇa nyāya - This maxim is used by Śābara on Jaimini's Pūrvamīmāṃsā Sūtras IV.3.27-28. In the foregoing Adhikaraṇa, it is explained that all the desired results have been enjoined as following from the principal sacrifice. Now the question arises whether all the results are brought by a single performance of the sacrifice or by the repeated separate performance. In this respect, the prima facie view is

that all the results follow from a single performance. The Siddhāntin holds that there is the regular succession. The result is brought about by the succession of the principal and the subsidiary sacrifice. There is an inherent impossibility in all results springing up simultaneously as there is incongruity involved in it. Besides, for every result that is desired, there must be a separate performance. This principle is brought to his own purpose by Devaṇṇabhaṭṭa in his Smṛticandrika. He quotes verse from the Yājñavalkya-Smṛti I.262-264 to show that the person desirous of particular - result, should perform a Śrāddha on the particular Tithi of the dark-fort-night. He finally concludes that if any body performs Śrāddha on the Āmāvāsyā day, then all the desires entertained by the person are fulfilled. Now the question arises whether by performing a Śrāddha on the Amāvāsyā day, a man is likely to get all the results that are laid down for performing the Śrāddha on the different tithis of the dark-fort-night or not. Here Devaṇṇabhaṭṭa makes the application of the principle of the above maxim and suggests that for every desired result, the Śrāddha should be performed on the different tithis, one has to perform different Śrāddhas on the different tithis.

17) Viśvajit nyāya - The principle of this

Nyāya is employed by Śabara on Jaimini's Pūrvamīmāṃsā Sūtras III.5.7 and IV.3.16. Here the question arises as regards the result for the sacrificial activity for which no specific result is mentioned. Here the established conclusion is that when no special result is laid down for any activity connected with the sacrifice, heaven is to be regarded as the result for the same. Moreover, it is a general observation that no one is tempted to undertake any activity, unless some special result is promised for the activity that is to be undertaken. Medhātithi has employed the principle of this nyāya in his commentary on the Manu-Smṛti II.24. Here Manu has asked the twice-born people to stay in the particular countries; the Śūdra may, however stay in any place particularly when he is distressed in the matter of his livelihood. Now the question arises as to what kind of result, a twice-born person is likely to get as a result of staying in the countries mentioned by Manu in the preceding stanzas. Actually, however, no independent result is promised by Manu for the twice-born people staying in particular countries. Here Medhātithi makes the application of the principle of the above maxim and points out that just as in the Viśvajit nyāya, heaven is regarded as a result for the sacrificial activity for which no result is promised, in the similar manner in the present case of staying of

the twice-born persons in the particular countries, purity is regarded as the result for the same. This kind of purity is always imagined in respect of the place and also the water that is available at such place. In fine, Medhātithi has made the best use of this maxim to arrive at some pointed conclusion.

18) Vṛttidvaya-Virodha-Nyāya- The principle of this maxim is used by Śābara on Jaimini's Pūrvamīmāṃsā Sūtra 1.4.8 and in the Jaiminīya-Nyāya-Mālā-Vistara at III.2.1.2. This maxim simply means that if a single word in Vidhivākyas is used in the primary sense in certain cases and in the secondary sense in some other cases, then the fault of the Vṛttidvaya virodha would incur. Hence the Mīmāṃsakas maintain that at one and the same place, one and the same word is to be understood only in one sense - primary or secondary - but not in two different ways. It seems that the writers on Dharma-Śāstra have violated this principle in interpreting the text of the Smṛti literature. Aparārka has incurred the fault of Vṛttidvaya-virodha particularly when he interprets the Yājñavalkya-Smṛti II.123. Here this line would mean that after the death of father, a mother should also take equal share along with the other inheritors in the property that has come down from the ancestors. While commenting on this line,

Aparārka says that the word occurring in this stanza, means not only a mother but also a step-mother. He also relied on the text of Vyāsa for interpreting the word mārā in the sense of a step-mother. It may be noted here that this kind of interpretation offered by the Commentator Aparārka is no doubt, supported by the Smṛti authority, but it suffers from the Mimāṃsā flaw of interpretation. In passing, one may also note that Nilakaṇṭha, the author of the Vyavahāra Mayūkha, finds fault with Vijñāneśvara particularly when he interprets the word Bhrātā in the text of the Yājñavalkya-Smṛti II.135-136 as indicating a full brother and also a half-brother or a step-brother. Nilakaṇṭha simply suggests that the mode of interpretation suggested by Vijñāneśvara, if accepted, would suffer from the fault of the Vṛttidvaya-virodha. A good student of the Pūrvamīmāṃsā and Dharma-Śāstra is expected to avoid this fault of interpretation.

19) Yūpakarma Nyāya :- This nyāya is employed on Jaimini's Pūrvamīmāṃsā Sūtras XI.3.3.4. In the Jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice, there is a reference to the three animals and one pole. Generally the poles are prepared from the trees of palāśa, khadira and rohitaka. Now the question arises whether with reference to the three animals to be offered as oblations, there should be one pole

or separate pole for a separate animal. The *prima facie* view is that in the Agniśomīya yāga, a pole is directly laid down. In other cases, it becomes available by the rule of transfer and with reference to every animal, there should be a different pole. The Siddhāntin, however, holds that the idea of a pole is introduced not only in the Agniśomīya yāga but even before that. Following the principle of Tantratā, there should be only one pole useful for all these animals. It may be noted that all the actions of cutting, paring etc., are to be carried out in respect of only one pole. The principle of this maxim is best utilised by Devaṇṇabhaṭṭa in his *Smṛticandrikā*. While discussing the qualifications of a Purohita, Devaṇṇabhaṭṭa quotes the text of Vyāsa. The purohita is a specific special officer appointed for a court matter. Here the question arises whether there should be different purohitas possessed of different attributes or only one Purohita possessed of all the Guṇas, attributes laid down by the text of Vyāsa. Here Devaṇṇabhaṭṭa applies the above principle and decides that there should be only one Purohita possessed of all the attributes enumerated in the text of Vyāsa. He possibly feels that just as all the acts of cutting, paring etc., are carried out in respect of one pole, in the similar manner, all the different attributes should be possessed by one and the same Purohita.

It may be noted here that the import of this nyāya comes very near to the principle of the Aruṇa nyāya explained below. Here one is tempted to observe that instead of using the Yūpakarma nyāya involving several activities in respect of one pole, Devaṇṇabhaṭṭa should have used Aruṇa nyāya suggesting the combination of all the attributes enumerated in a sentence or a stanza. This may be regarded as a glaring example of the slight carelessness on the part of the author of the Smṛticandrikā.

20) Aruṇa nyāya - This maxim is used on Jaimini's PūrvamīmāṃsāṃSūtra III.1.12. Here the sentence under discussion is 'He purchases Soma with a hiefer one year old, having brown eyes and red in colour. Here the question arises whether one should purchase Soma with a different hiefer possessing above qualities or only one hiefer possessed of all the above attributes. Here the established conclusion is that in the case of one hiefer, all the attributes mentioned in the sentence are to be lumped together and are not to be taken separately. Hence this Nyāya lays down that one who earns money by lawful (fair) means, one who has unflinching devotion or faith in the highest reality, one to whom the guests are dear, one who performs Śrāddha ceremony and one who speaks

the truth, becomes released (i.e. he gets immortality). He further quotes passages from the śruti and also the Chāndogyopaniṣad to show that one will not attain immortality by performing deeds but by the knowledge of the highest reality. Thus, there arises a conflict between the Smṛti text laying down for several acts and the śruti text pointing out immortality for knowledge. In fact, there is a conflict between the Karma-marga and Jñāna-marga. Aparārka removes this conflict by the use of the principle of the Aruṇa nyāya and suggests that when the highest object is one and the same, i.e. immortality, but the subordinate elements are different, one should simply lump together all the sub-ordinate elements - that is the actions mentioned in the text of the Yājñavalkya-Smṛti and also the knowledge of the highest reality advocated in the śruti and the Chāndogyopaniṣad. In fact, this is a happy combination of Jñānamarga and the Karma marga suggested by Aparārka, the great commentator of the Yājñavalkya-Smṛti and particularly a Dharma-śāstra writer.



23. Max-Well's rules of interpretation and the Pūrvamīmāṃsā rules of interpretation

11. In all the above matters the Mīmāṃsa rules of interpretations are frequently used. Many of these rules closely resemble, Maxwell's rules of interpretation of law.

We quote a few examples below.

1. The golden rule is that the words of statute must *prima facie* be given their ordinary meaning (Maxwell).

Loke eṣu artheṣu padāni sati
sambhave tadarthānyeva. (Mīmāṃsā rule)

लोके येषु अर्थेषु पदानि सति सम्भवे तदर्थान्येव ।

2. Exposition of one act in the language of another in the same matter (Maxwell)

The criterion of Samākhyā of Pūrvamīmāṃsa.

3. Usage may determine the meaning of the language.

yogāt rūḍhiḥ baliyaṣi. (Pūrvamīmāṃsa)

4. The title is no part of law (Maxwell)
Nāmadheya is not Karmavidhi (Pūrvamīmāṃsa)

5. The general statute is read as silently

excluding the cases which are provided by special (Maxwell).

Utsargāpavādanyāya (Pūrvamīmāṃsā)

6. Construction has to be made of all parts together (Maxwell)

Vākyabhedo doṣaḥ

7. Personal acts and local customs (Maxwell)

Rathakāranyāya and Niṣādashapatināya,
Āchāraprāmānya. (Pūrvamīmāṃsa)

8. To arrive at the real meaning, it is always necessary to get an exact idea of the object of the act. (Maxwell)

Phala is the criterion to determine the purport. (Pūrvamīmāṃsa)



24. The ontological nature of cognition in Pūrvamīmāṃsā

The ontological nature of cognition is differently envisaged in different schools of Indian philosophy.

Firstly whether it is a constituent of the very core nature of knowing self or it is an attribute of the self has to be examined. If it is an attribute, whether it is a quality or activity needs to be looked into. It is also considered as a substance by some. As a background to present the Pūrvamīmāṃsā view in detail, these views are briefly noticed here. The Nyāyavaiśeṣikas consider it as a quality of knowing self. The sāmkhyaś do not classify the categories as dravya, guṇa etc. They describe cognition as a result of Sattvasamudreka of Buddhitattva.

In Viśiṣṭādvaita cognition is given a special name viz Dharmabhūtajñāna. It is considered both as substance and quality. They do not see any contradiction in it. They compare it with dipaprabhā (the light of a lamp). The Jains consider it as a modification of knowing self. It is staged to be a natural and special quality of knowing self.

In Advaita vedānta the cognition is considered at two levels viz śuddha chaitanya and vṛttijñāna, i.e. pure consciousness and empirical cognition. The

first is the foundation of the entire cognition process. The second one is a conditioned epistemic process. It is only at this state that the knower, known, and the means of cognition bifurcation takes place. Dvaita vedānta also proposes two types of cognition, svarūpajñāna and vṛttijñāna. The first is the very nature of knowing self. The second is the cognition obtained through the sense perception, inference etc external means.

Mīmāṃsā concept of cognition

For Bhāṭṭa mīmāṃsakas the cognition is an activity of the knowing self.

Before we elaborate this point we have to take into account the process laid down for establishing the contact between the objects to be known and the knowing self. There are two approaches viz. 1) Modification of the knowing agent i.e. buddhi or antahkaraṇa by the contact of the object through the external sense (ii) The contact of the knowing self with the external object through the manas and external sense without any modification. The first is the sāmkhya model and the second is the Nyāyavaiśeṣika model. Though these two processes cannot be equated fully with the two causation theories viz. Evolution theory and Creation theory, the influence of these theories on them cannot be ruled out. The process of contact laid down by the

Bhāṭṭa mīmāṃsakas seems to be a mix up of these two processes.

The Bhāṭṭa theory that the cognition is an activity of the knowing self is established on the following grounds.

The knowing self is an agent, the known is an object. This agent-- object relationship is not possible without some activity on the part of the agent. Hence an activity has to be envisaged on the part of the knowing self. The act of knowing itself is this activity. This is a kind of modification i.e. vikriyā on the part of the knowing self. The contacts among the knowing self, manas, sense and the object bring about this modification in the knowing self. This modification itself is cognition. It is with this modification that the self becomes the knower. 'Buddhau utpannāyām utpadyate eva jñātṛrūpa-vikārah' (T.T.132) (बुद्धौ उत्पन्नायां उत्पद्यते एव ज्ञातृरूपविकारः) It is a state that is attained by the self. One and same self could be recognised in both the states viz before developing the cognition and after developing the cognition. Therefore, this modification does not affect the eternality of the self. 'Na asau vikārah nityatvam vināśayati pratyabhijñā pratyayena avasthādvayepi anusandhānāt.' (T.T. P.132) (नासौ विकारः नित्यत्वं विनाशयति प्रत्यभिज्ञा प्रत्ययेन अवस्थाद्वयेऽपि अनुसन्धानात्) Vikriyā jñānarūpā asya nityatve na virotsyate. (S.V. Pratyakṣa st.53,56)

This modification designated as cognition, is subtle. It has to be inferred by its result viz. revelation of the object. A 'phalanumeyā tasyāśca phalam syāt artha dr̥ṣṭatā' (M.R.S P.280) (फलानुमेया तस्याश्च फलं स्यात् अर्थदृष्टता)

To fully grasp its nature and role the following points have to be noted.

i) It is Karaṇa i.e. means as well as phala i.e. result. The fact of its very arising by the contact with manas, senses and object makes it the means, and its enabling the object to reveal makes it the result.

ii) It is distinct from other Karaṇas in two respects.

iii) It is not already there to play the role of Karaṇa. It arises and plays the role of Karaṇa.

iv) It does not require any intermediary activity i.e. avāntaravyāpāra to play its role while other Karaṇas do require it.

v) In a way revelation of object itself may be taken as both avāntara vyāpāra intermediary action and pradhānakriyā, main action.

From these features it is clear that when Mīmāṃsakas say that the cognition is an activity, they do not mean the usual type of activity. It is a

modification of the self into a knowing self investing him with the activity of knowing. Their real interest is to maintain a clear distinction between the subject and the object by pointing out that these two are linked by the cognition.

This concept of cognition as activity is criticised by Jayanta Bhatta on three grounds⁴ : i) The cognition by itself is not an activity. It is a result of sense contact etc activity (ii) An activity that is present in a perceivable object cannot be imperceptible. Ātman is perceptible according to the Bhāṭṭas. Therefore, the cognition which is claimed to be its modification has got to be perceptible. If it is accepted as perceptible, then, the Bhāṭṭa theory that the cognition is inferred will collapse. (iii) There cannot be any activity that is subtle and that is not of the nature of motion. Hence, the activity of the nature of cognition which is claimed to be subtle and not of the nature of motion, cannot link the ātman, manas, senses and the object. (iv) The cognition as an activity is claimed to be both Karaṇa and phala. However, one and the same cannot be both Karaṇa and phala. (N.M. P.16-17 Kāśi Sanskrit series No.106, 1936)

All these objections are based on the assumption that the Bhāṭṭas hold the cognition is an activity of usual type. However, Bhāṭṭas have conceived it as a

vikriyā i.e. modification of ātman that operates through the manas and sense, and enables the object to reveal itself. It is better to describe it as a state of the self rather than an activity or quality. It may be noted that in Vedānta cognition is described as a state of antahkaraṇa in the case of vṛtti jñāna. Later Mīmāṃsā writers have called it a guṇa. Kumārila uses the expression dharma i.e. an attribute. Some commentators have stated it to be a Śakti of self. In any case it is not a guṇa or an action of motion type in the Nyāyavaiśeṣika sense.

The comprehension of cognition

The next issue is the comprehension of cognition itself. The cognition enables us to comprehend the objects. But what are the means to comprehend the cognition itself? In this respect three views are held viz. (i) cognition is self-revealing i.e. svaprakāśa (ii) It is comprehended by Manas (iii) It is inferred on the basis that the object is revealed. The Bhāṭṭa mīmāṃsakas go by the third view and the Prābhākaras by the first view.

According to the Bhāṭṭas all objects are invested with a quality called prākāṣya i.e. a special capacity to reveal itself. It is also called as jñātātā or dr̥ṣṭatā the capacity to be known or perceived. This is clear from the experiences like 'jār is revealed' 'jār is known' etc. This quality is found in all substances.

It is also found in *jāti*, *guṇa* etc that are connected with the substance by *tādātmya* relation. It is this quality that enables to infer the cognition of the object. Knowledge itself cannot be equated with *prākātya* since the cognition is in *ātman* and *prākātya* is in the object. It is only on the basis of *prākātya* of an object that the cognition of that object is inferred. (M.M. P. 256-260)

Thus according to the Bhāṭṭas knowledge is neither self-revealing nor comprehended by *manas*. It is inferred by the fact that the object is revealed.

This concept of *prākātya* is criticised by raising the following objections : (i) *Prākātya* is stated to be a quality. At the same time it is also stated that it is found in the qualities like colour etc. A quality cannot be a quality of another quality. (ii) *Prākātya* should either be revealed by another factor or be self revealing. If it is revealed by another factor, then, the *prākātya* in that has to be revealed by yet another factor and so on. This leads to infinite regress. On the other hand if it is self revealing why not consider cognition of the object itself as self-revealing? (iii) Since the awareness of objects could be explained by the cognition of the object, there is no justification to accept an intermediary entity like *prākātya*.

The first objection can be answered by pointing

out that a quality like number is found in other qualities. Therefore, there is no bar for a quality to be in another quality. The second objection also may be cleared on the analogy of eye. Eye reveals the other objects without itself being revealed by anything else. As regards the third point, it is true that the cognition enables the object to be revealed but the question is as to how cognition itself is comprehended. The Bhāṭṭas, answer is that it is inferred by the fact of the revelation of the object. (MM 262-63)

The Prābhākaras do not go by this theory. They accept cognition as svaparakāśa. According to Prābhākaras in all cognitions, the knower, the known and the cognition are presented. The knower and the cognition are directly cognised in all cognitions. Their cognition is of the nature of perception. The status of the cognition of object as perception, inference etc. depends upon the means by which the cognition is produced. However, all kinds of cognitions are self revealing in the ultimate analysis. The cognition is termed as 'samvit' in the Prābhākara system.

Majority of the schools of Indian philosophy accept that cognition is Saviṣaya i.e. it is about an object.



25. Nirvikalpaka and Savikalpaka

In a perceptual cognition the object is cognised in two stages viz. nirvikalpaka and savikalpaka. In describing the nature of these two stages the systems of Indian philosophy considerably differ. We may briefly notice their views :

i) Buddhists hold the view that nirvikalpaka alone is valid cognition. At nirvikalpaka stage, the svalakṣaṇa i.e. the thing in itself which is momentary is presented. The expression svalakṣaṇa means different from all others. It is a state in which there are no attributes. Savikalpaka is a mental projection. At this stage the attributes are projected.

ii) The Grammarians say that there is no nirvikalpaka stage. There can be no cognition of an object without a reference by words. The words always refer to the attributes. Therefore, there is no such stage such as nirvikalpaka.

iii) The Advaita holds the view that the cognition of sat i.e Brahman, is nirvikalpaka. The difference between the Buddhist approach to nirvikalpaka and that of Advaita is that the object of nirvikalpaka is momentary according to Buddhists and it is permanent according to Advaita. However, the object of nirvikalpaka cognition is attributeless according to both.

iv) It is in Nyayavaiśeṣika system that these two stages are systematically worked out. At the nirvikalpaka stage the entity, its attributes, and the relation between the two are presented in the cognition but these are not identified as qualified and qualification. It is only at the savikalpaka stage that these are presented as a complex of qualified and qualifications. It is viśiṣṭaviśayakajñāna i.e. cognition of a complex of an entity and its attributes duly related. A viśiṣṭapratyaya presupposes viśeṣaṇa pratyaya. This is the ground to envisage nirvikalpaka as an earlier stage of savikalpaka. At the stage of nirvikalpaka there is only viśayatā of the entity and the attributes with reference to the cognition while at the savikalpaka stage there is prakāratā of the attributes, viśeṣyatā of the entity and sansargatā of the relation with reference to the cognition.

In the definition of perception given in Gautamasūtra the expressions 'avyapadeśya' and vyavasāyātmaka occur. These are interpreted by Vāchaspati Miśra, as referring to nirvikalpaka and savikalpaka respectively. Avyapadeśya means that which is not referred by words. The nirvikalpaka stage is not referred to by words. Vyavasāyātmaka means determinate. The savikalpaka stage is a determinate stage.

According to the Bhāṭṭa mīmāṃsakas, at the nirvikalpaka stage the entity and its attributes universal etc. are cognised without realising their viśeṣa and sāmānya nature. This cognition is like a cognition of a child or a dumb person. Kumarila describes it as ālochanātmaka i.e. mere sensation. Later at the savikalpaka stage, the fact that the attribute i.e. universal, continues in other individual entities of the same class and the entity itself is specific, is realised. This process is called anuvṛtti i.e. continuing nature, vyāvṛtti i.e. specific nature. In view of this realisation the entity is now cognised with its general and special aspects and referred to by the word.

asti hi ālocana jñānam prathamam nirvikalpakam
 balamūkādivijñānasadṛśam śuddhavastujam
 na viśeṣo na sāmānyam tadānīm anubhūyate
 tayoh ādhārabhūtā tu vyaktiḥ eva avaśiṣyate
 (S.V.Pr. 112-113)

(अस्ति हि आलोचनज्ञानं प्रथमं निर्विकल्पकं
 बालमूकादि विज्ञानसदृशं शुद्धवस्तुजम् ।
 न विशेषो न सामान्यं तदानीमनुभूयते
 तयोराधारभूता तु व्यक्तिरेवावशिष्यते ॥)

Pārthasārthi explains the term sāmānya as anuvṛtti and viśeṣa as vyāvṛtti and remarks that anuvṛtti vyāvṛtti na nirvikalpake prakāśēte tayoh ādhārabhutam anuvṛttam vyāvṛttam yat jātivyaktyādi anekā-

kāram vastu tattadākārasamyuktaṃ sammugdham sarvaṃ avasīyate. (अनुवृत्तिव्यावृत्ती न निर्विकल्पके प्रकाशेते तयोराधारभूतं अनुवृत्तं व्यावृत्तं यत् जातिव्यक्त्यादि अनेकाकारं वस्तु तत्तदाकार संयुक्तं संमृगं सर्वं अवसीयते)

It is this cognition of śuddhavastu that reminds the word at savikalpaka stage. 'tadabhāve nirnimittam' śabdasmaraṇam na syāt' (तदभावे निर्निमित्तं शब्दस्मरणं न स्यात् 1).

The Prābhākaras also explain the nature of nirvikalpaka and savikalpaka in the same way. Śālikanātha explains the process of nirvikalpaka and savikalpaka as follows:

On seeing an entity the cogniser gets the cognition of that entity and its attributes universal, quality etc. However, he does not realise which of them is common with other entities of the same class and which is special. When he reflects on other entities of the same class he sorts out the common and the special.

i) prathamam svarupamātra grhaṇam dravyajāti guṇeṣu utpadyate'. (प्रथमं स्वरूपमात्रग्रहणं द्रव्यजातिगुणेषु उत्पद्यते) At the initial stage barely the object, as it is, is perceived in lieu of the stuff it is made of, the class it belongs to and the qualities it has inherent in it.

ii) sāmānyaviśeṣau dve vastuni pratipadyamānam

pratyakṣam prathamam utpadyate kintu vastvantara
anusandhān sunyatayā sāmānya viśeṣatayā na
pratiyate.

anugatam sāmānyam ucyate vyāvṛttiśca viśeṣaḥ
(Pr.p 163)

(सामान्यविशेषौ द्वे वस्तुनी प्रतिपद्यमानं प्रत्यक्षं प्रथममुत्पद्यते किन्तु
वस्त्वन्तरानुसन्धानशून्यतया सामान्यविशेषतया न प्रतीयेते । अनुगतं सामान्य
उच्यते व्यावृत्तिश्च विशेषः)

The stage at which the entity and its attributes are cognised without the realisation of their continuing nature and special nature is nirvikalpaka stage while the next stage at which this is realised is savikalpaka stage. The entity, and its attributes are cognised at both stages but at the first stage their common and special nature is not realised while at the second stage this is realised.

This distinguishes the Prābhākara concept of nirvikalpaka from that of Buddhists and Advaita. According to Buddhists svalakṣaṇa alone is cognised but not its attributes. According Advaita 'sat' alone is cognised. At savikalpaka stage, according to Buddhists the attributes are projected while according to Mīmāṃsā and Nyāya these are real.

In respect of Savikalpaka, Śaṅkaranatha clarifies two points.

i) It is stated that to have savikalpaka stage of cognition reflecting on another entity is necessary. Such a reflection is not caused by the contact of sense with that entity. Therefore, the involvement of such a procedure will come in the way of treating Savikalpaka stage as perception. Śālikanātha states this difficulty and clarifies that the reflection of another entity is only a sahakārin i.e. an aid, to the savikalpaka cognition. Its chief means is the contact between the sense and the object. Therefore, its status as perception is not affected.

ii) It is stated that the content of both nirvikalpaka and savikalpaka is same. The entity and its attributes are cognised at both stages. This appears to affect the very validity of savikalpaka, since, there is no new element in savikalpaka. Therefore, it is clarified that the identifying the common and special nature of the entity and its attributes is a new element at the savikalpaka stage. Therefore, the validity of savikalpaka is not affected.



26. The definition of Pramāṇa

In Indian epistemology cognition is bifurcated as valid and invalid. The valid cognition is designated as *pramā* and invalid cognition as *bhrama*. In *Pūrvamīmāṃsā* text these are called *pramāṇa* and *apramāṇa*. The expression *pramāṇa* could be interpreted as means of valid cognition and also as valid cognition itself following appropriate etymological explanation viz. (i) *pramiyate anena* i.e. that by which cognition is obtained (ii) *pramiyate yat* i.e. the cognition obtained. Its particular meaning has to be identified by the context.

Jaiminī sūtra does not explicitly state any definition of *pramāṇa*. However, *Śāstradīpikā* evolves a definition of *pramāṇa* by utilising certain expressions in the *autpattika sūtra* of *Jaiminī*. The definition evolved reads as '*Karaṇa doṣa bādhaka jñāna rahitam agrhīta-grāhijñānaṃ pramāṇaṃ*' (करणदोषबाधकज्ञानरहितं अग्रहीतग्राहिज्ञानं प्रमाणम्). The cognition which is not produced by defective cause, which is not contradicted and which cognises an object that is already not cognised, is *pramāṇa* i.e. valid cognition. The first two clauses exclude invalid cognition from the scope of this definition and the third clause excludes *anuvāda* i.e. restatement, from the scope of this definition. The third clause excludes *smṛti* i.e., memory also. The first two

clauses are suggested by the word *avyātireka* in the sūtra and the third clause is suggested by *anupalabdha*. The sūtra is framed to explain the nature of *śabdapramāṇa* and establish that it is the only *pramāṇa* in respect of *dharma*. However, it has to have the basic requirements of a *pramāṇa*. These requirements are stated in the sūtra. Śāstradīpikā utilised these clauses and has evolved the above definition.

The definition given by Kumarila adds one more clause viz *ḍṛdham* i.e. firm. This excludes doubt from the scope of the definition of *pramāṇa*.

Dhārāvāhika jñāna i.e. the cognitions of the same object occurring in a series are considered as valid both by the Bhāṭṭas and the Prābhākaras. However, the justifications given by them is different. According to the Bhāṭṭas the condition 'not already known' is not violated in the case of dhārāvāhika jñāna though the same object is cognised again and again. For the time element grasped is different in each cognition. But, the Prābhākaras do not introduce time element. Instead they hold that each succeeding cognition in the series, is produced by the sense contact separately. Therefore, all the cognitions in the series are equally valid.

The Prābhākaras define *pramāṇa* as 'anubhūtiḥ

pramāṇam' i.e. primary experience is pramāṇa. By using the expression anubhūti i.e. primary experience, they exclude memory from the scope of the definition of valid cognition. They declare that 'yathārtham sarvavijñānam' i.e. all cognitions are true. The instances of doubt and wrong cognition are also explained in such a way that these cognitions also convey the objects as they are. They do not accept anyathākhyāti i.e. a cognition that cognises an object as another. The Prābhākaras explanation for the instances of bhrama, will be fully explained while discussing the akhyāti theory of the Prābhākaras.

Nyāya defines pramā as yathārthānubhava i.e. the primary experience that cognises an object as it is. Nyāya and the Prābhākara concepts of valid cognition imply correspondence theory of cognition.



27. The theory of the validity of Cognition

In the context of the concept of valid cognition the question whether the validity of cognition is intrinsic i.e. svataḥ or it is brought about by some additional factors viz parataḥ is raised. The same question is also raised in respect of aprāmāṇya also. In this respect the following views are generally discussed.

- i) Sāṃkhya- Both prāmāṇya and aprāmāṇya are intrinsic i.e. svataḥ.
- ii) Nyāya- Both are parataḥ i.e. extrinsic.
- iii) Bauddha- a) prāmāṇya is parataḥ i.e. extrinsic.
b) aprāmāṇya is svataḥ i.e. intrinsic.

Mīmāṃsaka - Pramāṇya is svataḥ and apramāṇya is parataḥ.

The nature of this problem can be understood by examining the views of Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā.

Mīmāṃsakas have a vested interest in considering Prāmāṇya as intrinsic. The concepts of apauruṣeyatva of Veda and prāmāṇya svatastva have intimate connection. Veda is the unquestionable authority for dharma. If it is considered as pauruṣeya its unquestionable

authority status cannot be maintained. Therefore, they have to establish its intrinsic validity. With a view to achieve it they took the larger question of the validity of cognition itself and formulated their theory of the intrinsic validity of cognition. On the other hand the Nyāya accepted the pauruṣeyatva of Vedas. They hold īśvara as the author of Vedas. Therefore, it was not necessary for them to accept the theory of the intrinsic validity of cognition.



28. The Nyāya theory of the validity of cognition

Let us first examine the Nyāya view. According to it, cognition is a quality of ātman i.e. self. The ātman is its samavāyikāraṇa. The contact between the sense and the object is nimittakāraṇa i.e. efficient cause. This contact between the sense and the object is found both in the case of pramā and bhrama. However, in the case of pramā the contact is between the sense and the object as qualified by its characteristic. It is a cognition of the object as characterised by its own characteristic. This characteristic is viśeṣaṇa of the object and it is called prakāra in the cognition of the object. When the characteristic of the object viz viśeṣaṇa plays the role of prakāra in the cognition of the object it is a valid cognition. 'Tadvati tatprakārakaḥ anubhavaḥ (तदभावति तत्प्रकारकः अनुभवः प्रमा)' is valid cognition. But if the object is cognised as characterised by a characteristic i.e. prakāra which is not actually found in the object cognised, then, it is not valid cognition. There is a gap between the characteristic actually found in the object and the characteristic that is reflected in the cognition. It is 'tadabhāvaṇi tatprakārakaḥ anubhavaḥ' (तदभावति तत्प्रकारकः अनुभवः भ्रमः). The crucial point here is that in the first case the sense not only has the contact

with the object as object but as associated with its own characteristic while in the latter case the sense has contact with the object without extending to the association with its own characteristic. Consequently, some other characteristic is reflected in the cognition.

Though both these cognitions have arisen by the contact between the sense and the object, there are additional factors that have made them valid or invalid. These additional factors are called *guṇa* and *doṣa* respectively. In the first case the very fact of cognising the object as characterised by its own characteristic is an additional factor, since mere contact with the object is found in the case of *apramā* also. In the case of the second, certain draw backs like distance, dim light etc. are additional factors. The additional factor in the first case is called *Guṇa* i.e. merit, as it is more efficient application of sense with the object, and in the second case, it is called *doṣa* as it hinders the proper application of the sense and leads to distortion of the cognition.

doṣo apramāyah janakaḥ pramayāstu guṇo bhavet
pittaduratvādirūpo doṣo nānāvidho mataḥ
pratyakṣe tu viśeṣya viśeṣaṇavatā samam
sannikarṣo guṇaḥ

(दोषोऽप्रमायाः जनकः प्रमायास्तु गुणो भवेत् । पित्तदूरत्वादिरूपो दोषो नानाविधो मतः । प्रत्यक्षे तु विशेष्य विशेषणवता समम् सन्निकर्षो गुणः)

In view of the role of these additional factors the Nyāya considers the validity or invalidity as extrinsic i.e. parataḥ. This is the extrinsic nature of the validity or invalidity at the stage of its very generation i.e. utpattau paratastvam (उत्पत्तौ परतस्त्वम्).

The cognition of the validity is also not intrinsic. If it were intrinsic no doubt would have arisen in certain instances. Therefore, the validity of a cognition has to be ascertained on the basis of successful result i.e. saphala pravṛtti. For instance, when one observes water in a lake he proceeds to fetch it. He drinks the water and his thirst is quenched. This confirms the validity of his cognition of water. On the other hand when one observes mirage and takes it as water and proceeds to fetch it he will not get water. This enables him to realise that his cognition of water was not valid. From this it is clear that both validity and invalidity are not intrinsic to cognition. These are ascertained by inference on the basis of the success or failure of the result.

This approach has certain unsurmountable difficulty. The inference by the successful result is also a cognition. Therefore, its validity also needs

to be verified. If it is further checked by another inference, then, that also has to be checked again. This leads to infinite regress, i.e. anavasthā. The Nyāya has no logical answer for it. Udayana simply states that validity need not be known to undertake activity in all cases. Mere doubt does not prevent activity.

‘prāmānyasya avaśyajñeyatva anabhyupagamāt
tadagrahepi artha sandehādapi upapatteḥ’(N.K. P.81)

(प्रामाण्यस्य अवश्यज्ञेयत्वाभ्युपगमात् तदग्रहेऽपि अर्थसन्देहादपि प्रवृत्त्युपपत्तेः।)

This is defeating the very purpose of the whole debate. Nyāya tries to show anavasthā in the case of svataḥ prāmānya also. We will notice this later. However, this cannot be an excuse for their failure to find out a satisfactory solution.

In this context we have to note two important points.

i) Nyāya defines padārtha as prameya i.e., an entity which is an object of cognition. Therefore, they have no other way to identify the existence of an object other than its cognition. If they had accepted the validity of cognition as intrinsic, there would have been no difficulty in establishing the existence of the object. Since, they have opted for parataḥ prāmānya they have landed into the

difficulty of verifying the validity of one cognition by another and that of the second by the third one and so on. In any case they cannot reach the object without the medium of cognition. This gives scope to deny the very outside object. This is a greater problem than infinite regress. By saying that the cognition of validity is not necessary in all cases and doubt does not prevent activity they have virtually accepted svataḥ prāmānya.

ii) The examples given in case of verificatory cognitions are the cognitions of such objects which are ontologically related with the object of the verified cognition. For instance,

‘idam pṛthivitva prakārakam jñānam, pramā, gandhavati pṛthivitva prakāratvāt.’ (इदं पृथिवीत्व प्रकारकं ज्ञान, प्रमा, गन्धवति पृथिवीत्व प्रकारकत्वात् ।) The cognition of the object characterised by pṛthivitva is a valid cognition as this object has odour. Here, the odour is a distinct characteristic of pṛthivi. This ensures that the object concerned is pṛthivī. Hence, it can be made out that the pṛthivitva which is prakāra is actually found in the object cognised. Here, the objects of the verified cognition and the verificatory cognition are ontologically related. Thus the verification is not merely at the cognition level, but it is at ontological level also. Probably Nyāya feels that in such cases no further verification by another

cognition is necessary. The Nyāya definition of pramā involving a reference to the characteristic of object at object level and the cognition level and linking the object with its characteristic at these levels is intended to ensure the existence of the object outside the cognition and its true reflection in the cognition.



29. Mīmāṃsā theory of the validity of cognition

Mīmāṃsakas consider the validity of cognition as intrinsic i.e. *svataḥ*, both at the level of its generation and cognition. At the generation level the causes that generate the cognition also generate its validity. No additional factors are necessary as contended by the Nyāya. At the cognition level also the causes of the comprehension of the cognition also enable to comprehend its validity. However, in the case of *aprāmāṇya* i.e. invalidity, some or other defect of the cause leads to the invalidity of the cognition. The comprehension of the invalidity also is produced by the contradiction of this invalid cognition by another cognition or by tracing the defect of the causes. Thus, the invalidity is *parataḥ* i.e. extrinsic, both at its generation level and its comprehension level.

The cognition of validity which is intrinsic, is explained in different ways by the three schools of Mīmāṃsā- (i) According to the Prābhākaras, the cognition is self-revealing, therefore, its validity also is self revealed. (ii) According to the Bhāṭṭas the cognition is inferred by *jñātātā*. Consequently its validity is also inferred by the same. (iii) According to Murari Mishra it is comprehended by *mānasa pratyakṣa*.

The procedure of the cognition of validity of a valid cognition is as under :

- i) Vyavasāya of the object as characterised by its own characteristic.
- ii) The cognition of this first cognition by one of the above three ways.
- iii) The cognition of the validity of the cognition concerned along with it.

The procedure of the cognition of invalidity of an invalid cognition is as under :

- i) Vyavasāya of the object as characterised by a characteristic which is not its own characteristic:

This is due to some or the other defect of the causes. At this stage the absence of this superimposed characteristic in the object cognised and the presence of the object's genuine characteristic are not realised.

- ii) The cognition of this first cognition as it is.
- iii) Undertaking a verification on a point of doubt or defect psychologically or epistemologically.
- iv) Realisation of the error by contradiction of this cognition by another cognition or by identifying the defect.
- v) Comprehension of the invalidity.

In this process, since the invalidity is comprehended by means of some other cause viz. realisation of the defect or the contradiction, the invalidity is not intrinsic to the cognition. It is *parataḥ* i.e. extrinsic.

In this context two difficulties have to be noted and solved.

- i) Why not consider *aprāmāṇya* also as *svataḥ* since *anuvyavasāya* conveys the *vyavasāya* level cognition as it is?

This may be answered by pointing out that the grounds of invalidity viz absence of the characteristic superimposed on the object cognised and the presence of its own characteristic in the object are not reflected in this cognition either at *vyavasāya* level or at *anuvyavasāya* level. Therefore, the invalidity is not self evident here.

- ii) If the invalidity is not *svataḥ* and if the ascertainment of the invalidity should await the verification, what is its status until it is verified and identified as invalid ?

This difficulty may be solved by pointing out that the validity of a cognition and its self revealing nature is general i.e. *utsarga*. Hence, the observer takes it as *pramā* though it is *bhrama*. In other

words he makes pramātvāropa on it. However, its real status is that it is apramā, even though it is not yet realised as such. This will be discovered after verification. It is the sublating cognition 'na idam rajatam' that exposes the grounds of its invalidity viz the absence of rajatatva and the presence of sūktitva. That is why the comprehension of invalidity is considered as parataḥ i.e. extrinsic.

The of repeated objection against the intrinsic nature of validity that if the validity is svataḥ, the doubt would not have arisen in certain instances, particularly, when the observer has not frequently observed the object is answered by pointing out that the doubt arises only when some defects in the cause are suspected. On verification if the defects are identified, then, the cognition is not taken as valid. If it is found that there are no defects, then, the doubt is eliminated. There is no need to confirm the validity. It is self-evident. The absence of defects is not the cause of validity. Its presence only distorts the cognition. In the case of aprāmāṇya the doṣas are its cause. The verification confirms the invalidity of the cognition. This distinguishes it from the valid cognition.



30. The Khyāti theories in Indian Philosophy

In Indian epistemology the theories of perceptual error have played an important role. There are five dimensions of these theories. (i) optical (ii) psychological (iii) epistemological (iv) logical and (v) Metaphysical.

The process of error starts at optical level. The psychological level adds to it. It takes epistemological shape. These three aspects have to be taken into account while analysing the nature of error. The analysis has to satisfy the logical requirements. Different schools of Indian Philosophy have different metaphysical view. They have worked out their theory of perceptual error within the framework of their metaphysical systems. Consequently every school has its own theory of error. These theories are known as khyāti theories. These could be broadly grouped into two (i) Idealist and (ii) Realist. Ātmakhyāti and Asatkhyāti theories of Vijñānavādin and Mādhyaṃika come under the first group. Within the second group of Realists, there are two groups viz Anyathā khyāti and Yathārtha khyāti. The Anyathākhyāti of Nyāya-vaiśeṣikas, Viparītakhyāti of Bhāṭṭas and Abhinava anyathā khyāti of Dvaita Vedānta come under Anyathā khyāti group. The Akhyāti theory of the Prābhākaras, Yathārthakhyāti

of Rāmānuja and Satkhyāti of Sāmkhyas come under Yathārthakhyāti group.

The Anirvachaniya khyāti of Advaita is a class by itself. It is based on the Sad-asad-vilakṣaṇa concept of advaita metaphysics and epistemology. The theories of Ātmakhyāti and Asatkhyāti were utilised by Buddhists to explain their metaphysical view. Advaita utilised Anirvachanīyakhyāti to support its Sad-asad vilakṣaṇa view.

Almost all schools of Indian Philosophy discuss the khyāti theories in the major works and defend their respective theories. Maṇḍana Mishra has written a separate treatise viz vibhrama viveka and has discussed five khyāti theories.

He particularly criticises the Akhyāti theory of the Prābhākara and supports Viparītakhyāti theory of the Bhāṭṭas.

Sri Jayatīrtha discusses five prominent khyāti theories in Nyāyasudhā and establishes Abhinava anyathākhyāti theory of Dvaita Vedānta. Recently, Vepattur Subrahmanya Shastry has written a special treatise on this topic viz khyāti Parīkṣā. Presenting Vyākaraṇa view is a special point of this work. He reviews Dvaita and Viśiṣṭādvaita views.

His criticism of Viśiṣṭādvaita view is answered by

Sri Rāmānuja tātāchārya in his work Yathārthakhyāti bhūṣaṇa. Some modern works on this topic have also appeared in English. Among these 'The theory of error in Indian Philosophy' by Dr. Bijayananda Kar 'Perceptual error - the Indian theories' by Dr. Srinivasa Rao, The critique of the theories of Viparyaya by Nāni Lal Sen deserve special mention. These modern works are not affiliated to any particular school.

In spite of a large number of works on this subject and continued debate among philosophers, this problem still remains a vexed problem. Prof. Kuppuswamy Shastry has given a good analysis of the five theories of error in his introduction to Vibhrama viveka. He has made an interesting remark- 'All the theories of Khyāti involve a negative element.' In Asatkhyāti the negative element is obvious. In Ātmakhyāti the external object is absent. In Anyathākhyāti the negative element is found in respect of sansarga or in presenting one object as another which is not present. He says even in Akhyāti of Prabhākara the viveka āgraha is a negative element. It is difficult to agree with this remark since the viveka āgraha is not a content of the two cognitions. He also remarks that in the anirvachaniyakhyāti no negative element is involved. It is difficult to agree with this remark also since the Pratibhāsika sattāka rajata is

superimposed on vyāvahārika sattāka sūkti and for the sake of Pravṛtti it is taken as Vyāvahārika. It is something like a tādātmyāropa of Nyāyavaiśeṣikas and does involve negative element. Something that is absent is presented in a cognition as present. Therefore, a plain definition of khyāti can be given as *astatvaṁ sattvena pratītiḥ*. This is Dvaita view underlies all the theories. This *asat* is *sādhīṣṭhāna*. Without *adhiṣṭhāna* and *sādrśya* no error is possible. This distinguishes this theory from Buddhists' theory of *asat khyāti* which is *niradhiṣṭhāna*. This theory is designated as *abhinava anyathākhyāti* in Dvaita Vedānta.

Prof. Kuppuswamy Shastriji's analysis is very brief. This problem needs full investigation. It also needs a comparative study with modern scientific view and western philosopher's view. Error is a distorted cognition. To determine the nature of error one has to investigate as to at what level the distortion has taken place.

- i) Is it a distortion at ontological level.
- ii) Is it a distortion at psychological level.
- iii) Is it a distortion at epistemological level.
- iv) Do these levels separately cause distortion or more than one level is involved in the distortion of the cognition.

These are the questions that have to be deeply examined.

a) Broadly speaking the Nyāyavaiśeṣikas go by the distortion at ontological level, that is to say one entity is taken as another. However, Sanskāra or Jñānalakṣaṇā pratyāsatti (ज्ञानलक्षणा प्रत्यासत्ति) is of psychological nature. These assist the distortion.

b) The Prābhākaras go by the distortion at epistemological level, that is the difference between the two cognitions is not realised.

c) Vijñānavādins go by the distortion purely at psychological level. These approaches have to be sorted out to determine the nature of error.

Anyathākhyāti theory of Nyāya school

Among the Khyāti theories the anyathākhyāti of Nyāya has a central position. It is discussed by all the schools while presenting their respective theories. According to this theory, in the stock example of shell-silver error the shell is cognised as silver. The shell is present before the observer. His eye is in contact with it. However, he does not cognise its special characteristic śuktitva but cognises it in a general way as a shining object. He also cognises the features that are similar to shell and silver. As he had cognised the silver earlier elsewhere, his mind brings in the silver by way of

jñāna lakṣaṇā pratyāsatti, that is to say, his previous cognition of silver itself serves as a contact to bring in the silver into the fold of his cognition. Both shell and silver are true objects. But the characteristic silverness is not found in the shell. However, this characteristic is presented as characterising *Idam* i.e. śukti, in the cognition while the genuine characteristic of śukti i.e. śuktitva is not presented. Consequently, he cognises shell as silver. This is anyathākhyāti i.e. cognising an entity as another.

These are not two cognitions as in the Prābhākara's theory. But the two objects are provided in the cognition by two different relations. The *Idam* i.e. shell is provided by the *laukika sannikarṣa* i.e. normal contact of the eye with the shell as *idam* and the other i.e. *rajata* or *rajatatva* by *alaukika sannikarṣa* i.e. extraordinary contact known as *jñanalakṣaṇa pratyāsatti*. These two viz *Idam* and *rajatatva* that are really not associated with each other are presented as associated with each other. This makes the cognition erroneous. The important point to be noted here is that the two objects of the cognition are really existent outside the cognition and are cognised by the cognition. These have *viśayatā* with reference to this cognition. But they miss *viśeṣyatā* and *viśeṣanatā* relation between the two. *Rajatatva* is

presented in the cognition but really it is not a viśeṣaṇa of the object referred by 'Idam.' The vaiśiṣṭya between the two which is not actually there is presented in the cognition.

The viparīta khyāti of the Bhāṭṭas is also explained in the same way with one important difference viz rajata is provided in the cognition by memory instead of jñānalakṣaṇa pratyasatti. Further, the Nyāya theory transfers the characteristic of one to the other. Rajatatva which is a characteristic of rajata is transferred to Idam in the cognition.

In the viparīta khyāti of Bhāṭṭas it is a case of wrong identity between Idam i.e. śukti and rajata. It is conceiving tādatmya i.e. identity between the two which really does not exist. The Prābhākaras differ from both these and have formulated a new theory known as akhyāti theory.

Akhyāti theory of the Prābhākaras

The Akhyāti theory of Prābhākara's is a distinct contribution to the theories of error in Indian epistemology. Almost all schools of Indian Philosophy quote the Prābhākara's theory and criticise it. The main features of Akhyāti theory are well known. However, the points raised against it have to be carefully examined to appreciate the Prābhākara's view point. Therefore, the main

features of this theory are briefly stated here and the objections are examined in detail.

The Prābhākaras take the firm stand that all cognitions are true. yatārtham sarvavijñānam (यथार्थं सर्वं विज्ञानम्). The content of the cognition and the object referred to always agree. That which is presented in the cognition is called bhāṣamāṇa and the object referred to by it is called Vedyā. These two always agree.

The Prābhākaras point out that even if in one instance this rule is broken, then, there can be no confidence in any cognition conveying its objects validly.

The well-known example of error viz. śukti rajata, is analysed in such a way that this does not violate the rule of agreement.

According to the Prābhākaras the statement 'Idam rajatam' represents two cognitions viz. perception and memory. One who perceives the śukti present before him, perceives it as 'Idam' i.e., 'this' in a general way without the comprehension of its special features that distinguish it from 'rajata' i.e. silver. Due to the similarity of śukti and rajata he remembers rajata. The perception of śukti and the memory of rajata occur in such quick sequence that he does not realise the difference between the

two cognitions or the objects conveyed by these two cognitions.

The contents of these two cognitions agree with the facts conveyed by them. 'Idam' refers to Śukti that is present before and 'rajatam' refers to 'rajata' that is remembered. Therefore, there is no disagreement between the contents of these two cognitions and the objects referred to by these.

Though these two cognitions are true and distinct, an erroneous statement is made as 'Idam rajatam' due to the non-realisation of the difference between the two cognitions and their objects. For the non-realisation of the difference the following factors are responsible.

- i) The absence of the comprehension of the distinct features of śukti and its comprehension merely as 'Idam' in a general way.
- ii) Remembering rajata on account of the similarity between śukti and rajata.
- iii) Absence of reference to the past time in the memory of rajata. This is called tattāpramoṣa
- iv) Occurrence of the perception of śukti and the memory of rajata in quick succession.

Objections against the Akhyāti theory and the Answers

i) The so called memory of rajata cannot be treated as memory as it lacks the main feature of memory viz reference to the past time.

Answer : Rajata cognition is caused by the revival of the impressions of the previous cognition of it. Being produced by the impressions is the main feature of the memory. Reference to the past-time is incidental. The impressions are roused by the similarity between śukti and rajata.

ii) Idam and rajatam are stated with sāmānādhikarānya. Therefore, the two refer to one and the same. 'Idam' refers to something that is present before. Therefore, rajatam should also refer to the same. Hence, it cannot be remembered as rajata.

Ans : The idea of Sāmānādhikarānya is based on the assumption that 'Idam' and 'rajatam' constitute a single cognition. Since, these are two distinct cognitions the question of Sāmānādhikarānya does not arise.

iii) It has to be taken as one cognition and sāmānādhikarānya has to be worked out since the comprehension of Sāmānādhikarānya and Viśiṣṭapratyaya are essential for Pravṛtti.

Ans : This objection can be answered by pointing out another factor in the circumstance of the occurrence of the two cognitions. Not only the difference between these two cognitions and their objects is not realised but the difference between the cognition of the rajata in the normal circumstances and these two cognitions is also not realised. These two cognitions are taken on par with the cognition of rajata in the normal circumstance. It is this samānarūpatā that motivates the pravṛtti. The difference between the normal cognition of rajata and these two cognitions is not realised for two reasons : i) One of these cognitions is perceptual ii) The same object i.e. rajata is presented in the other cognition i.e. memory.

iv) If the cognitions 'Idam' and 'rajata' are true there will be no scope for bādha i.e. repudiation.

Ans : This objection also does not stand. By the realisation of the difference between the objects of the two cognitions viz śukti and rajata the observer gets the correct cognition of śukti. This enables him to discover that the statement i.e. vyavahāra 'Idam rajatam' was not bonafide. It is more a discovery of śukti than the rejection of any earlier cognition. It is a case of vyavahāra bhādha but not that of jñānabādha.

The above four objections are stated and answered by Śālikanātha as stated above. Later critics have raised some more objections. We will notice some of them.

v) According to the Prābhākaras the difference is an integral attribute of the entity concerned. That is to say it is Dharmisvarūpa. When an entity is cognised its attribute is also cognised. In the present case when the cognition 'Idam' is obtained the cognition of its difference from all other cognitions is also obtained. Same is the case with 'rajatam'. Therefore, Prābhākaras cannot talk of the non-realisation of the difference between the two cognitions 'Idam' and 'rajatam.'

Ans : Though the difference is an integral attribute of the entity and cognised along with its cognition, it is cognised in a general way as this entity is distinct from all other entities in the first instance. To comprehend the difference from a specific other entity the presentation of that object as a pratiyogin is necessary. In the present case the cognitions 'idam' 'rajatam' are not presented as pratiyogin for each other since these have occurred in quick succession. Hence, their difference is not realised.

vi) The non-realisation of difference is of the

nature of abhāva. The Prābhākaraś do not accept abhāva. Therefore, they cannot make it as a ground to explain the error.

Ans : Though the Prābhākaraś do not accept abhāva as a separate category, they have their own explanation for the abhāva situations. When the ground and the jar are cognised together it is sansr̥ṣṭa-viṣayabuddhi. When the jar is removed it is ekaviṣaya buddhi or tanmātra buddhi. The latter is the position in so called abhāva situations. There is no need to envisage a separate category as abhāva.

In the present case, each of the cognition viz 'Idam' and 'rajaṭam' are of the nature of eka viṣaya buddhi separately. However, in view of their quick succession, this is not realised. This is exactly the vivekāgraha or bhedāgraha.



3 1. Śāstrapramāṇa i.e., Scriptural testimony

The definition of Śāstra pramāṇa

1) Śābdapramāṇa is designated as śāstrapramāṇa by Śābara. Śālikanātha also calls it in the same way. Kumārila prefers the name śābdapramāṇa. The Prābhākaraś include non-vedic speech under inference. Therefore, Śāstra i.e. Vedic speech only constitutes śābdapramāṇa for them.

Kumārila explains that Śābara has designated śābda-pramāṇa as Śāstrapramāṇa, since, he is primarily interested in presenting this pramāṇa as a means for the comprehension of Dharma which is conveyed by śāstra i.e., vedic injunction. In fact in the very second sūtra 'codanālakṣaṇaḥ arthaḥ dharmah' (चोदनालक्षणोऽर्थः धर्मः) it is stated that scriptural injunction is the means to comprehend Dharma.

Śābara explains the nature of śāstrapramāṇa as 'Śāstram śābda vijñānāt asannikṛṣṭe arthe vijñānam' (शास्त्रं शब्दविज्ञानात् असन्निकृष्टेऽर्थे विज्ञानम् ।). The expression śābda refers to vedic injunction, artha refers to dharma and asannikṛṣṭa means not known by any other pramāṇa. The whole statement conveys that the cognition of vedic injunction is the means for the cognition of Dharma. Pārthasārathi quotes this

statement of Śabara and expands the scope of śabda to non-vedic speech also. He also adds that the cognition of śabda leads to the cognition of artha through abhidhāna i.e., the power to convey the meaning. In this respect there are two views among the Bhāṭṭamīmāṃsakas. Pārthasārathi holds the view that the word has the power to convey the meaning. Therefore, it has to be taken as conveyed i.e., abhihita. Chidananda holds the view that the word reminds artha.

Śalikanātha also quotes Śabara's statement about śāstrapramāṇa and explains the meaning of artha as kārya. He expands the scope of the meaning to viśaya, niyojya etc., also as he takes the whole statement as one unit and formulates the import on the basis of Anvitābhidhāna theory of sentence meaning.

Classification of Śabda

Pārthasārathi classifies śabda as (i) vedic (ii) non-vedic. The vedic speech always leads to valid cognition while the non-vedic leads to valid cognition when the speaker is not unreliable person. Unreliability of the speaker is the ground for invalidity. In the case of vedic speech as there is no speaker there is no question of any unreliability.

i) Śabda is further divided into two (i) siddha

i.e., statement of fact (ii) vidhāyaka injunctive. The injunctive is of two types (i) upadeśa i.e., this should be done eg. by performing darśapūrṇamāsa one obtains svarga (ii) atideśa i.e., this should be done as that e.g. perform śaurya sacrifice on the line of Āgneya. To implement upadeśa a number of guidelines are laid down for the following purposes: (i) to distinguish different rituals (ii) to relate the main and the subordinate (iii) to monitor the sequence. Most of these are linguistic in nature and will be discussed in the article on semantics of Pūrvamīmāṃsa.

In Mīmāṃsā tradition śabda is also grouped as vidhi i.e., injunctive statement, Mantra i.e., Hymns recited at the sacrifice, Nāmadheya i.e., names of the sacrifices, Niṣedha i.e., prohibition and artha vāda i.e., eulogy. Among these vidhi i.e., injunctive statements occupy the central position in enjoining a sacrifice while others co-operate with it. A detailed classification of injunction is made in Mīmāṃsā texts. These will be noticed separately. The arthavādas quoted in the context of different sacrifices are also significant. These also will be noted separately.

The expression asannikṛṣṭa is interpreted to convey two important points also (i) it excludes from the scope of śabda pramāṇa, anuvāda i.e.,

statement of what is already known by another pramāṇa (ii) it excludes such statements that are contradicted by another pramāṇa.

Śabdapramāṇa cannot be included under Anumāna

Before we proceed to present the other details of śabda pramāṇa, the basic question whether it is an independent means of cognition or it could be included under inference has to be examined.

Kumārila strongly argues that śabda pramāṇa cannot be included under Anumāna. Before he presents his arguments, he examines the arguments advanced by Sāṃkhya to distinguish śabda pramāṇa from Anumāna. He points out that these arguments do not help to refute the arguments advanced by those who include śabda pramāṇa under Anumāna. He lists the arguments of abhedā-vādins as under :

(i) Anvaya and Vyatireka criteria that are utilised for anumāna are utilised for śabda pramāṇa also as 'whenever śabda is present the artha is also presents' whenever śabda is not present artha is also not present as in the case of fire and smoke.

(ii) By the cognition of one the cognition of the other is obtained both in anumāna and śabda. By the cognition of śabda the cognition of artha is obtained as in the case of the cognition of fire by the cognition of smoke.

(iii) The comprehension of the relation between the two is the basis of the cognition of one from the other both in anumāna and śabda. The cognition of invariable association between śabda and artha is the basis for the cognition of artha by the cognition of śabda as in the case of the comprehension of the invariable relation between smoke and fire.

(iv) Both anumāna and śabda lead to the cognition of an object that is not perceived. Śabda leads to the cognition of artha that is not necessarily perceived at the present time as in the case of the cognition of smoke leading to the cognition of fire which is presently not perceived.

(v) The cognition produced by both is not confined to the present time only.

On these grounds it is claimed that the śabda pramāṇa is not different from anumāna.

Quoting these arguments Kumārila states that superficial similarities do not prove the identity of śabda pramāṇa and anumāna. Anumāna has three distinct features viz., (i) pakṣasatva i.e., presence in the pakṣa (ii) sapakṣānvaya i.e., presence in sapakṣa (iii) vipakṣa vyātireka i.e., absence in vipakṣa. These cannot be worked out in the case of śabda leading to artha'.

He states that the Sāmkhyas have failed to pin point this important point, and have advanced the arguments distinguish śabda pramāṇa and anumāna that cannot stand scrutiny. Some of their arguments and their draw backs are as follows.

i) In the case of śabda pramāṇa there are many factors such as words, sentence, intention of the speaker etc., that contribute to produce the verbal cognition while in the case of anumāna there is a difinite ground viz., hetu that leads to inferencial cognition :

This is not a sound argument to distinguish śabda and anumāna. Even in the case of inference there are many factors.

ii) The relation between the śabda and artha is fixed by the men while in anumāna the relation between Hetu and Sadhya is not fixed by men.

This is also not a proper argument. In the case of vedic words, the relation is eternal and natural. It is not fixed by any one. More-over even in the case of anumāna, the grounds of relation differ in different cases. For instance, in the case of smoke and fire the relation is spatial while in the instance of rise of moon and spate in the sea it is temporal.

(iii) The cognition of hetu produces the cognition

of sādhyā when there is the comprehension of the invariable relation between them while śabda in the instances like apūrva, svarga etc., produces the cognition of these without the comprehension of the relation between these words and their meaning.

This is also not a valid argument. Even in the case of apūrva etc., these are established by arthāpatti and the relation between the words apūrva etc., and their meaning is comprehended. A word cannot produce the cognition of its meaning unless the relation between the two is comprehended.

Kumārila has rejected all these arguments as stated above and given his own arguments viz., the lack of three main features of anumāna in śabda is the real ground to reject the inclusion of śabda pramāṇa under anumāna.

4) With a view to reject the theory that śabda leads to the inference of artha, Kumārila raises the question whether it is pada i.e., word or vākya i.e., sentence, that leads to the inference of artha. He examines the claim that pada leads to the inference of artha and rejects it.

i) The word which is claimed to be hetu conveys ākṛti i.e., universal while sādhyā in an inference is a

qualified object. This clearly shows that the object conveyed by the word is quite different in nature from the object conveyed by anumāna.

ii) The word which is claimed to be *hetu* has to have the characteristic of *pakṣadharmatva*. In the case of the inference of fire by smoke *parvata* is available as *pakṣa* and smoke can be its *dharma*. In the case of *śabda* no such *dharmin* is available. *Artha* itself cannot be treated as *dharmin*. For it cannot be both *pakṣa* and *sādhya*. *Sapakṣānvaya* also cannot be worked out in the *śabda*.

iii) There is no *anvaya* i.e. co-presence, between word and meaning. For, in the case of ignorant persons, the word is heard but the meaning is not comprehended. There is no *vyatireka* i.e. co-absence also. For the words *Yudhiṣṭhira* etc., are used even when there is no *Yudhiṣṭhira*.

v) It cannot be argued that the cognition of the word does lead to the cognition of meaning for those who know the relation between the word meaning. In this case, it is the comprehension of the natural relation between the word and meaning that has led to the cognition of meaning. This means there is no need of any inference. *Anvaya* and *vyatireka* help only to comprehend the natural relation. Their role need not be stretched to draw the inference.

vi) A word is employed in four contexts viz., (i) to convey an object that is known and now perceived (ii) not known and perceived (iii) not perceived but known (iv) not perceived and also not known. In the first case it is merely anuvāda i.e., conveying what is already known. Therefore it is not pramāṇa. In the second case, either it does not convey the object or the object is introduced for the first time. In either case the object is known by pratyakṣa. In the third case the word reminds the object seen in the past therefore it is smṛti, and in the last case the word does not produce any cognition. In all these cases the word does not lead to the inference of artha. Therefore the word by itself cannot constitute śabda pramāṇa.

The view of a section of early Mimāṃsakas who consider only veda as śabda pramāṇa and exclude pauruṣeya statements from its scope

In the course of the discussion whether śabda pramāṇa is a separate pramāṇa or it could be included under anumāna, Kumārila refers to a section of Mimāṃsakas who distinguish śabda pramāṇa from anumāna on the ground that it conveys dharma which is not conveyed by pratyakṣa, anumāna etc., other pramāṇas. However, this applies to vedic śabda only. They do not mind to include pauruṣeya śabda under anumāna. They

state that the statements made by men enable the listener to infer the knowledge of the speaker about the objects mentioned in his statement and the statement is taken to convey the same. Kumārila rejects this view. He points out that unless the statement conveys its meaning the speaker's knowledge of the objects mentioned in his statement cannot be made out. There is no other means other than the statement to enable the hearer to ascertain the knowledge of the speaker. Therefore, the statement has to be taken to convey the objects as śabda pramāṇa only. Kumārila warns that if pauruṣeya statements are included under anumāna, there is a danger of vedic statements becoming apramāṇa. The validity of pauruṣeya statement can be ascertained on the grounds of āptavākyatva and avisamvāda. But in the case of Veda both these criteria are not available.

This view of a section of Mīmāṃsakas criticised here is very similar to Prābhākara's view. The Prābhākaras include pauruṣeya statements under anumāna. They consider vedic statements only as śabda pramāṇa. Some Mīmāṃsā theories later developed by Prābhākaras were held by some early Mīmāṃsakas. The view criticised here seems to be the view of such early Mīmāṃsakas.

Prābhākara view

The Prābhākaras do not consider pauruṣeya statements as śabda pramāṇa. These only help to infer the knowledge of the speaker about the objects mentioned in the statement. Śalikanātha explains the process of the inference as under :

When a pauruṣeya statement is heard the facts referred to by the words in the statement are brought to the mind of the listener. Then, he sorts out as to how these could be meaningfully organised. Taking into account the position of the words in the statement he arrives at an organised sense. This process is called vimarśa. From this he infers the speaker's knowledge of these facts and comprehends them. This crystallised position is finally taken as communicated by the statement. The statement plays the double role of serving as a means to infer the speaker's knowledge and to communicate it to listener. In the first role it is a hetu to infer the speaker's knowledge and in the second role it is verbal communication of anuvāda type. Vimarśa stage is only a saḥakarin or itikartavyatā.

This process normally leads to the correct inference of the speaker's knowledge and the correct position of the facts. However, there are certain statements that are defective and

consequently do not lead to correct inference of the speaker's knowledge and correct position of the facts mentioned in the statement. The statements that do not agree with the facts are made for the following reasons:

- i) The speaker's knowledge itself is erroneous.
- ii) He has no intention to speak truly
- iii) He is out of mind
- iv) He formulates the statement defectively, consequently something different than what he intends to convey is presented in the statement.

In all these cases the statement becomes a defective *hetu* leading to a defective inference. This results in the disagreement between the statement and the facts.

The grounds of difference between Kumārila and Prabhākara

To comprehend the ground for the difference between Kumārila and Śālikanātha it is necessary to look into the context in which this question is discussed by these two.

At the commencement of *śabda pramāṇa* section Kumārila raises the question whether the scope of *śabda pramāṇa* is to be confined to Śāstra i.e.,

vedic speech, particularly, vedic injunction only or the laukika speech also constitutes śabda pramāṇa. The designation śāstra given in the Bhāṣya pinches him. He takes for granted that Bhāṣyakāra considers both vedic and non-vedic as śabda pramāṇa but his immediate interest is in śāstra that conveys dharma. He states that this is the reason for Bhāṣyakāra, designating śabda pramāṇa as śāstrapramāṇa. Then he takes up the question whether śabda pramāṇa could be included under anumāna or not. Arguments for and against this question quoted by him relate to laukika śabda only. He quotes the view of a section of the Mīmāṃsakas who try to exclude the vedic speech from the scope of anumāna on the ground that its subject matter viz., dharma is quite distinct from the subject matter of inference. He insists that the claim to include śabda pramāṇa under anumāna be countered on a common ground for both vedic and non-vedic speech. This has resulted in Kumārila not examining the cases of vedic-speech and non-vedic speech separately and consider the possibility of including non-vedic speech alone under anumāna.

Śālikanātha discusses this question in the larger context viz., whether the verbal statements are capable of producing valid cognition at all. The

statements that are linguistically faultless do communicate the facts mentioned in them. But there is no guarantee that these facts are really present. Therefore, the verbal statements are not capable of producing valid cognition. Śālikanātha answers this objection by pointing out that the verbal statements do not communicate anything independently. These enable the listener to infer the speaker's knowledge of the facts mentioned in the statement.

If the speaker correctly presents facts known to him in his statement, it helps the listener to infer the speaker's knowledge of facts correctly. Otherwise the statement fails to help the listener to correctly infer the speaker's knowledge. The circumstances under which the statement does not lead to valid cognition are already stated above. If *pauruṣeya śabda* is treated separately in this way, the *apauruṣeya śabda* will be free from such objection. Since persons are not involved in vedic speech.

Kumārila feels that the inclusion of non-vedic speech under *anumāna* will make room for the claim to include vedic speech also under *anumāna*, because, both are of verbal form and there is no reason to distinguish their status as *pramāṇa*. Both have to be treated as same kind of *pramāṇa*.

But Śālikanātha seems to be right when he says that the vedic speech is impersonal and there is no question of the inference of the speaker's knowledge. This distinguishes the two and provides room for considering one as śabda pramāṇa and the other as anumāna.

The issues under Śāstra pramāṇa

In the course of the exposition of śabda pramāṇa mīmāṃsakas discuss a number of related details such as the nature of word, the nature of meaning the relation between the word and meaning, the process of the formation of sentence and the sentence meaning. All these are worked out in such a way that the apauruṣeyatva and svataḥ prāmāṇya of vedas are sustained. Vedas are not composed by any person. The validity of the cognition provided by vedas is intrinsic. These two concepts are the corner stone of the entire Mīmāṃsā thought.

We will first take up the question of the nature of the word. In Indian tradition there are two views in respect of the nature of word viz., (i) A word is a combination of syllables that yields a unit of meaning (ii) Apart from the syllables there is a separate entity designated as sphoṭa. This is manifested as a word. In the first view also there are two approaches viz. (i) syllables of a word are

produced and therefore the word is perishable. It is non-eternal (ii) syllables are eternal. These are manifested. Mīmāṃsakas hold the view that the syllables are eternal and manifested. Mīmāṃsakas consider the relation between the word and meaning as natural and permanent. If the words are considered as perishable, then, the relation between the word and meaning also will have to be considered as perishable. This will affect their central concept viz., the eternity of veda.

The doctrine of eternity of śabda

The doctrine of the eternity of śabda is discussed in Jaimini sūtra (I-1-6 to 23) in detail and commented by Śābara. Some important points are noticed here. The arguments advanced by those who hold that the syllable are not eternal are given below with the answer for the same.

i) The syllables are produced with the effort and disappear soon after these are produced. This indicates that these are not eternal.

Ans.: By the effort the syllables are manifested but not produced. It is the manifested state that disappears but not the syllable itself.

ii) The statement 'utter the śabda,' 'do not utter the śabda,' indicate that the śabdās are produced.

Ans.: These statements convey 'employ the śabda' and 'do not employ the śabda.' These do not convey 'produce' and 'do not produce.'

iii) The śabda is simultaneously heard in many places. One eternal śabda cannot be heard in many places.

Ans. : Just as one sun is seen, as present in many places, one śabda can be heard in many places.

iv) In the conjuncted expression like 'dadhyatra' the vowel 'i' is modified as 'y' this will not be possible if the śabda is eternal.

Ans.: Substitution of one syllable by another is not a vikāra i.e., modification. Such substitution does not hurt the eternity.

vi) When many persons utter a śabda its volume is increased. This cannot happen if śabda is eternal.

Ans.: Increase of the volume is not that of śabda, but it is that of nāda. Continuous manifestation of a śabda by many gives an impression of volume.

Answering the objections against the eternity of śabda, Jaimini gives his arguments in support of eternity of śabda as under :

i) The utterance of śabda is intended to convey the meaning. If śabda perishes as soon as it is uttered, it will not be able to convey the meaning.

ii) When the word cow is uttered the whole class of cow is conveyed. This means that the word cow conveys the class characteristic gotva.

This is comprehended if one and the same word is used with reference to many cows. This means that the word has to be constant. If the word cow is separate in the case of each cow, then, it will convey only that cow. It cannot convey the class characteristic gotva. Therefore, śabda has to be considered as eternal.

ii) When the word gau is uttered eight times, it is not stated as eight 'gau' words are uttered. It is only stated that the word 'gau' is uttered eight times.

iii) When something is considered as perishable, the reason for its perishment has to be identified. No such reason is found in the case of śabda.

iv) It cannot be said that śabda is produced by the conjunction and disjunction of the air and it perishes when the same ceases. Air is not the cause of the śabda. If air were the cause then, quality of touch would have been present in śabda.

Finally Jaimini and Śabara point out that the śruti- 'vācā virūpa nityayā' (वाचा विरूपनित्यया) supports the eternity of śabda.

The process of the manifestation of śabda

The process of the manifestation of the syllables of a word is explained by Śalikanātha as under.

The air within the body is moved by the effort of the inner self. It starts from the navel, moves through chest etc eight places reaches śrotrendriya and provides necessary sanskāra for the manifestation of śabda. The very contact between the air and śrotrendriya is the ground for the manifestation of śabda. It is not produced by the effort but the śabda that is already there is manifested. It is clear from the recognition as it is same 'gakara.'

Sometimes variation is found in the audibility of the syllables and the word, this is due to the variation in the efforts to manifest it. Śabda as such is constant and permanent.

Śrotrendriya is conceived to be ākāśa. The ākāśa is one and everywhere but still when a word is manifested to a person by his effort of moving the air from navel etc., it is not heard by all others, since, each one has a separate ear cavity. The air moved by the effort of a person can reach his ear

and the ears of the near-by persons. These persons will have *sanskāra* for their ear for the manifestation of the word to them. People in distant places will not have such *sanskāra*.

When different persons speak, the *śabda* is not different. These are different manifestations of the *śabda* that is constant and permanent.

Śabda is heard in the ear cavity only. It is manifested there only. However, sometimes it is mistaken as emanating from the mouth. Mouth is also one of the manifesters along with other vocal organs. The *śabda* is not manifested in the mouth. It is manifested in the ear cavity only. With these explanations to meet the various objections Śalikanātha maintains that the *śabda* is eternal.



3 2. The explanation of the nature of word, meaning, sentence

A group of syllables that convey a unit of meaning constitute a word.

When a word consisting of a group of syllables is pronounced it is found that the syllables disappear one after the other. However the cognition of each syllable leaves an impression. The last syllable supported by these impressions conveys a unit of meaning. This impression is not the same as the impression that causes memory. It is a different kind of impression. If it were the same it would have led to the memory of isolated syllables only. With the support of this impression the last syllable conveys a unit of meaning in association with the earlier syllables. A group of syllables is called a word on this basis. Those who hold the view that the syllables are produced also explain the process of the formulation of the word in the same way. The two differ only on the issue whether syllables are manifested or produced.

As stated earlier, after discussing the nature of word, the nature of meaning, the relation between the word and meaning, the process of the formation of the sentence, the procedure of learning language, the centre of semantic

organisation in a sentence, the problem of Kārya vyutpatti or siddha vyutpatti, and the import of vidhi i.e., injunction, constitute important items to be considered under śabdapramāṇa. These items are covered under a separate article. Therefore, the mīmāṃsā position on these issues is briefly mentioned here.

- i) The meaning of a word is ākṛti or jāti i.e., universal, present in the object concerned.
- ii) Pratyāyya Pratyāyaka bhāva (प्रत्याय्य प्रत्यायकभाव) is the relation between the word and meaning. This relation is natural and permanent.
- iii) A group of words that satisfy the requirements of ākāṅkṣā, yogyatā and sannidhi constitute a sentence.
- iv) The language is learnt through the conversation of the elders by observing the activity that follows.
- v) Bhāvanā is the centre of semantic organisation in a sentence according to the Bhaṭṭas.

Kārya is the centre of semantic organisation according to Prābhākaras.

- vi) In respect of the process of communication by a sentence, the theory of abhihitanvaya is

adopted by the Bhattas and the theory of anvitabhīdhāna by Prabhākara.

vii) Mīmāṃsakas accept Kārye vyūtpatti theory.

These points are stated in respect of a sentence as a grammatical unit. However, Mīmāṃsakas concept of the basis of verbal communication goes beyond the unit of a grammatical sentence. The ākāṅkṣā among different words in a sentence is satisfied by the syntactical arrangement of the sentence. However to implement bhāvanā or kārya conveyed by the injunction there are three ākāṅkṣās viz. phala-ākāṅkṣā, karaṇa-ākāṅkṣā and itikartavyatā ākāṅkṣā. These are stated as 'kim bhāvayet' 'kena bhāvayet' and katham bhāvayet. The statement that covers the items that satisfy these three ākāṅkṣās constitutes a unit of communication in the sacrificial context according to Bhattas and the ākāṅkṣās of viśaya and niyojya have to be satisfied according to the Prabhākaras. Such an organised statement is termed as prayogavidhi in Mīmāṃsā. To fully implement the prayoga of a sacrifice, the organisation of the principal and subordinate items, following proper procedure, sanctifying the performer and the items to be used have to be carried out. These are stated in different contexts of prescribing sacrifices in Brāhmaṇa literature. These statements have to be

interpreted. This is a unique kind of verbal communication. For this purpose the language and the sacrificial activity are closely syncretised. All these form the subject of śabdapramāṇa in Pūrvamīmāṃsā. With a view to do full justice to this vākyaśāstra aspect of pūrvamīmāṃsa, a separate article is planned on the semantics of pūrvamīmāṃsā. The doctrine of Vedāpauruṣeyatva is also discussed separately.



3 3. Upamāna-comparison

Definition of Upamāna

Śābarabhāṣya explains the nature of upamāna as 'the perception of similarity in an object produces the cognition of similarity in its correlate that is not in contact with the sense of the observer' e.g. perception of similarity in the forest cow i.e. (gavaya) produces the cognition of similarity in the village cow seen earlier and now remembered.

The process of this cognition is explained as under : a person goes to the forest and happens to see a forest cow i.e. (gavaya) which is similar to the village cow. He remembers the village cow and cognises the fact that the village cow is similar to forest cow. In this process the perception of similarity of village cow in the forest cow is the means and the cognition of similarity of forest cow in the village cow is the result. It is a case of the perception of similarity in one correlate i.e, pratiyogin, producing the cognition of similarity in the other correlate i.e. pratiyogyantara (प्रतियोग्यन्तर).

The cognition of similarity in the forest cow is of the nature of perception, since, the forest cow is actually perceived. However, the cognition of the similarity in the village cow cannot be considered as perception since the cow is presently not in contact

with the observer's eye. The cow is remembered. But its similarity with the forest cow cannot also be considered as remembered, since, it was not experienced earlier. The observer of the cow was not aware of its similarity with forest cow as he had not yet seen the latter. Therefore, the cognition of this similarity is not a case of memory. It cannot also be considered as inferred.

Those who try to include it under inference formulate the syllogism as 'The village cow has similarity with the forest cow, because, the latter has similarity with it.' This is a maxim or a general rule but not vyāpti relation between the two similarities or similar objects. Similarity is dual. The similarities found in the two correlates are not found in one together. Therefore, one cannot be the hetu to infer the other.

Since, this cognition of similarity cannot be classed as perception, memory or inference, a new pramāṇa is conceived. As this new pramāṇa is based on similarity it is designated as upamāna.

The nyāya view

The Nyāya explains the nature and purpose of upamāna differently. A forest dweller informs a villager that the forest cow is similar to village cow and it is called gavaya. The villager when visits the

forest happens to see the forest cow that is similar to village cow and understands that this forest cow is called gavaya. The knowledge of the import of the statement of forest dweller is the means and the comprehension that the forest cow is called gavaya is the result.

The older Naiyāyikas consider the knowledge of the statement is the means as stated above and new Naiyāyikas consider the perception of similarity in the forest cow is the means. In either case similarity is the basis for the comprehension of the relation between the name gavaya and the forest cow. Therefore, this cognition is called upamāna. In the Nyāya tradition the means is called upamāna and the result is called upamiti.

On careful analysis of the the above procedure it will be found that it does not make any room for a new pramāṇa. The statement that a forest animal is similar to village cow gives only the meaning of the word gavaya indicating its special nature. The listener has to await the actual observation of such an animal to comprehend the meaning of this word. When he actually perceives the animal he comprehends the meaning of the word gavaya.

On seeing gavaya he remembers the statement and comprehends that the object perceived by him

is conveyed by the word gavaya. Thus the relation between the word gavaya and the object gavaya is comprehended from the statement i.e. śabda-pramāṇa aided by the perception of object. Hence, there is no need of envisaging any new pramāṇa for this purpose.

It is already stated above that the Mīmāṃsā concept of upamāna cannot be included under anumāna or pratyakṣa.

Mānameyodaya raises an objection that if on the basis of similarity a new pramāṇa is envisaged why not think of a new pramāṇa on the basis of dissimilarity. He answers that dis-similarity is negative and it can be cognised by anupalabdhi pramāṇa.

A later Naiyayika expands the scope of upamāna and says that the relation between the word and the meaning can be comprehended on the basis of dis-similarity also.

For Mīmāṃsaka, the upamānapramāṇa serves a practical purpose in organising the sacrifice in two respects : (i) the details of the Āgneya sacrifice are borrowed to śaurya sacrifice on the ground that these have common deity and are similar in this respect. (ii) when vr̥hi grains are not available for preparing puroḍāśa nīvāra grains may be used for this purpose since these are similar in nature.

The Prābhākaras also explain the nature and role of upamāna in the same way. However, they consider similarity as separate category while the Bhāṭṭas consider it as an assemblage of common attributes in the two correlates.



34. Arthāpatti - Presumption

The definition of Arthāpatti

The concept of arthāpatti is a special contribution of Pūrvamīmāṃsā. It is primarily formulated to establish the concept of apūrva which is very vital to Pūrvamīmāṃsā. Śakti is also established by arthāpatti.

Śābara bhāṣya explains the nature of arthāpatti as 'Arthāpattirapi dr̥ṣṭaḥ śruto vā arthaḥ anyathā na upapādyate iti artha kalpanā.' (अर्थापत्तिरपि दृष्टः श्रुतः वा अर्थः अन्यथा न उपपद्यते इति अर्थकल्पना ।)

Postulating another fact when a fact that is seen or heard is found incompatible in the absence of such a postulation is Arthāpatti. For instance, on finding that Devadatta who is known to be alive is not found in his residence, it has to be postulated that he is outside. This is arthāpatti.

Before we proceed to discuss the full implication of this observation of bhāṣya we have to note three important points :

(i) The expressions dr̥ṣṭaḥ śruto vā in the bhāṣya gives an impression that Śābara has two types of arthāpatti in mind. Kumārila takes it in this way only. However, Prābhākara include the examples of Śruti also under dr̥ṣṭa only. (ii) Śābara has given

one example only which is *dr̥ṣṭa* type. (iii) The example given by Śabara is not *pratyakṣa dr̥ṣṭa* type, but *abhāvapramāṇa-pramita* according to Kumārila. Prābhākara does not accept *abhāva pramāṇa*.

Six types of Arthāpatti

Kumārila expands the scope of the import of the expression *dr̥ṣṭa* as *pramāṇa pramita*, and gives interesting examples in respect of each *pramāṇa* leading to *arthāpatti*. He brings the *arthāpatti* by *śabdapramāṇa* under *śrutārthāpatti* and all others under *dr̥ṣṭārthāpatti*. He quotes *go-balivardanyāya* to explain this arrangement.

i) Burning power in the fire is to be postulated by the perception of the burning of fire. This is *arthāpatti* by *pratyakṣa*.

ii) The power to move on the part of the Sun has to be postulated by the inference that whoever moves from one point of space to another has the moving power. This is *arthāpatti* by *anumāna*.

iii) On hearing the statement 'Devadatta who is quite strong but does not eat during the day' the statement that he eats during the night has to be postulated. This is *arthāpatti* by *Śabdapramāṇa*.

iv) The power to reveal its similarity with forest

cow has to be postulated on the part of village cow, since, on seeing the forest cow such a similarity is cognised. This is arthāpatti by upamāna.

v) The power to convey the meaning on the part of the words has to be postulated by arthāpatti and to sustain this the natural relation between the word and the meaning has to be postulated. This is arthāpatti by arthāpatti.

vi) On seeing the absence of Devadatta at his residence, his presence outside the residence has to be postulated. This is arthāpatti by abhāva pramāṇa.

It may be noted that the establishment of power i.e. śakti is the outcome of arthāpatti in majority of these instances. Only in the cases of śabdapramāṇapramīta arthāpatti and abhāvapramāṇa pramīta, arthāpatti, śakti is not brought in.

The arthāpatti pramāṇa has two important aspects viz. identifying incompatibility i.e., anupapatti, between two known facts and postulating a third fact i.e. upapādaka kalpanā to resolve the incompatibility. In the stock example the facts of Devadatta being alive but not finding him in his residence are incompatible. This incompatibility is resolved by postulating his presence outside.

When two facts are not compatible with each other either one of them is to be rejected as not true or a third possibility has to be worked out. In the instances of arthāpatti, since, both are supported by appropriate pramāṇas, none of them can be rejected as not true. In the stock example the fact of Devadatta being alive is vouchsafed by his horoscope and his absence in the residence is cognised by abhāvapramāṇa. Therefore, instead of rejecting one of these two facts, a third possibility viz. his presence outside is postulated and the incompatibility is resolved. It is a case of pramāṇadvaya virodhāparihāra (प्रमाणद्वयविरोधपरिहार).

The Prābhākara's explanation of Arthāpatti

Prābhākaras explain the basis of arthāpatti differently. Śālikanātha offers two explanations :

i) An observed fact leads to the postulation of an unobserved fact to avoid incompatibility with a known fact.

ii) Postulation of something without which a known fact becomes doubtful.

The common point of both these explanations is that a known fact would be incompatible or doubtful.

To resolve this incompatibility or doubt the process of postulating the required fact is initiated

by the observed fact in the first explanation, and by otherwise known fact in the second explanation. In both the cases it is the otherwise known fact that becomes incompatible or doubtful. The postulated fact resolves this incompatibility or doubt.

In the stock example, as per the first explanation when one observes the absence of Devadatta at his residence, he finds that it is incompatible with the very existence of Devadatta unless his existence outside is postulated. The fact of Devadatta being alive is known from his horoscope etc. and his absence at his residence is observed. The existence and non-existence of one and the same person is incompatible unless existence of Devadatta in a different place is envisaged. By postulating Devadatta's presence outside this incompatibility is resolved.

As per second explanation, when one observes the absence of Devadatta at his residence, he will have doubt about the very existence of Devadatta. This doubt will be resolved by postulating his presence outside. Such doubt will not arise if it is already known that he is dead. Hence, the removal of the doubt by postulating his presence outside is quite in order.

Parthasarathi is not happy with the second

alternative as the ground of arthāpatti proposed by Śālikanatha. He argues that when the very living of Devadatta is in doubt, there is no scope to envisage his presence outside. He states that a doubt is removed either by the removal of its cause or by affirming one of the alternatives of the doubt. In the present case, the cause of the doubt is the absence of Devadatta in his residence. This is not removed by envisaging his presence outside. His absence in the residence continues. The two alternatives of the doubt are whether Devadatta is alive or not. His presence outside is not one of the alternatives of the doubt. Therefore, its affirmation is not the affirmation of one of the alternatives of the doubt. Hence, no purpose is served by envisaging the presence outside on the basis of the doubt.

However, this criticism of Parthasarathi is not convincing. We may examine his arguments one by one. (i) The doubt about the very living of Devadatta does not prevent the effort to find out a solution to remove the doubt. It is only a firm knowledge of one side that prevents the effort to remove the doubt. But when his presence outside is envisaged it ceases to be the cause of the doubt.

The absence at a particular place alone is not the cause of the doubt but the possibility of

absence in other places also suggested by the absence at a particular place where he was normally present is the cause. By envisaging the presence outside the absence in the usual place ceases to be the cause of the doubt. The continuation of the absence in the particular place is no longer the ground of the doubt.

(iii) It is true that the form of the doubt is whether Devadatta is alive or not. The first alternative i.e. being alive implies a place of his existence. When his presence outside is envisaged his existence in that place is also envisaged. This means that one of the alternatives of the doubt viz he is alive is affirmed by the affirmation of his presence outside.

In view of the above, Pārthasārathi's criticism of Śālikanātha's view seems to be laboured and not convincing.

Arthāpatti cannot be included under Anumāna

The Nyāya does not accept arthāpatti as a separate pramāṇa. It is included under anumāna. The stock example is put in the form of a syllogism as under :

Devadatta is outside his residence, because, he is alive but not found in his residence.

However, on closer examination it will be found that this syllogism does not serve any purpose. The hetu given here has two clauses viz Devadatta is alive and he is not found at his residence. The first one clearly implies that Devadatta must be in some place since he is alive. This place is naturally other than his residence. Therefore, the conclusion to be drawn by the inference, is already known as the hetu stage only. The two clauses of the hetu will remain incompatible if the presence of Devadatta outside the residence is not envisaged. Both clauses are supported by pramāṇa. The clause, 'Devadatta is alive' is supported by sādharmaṇa pramāṇa i.e. his horoscope etc. and the second clause that he is not found at his residence is supported by a specific pramāṇa. However, these are conflicting with each other. Unless this conflict is resolved by envisaging the presence outside, these conflicting clauses cannot be taken as one unit of hetu. Therefore, at the very stage of the formation of hetu the proposed conclusion of the so called inference is already drawn. In fact the formation of the hetu itself is achieved by arthāpatti.

Śālikanātha who makes the doubtfulness of the very existence of Devadatta as one of the grounds for arthāpatti, states that the clause Devadatta is alive cannot be a constituent of the hetu, as it is

doubtful. A doubtful element cannot be the constituent of hetu.

Both Kumārila and Prābhākara point out some important differences between anumāna and arthāpatti.

- i) Anumāna needs the knowledge of vyāpti while arthāpatti does not depend upon it.
- ii) In anumāna the hetu is definite while in arthāpatti one of the grounds is doubtful.
- iii) In the case of anumāna the hetu is not confronted with any incompatibility or doubt in leading to sādhyā while in arthāpatti the incompatibility or the doubt is the basis.

In view of this, arthāpatti cannot be included under anumāna.

Śrutārthāpatti

While explaining the nature of arthāpatti Śābara bhāṣya has used two expressions dṛṣṭaḥ and śrutaḥ. Kumārila has explained dṛṣṭaḥ as referring to dṛṣṭārthāpatti and Śrutaḥ to Śrutārthāpatti. He has further explained that the arthāpatti arising out of Śabdapramāṇa comes under Śrutārthāpatti and arising out of the other five pramāṇas comes under dṛṣṭārthāpatti. There is no dispute between the Bhāṭṭas and the Prābhākaras on the point that

Śabdapramāṇa gives rise to arthāpatti. They only differ in the manner in which the conclusion of arthāpatti is provided by it. In the stock example 'pīno devadatto divā na bhuñkte.' (पीनो देवदत्तो दिवा न भुङ्के ।) Devadatta is stout but does not eat during the day'; the conclusion arrived at by arthāpatti is that he eats during the night. Now, the question is whether this conclusion is arrived at by providing a statement 'he eats during the night' or by providing the fact that 'he eats during the night' without necessarily arrived at by a verbal statement. The Bhāṭṭas hold that the conclusion of arthāpatti is necessarily provided by a verbal statement in such cases. They base their stand on two grounds :

i) 'Pīno Devadatto divā na bhuñkte' is a statement made by someone. It is Śabdapramāṇa. Any addition or supplementing to be made to a Śabdapramāṇa has to be in the form of a Śabda only. A fact conveyed by a statement, has to be supplemented only by another word or statement. A fact conveyed by any other pramāṇa cannot be a part of the verbal communication. Therefore, the conclusion of arthāpatti in the present case has to be arrived at by verbal statement only.

ii) The knowledge conveyed by the conclusion of arthāpatti is savikalpaka type. A savikalpaka cognition is always accompanied by words.

Prābhākaras do not agree with this contention. They argue as follows :

1) By arthāpatti something is envisaged to resolve the incompatibility between two known things. Therefore, something that is envisaged should be capable of resolving the said conflict. The conflict between the facts of Devadatta being stout and not eating during the day is not resolved by the mere statement that he eats during the night. The fact of his eating during the night has to be provided by the conclusion of arthāpatti. Just as in other instances of dr̥ṣṭarthāpatti words have no role, in Śabdapramāṇa pūrvaka arthāpatti also the fact of its conclusion can be provided directly.

ii) The words play a role in savikalpaka cognitions by way of reminding the fact only. Smṛti is not a pramāṇa. Therefore, even if the words- 'he eats during the night' are brought to the mind, these cannot be considered as pramāṇa.

From the above discussion two points are clear-

i) Śrutārthapatti in the sense that it arises from Śabdapramāṇa is acceptable to both the Bhāṭṭas and the Prābhākaras.

ii) However, the form of this arthāpatti is not of the nature of a verbal statement according to the Prābhākaras and it is of the form of a verbal statement is the view of the Bhāṭṭas.

This difference has a wider implication in the context of the abhihitānvaya and anvitābhidhāna theories of sentence meaning, the association of aṅgas with angin, and the concepts of bhāvanā and niyoga.



35. Anupalabdhi - Non-cognition

The definition of Anupalabdhi

Bhāṭṭa mīmāṃsakas accept a sixth pramāṇa viz. Anupalabdhi for the cognition of negation i.e. absence. This is called Abhāva pramāṇa in Śabarabhāṣya. Its nature is explained as 'Abhāvopi pramāṇābhāvaḥ nāsti iti arthasya asannikṛṣṭasya.' (अभावोऽपि प्रमाणाभावः नास्तीति अर्थस्यासन्निकृष्टस्य १). The non-cognition by the five pramāṇas is the means of cognition of negation that is represented as 'is not.'

The cognition that there is no jar on the ground is the cognition of the negation of jar. The entity represented by 'no' is negation. The ground is its location. However, it is different from the ground. The jar is the counter entity of this negation. The counter entity- jar which is capable of being cognised is not cognised on the ground. This very non-cognition of jar is the means of the cognition of its absence. Here both the means and the result are of negative type. The non-cognition of a positive entity is the means for the cognition of its negation. In this connection two points have to be noted : (i) The relevant means of cognition viz., pratyakṣa, anumāna etc should be properly employed before arriving at the conclusion that the object concerned is not cognised. (ii) The object concerned should be capable of being cognised by

the relevant means *pratyakṣa* etc. When these two requirements are fulfilled but still the object concerned is not cognised, this very non-cognition is the means for the cognition of the absence of that object.

The negation i.e. absence of an object, cannot be cognised by *pratyakṣa*, since, there can be no contact of sense with a negative entity. It cannot be comprehended by inference, since, there is no *hetu* or *vyāpti* to infer it. Hence, a new *pramāṇa* viz *anupalabdhi* i.e. non-cognition is envisaged.

The Nyāya view

However, The Nyāya argues that negation can be cognised by *pratyakṣa*. Though there is no usual contact between the sense and the negation, there is the contact between the locus of the negation and the sense. The eye is in contact with the ground. The absence of jar is an attribute of the ground. It has the relation of *viśeṣaṇatā*. This is sufficient to establish the contact between the two. But this argument is not sound. To be an attribute some positive relation is necessary. Negation is negative in its nature and therefore, it cannot have any positive relation. Hence, it cannot be considered as an attribute in the strict sense of the term. Though the Nyāya holds that the negation is *pratyakṣa*, they also consider the non-cognition of

the pratiyogin i.e. counter entity the jar, as an aid i.e. Sahakārin. The non-cognition of jar is an aid to the perception of its absence according to Nyāya. They do not want to give it the status of separate pramāṇa. However, no sahakārin is of any help if the kāraṇa i.e. the chief means viz. the contact between the sense and the negation, cannot be worked out. Therefore, it is better to consider anupalabdhi itself as the means of the cognition of negation. Yogyatā i.e. the capacity of the counter entity to be cognised, is sahakārin i.e. aid to anupalabdhi to cognise the absence. This yogyatā includes all the requirements that are necessary to cognise the counter entity i.e. jar, such as properly employing the eye, the required amount of light, concentration of mind etc. The counter entity itself and the contact of sense with it, of course, will be absent. This yogyatā enables the non-cognition to lead to the cognition of the negation. We may contrast the Nyāya position and the Bhāṭṭa mīmāṃsā position as under.

a) Nyāya position- Pratyakṣa is the means and anupalabdhi i.e. non cognition of the counter entity is an aid to cognise its negation.

b) The Bhāṭṭa position- Anupalabdhi i.e. non-cognition of the counter entity i.e. jar, is the means and yogyatā i.e. the capacity of the counter entity

to be cognised if it were present is an aid to cognise its negation.

The requirements for the cognition of negation are same both in the Nyāya and the Bhāṭṭa mīmāṃsā. The dispute is only about the status of anupalabdhi whether it is an independent means for the cognition of negation or merely an aid. As stated earlier an aid requires a kāraṇa. The contact between the sense and the negation which is supposed to be kāraṇa cannot be worked out. Therefore, Mīmāṃsā position seems to be more reasonable than that of Nyāya.

Udayana insists that the cognition of negation be treated as pratyakṣa on two grounds : (i) This cognition is direct (ii) The senses negotiate for it. Both these arguments are based on the misunderstanding of the circumstances. The direct cognition is that of a locus of the negation i.e. the ground but not that of the negation. The sense negotiates only with the locus but not with the negation.

Further, the cognition of negation is savikalpaka as it requires a reference to its counter entity. However, it has no nirvikalpaka stage. Hence, it cannot be treated as pratyakṣa as per Nyāya definition of pratyakṣa.

Anupalambha i.e. non-cognition, is of two types : non-cognition by *pratyakṣa* and non-cognition by *smaraṇa*. The usual example of non-cognition of jar on the ground is by *pratyakṣa* and the non-cognition that *chaitra* was not present in the morning at this place is by *smaraṇa*. The fact that *chaitra* was not present in the morning cannot be ascertained by his non-perception in the evening. It can be ascertained only by the absence of memory. If he were present in the morning the memory of his presence would have occurred now. Since, there is the absence of the memory of his presence in the morning, his absence in the morning is now comprehended. This second type is introduced in *śāstradīpikā* to meet certain objection by later writers of Nyāya.

Negation is usually classified in four groups viz. (i) *prāgabdhāva* i.e. the absence before the origination of a product (ii) *pradhvamsābhāva* i.e. absence after the destruction of a product (iii) *anyonyābhāva* i.e. reciprocal negation e.g. cow is not horse (iv) *atyantābhāva* i.e. the absence of the very entity. Kumārila argues that if these negations are not accepted, then, there would be the contingency of the cognition of (i) the curd in the milk (ii) milk in the curd (iii) cloth as jar and horns in the hare.

The Prābhākara's explanation of Abhāva situations

The Prābhākaras do not accept the category of abhāva. Consequently they do not accept the abhāvapramāṇa also. To understand the Prābhākara's stand that the abhāva is not a separate category, their concepts of sansr̥ṣṭaviṣaya buddhi and ekaviṣayabuddhi i.e. have to be understood. When two positive entities are cognised together it is sansr̥ṣṭaviṣaya buddhi, while cognising only one of them is ekaviṣayabuddhi. The latter serves the purpose of abhāva. The object which is present in sansr̥ṣṭaviṣayabuddhi is not present in ekaviṣayabuddhi. For instance, when one cognises a jar on the ground it is sansr̥ṣṭaviṣaya- buddhi, since, two objects viz. ground and jar are cognised. When the jar is removed he cognises ground only. This is ekaviṣayabuddhi. The absence of jar is not a separate fact. The jar that is removed is designated as dṛśya pratiyogin. It is pratītiyogya i.e. observable if it were there. Such observable pratiyogins characterise the absence conveyed by ekaviṣayabuddhi that serves the purpose of conveying the absence of the pratiyogin. There is no separate fact as abhāva. Hence, there is no need of a separate pramāṇa to cognise it. In the instance, wherein the jar is destroyed, there is ekaviṣayabuddhi, since, jar has ceased to be

present. However, if the broken pieces are taken into account there is *sansṛṭaviṣayabuddhi* of the ground and pieces. Therefore, there is no such thing as *pradhvansābhāva*.

Śālikanātha criticises *anupalabdhi* *pramāṇa* by raising the question whether it conveys its *prameya* i.e. the negation, by its presence only or being comprehended. In the case of perception it is well-known that the mere presence of eye is sufficient to lead to the perception. The knowledge of the eye is not necessary. In the case of the inference, mere presence of *liṅga* is not sufficient. It has to be comprehended to produce the inference. In the present case of *anupalabdhi* its comprehension is necessary. This is clear from the recollection of *anupalabdhi* in a place where it was observed earlier. Mere presence of *anupalabdhi* will not produce such a recollection. Now, *anupalabdhi* itself is of the nature of negation. Therefore, it requires another *anupalabdhi* for its comprehension. This leads to infinite regress.

The Bhāṭṭas overcome this difficulty by pointing out that *anupalabdhi* leads to the cognition of negation by its mere presence. It need not be known. Just as *sanskāras* produce the memory without being known, the non-cognition of jar produces the cognition of the absence of jar

without itself being known. Śāstradīpikā further explains that there are two requirements for the cognition of absence viz. *yogyatā* and *anupalabdhi*. The first requirement has to be known while the mere presence of the second is sufficient. Since, the knowledge of *anupalabdhi* aspect is not necessary there is no room for infinite regress. The knowledge of *yogyatā* and the presence of *anupalabdhi* i.e. non-cognition are sufficient to produce the cognition of the negation.

The purpose of the acceptance of *anupalabdhi* *pramāṇa* by Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas seems to be not so much to find out a *pramāṇa* for the cognition of negation but to prevent the negation of the entities like *dharma* etc that are not cognised by the five *pramāṇas* on the ground that these are not cognised. Only such of the entities that could be cognised by these five *pramāṇas* could be denied if these are not cognised by the appropriate *pramāṇas*. *Dharma*, *adharma* etc are beyond these *pramāṇas*. Therefore, these cannot be denied on the ground that these are not cognised by these *pramāṇas*.



36. Metaphysics and Ontology of Pūrvamīmāṃsā

The necessity of metaphysical enquiry for Pūrvamīmāṃsā

Every school of Philosophy develops its own theory of metaphysics and ontology. However, it is not clear whether Pūrvamīmāṃsā developed its own concepts of metaphysics and ontology in its early stages. Its main theme is dharma. Its concept of dharma is the performance of sacrifices. These are described in Brāhmaṇa literature. This description has to be correctly comprehended and the sacrifices have to be performed accurately. This requires the correct interpretation of Brāhmaṇa literature. Therefore, Mīmāṃsā concentrated more on the science of interpretation than metaphysics. It developed as a vākyaśāstra. However, this sacrificial programme envisages certain results that have to be realised beyond one's lifetime and beyond this world. This necessitates the concept of an enduring self. It also necessitates an enduring world. The sacrifices that are of perishable nature have also to be given a religious and mystical stature so as to lead to the enduring results. All this required the construction of a theory of metaphysics and ontology. Moreover, Buddhists questioned the very concepts of a permanent self and a permanent world. If this

challenge is not countered the entire culture based on sacrificial programme would collapse. This made the Mīmāṃsā to enter into the area of metaphysics and ontology. Their strategy in this field is two fold i) To refute the Buddhist theory of Kṣaṇabhaṅgavāda and connected ontological, epistemological and linguistic theories (ii) To develop their own theory of metaphysics and ontology. The works of Kumāriḷa and Śālikanātha devote more to the first task than to the second. Among the Indian philosophers Kumārila's contribution to the refutation of Buddhism is the highest both in quantity and quality. In the second task of constructing their own metaphysics and ontology Mīmāṃsakas have not much originality. They mostly borrow from Nyāyavaiśeṣikas with some modifications here and there. Their presentation of their own concepts is lost in the midst of frequent refutation of Buddhist position at each step. Even later writers like Pārthasārathi concentrates more on the criticism of Buddhist's position on each item than explain fully his own position. He is equally vehement in criticising the Prābhākara position on each item. Therefore, it is very difficult to gather a clear picture of the Bhāṭṭas position on many metaphysical and ontological concepts. However, a later writer Nārāyaṇa gives a brief account of mīmāṃsā categories in the prameya section of

Mānameyodaya. In the case of the Prābhākaras it seems Śālikanātha had a section on Prameya-pārāyaṇa in Prakaraṇa Pañcikā. However, that is lost. In the commentary viz. Nyāyaśuddhi some details of the prameyas are given. The presentation of Mīmāṃsā theory of metaphysics and ontology is based on these two sources. Another source is the criticism of Mīmāṃsā views in the standard works of other systems. Major writers of Nyāya like Jayantabhaṭṭa, Udayana and Gangeśa review Mīmāṃsā views, particularly, the Prābhākara views. This helps us to counter-check the Mīmāṃsā views.

The area of metaphysics

The area of metaphysics is an enquiry into the nature of Being or Existence. In Indian tradition it is called padārthavichāra or tattvavichāra. These terms represent the whole reality. This reality is classified into certain categories. While structural definitions may be given to the categories in terms of their properties and functions, it is difficult to give the same to the whole reality. It can be only introduced as the object of cognition or conveyed by language. Keeping these two features in mind Nyāyavaiśeṣikas have defined padārtha as 'prameyatvam padārthasāmānyalakṣaṇam' (प्रमेयत्वं पदार्थसामान्यलक्षणम्) and 'abhidheyatvam padārthasāmānyalakṣaṇam' (अभिधेयत्वं पदार्थसामान्यलक्षणम्). The very term padārtha conveys the

latter definition. These definitions are accepted by all realist schools and pūrvamīmāṃsā is a realist school. This reality consists of matter and mind according to realists.

Two approaches of Indian philosophy

In respect of matter there are two approaches : (i) Prakṛti theory (ii) Paramāṇu theory. The Sāmkhyas accept Prakṛti i.e. primordial matter, as the source of all material objects and Nyāyavaiśeṣikas consider the paramāṇus as the source of the four material elements, viz earth, water, light, air. These and also manas are called mūrta-dravyas. The Mīmāṃsakās go by paramāṇu theory. However, the Bhāṭṭas concept of paramāṇu is slightly different from Nyāyavaiśeṣikas. The Bhāṭṭas consider tryaṇuka or Trasareṇu level as the final level while Nyāyavaiśeṣikas go to two more steps viz dvyaṇuka and paramāṇu. It is only at tryaṇuka level that it has six sides and can be observed. The other two steps seem to be theoretical abstractions. Therefore Pūrvamīmāṃsakās do not accept them. The Nyāyavaiśeṣikas workout a process of creation and destruction of material aspect of reality. Samkhyās also work out the evolution of Prakṛti. However, Mīmāṃsakās do not accept these two processes. The world is ever present. There is no creation or destruction.

Mīmāṃsakas argue that there is no creator. Īśvara

cannot be accepted as creator either on the authority of Veda or by inference. According to Nyāyavaiśeṣikas Vedas are composed by Īśvara. Until Īśvara is established Vedas cannot be considered as composed by him and until the authority of vedas is established. Īśvara cannot be accepted as the composer. Thus, it leads to reciprocal dependency.

He cannot also be established by inference. The stock syllogism proposed in this connection is as follows. All products have an agent to produce them, the earth, the trees and plants etc on the earth are products. Therefore, these also have an agent. This agent is Īśvara. This line of argument is not acceptable to Mīmāṃsakas. An agent is required to have a body. According to Nyāyavaiśeṣikas Īśvara has no body. Therefore, he cannot be the agent.

Then, the question arises as to how these products come into being. A material cause and an efficient cause are required for a product to arise. In the absence of an efficient cause how can a product arise. The Mīmāṃsakas solve this problem by holding that three types of causes viz Samavāyi, asamavāyi and nimitta are not necessary to bring about a product. In certain cases nimittakāraṇa i.e efficient cause is not necessary. In this case a

further question arises as to 'how the various avayavas of an avayavin are brought together in the absence of an agent. This is answered by pointing out that the adṛṣṭa of the persons who have to enjoy these objects brings these avayavas together.

Nyāyavaiśeṣikas and Sāṃkhya also have to answer the question as to 'how the processes of creation or evolution is initiated. Paramāṇus and Prakṛti are non-sentient. These cannot take initiative on their own. For this purpose they also bring in adṛṣṭa i.e. dharma and adharma of the persons who are destined to enjoy the benefit of the created world. This amounts to bringing in an extraneous element to solve a difficulty to explain causation.



37. The categories

The Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas accept five categories viz. substance, quality, action, universal and negation i.e. *dravya*, *guṇa*, *karma*, *sāmānya* and *abhāva*. Two more categories accepted by Nyāyavaiśeṣikas viz *Samavāya* i.e. inherence, *viśeṣa* i.e. particularity are dropped. In the place of *samavāya*, *tādātmya* relation is accepted. However, the Prābhākaras accept *Samavāya*.

The Prābhākaras accept eight categories. In addition to the first four accepted by the Bhāṭṭas, they accept four more viz. Śakti, Sādṛśya, *Samavāya* and *Sāṅkhyā*.

Dravya i.e. substance

Dravya i.e. substance, is the locus of qualities, action etc attributes. The Nyāyavaiśeṣikas define substance as that which is the locus of qualities. They also define substance as *samavāyikāraṇa* i.e. inherent cause. Both these definitions are not acceptable to Bhāṭṭas. They argue that *Sāṅkhyā* i.e. number is a quality and it is found in other qualities. Therefore, the definition '*guṇāśrayatva*' is not an exclusive characteristic of substance. Further, *Samavāya* is not acceptable. Hence, the definition *samavāyikāraṇatva* is also not acceptable. The Bhāṭṭas define substance as '*parimāṇa guṇāśraya*' i.e. that which has dimension as the quality.

The Bhāttas do not agree with the contention of Nyāyavaiśeṣikas that the substance will remain without any quality during the first moment when it is produced. They hold the view that the substance and its qualities are produced simultaneously. This does not come in the way of Kāryakāraṇa bhāva of substance and quality in view of tādātmya relation between the two. The entities that are simultaneously present can be kārya and kāraṇa.

In respect of the nature of substance different views are held in Indian Philosophy. Mānameya rahasya śloka-vārtika summarises these views in an interesting way. In some cases the name of the school that holds a certain view is mentioned while in other cases we have to trace the sources. Since this summary widens the scope of the perspective of the concept of substance in Indian philosophy. It is briefly stated below :

- i) There is a view that there is no entity such as Dravya i.e. substance, apart from the attributes.
- ii) Brahman, Śabda, Kāla and Sat are considered as dravya by different schools.
- iii) Jainas consider the constant aspect of an entity as dravya and changing aspect as paryāya.
- iv) Sāmkhyas consider the entire prakṛti as dravya.

v) Some hold the view that dravya is constant and others say that it undergoes modification.

vi) Some hold the view 'that which has śakti i.e. potency' is dravya.

vii) There is also a view that dravya undergoes avasthās i.e. different states. These avasthās are contingent but still not separable from dravya. In respect of the relation between dravya and its avasthās some say it is bheda-abheda i.e. identity and difference. It is also stated that dravya is permanent and avasthās are temporary.

These views reveal that considerable thought was bestowed on the nature of substance in Indian philosophy. Different metaphysical and ontological views were formulated on the basis of the concept of substance by the respective schools.

The concept of substance of the Bhāṭṭas and the Prābhākaras is the same as Nyāyavaiśeṣika. However, in the case of ātman which is considered as a substance the Bhāṭṭas accept pariṇāma or avasthāntara while cognition arises.

The Bhāṭṭas also accept the nine substances worked out by Nyāyavaiśeṣikas viz earth, water, light, air, ether, space, time, ātman and manas. They add two more substances viz tamas i.e. darkness, and

śabda i.e. varṇa i.e. syllables. The Prābhākaras do not accept tamas as a separate category. They consider śabda as a quality of ākāśa.

The first four substances are defined in the same way as Nyāyavaiśeṣikas define. However, air is considered as perceptible. Nyāyavaiśeṣikas take the position that it is not perceptible as it has no colour. But the Bhāṭṭas argue that through touch it can be perceived. Moreover the Bhāṭṭas consider ether, time and space that have no colour as perceptible. Colours are not the ground for perception.



38. Time and Space

The Bhāṭṭas do not agree with the contention that ether, time, and space are inferred. Nyāyavaiśeṣikas say that Śabda is a quality. It must belong to some substance. This substance is ether. This is not acceptable to the Bhāṭṭas. They do not consider śabda as a quality. It is a substance. Therefore, the question of inferring a locus for śabda does not arise. Even if it is considered as a quality it may be taken as a quality of the space.

Time and space are also not to be inferred. These are perceived. The cognitions 'this is earlier, that is later, these two are simultaneous etc are stated to be the grounds for the inference of the time. However, the expressions earlier, later etc are not distinct from the time. These refer to time itself but not to the ground to infer time. Unless one cognises the time he cannot talk of earlier and later. These very expressions reveal that the time is perceived. The time is perceived by all senses. All experiences have necessarily a reference to time.

Similarly Dik i.e. space, also is perceived according to the Bhāṭṭas. The statements 'This is here, that is after it, and the other is before it' clearly indicate that the space is also cognised along with the object. If the perception of the space

could be denied, then, the perception of the very objects in those places may also be denied. On these grounds the Bhāṭṭas consider the ether, time and space as perceptible. The Prābhākaras on the other hand say that these are to be inferred.

In respect of these three, different views are held in Indian Philosophy.

- i) Buddhists do not consider time as a separate element. It is not different from motion. Counting of time with reference to the movement of the sun, the moon, stars etc is only a mental process. There is no corresponding separate entity.
- ii) Sāmkhyas consider the space and time as the aspects of Prakṛti.
- iii) Patanjalas do not accept an all pervasive time. They say it is a series of moments. Jains also consider it as series of moments.
- iv) There are three levels of Time viz i) mahākāla
ii) khaṇḍakāla iii) ubhayakāla.
 - i) Ether is merely avakāśa i.e. a vacuum. It is āvaraṇābhāva i.e. absence of covering.
 - ii) Time, space and ether are not distinct from Īśvara.

- iii) Two levels of ākāśa viz avyākṛta i.e. undemarcated and vyākṛta i.e. demarcated are also accepted. The latter is bhūtākāśa that is counted among elements.
- iv) The Jainas also accept two levels of ākāśa viz lokākāśa and alokākāśa.

The nature of these are discussed in detail by respective schools. The nature of ātman and manas will be explained in separate sections, since, these involve epistemological and psychological aspects also.

The concept of Tamas i.e. darkness

The concept of Tamas i.e. darkness as a substance is a peculiar view of the Bhāṭṭas. They argue that tamas i.e. darkness, has two attributes viz a quality i.e. blue colour, and motion which are required for an entity to be a substance. As it cannot be brought under any other substance it has to be considered as a separate substance.

Nyāyavaiśeṣikas do not agree with this view. They consider it as the absence of light. It has no dark colour. In the absence of light the eye is not able to see the objects around. This creates an impression that some thing blue black is seen. Strictly speaking there is no positive entity. There is an absence. Therefore, there is no question of our

seeing blue black colour as belonging to some entity. Same is the case with motion. As the light moves its absence is observed. The movement is that of light but not that of darkness. Moreover, darkness has no touch. All coloured objects have touch also. Hence, it cannot be a substance.

The last point is countered by the Bhāṭṭas by pointing out that air has no colour, it has only touch. It is considered as a substance, similarly, the darkness that has colour but no touch may also be considered as a substance. It is not necessary that a substance must have both colour and touch. The presence of one of them is sufficient.

The Prābhākaras do not consider darkness as a separate substance. They do not also consider it as the absence of light, since, they do not accept the category of abhāva i.e. absence. Therefore, they explain the nature of darkness as under : when the light is withdrawn the observer is reminded of blue-black colour. He does not realise the difference between his cognition and the memory of the blue black colour. He takes it as a content of his cognition. Darkness as such is not a separate entity.

There are a few other views in respect of darkness.

- i) Śrīdhara in Nyāyakandali states that in a place where there is no light the blue-black colour is superimposed. This is called darkness.
- ii) The jainas hold the view that the paramāṇus have all capacities. These spread as light and darkness like spreading of the clouds.
- iii) Maṇḍana Mishra states in Vidhiviveka that darkness is the shadow of the earth.

These views reveal that they did not reject easily it as the absence of light.

8) The concept of śabda i.e. Varṇa

The Bhāttas consider śabda i.e. varṇa also as a substance on two grounds viz. i) It is not located in anything else (ii) It is directly cognised by the sense i.e. ear. Śabda is all pervasive. For instance, one and same syllable 'ga' is found everywhere. It is not correct to say that there are different 'ga' syllables pronounced by different persons at different times, since, it is recognised as the same 'ga' syllable even when pronounced by different persons at different times. It is not produced by the vocal organs. It is only manifested by these. Though the śabda is all pervasive it is heard only in such places where it is manifested. The variation in the manifestation of śabda as strong, soft etc is due to the variation of the process of manifestation.

A group of varṇas i.e. syllables that convey a meaning is a word. A group of words that conveys a unitary meaning is a sentence. Mīmāṃsakas do not accept the concept of sphoṭa for this purpose.

The Prābhākaras consider śabda as a quality of ākāśa.



39. The qualities

The Bhāṭṭas define quality as that which is not upādānakāraṇa i.e. the material cause, and which is distinct from motion. The first clause is intended to distinguish it from substance. They list colour, taste etc twenty four qualities.

Twenty one of these are common with Nyāyavaiśeṣika list. Three qualities viz Śabda, dharma and adharma are dropped and three viz śakti, prakṛtya and dhvani are added. The nature of twenty one qualities common with Nyāyavaiśeṣikas are described more or less in the same way. However, there are few differences.

- i) Chitrarūpa i.e. variegated colour is not accepted as a separate colour. Darkness is stated to have blue black colour.
- ii) Pṛthaktva i.e. distinctness is present not only at paramāṇu level but at the kāryadravya level also. The Prābhākaras accept it only at paramāṇu level.
- iii) Samyoga i.e. conjunction between two all pervasive substances like ākāśa and kāla is accepted. This is stated to be permanent conjunction.
- iv) Among the qualities of ātman, joy, sorrow,

desire, hatred and initiative are cognised by manas. Buddhi i.e. cognition, is inferred through prākatya i.e. revelation of objects. It is not considered as self-revealing by the Bhāṭṭas while the Prābhākaras consider it as self revealing. Nyāyavaiśeṣikas consider cognition as comprehended by manas.

- v) Sanskāra is of two types (i) Laukika (ii) Vaidika. The former is explained in the same way as in Nyāyavaiśeṣika. The latter is of the nature of treatment of sacrificial items such as grinding the paddy for preparing purodaśa, sprinkling it with water, cutting the yūpa etc. This latter Sanskāras considered as śakti by some as they invest the items concerned with a religious status.

The concept of prākatya is a special concept of the Bhāṭṭa mīmāṃsakas. It is a quality invested on objects when the objects are cognised. It reveals the object. Though it is a quality of substances it also reveals the qualities, universal etc present in the object. It reveals the past and future objects, and abhāva also. The experiences such as 'jar is revealed' is the ground to accept prākatya. The cognition itself cannot be taken as a ground for such experience as it is only in the ātman but not in the object. Prākatya is also called as dṛṣṭatā and jñātatā.

In the instances wherein the objects are perceived it is called *dṛṣṭatā*, in the instances wherein the objects are revealed by inference etc. it is called *jñātatā*. *Prākatya* is a common name. This concept will be discussed in detail later. It is considered as separate category by some *mīmāṃsakas*. The *Prābhākara*s do not accept this concept.

Śakti i.e. potency

Śakti is conceived as a quality present in substances, qualities and action. *Bhāṭṭas* do not accept the contention that a quality is present in substance only. They point out that *Samkhyā* i.e. number, which is a quality, is present in qualities also. Śakti is of two types (i) *Laukika* (ii) *Vaidika*. The former is established by *arthāpatti*. For instance, the fire normally burns, but the same fire when mantra or *auṣadhi* is employed does not burn. This means that there is some additional factor that is the ground for burning. This factor is not actually seen. Therefore, it has to be envisaged by *arthāpatti*. The śakti of sacrifice that leads to *svarga* is of the second type. This is to be known through Vedic injunction. Śakti is also classified as (i) *Sahajā* and (ii) *ādheyā*. The potency of the fire is *sahajā* i.e. natural while the potency found in the sacrificial context is *ādheyā* i.e. brought about by the implementation of vedic injunction. Śakti is

found in substance, quality and action. The Śakti present in the fire is an example of the potency in substance. The killing leading to the sin is an example of potency in action and when an object of certain quality is prescribed for the sacrifice to produce the result the potency is that of a quality. Thus potency is to be found in substance, quality and action. The Prābhākaras consider Śakti as a separate category. They establish it by inference. Nyāyavaiśeṣikas do not accept Śakti.⁹

Karma i.e. Action

It is of the nature of movement. It causes conjunction and disjunction, it operates in the case of non-all pervasive entities only and it is perceptible.

The Prābhākaras consider it as inferred. What is observed by the eye is only conjunction and separation. The action itself is not perceived. It is inferred from the conjunction and separation that are perceived. This view of the Prābhākaras is not acceptable to the Bhāṭṭas.

Sāmānya

The nature of Sāmānya i.e. universal is discussed in a separate section, since, it is an important concept and it is utilised to reject the Buddhist view of kṣaṇikatva.

Sādrśya i.e. similarity

Sādrśya i.e. similarity is considered as a separate category by the Prābhākaras. It is comprehended by upamāna pramāṇa. The nature and the process of upamānapramāṇa is explained in the same way both by the Bhāṭṭas and the Prābhākaras. Both of them differ from Nyāyavaiśeṣika explanation. However, in respect of the ontological status of sādrśya the two differ.

The Prābhākaras consider it as a separate category on the following grounds.

- (i) Sādrśya cannot be considered as a substance, since it is found in qualities and actions also.
- (ii) It cannot be considered as a quality or action for the same reason.
- (iii) It cannot be included under sāmānya as it has no continuity.
- (iv) It cannot be included under samavāya, as it is not a relation.

Therefore, it has to be treated as a separate category.

The Bhāṭṭas do not consider it as a separate category. They say that the commonness of the qualities, parts and the universal of the village cow

and the forest cow is the ground for similarity. They give the following reasons against considering it as a separate category.

- (i) We talk of more similar and less similar. This cannot be explained if sādṛśya is a separate category.
- (ii) It cannot be stated that these statements are based on the quantity of similarity, since, substance only has quantity but not other categories.

These objections will not arise if the commonness of quality, parts etc is made the ground for sādṛśya.

The qualities etc will be less in some objects and more in others. This will explain the above statements.

The Prābhākaras argue that if sādṛśya is reduced to the objects with common features then it will have to be stated as 'tat' i.e. this, but not as 'tadvat' i.e. it is like this. The latter statement clearly shows that sādṛśya is different from substance, quality etc and is present in them.

Pūrvamīmāṃsā utilises the concept of sādṛśya in the context of sacrifices. For instance, Śaurya and āgneya have same deity and dravya. Therefore,

these lead to the same result. A section of Navyanaiyāyikas also accepts Sādrśya as a separate category.

Samkhyā i.e. number

The Prābhākaras consider Samkhyā i.e. number also as a separate category as it is found in all objects. It cannot be considered as a substance, since, it is found in qualities, action etc also. It cannot be considered as a quality, since, it is found in many. It cannot be taken as action, since, it is observed to be quite different from that. It cannot also be taken as a universal as it is not eternal. Hence, it has to be considered as a separate category.

The Bhāṭṭas and Nyāyavaiśeṣikas consider it as a quality. They point out that since the number is found in numbers also. It will lead to infinite regress if number is considered as a separate category.

Samavāya i.e. inherence

The Prābhākaras accept samavāya as a separate category like Nyāyavaiśeṣikas. However, there is an important difference. They do not consider it as eternal in all cases. If the two relata are eternal then it is eternal. For instance, the Samavāya between ākāśa and its mahat parimāṇa is eternal. If one of the relata or both the relata are not eternal,

then, Samavāya also is not eternal. For instance when a member of a class perishes, the Samavāya between that individual and the class i.e. universal ceases to exist. For instance, when a particular cow perishes the samavāya between that cow and the universal i.e. cowness ceases. This explains the position that the universal is eternal and it does not perish when a member of the class perishes. It was linked by Samavāya with that member and when samavāya ceases to exist the universal is delinked from it. It is not destroyed.

Nyāya-vaiśeṣikas consider samavāya as perceptible while the Prābhākaras consider it as inferred. The Bhāṭṭas do not accept Samavāya. They replace it by tādātmya. They refute Samavāya by the stock argument that it will lead to infinite regress. Samavāya is expected to relate the two relata. However, Samavāya itself needs a relation to be connected with the relata. That relation needs another relation. Thus it leads to infinite regress. However, it may be pointed out that since Samavāya is conceived to relate the two relata, it relates them without needing any further relation. It is conceived as a separate category to serve a specific purpose. It is its very nature to relate the substance-quality, substance-action etc. Tādātmya works on the basis that the substance

and quality have bheda-abheda relation while samavāya works on the basis of difference between substance and quality etc. Therefore, the difference of opinion in respect of samavāya is not merely a difference in respect of working out a relation but the very metaphysical view based on bheda and bheda-abheda.

The category viśeṣa accepted by Nyāyavaiśeṣikas is rejected by both the Bhāṭṭas and the Prābhākaras. Its purpose is served by the quality called prthaktva.

The category of abhāva i.e. absence

The Bhāṭṭas accept the category of abhāva. The cognition 'asti' i.e. is, conveys bhāva i.e. a positive entity, and the cognition 'nāsti' i.e. absent, conveys abāva i.e. the absence of an entity. This absence itself is considered as a separate category. The absence is of four types viz. prāgabhāva i.e. previous absence i.e. the absence before the object is produced, e.g. the absence of the curd in the milk before it is produced from the milk. (ii) pradhvansābhāva i.e. absence after the destruction, e.g. the absence of milk when it is made curd. (iii) atyantābhāva i.e. the absence all along e.g. the absence of colour in the air. (iv) anyonyābhāva i.e. reciprocal absence, e.g. the jar is not the cloth. This fourth type is also called tādātmyābhāva. According

to Bhāṭṭas absence is cognised by anupalabdhi pramāṇa i.e. absence of cognition. It is the absence of the cognition of jar even when appropriate means are employed to cognise it that leads to the cognition of its absence. Such an object should be capable of being cognised by these means, if it were present.

The Prābhākaras do not accept the abhāva category. They state that the cognitions are of two types (i) samsṛsta viśaya buddhi i.e. cognition of two objects together (ii) tadekaviśaya buddhi i.e. cognition of one only. The statement 'there is a jar on the ground, represents the first type. When the jar is removed the statement is made as 'there is ground' in addition to the ground there is no such thing such as 'absence of jar' as an entity. Keeping the jar present elsewhere in mind, we talk of absence of jar. Strictly speaking there is no such entity as the absence of jar that is present on the ground. The Prābhākaras position is fully discussed under abhāva pramāṇa in the epistemology section.

The category abhāva is not mentioned in the statement of categories in vaiśeṣika sūtras. However, it is implied in other places.

The Sāṃkhyas also do not accept abhāva. They state that it is Kaivalya form of pariṇāma of

bhūtala, that is to say the state of bhūtala alone being present without jar. This explanation is very close to the explanation of the Prābhākaras.

Anyonyābhāva is the difference between two objects. In respect of the nature of difference, the Bhāṭṭas and the Prābhākaras differ. In this connection a discussion is raised while describing the role of the quality prthaktva i.e. distinctness. The Bhāṭṭas state that prthaktva is a quality that is the ground of difference. It is found in all substances. The Prābhākaras say that prthaktva is a quality of permanent substances only. It is not necessary for produced substances. The difference of these is perceptible, since, the difference is an integral part of the very essential nature of the object. Hence, no separate quality such as prthaktva is required to present the difference.



40. Concept of svarūpabheda

The concept of svarūpabheda is challenged by Bhāṭṭas on the following grounds.

(i) If the jar and its difference from other objects are one, then, these two words jar and difference should become synonyms. The statement would have been as 'jar is difference'. This is against our experience.

(ii) The statements such as 'difference of jar' and 'jar is different from cloth' indicate that the difference is related with jar and is an adjective of jar. These statements clearly show that the jar and the difference are different.

(iii) If the difference is not different from jar, then, one should be able to comprehend the difference of jar from the cloth etc automatically on seeing the jar alone.

The Prābhākāras answer these objections as follows :

(i) The difference is an integral part of the very essential nature of an object. When an object is comprehended its distinction from other objects is also comprehended. However, to understand its distinction from a particular object and make a statement about it a reference to that object is

necessary. This is technically called as *pratiyogi sāpekṣatva* i.e. requiring a reference to its correlate.

(ii) The expressions *jar* and *difference* will not be synonymous even though the *difference* is an integral part of the *jar*. The *jar* aspect does not require any reference to *pratiyogin* i.e. counter correlate while the *difference* aspect does require it. This may be explained by an example. *Devadatta* is an individual and he is also a son of *Yajñadatta*. To know him as a son of *Yajñadatta* a reference to *Yajñadatta* is necessary. But to know him as an individual no such reference is necessary. However, *Devadatta* the individual and *Devadatta* the son of *Yajñadatta* are one and the same. Similarly, to know the *jar* as *jar* no reference to other objects is necessary, but to know it as different from cloth a reference to cloth is necessary. This does not mean that the *jar* and the *difference* of it from others are different.

(iii) The statements such as 'the *difference* of *jar*' and 'the *jar* is different from cloth' are made keeping in mind a reference to the counter correlate and do not affect the basic identity between the *jar* and the *difference*.

It may be added that when an object is comprehended it has to be understood as distinct

from all others. To comprehend A as A it is necessary to understand it as not B not C etc in a general way and only when the difference from a particular other entity is to be comprehended a reference to that entity has to be made. In either case the difference is an integral part of the object differentiated.

Both the Bhāṭṭas and the Prābhākaras refer to Advaita Vedānta view viz the difference is mithyā and reject it.



41. The concepts of Ātman i.e. self, Manas i.e. mind, body and senses

To understand the world view of a philosophical system it is necessary to identify their concepts of the subjective side and the objective side. Whether the two sides are considered as radically distinct or one covers the other? What is the nature and the components of these two sides? How these two make an impact on each other are the questions that have to be examined.

In Indian philosophical tradition the concept of ātman is the core concept of subjective side and the concept of the matter represented by the concept of prakṛti or Paramāṇu is the core concept of objective side. The time, space, universals, relations etc other concepts are developed to explain the functions and the purpose of the above two fundamental concepts of the metaphysics of Indian Philosophy.

The concept of Ātman

The expression ātman is as old as vedic hymns. It is difficult to fix its import in its vedic usage independent of its later development in the Upaniṣads and the philosophical schools. The concept of ātman is the central concept in the Upaniṣads. The entire Upaniṣadic philosophy is an

exposition of this concept. Its nature, its functions and its purpose are discussed, debated, and described in Upaniṣads. The Vedānta Schools have further developed this concept. The core nature of this concept is kept intact by all the schools of Vedānta. It is kept as a central concept. However, in relating it with the matter different metaphysical views are formulated. Consequently, its nature and the mode of its comprehension is differently described. The theistic schools have added a theistic dimension also.

Ātman is the centre of subjective side. The main features of subjective side are (i) to know (ii) to desire (iii) to take initiative for activity (iv) to undergo the experiences of joy and sorrow, that is to say, jñāna, icchā, kṛti and sukha-dukhānubhava.

An agent to perform these roles has to be accepted by all philosophers. This agent is termed as ātman i.e. self, in Indian Philosophy. The question whether it is of physical in nature, psychological or spiritual is raised.

Chārvaka view

The Chārvākas consider it as physical. They argue that there is no self apart from the body. The body itself develops consciousness from its physical sources and plays the role of knower,

enjoyer etc that are stated to be the functions of the self. The consciousness arises along with the body and perishes when body perishes. Chārvākas do not believe in an enduring separate self distinct from the body. Consequently they do not believe in rebirth, the karma, svarga etc that are closely connected with the concept of a permanent self.

The main arguments against the Chārvāka theory are (i) Since, the non-sentient elements that develop into a body do not have consciousness, their product i.e. the body also cannot have consciousness. (ii) The vital air, the cognition, joy, sorrow etc cannot be the attributes of the body, since, after death even though the body continues these are not found, (iii) The attributes of the body that are perceived by the person concerned are also perceived by others. However, cognition, joy, sorrow etc are perceived by the person concerned but not by others. Hence, these are the attributes of some entity other than the body. This entity is ātman.

Sāmkhya view

The Sāmkhyas do not use the term ātman. The Puruṣa conceived by Sāmkhyas does not perform the functions normally assigned to ātman as in other systems. Buddhi i.e. antaḥkaraṇa performs these functions. According to Sāmkhya the

apparatus of both subjective side and objective side arise from prakṛti i.e. primal matter only. At the stage of ahankāra-tatva the apparatus of subjective side and the objective side get bifurcated. Buddhi together with eleven senses constitutes the apparatus of subjective side while tanmātras and bhūtas i.e. elements, constitute the objective side. Though buddhi performs the functions of subject it needs the presence and the impact of puruṣa. Puruṣa is sentient while buddhi is non-sentient. Therefore, the two cannot have any physical contact. The mere presence of puruṣa makes an impact on buddhi. This buddhi plays the role of the agent, enjoyer etc. Puruṣa wrongly appropriates these as his own. Therefore, buddhi alone cannot be designated as knowing self nor puruṣa alone can be designated so. It is the complex of Puruṣa and buddhi that form the subjective side according to Sāṃkhya. In this complex, puruṣa is permanent and enduring. The association with antaḥkaraṇa continues until puruṣa realises the distinction between himself and prakṛti.

Since the Sāṃkhya does not ascribe the role of cognising, experiencing joy and sorrow directly to puruṣa their arguments to establish a permanent puruṣa and to consider him as distinct from prakṛti i.e. matter, are quite different from that of other

systems. Their main arguments are (i) Prakṛti is constituted of three guṇas. An entity that is constituted of guṇas must be for some one else. This someone else is puruṣa. (ii) Since, Prakṛti is constituted of three guṇas, there must be something else also which is quite different from it. (iii) An entity that is constituted needs someone to supervise it (iv) Joy and sorrow etc are meant for some one who is the enjoyer (v) Wise men are found to undertake efforts to get released.

The driving point of these arguments seems to be the concept of the duality of the universe. The universe is not constituted of mere matter nor mere sentient being. These two are opposite to each other but co-operate with each other. Therefore both have to be accepted. Sometimes it is suggested that Sāṃkhya metaphysics can be intelligibly explained without puruṣa. The Sāṃkhyas probably added the puruṣa under the pressure of upaniṣadic thought. However, this suggestion does not seem to be valid. If Sāṃkhya had managed the subjective side and the objective side within the framework of the evolutes of prakṛti, then, there would have been no difference between the Chārvāka approach and the Sāṃkhya approach. The Chārvāka envisaged consciousness at gross physical level and Sāṃkhya envisaged it at subtle physical level i.e. ahamkāra

level. Sāmkhya's intention in accepting separate sentient being seems to be due to their belief in duality. Their argument triguṇādiviparyaya clearly suggests that they believed in the duality of matter and mind. A sentient and a non-sentient cannot be physically connected. They can only make impact on each other without involving any physical relation. However, the presence of a sentient being is necessary to explain the cognitive process of the subjective side. Consciousness functions only through a physical structure. The physical structure needs the presence of consciousness to account for the cognitive process. Psychological processes need physical apparatus to function and physical apparatus needs psychological process to play the cognitive role. Therefore, the presence of a sentient being i.e. Puruṣa is necessary to enable buddhi to perform the cognitive functions.

Nyāyavaiśeṣika view

Nyāyavaiśeṣika concept of ātman is quite different from Sāmkhya. They accept a permanent self. They argue that senses and manas cannot produce the cognition. These are the instruments. The instruments cannot produce anything on their own unless these are handled by an agent. Therefore, an agent has to be envisaged. Such an agent is ātman i.e. self. According to Nyāya-

vaiśeṣikas ātman is perceived. This is clear from the experiences such as 'I am happy, I know etc.' However, they prove it by inference also. So far as the ātman of others is concerned it has to be inferred by their activities.

The ātman is permanent and it is all-pervasive. Cognition is not its essential nature but only its quality. The ātman is sentient in the sense that it has cognition as its quality. What distinguishes the non-sentients from ātman is that it is samavāyikāraṇa of cognition and the locus of cognition. Manas cannot be considered as a sentient entity and the agent of cognition, since, it is atomic in size and it is invisible. If cognition is considered as its attribute that will also be invisible. The senses also cannot be assigned the role of ātman. Even after one or more of senses are mutilated cognition through other senses arises and the memory of earlier cognitions continues. Therefore, an agent to perform the cognitive activities is required and ātman i.e. self, has to be conceived as the agent. Nyāyavaiśeṣikas accept Īśvara and workout two categories of ātman viz. jīvātma and paramātma. The latter has no body and senses. He cognises all objects at all time. The jīvātmans are many. These are all pervasive. However, these function through their respective bodies. They reject the Advaita

Vedāntin's idea of one ātman. Apart from the cognition, joy etc. the ātman is the locus of dharma and adharma. These continue in the next birth also. This gives a moral personality to ātman.

5) Pūrvamīmāṃsā view

The Pūrvamīmāṃsa concept of ātman is broadly similar to that of Nyāyavaiśeṣikas. Their arguments to distinguish it from the body, manas and senses are also same. However, there is an important difference between the Bhāṭṭa concept of ātman and the Nyāyavaiśeṣika concept of ātman. While the cognition is an attribute of ātman according to Nyāyavaiśeṣikas it is a modification or a state of ātman according to Bhāṭṭas.

The very purpose for which ātman is accepted and the context in which the need of this concept is discussed is quite interesting and peculiar to Pūrvamīmāṃsā.

While discussing the validity of Veda an objection is raised that certain inconsistent statements are found in Veda, therefore, Veda cannot be taken as an authority. For instance, in the passage 'sa eṣaḥ yajñāyudhī yajamānaḥ anjasā svargam lokam yāti' (स एषः यज्ञायुधि यजमानः स्वर्गं लोके याति) it is stated that the sacrificer goes to heaven holding the sacrificial instruments. This gives an impression that he bodily

moves to heaven which is impossible. Such statements make room for the objection that the Vedas are not valid.

This objection is answered by pointing out that there is ātman i.e. self, distinct from the body and it is this ātman that is referred to in the above passage as going to heaven. It is not the body of the sacrificer that goes to heaven but it is his self i.e. ātman.

There is a detailed discussion on the question of the existence of a separate self distinct from the body in this context. The following arguments are stated to establish a distinct ātman.

1) The breathing etc activities do not belong to body. These are not found after the death even though the body is found. Therefore these are the attributes of some other entity that is distinct from the body. This is ātman.

2) The joy, sorrow etc are cognised by oneself but not by others. The bodily attributes are perceived by others, but these are not perceived by others. Hence, these belong to ātman.

3) By the desire also ātman can be inferred. A person desires something that is already known to him. Therefore, the knower and desirer should be

one and the same. This means that there is a permanent ātman. This argument is intended to refute the view that the vijñāna that is momentary can serve the purpose of the cogniser. The cogniser has to be enduring.

4) By memory and recognition also a permanent ātman can be inferred. These arise only in the case of the objects that are already known and to the same agent who knew. This proves an enduring agent.

5) The experience as aham i.e.' establishes ātman. The ātman is capable of knowing itself i.e. svasamvedya.

6) The initiative to continue the work that was done half way in an earlier day on the next day also indicates an enduring self.

It is interesting to note that Śabara quotes a number of Upaniṣadic passages to explain the nature of ātman. We will notice a few :

i) The ātman is imperishable

a) Sa vā ayam ātmā aśīryo nahi śīryate (स वाऽयमात्मा अशीर्यो न हि शीर्यते ।)

"The ātman is, to be sure, imperishable, since decidedly he does not perish."

b) avināsī vā are ayam ātmā anucchitti dharmā.
(अविनाशि वा अरे अयमात्मा अनुच्छित्तिधर्मा ।)

“Lo, the ātman is imperishable, possess, as he does, the quality of imperishability.”

ii) The ātman knows itself. It is not perceived by others :

a) Kim jyotirayam puruṣaḥ? ātmajyotiḥ. (किं ज्योतिरयं पुरुषः, आत्मज्योतिः)

“What does serve as the light for the ātman? That is the light of himself.”

b) atra ayam puruṣaḥ svayam jyotiḥ bhavati (अत्रायं पुरुषः स्वयं ज्योतिर्भवति).

“Here this puruṣa serves by himself as his light.”

c) agrhyo na hi grhyate (अगाह्यो न हि गृह्यते)

“Since he is not grasped, he is incapable of being grasped.”

iii) Ātman is distinct from body, vital air, senses etc.

a) sa eṣaḥ na iti na iti ātmā. (स एष न इति न इति आत्मा)

“This ātman is not this, not this.”

From these quotations it is clear that Śābara was quite familiar with upaniṣadic texts and took them

as authority for understanding the nature of ātman. The arguments given by him before quoting Upaniṣad passages are meant to refute the Chārvākas and Buddhists. The question of ātman is discussed in apūrvādhikaraṇa also. Apūrva is a link between the sacrifice and its result. It is produced by the sacrifice but remains on ātman until the result is produced. To explain this point ātman is referred to in apūrvādhikaraṇa.

Kumārila discusses the nature and the functions of ātman under Ātmavāda in śloka-vārtika and in apūrvādhikaraṇa in Tantravārtika.

He describes ātman as eternal, all pervasive, takes different bodies in different births, agent and enjoyer. (S.V. 73)

When it is said that he is an agent, it is not meant that he himself actually performs the actions. Whatever activities are performed by his body and senses he initiates them. The body and senses cannot perform any activity on their own. The self has to initiate them. Therefore, he is agent. The body and senses are acquired by him by his past deeds. Therefore, their activities are his activities.

Nyāyavaiśeṣikas arguments are mostly aimed at refuting Chārvākas, while Śābara's arguments are aimed at refuting vijñāna-ātmavāda also. We may

particularly note the points (i) Memory and recognition need an enduring ātman (ii) A person desires something which he already knows, this needs an enduring ātman (iii) An initiative taken on one day is continued on the next day. This also needs an enduring ātman. Vijñāna which is momentary cannot carry out these functions and therefore, it cannot play the role of ātman.

The Prābhākara's concept of ātman is briefly explained by Śālikanātha as (i) It is distinct from the body, manas and senses (ii) It is permanent and all pervasive (iii) The ātmans are many (iv) It is cognised as the agent along with the object of the cognition.

The Prābhākaras differ from Bhāṭṭas in two important respects viz (i) They do not admit any change or modification of ātman when cognition arises. (ii) The ātman is not cognised as an object of cognition 'aham' i.e. 'I'. The ātman always reflects as agent in the cognition but never as an object. One and the same cannot be both the subject and the object. All cognitions consist of a knower, an object and the knowledge. The cognition of these three together is called Samvit in the Prābhākara tradition. This samvit is self revealing while ātman and the object are not self revealing. They argue that if ātman is considered as self-

revealing, then, one will have to have the cognition of ātman even during deep sleep. This does not happen. The Prābhākaras reject the Bhāṭṭa theory of the inference of cognition.

Śālikanātha rejects the views of Chārvākas and Buddhists in detail. For this purpose all orthodox schools put forward more or less the same arguments.

Buddhist's contention is that there is no cogniser apart from the cognition. Cognition itself plays the role of both the cogniser and the cognition. The cognitions are momentary. There is an endless series of momentary cognitions. The previous cognition gives rise to the next cognition and so on. Each cognition leaves an impression on the next cognition. This accounts for the continuity of personality and also accounts for the memory, recognition, desire etc on the basis of previous experience, effort to complete the act that was not completed and so on.

The orthodox systems argue that cognition, desire, etc are the attributes. Therefore, there must be some substance of which these are attributes. Momentary cognitions cannot provide memory, recognition etc stated above, since, these occur at a later moment, when the earlier moments have

already ceased to exist. Momentary cognitions do not have the capacity to link the two or more momentary cognitions. The series of the momentary cognitions cannot be considered either the same as the momentary cognitions or different. If it is considered as different it amounts to the acceptance of an enduring entity, if it is the same as the momentary cognitions, then, the objections already raised stand.

Further, if cognition itself is considered as cogniser, then 'A' cognition does something as cogniser and 'B' cognition gets its results. It also becomes difficult to work out individual personal identity of persons and also the difference among different experiences. Therefore, an enduring ātman has to be accepted to account for the above experiences.

The above arguments and counter arguments are based on different metaphysical views and they work out the subjective side and the objective side on the basis of their respective metaphysical views. The epistemological and psychological processes are worked out within the framework of the respective metaphysics. Therefore, these cross-roads can never meet. They talk about the same theme in two different metaphysical terminology. Each one is logical and consistent within the framework of his

metaphysical view. However, they have to differ to agree on a common point of view.

Manas

Manas is considered as the tenth substance by the Bhāṭṭas. It is an instrument to provide joy, sorrow etc to ātman. Nyāyavaiśeṣikas consider it as atomic in size, while the Bhāṭṭas consider it all-pervasive. As it is pervasive it need not move to be in contact with ātman or senses. It functions within the body as in the case of ātman. It is considered as pervasive on two grounds (i) It has no touch (ii) It is not produced by any other. The first ground indicates that it has no limit and the second ground indicates that it is eternal. It is pervasive like space and time but functions within the body only. It provides cognition about the external objects in co-operation with external senses. That is why the pain in the foot is cognised as pain in that place only, though the manas is everywhere in the body and has contact with ātman everywhere.

The Bhāṭṭas do accept conjunction between two pervasive objects. For instance, there is contact between dik i.e. space, and ākāśa. The expression 'the ākāśa in the east and ākāśa in the west' indicate such contact. This conjunction is eternal while conjunction between two limited objects is caused by motion in one of them.

Manas cannot be equated with other pervasive objects since, Manas is an instrument for the cognition of these.

Śarira and Indriyas i.e. body and senses

The Body and senses are not considered as separate categories. These are the products of the Pṛthivi etc elements. Nyāyavaiśeṣikas work out four types of body arising from earth, water, light and air. The first one is the body of the living beings on the earth while the bodies made of water, light and air are in respective other worlds. Mānameyodaya a primer of Pūrvamīmāṃsa mentions the body of the living beings on the earth only. The question of the body in the other world is linked with the question whether deities have body are not. This question is discussed by Kumarila in Tantravārtika in detail.

Mānameyodaya mentions four types of earthly bodies viz. (i) produced from womb (ii) produced from egg (iii) produced from sweat (iv) produced from seed of trees and plants. The last one is not accepted by the Prābhākaras. Bhāṭṭas accept it on two grounds (i) when the water, fertiliser etc are properly provided the trees plants etc grow, when the same is not properly provided these decay (ii) By cutting and burning etc these are mutilated. Therefore, these have life. Consequently through the seeds these procreate.

Both the Nyāyavaiśeṣikas and Pūrvamīmāṃsā have not developed the concept of subtle body as in Sāṃkhya and Vedānta.

Indriyas i.e. senses

Five external senses eye, ear etc are accepted by Mīmāṃsakas. These are the instruments for the cognition of external objects. We have the cognitions of colour, taste, odour, touch and sound. These require instruments to cognise. Eye, ear etc are envisaged as such instruments. An instrument that assists the cognition of certain object must be suitable to assist the cognition of that object. It is found that the light assists the cognition of colour. Therefore, the eye that assists to cognise the colour is envisaged to be of the nature of tejas i.e. light. It is located at the pupil of the eye. Water assists the cognition of taste. Therefore, the sense of taste is envisaged to be that of water. It is located at the tip of the tongue. Sandal paste which is an earthly object assists the cognition of odour. Therefore, the sense of odour is envisaged to be that of earth. It is located at the nose. The breeze from a fan assists the cognition of touch. Therefore, the sense of touch is envisaged to be that of air. It is located all over the body. These four senses are derived from the four elements viz light, water, earth and air on the basis of their function. However, in the

case of śabda, ākāśa itself is considered as a sense to cognise the śabda, ākāśa within the ear cavity is considered as śrotrendriya. It is not derived from ākāśa but it is ākāśa itself demarcated by ear cavity. Since, the other four senses are derived from elements, the sense for śabda also is assigned to an element. They could have assigned it to air but this would have resulted in assigning two sense organs to one element. Manameyodaya assigns the sense for śabda to ākāśa. However, earlier tradition assigns it to dik i.e. space. It may be noted that śabda is not considered as a quality of ākāśa by the Bhāṭṭas. Therefore, this has resulted in assigning the sense for śabda which is a dravya to another dravya.

Manas is also considered as Indriya. It is an internal sense organ. It assists the cognition of joy, sorrow etc the qualities of ātman directly. It assists the cognition of external objects through the external sense organs.

These senses do not have manifest colour. Therefore, these are not perceptible. These have to be ascertained by arthāpatti.

These senses produce the cognitions of the objects concerned by actual contact with them. This point needs to be explained in the case of eye as

there are some difficulties in establishing direct contact of the eye with objects.

(i) How can the eye with its limited rays contact such large objects as mountain.

(ii) If the eye rays can directly reach a distant object, the distance should not be felt and the gap between the eye and the distant object should not be cognised.

(iii) The eye rays have to move and contact the objects. The movement has its own timing. Therefore, objects that are nearer and away cannot be simultaneously cognised. However, we do cognise them simultaneously. This has to be explained.

These difficulties are solved by explaining the procedure of contact between the eye and the object. The eye rays proceed from the eye and get mixed with the external light. Though the external light is vast the eye moderates it and utilises only that much which is required to perceive the object concerned.

For the purpose of contact between the senses and the objects and their attributes etc. Nyāyavaiśeṣikas have elaborately worked out six types of relations. However, both the Bhāṭṭas and

the Prābhākaras have managed by three types only viz (i) Samyoga, Samyukta tādātmya, tādātmya and Samyukta tādātmya are three steps according to the Bhāṭṭas (ii) Samyoga, Samyukta-Samavāya Samyukta Samaveta Samavāya according to the Prābhākaras.



42. Universals i.e. Jāti, parts and whole i.e. avayava and avayavin, and relations i.e. sambandha

Mimāṃsakas are realists and pluralists. They demarcate the subjective side and the objective side and explain the nature of the entities belonging to these two sides. On the subjective side the ātman is conceived as a centre of cognitive activities. To achieve the psychological unity and stability of cognitive activities the concept of a permanent ātman i.e. self is developed. This ensures the unity and continuity not only during one life time but even during the next birth. Manas, senses and body are provided as aids to ātman.

On the objective side many substances, qualities and activities are worked out. These are many but related to each other, co-operate with each other, and fulfil the needs of the subjective side. To relate these and to ensure their co-operation to serve their purpose, certain other categories are formulated. Universal is one such important category. It brings together a class of entities to serve the epistemological and ontological purposes. The concept of parts and whole though not a separate category brings internal unity of an object. The relation as such is not considered as a category. However, a particular relation viz

Samavāya i.e. inherence, is considered as a separate category by Nyāyavaiśeṣikas and the Prābhākaras. There are many other relations of ontological, epistemological and linguistic nature. These serve the purpose of bringing unity and co-ordination among different entities. While formulating the concepts of these relations, the realists take care that these also have objective reality. These are not mere ideas or mental creations. Pluralists accept many categories and many entities under each category, they achieve the unity and co-ordination by means of universals, parts and whole position and the relations. Let us first study the nature and functions of universals.

Universals

Universals are called jāti, and sāmānya in Sanskrit. This expression is contrasted with the expression vyakti i.e. particular. Jāti is conveyed by a common name and vyakti is conveyed by a proper name. For instance, the word 'Cow' conveys the whole class of cows while the words white cow or black cow convey particular cow. The first conveys jāti and the second vyakti. Strictly speaking the first conveys cowness i.e. gotva and the second a particular cow i.e. go vyakti. The first is universal and the second is individual.

This cowness is found in all cows. It is perceived along with the cow. It enables to know the meaning

of the word cow with reference to all cows. It enables even to infer certain features of the cows in all cows including the unseen cows. To comprehend the full implications of all these features of a universal, we have to examine the objections raised against the very concept of universal. The following are the main objections :

objections against the concept of the Universal

1) (a) Is the universal identical with the particulars or different ?

(b) i) If it is identical, it has no existence of its own. This amounts to its negation.

ii) If it is different, being different in case of each particular, it cannot be a common characteristic.

2) Is the universal all pervasive or present only in particulars.

i) If it is all pervasive, then, it will have to be found in all places beyond its particulars also.

ii) If it is present only in particulars, then, it will have to be explained as to how and when it is introduced in a newly born cow. It cannot move from already existing particulars to new particulars as it has no capacity to move. It cannot also be said that it partly moves from one into another as it has no parts.

3) When a particular perishes whether the universal perishes or not

i) If it does not perish, then, it will have to be found in that place even after the perishment of the particular.

ii) It cannot be said that it perishes. In that case it must not be found in other particulars also. Further, it is supposed to be permanent.

The answers given to these objections by the Bhāṭṭas makes the Bhāṭṭa concept of universal clear.

(1) The Bhāṭṭas answer the first objection viz whether the universal is different from the particular or identical, by saying that it is both different and identical. When particulars are taken into account as particulars it is different and when these are taken into account as belonging to a class, the universal is identical with them. The difference and identity between the same does not result in any contradiction, if the points of view are different.

2) The answer to the second objection viz whether the universal is all-pervasive or present in particulars only, is that it is both all-pervasive and present in particulars.

Though it is all pervasive it is observed only

through the particulars. Just as ātman that is all pervasive undergoes experiences only in the body, the universal manifests only through the particulars.

3) The third objection viz whether when a particular perishes, the universal perishes or not, is answered by saying that its manifestation through the particular only ceases, since, the medium of its manifestation has ceased.

These answers not only remove the objections but also give an idea of the Bhāṭṭa's concept of universal. According to the Bhāṭṭas the universal is in all particulars, it has tādātmya relation with the respective particulars, it is permanent in the sense, when one or more particulars perish it does not cease to exist and it is perceived.

The expression ākr̥ti also conveys universal according to the Bhāṭṭas. The earlier Nyāya works used to distinguish between ākr̥ti and jāti. But later writers dropped the term ākr̥ti and use jāti only. When many particulars are comprehended as one group or class the concept of Sāmānya arises. All objects are comprehended in two ways (i) as Individuals and as distinct from other individuals (ii) A group with a continuing common characteristic. Both the aspects are true. There is no common characteristic without particulars and there are no

particulars without a common characteristic unless they are single entities.

The relation between the universal and particular is a natural relation. It is *tādātmya* relation i.e. the relation of identity and difference. Universal has no parts and it is pervasive. Therefore, it is not limited to one particular or each particular. These observations make the nature of universal more clear.

Kumārila rejects the view that *avayava sansthāna* i.e. arrangements of constituent parts in a certain way is universal. Such an arrangement is different in different particulars and therefore, it cannot be considered as universal. He also rejects the view that the similarity is universal. *Avayava sansthāna* and *sādrśya* help to cognise the universal. These are only *upalakṣaṇa* i.e. indicators. These are not universals.

Prābhākaras concept of Universal

The Prābhākaras consider the universal as distinct from the particulars. It is found in them but it is not identical with them. The relation between the universal and particular is *samavāya* i.e. inherence, but not *tādātmya*. When the first member of a class is observed the universal is cognised. But its continuing nature is realised only when the second or more particulars of the class are cognised.

Continuity is an attribute of the universal. An object may be cognised without its attribute when that attribute needs a sahakārin to be cognised. Pūrvākāra parāmarśa i.e. recapitulation of earlier form is a sahakārin to cognise the continuity. This is available only at the cognition of second member onwards.

Some of the objections that were raised while discussing the Bhāṭṭas concept of universal are also raised by Śālikanātha and answered differently based on Samavāya relation between universal and particular instead of tādātmya relation. The Bhāṭṭa's answers were based on tādātmya relation. We may note the following objections :

1) Whether the universal is eternal or produced? If it is eternal the questions where it was before the production of the particular and how it came to the particular have to be explained. It cannot remain in ākāśa, since, the particulars only are its locus. Nor it can move into the newly produced particular, since, it has no capacity to move.

2) i) Whether the universal is identical with particulars or distinct. It cannot be considered as identical, because, in that case it has to arise and perish along with the particular. This will destroy its very nature of being one and eternal.

If it is different it should have been possible to cognise the universal without cognising the particular. If the two were to be cognised together, then, the relation of ādhāra ādheyabhāva should have been comprehended. However, on seeing a cow no body will say he is comprehending cowness in cow.

3) Further, If the universal is located in particulars, the question again arises whether it is located in all particulars in a spreading manner i.e. vyāsajyavṛtti or it is located in each particular separately? It cannot be stated that it is located in a spreading manner as it cannot occupy the past and future particulars. It cannot also be stated that it is located in each particular separately. In this case when it is present in one particular it cannot be in another, unless many universals of the same type are envisaged to occupy each particular separately.

Śālikanātha answers these objections as follows:

1) Universal is eternal and all pervasive. It is connected with the particular by Samavāya relation. Samavāya is not eternal. Out of the very samavāyikāraṇa from which the particular arises the samavāya of universal with it also arises. When the particular perishes the samavāya of universal with it is withdrawn. It is not the case of universal moving

in and moving out of particular but a case of the samavāya relation taking place between the universal and the particular. The movement of the two parties to relate is required in the case of Samyoga i.e. conjunction but not in the case of samavāya.

2) Universal is distinct from particular. However, it is always cognised along with the particular. Universal is an attribute. An attribute cannot be cognised without the cognition of the entity of which it is an attribute. Both the universal and the particular are cognised simultaneously. The cognition of the universal is included in the cognition of particular. Hence, the contingency of cognition of cowness as present in a cow involving the notion 'here it is' i.e. 'Iha pratyaya' does not arise.

3) The universal is all pervasive. The questions whether it is in all particulars in a spreading manner or in each particular in its entirety are not relevant. It is present where and when it is connected with samavāya and it is cognised where and when it is present.

These answers make the Prābhākaras concept of universal clear. An important difference between the Bhāṭṭas and the Prābhākaras is that the Bhāṭṭas consider it as both different and non-different and connect with particulars by tādātmya relation and

the Prābhākaras consider it as distinct and connect it with particulars by samavāya relation. However, both consider that it has objective reality. It is not merely conceptual or nominal.

The Universal also plays the role of a relation for comprehending the vyāpti relation and the relation between the word and the meaning. The former role is explicitly stated by Nyāyavaiśeṣika by accepting sāmānyalakṣaṇa pratyāsatti.

Avayava and avayavin i.e. constituent parts and the whole

The concept of the constituent parts and the whole is as much important to the realists as universal and particular. In fact, if a whole as distinct from the parts is not established, then, there will be no need of any universal. Therefore, Nyāyavaiśeṣikas and Mīmāṃsakas discuss this problem. This problem has arisen, because, the Buddhists deny the existence of a whole apart from a series of momentary svalakṣaṇas that are in a continuous flux. The arguments against an enduring whole i.e. avayavin, are summarised by Śālikanātha in Prakaraṇa Pañcikā and replied. We may notice some important arguments :

(1) The Paramāṇus are stated as the basic units of a concrete substance and these are stated to

lead to the formation of gross objects by the process of formation of dvyaṇuka, tryaṇuka etc.

However, each paramāṇu by itself cannot give rise to a gross object. More than one paramāṇu have to join by the relation of conjunction and lead to the formation of a gross object. This is not possible for two reasons :

(i) Paramāṇus have no sides to join.

(ii) The conjunction by which two or more paramāṇus are expected to be connected, if inheres in each paramāṇu separately, then, these cannot lead to the formation of one whole. The conjunction cannot be stated as inhering in more than one. Since, each one is a unit by itself and the very idea of another or more is not valid.

Therefore, no conjunction is possible. Consequently the formation of dvyaṇuka, tryaṇuka etc leading to a gross whole is not possible.

Further, even if the formation of a whole i.e. avayavin, is granted, the problem as to how this whole which is constituted of many constituents is located in them has to be solved. It cannot be stated either as located in each constituent separately or in all constituents in a spreading manner i.e. vyāsajyavṛtti.

a) If it is stated as located in each constituent separately, the following difficulties will arise.

i) If the whole is located in each constituent separately, then, it would have been observed separately in each constituent resulting in the observation of as many wholes as there are constituents.

ii) When motion takes place in one constituent the whole also should be observed as moving. When a colour is given to one constituent, the whole should be observed with that colour.

At the same time since the other constituents have no motion nor the colour the whole would have been observed as motionless and colourless. This means that one and the same will have motion and the absence of motion, colour and the absence of colour. This is an absurd position.

b) If it is stated that the whole is located in its constituents in a spreading manner, the following difficulties will arise.

i) To spread over all its constituent parts, the whole will have to have another set of parts apart from its constituent parts, so that each part can occupy a constituent part. No such parts in addition to the constituent parts could be envisaged.

c) The problem whether the whole is different from the constituent parts or identical with them is also has to be faced.

i) If the whole and the parts are different from each other, then, one should be observed without the other at least some time. The objects that are different are not always comprehended together. The whole is never comprehended without comprehending the parts. Therefore, the two cannot be considered as different.

ii) If the two are considered as identical, it amounts to eliminating one. Naturally, since, the parts are observed, the idea of the whole has to be eliminated.

Stating the difficulties to accept a separate whole apart from parts as stated above, the Buddhist presents his view to account for the common notion of a whole i.e. the gross object.

The paramāṇus i.e. svalakṣaṇas are in continuous flux. These are observed in continuity. This projects a mental image of a gross object. This may be compared to the idea of a forest on seeing a large group of trees.

Śālikanātha answers the Buddhists objection as follows :

i) The constituent parts do lead to the formation of the whole joined by the relation of conjunction. The constituent parts are samavāyikāraṇa and the conjunction is asamavāyikāraṇa. Assisted by the asamavāyikāraṇa samavāyikāraṇas do produce the effect i.e. avayavin i.e. the whole.

ii) The conjunction, though one, is located in many. It is the very nature of the conjunction to be in more than one. Though each paramāṇu is single and a unit by itself it can be the locus of conjunction along with another paramāṇu and lead to the formation of dvyaṇuka etc.

iii) As regards the location of the avayavin, the position is that it is spread over all avayavas. It need not have another set of avayavas to occupy its avayavas. The very avayavas that produce the avayavin with the aid of conjunction also serve the purpose of locus. The avayavas are samavāyikāraṇa. These produce the avayavin and also serve as the locus of avayavin.

iv) A question is raised whether the avayavin is cognised only when all avayavas are cognised or even when one avayava is cognised? This is answered by stating that it is cognised when sufficient number of avayavas are cognised. Neither the cognition of only one avayava is sufficient nor

the cognition of all avayavas is necessary. What constitutes sufficient number for this purpose has to be ascertained by experience. Though the avayavas and avayavin are different these are comprehended together, since, these have the relation of cause and effect.

The Bhāṭṭa view in respect of parts and whole is briefly stated by Pārthasārathi Misra while discussing the concept of jāti. The Bhāṭṭas accept bheda-abheda i.e. difference and identify between avayava and avayavin. The relation is tādātmya. It is not samavāya as contended by the Vaiśeṣikas and the Prābhākaras. The whole is a certain set up of parts. It is not a separate substance. As avayavas these are distinct and many, and as avayavin these are one. The qualities of these two are not different. The qualities of avayavas will be the qualities of avayavin when avayavin is formed. The avayavin remains over avayavas in a spreading manner.

Both the Bhāṭṭas and the Prābhākaras are equally interested in establishing the avayavin i.e. the whole. However, one envisages bheda-abheda between parts and whole and the other bheda therefore, they present their case differently.

The Relation

In Indian Philosophy relation as such is not

considered as a separate category. However, one of the relations viz. samavāya is considered as a separate category by the Nyāyavaiśeṣikas and the Prābhākaras. Another relation viz. samyoga i.e. conjunction is considered as a quality by them. The Sāṃkhyas and Bhāṭṭa mīmāṃsakas consider tādātmya as a relation in place of samavāya. This relation is considered as vastusvarūpa. There are many other relations that are described and utilised to explain the ontological, epistemological, and linguistic functions. All these relations are broadly grouped into two groups viz (i) vṛtti niyāmaka i.e. relations that lead to the physical contact of the two relata (ii) vṛttyanīyāmaka i.e. relations that do not lead to the physical contact. The three relations stated above viz. samyoga, samavāya and tādātmya are vṛttinīyāmaka relations.

Buddhists do not accept Samyoga i.e. conjunction, since, each kṣaṇa i.e. svalakṣaṇa, is a unit by itself and is not related with any other kṣaṇa. Nyāyavaiśeṣikas define it as that which joins the two that were not joined earlier. aprāpti pūrvikā prāptih samyogaḥ (अप्राप्तिपूर्विका प्राप्तिः संयोगः ।). This is brought about in two ways: (i) By the motion in one or both the relata (ii) By the conjunction with the avayava with avayavin. The latter is called samyogaja-samyoga i.e. a conjunction leading to

another conjunction. For instance, by the conjunction between the hand and the book the conjunction between the body and the book arises. This is due to the Nyāyavaiśeṣika idea of difference between avayava and avayavin. The conjunction is always between two substances. However, there is no conjunction between two vibhus i.e. all pervasive substances. For instance, there is no samyoga between ātman and ākāśa. Another special feature of samyoga is that it is avyāpya vṛtti i.e. it does not occupy the whole of the substance in which it is found. For instance, the contact between the monkey and the tree is only at the top of the tree but not at the bottom. This means that the tree has both the conjunction with the monkey and its absence.

The Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas hold the view that there is samyoga between two vibhus also. It is nitya-samyoga i.e. permanent conjunction. Therefore, the definition given by Nyāyavaiśeṣikas holds good only in the case of anitya samyoga. Some hold the view that the restriction that samyoga is only between substances is not necessary. Some hold that the samyogas found in pratiyogin and anuyogin are distinct. (M.R.S. p.254)

The relation of samyoga serves many purposes viz i) By the conjunction of paramāṇus, dvyaṇuka,

tryaṇuka etc are formed and the whole avayavi dravya is formed, by the conjunction of water and seeds etc the sprout develops. In this way samyoga plays a big role in the process of creation. (ii) By the conjunction between senses and objects the cognition is produced. This is epistemological role of conjunction. (iii) The theological concept of purity is also sustained by the absence of conjunction with impure objects and the conjunction with pure objects.

Samavāya relation is an ontological relation. This relation is found between the entities that are distinguishable but not separable. For instance, the universal and particular are distinguishable but not separable. The substance and qualities are distinguishable but not separable until one of them is destroyed. Same is the case with an object and the motion, the constituent parts and the whole. Such pairs are designated as ayuta siddha.

In Indian philosophy two theories of causation viz. pariṇāma vāda and ārambhavāda are prevalent. The sāmkhyaś go by pariṇāmavāda and vaiśeṣikaś go by ārambhavāda. The former have conceived the tādātmya as the relation between the cause and effect while the latter have conceived samavāya as the relation. The term used for the cause by the former is upādāna kāraṇa while latter uses the term samavāyikāraṇa.

As per the pariṇāma theory of causation, the cause and the effect are not different. Therefore, tādātmya is conceived as their relation. The same holds good between the universal and particular, substance and qualities. This tādātmya relation involves both difference and identity i.e. bheda-abheda from different points of view. As per the ārambha theory, the cause and effect are different. Hence, a different relation has to be conceived to relate them. Samavāya i.e. inherence, is conceived as such a relation. The effect is inherent in the cause. Therefore, the cause is designated as Samavāyikāraṇa. Similarly substance and qualities etc that are ayuta siddhas are also distinct from each other. Hence, these also require a relation. Therefore, the scope of Samavāya is extended to these also. This samavāya is considered as permanent. It is eternal. Nyāyavaiśeṣikas give utmost importance to brevity. Therefore, instead of conceiving a samavāya separately in each case and as generated on each occasion, they have conceived only one samavāya and that too as eternal.

Those who oppose the concept of samavāya raise the question whether samavāya is related with the two relata or not? If it is not related, then, it cannot serve its purpose of relating the two relata viz kāraṇa-kārya, avayava-avayavin etc. If it is

related, then, what is the relation by which it is related. If that is another samavāya, then, that requires one more samavāya to relate it. This leads to infinite regress.

This criticism is not justified. The very purpose for which Samavāya is conceived is to relate avayava-avayavin etc ayuta siddha pairs. Therefore, it does not require another relation to relate it with its relata. Its capacity to relate the two relata may be stated as dharmigrāhaka-māna-siddha i.e. it is established by the very pramāṇa by which samavāya is established. That is why it is conceived as a separate category. In the case of Samyoga, as it is a quality it requires a relation to relate it with its relata. It is related by Samavāya.

The Prābhākaras conceive Samavāya as anitya and many. In other respects they agree with Nyāyavaiśeṣikas.

The relation Samavāya serves the ontological purpose of producing the effect from the cause and also holding the two together. It also brings the unity between the substance and qualities, universal and particular etc.

It also serves the epistemological purpose of serving as a contact between the senses and the qualities through the object to which these qualities

belong. In the case of Samyoga it has to be developed between the senses and the qualities through the object to which these qualities belong. However, in the case of Samavāya it is a part of the very structure of the object. It is an ontological relation that is utilised for epistemological purpose. Those who do not accept samavāya, manage these functions by tādātmya relation. The Bhāṭṭa school of Mīmāṃsā goes by tādātmya while the Prābhākaras go by Samavāya.

Viśiṣṭādvaita vedānta has conceived the relation of aprthaksiddhi as a substitute for Samavāya. The expression prthaksiddhi refers to separate functioning in respect of utpatti i.e. origination, sthiti i.e. existence and jñapti i.e. cognition. An entity which does not function separately from another entity in these three respects has aprthaksiddhi relation with that entity. This relation is basically conceived to explain the relation between the Śarīrin i.e. brahman and Śarīra i.e. the jīva and jagat. It is utilised in other areas also. It is an ontological relation. It is utilised to serve the purpose served by samavāya and tādātmya.

Besides these ontological relations which come under vṛttiniyāmaka, a number of other relations also are worked out in Indian philosophy. Some of these are in the area of cognition, some are

linguistic and some are correlative. These relations are minutely worked out in Nyāyavaiśeṣika system. The others broadly follow the Nyāyavaiśeṣika model with certain changes to suit their respective metaphysical views. The gap between the idealist view and the realist view is maintained all along.

Viśayatā is a relation in the area of cognition. It has three dimensions i) viśeṣyatā ii) viśeṣaṇatā/prakāratā iii) samsargatā.

Pratīyogitā and anuyogitā relations indicate the correlative nature of the relata. These can be worked out in any area where the relata are correlatives. For instance the two relata of sādṛśya i.e. similarity, the bheda i.e. difference and so on. Kāryakāraṇa bhāva i.e. kāraṇatā and kāryatā, Ādhāra-ādheyabhāva- ādhāratā-ādheyatā, and so on. These are more of the nature of the description of the status and the role of the relata than the actual relation. To attain this status or play the role these will have to have an ontological or epistemological relation at their basis.

Nirūpya-nirūpakata also indicates the role. Avacchedakatā specifies the characteristic.

The nature of Kāraṇatā and kāryatā depends upon the theory of the causation of the respective schools viz. satkāryavāda, asatkāryavāda,

sad-asat kāryavāda, pratitya samutpāda vāda, adhyāsa vāda and so on.

Though relation is not given the status of a separate category in Indian Philosophy, different types of relations are worked out in detail in the areas of ontology, epistemology and linguistics to bring a unity and co-operation among different categories and the objects under these categories. It is interesting to note that the two schools of Pūrvamīmamsā adopt two different relations viz tādātmya and samavāya in the area of ontology. Tādātmya is more suitable for pariṇāma theory of causation and Samavāya for ārambhavāda. Mīmāṃsakas are not interested in any particular causation theory as they hold the view that there is no creation or destruction of the world.



4 3. Semantics of Pūrvamīmāṃsā

1-1 There is a general impression that grammar aided with etymology and laxicon is concerned with the language. However, it is concerned only with the structure of the language. It primarily deals with morphology and syntax. It deals with semantics in a limited way. The area of semantics is deeply probed by philosophy, psychology, anthropology and other human sciences that deal with the mind. It is the behaviour of the mind that is reflected in the behaviour of language. Mīmāṃsā philosophy that gives utmost importance to Śabdapramāṇa is vitally concerned with language. It studies all aspects concerning the import of language. Its studies belong to a period of our intellectual history when psychology, sociology etc human science were not bifurcated from philosophy. Therefore its handling of the problems of language involves the approach of these disciplines also unconsciously. Mīmāṃsā reveals remarkable insight on these aspects.

1-2 In respect of the study of language Mīmāṃsā raises some interesting questions -

- i) Whether the language of the day to day discourse be taken as standard for the purpose of study or the scholastic language.

- ii) What is the status of the vocabulary that is assimilated from the tribal languages into the sophisticated language.
- iii) What is the status of corrupt forms vis-a-vis the standard forms.

Mīmāṃsā has a very practical and liberal views on these questions.

- i) The language of the day to day discourse be taken as standard for the study of the nature and behavior of language but not the scholastic language.
- ii) The vocabulary assimilated from tribal and other sub-culture languages be taken in the same sense in which these were used by them.
- iii) The corrupt forms do not form the genuine part of the language.

1-3 The study of language has to cover the following issues.

- i) What is the nature of the word?
- ii) what is the nature of the relation between the word and meaning?
- iii) What constitutes a sentence ?

- iv) How to determine the purport of a passage or discourse ? What is the import of scriptural injunction?
- v) The types of injunctions
- vi) Import of negative statements.

These are main issues, there are good many related issues. Mīmāṃsā has distinct views on all these issues. These are thoroughly discussed. Nyāya and Vyākaraṇa also discuss these issues. The modern semantics also is considerably developed. There is full scope for interdisciplinary approach in this area.

Pūrvamīmāṃsā considers language as autonomous at three levels viz. i) The relation between the word and the meaning ii) sentence meaning iii) The purport of a passage or discourse.

The relation between word and meaning is natural. It is not fixed by any human agency or God. When a meaningful expression is expressed its meaning is also expressed. It is comprehended through elder's conversation from generation to generation. No generation fixes it.

The process of learning the language.

The language is learnt by children by observing

the elder's conversation. When an eldest person asks an elder person "Chaitra bring the cow" the elder person Chaitra brings it. The boy standing nearby listens to the statement, observes the action of bringing the cow, and comprehends that this statement conveys this activity. He is yet to learn as to which word conveyed which item of the activity. The same boy listens to another statement. "Chaitra bring the horse" and observes the activity of bringing the horse. From this statement he comprehends that the animal brought is horse. and the animal stated in the earlier statement is cow. Then on another occasion he listens to the statement 'take away the cow' and he comprehends that the verb 'take' away conveys the action of taking away, he also comprehends that the verb 'bring' in the earlier statement conveyed the action of bringing.

In this way the boy goes on comprehending the sentence-meanings and word meanings one after the other and makes progress in learning the language.

This process of learning the language has been going on generation after generation. The earliest or first generation cannot be identified. Probably it is as old as the very evolution of the human race and the evolution of speaking habit on the

part of man. No individual or no particular generation fixed the meaning of a given word or a given sentence. Each individual and each generation inherited it from previous generation. The articulation of the words, conveying of meaning by words and the use of the same in sentences must have developed over several generations. It is difficult to fix any stage of this development as the starting stage. Therefore the trio of word, meaning, and their relation is stated to be nitya in pūrvamīmāṃsā. The expression nitya has two implications viz., i) anādi i.e., the beginning of these cannot be traced ii) sahaja i.e., emerging together. To indicate this nityatva Jaimini uses an interesting expression viz., autpattika. This expression conveys that the word and its meaning arise together. It is not brought about or fixed by any outside agency.

It is not fixed by any human agency later by way of fixing a sanketa or in any other manner. It is natural.

The process of the evolution of language can be ascertained by a study of the acquiring of language skill by children. The child has a natural capacity to speak. However, it starts with inarticulated sounds and gesticulation. It slowly starts articulating the sounds into clearer and clearer words and syllables

on the model of the pronunciation of the parents and other inmates at home. It learns the language through the elder's conversation as described above. We can envisage similar process for the very evolution of the language. In the early stages, probably, each individual had his own language. With the interaction with the members of the family he must have evolved a common language at family level. In due course when social interaction developed the language must have developed at social level. The social level development also must have regional variations and social variations. At all these levels the language is primarily developed through the conversation, generation after generation. This validates the Mīmāṃsā theory of learning language through elder's conversation and the theory of the trio of word meaning and their relation being natural. The words convey their meaning in a natural way. However, one has to get acquainted with this through elder's conversation. Vācaka-śakti i.e., denotative power of the words is natural but śakti graha i.e., comprehension of this denotative power of the words is provided by elders conversations. The sweetness of a sweet object is natural but the comprehension of it is provided by the tongue.

The theory of learning the language by elder's

conversation is very vital to Pūrvamīmāṃsā. It lays the foundation for the Mīmāṃsā doctrine of the *apauruṣeyatva* of Veda. It also supports the *anvitābhidhāna* theory of Prabhākara, since, the language is learnt initially through the sentences and then only word meanings are comprehended by *avāpa* and *udvāpa* i.e., dropping a word and substituting another word. It makes the language autonomous both at word level and the sentence level. It gives more importance to day to day conversational language than the scholastic language. In fact it puts vedic language on par with day to day language so far as the comprehension of the language is concerned.

The very opening remark of Śābara bhāṣya viz., 'loke yeṣu artheṣu prasiddhāni padāni sati sambhave tadarthāni eva sūtreṣu iti avagantavyam' (लोके येषु अर्थेषु प्रसिद्धानि पदानि सति सम्भवे तदर्थानि एव सूत्रेषु इति अवगन्तव्यम् ।) i.e., the words employed in the sūtra be taken in the same sense in which these are used in day to day language. This remark not only applies to sūtras but applies to the words employed in the veda also. The sūtra are meant to interpret veda. Therefore, this remark applies to the words of veda also. Śābara makes it more clear in another place by his remark 'śabdānām arthajñāne laukikaḥ prayogaḥ abhyupāyaḥ' (शब्दानामर्थज्ञाने लौकिकः प्रयोगः

अभ्युपायः) i.e. The meaning of the words is comprehended from the day to day usage. Under the Sūtra 'prayoga codanābhivāt arthaikyam avibhāgat' (प्रयोग चोदनाभावात् अर्थैकं अविभागात्). Jaimini himself makes it clear that the vedic words are same as the laukika words and they have the same sense. Otherwise the comprehension of the very vedic injunction becomes difficult. The elder's conversation helps to comprehend the meaning of the laukika words, If the vedic words are same as these, then their meaning is easily comprehended. This enables to impliment the injunction. There is no other way to comprehend the meaning of Vedic Words. In this way the theory that the elders conversation is the means for comprehending the language forms the foundation to comprehend the meaning of veda and the implimentation of vedic injunctions. Keeping this in mind Jaimini affirms this position again under the sūtra 'śabdārtha schāpi lokavat.'

The formation and the nature of the word

The vedic injunctions are in the form of sentences. The sentence consists of words. The word meanings appropriately associated form the sentence meaning. Therefore, Pūrvamīmāṃsā discusses the nature of the word and the word meaning. The nature of the word is explained as

'a group of syllables arranged in a certain order and yielding a meaning. Here, two questions arise. According to Mīmāṃsakās the syllables are eternal and all pervasive, how can these be arranged in an order. This is answered by pointing out that these eternal syllables are manifested in the ear cavity. The order is the order of the manifestation. The next question is, since, the presence of the manifested syllables is momentary how can a group of these be formed and the unit of syllables designated as word be cognised. This question is answered by pointing out that each syllable manifested leaves a samskāra i.e., impression in the mind of the listener and the last syllable together with the impressions of the earlier syllables gives the cognition of the word.

To avoid these difficulties vyākaraṇa envisaged the concept of sphota. Mīmāṃsā does not accept the concept of sphota. According to Nyāya the syllables are not eternal. These are produced by the efforts of the vocal organs. These are not manifested. In other respects their explanation of the nature of words is same as Mīmāṃsā.

The nature of word meaning

The nature of the meaning of the word is differently explained by Mīmāṃsā, Vyākaraṇa and Nyāya.

Nyāya holds the view that *vyakti* i.e. the object referred to by the word is its meaning while the Mīmāṃsā holds the view that *ākṛti* or *jāti* i.e. the universal i.e. the common characteristic the object shares with the other objects of the same group is the meaning of the word.

For instance, the word 'cow' conveys the object cow according to Nyāya while its characteristic 'cowness' is conveyed by the word 'cow' according to Mīmāṃsā.

Jaimini raises this question viz., whether *ākṛti* is the meaning of the word or *Vyakti* in *ākṛtyadhikaraṇa*. Ordinarily the word *ākṛti* is understood in the sense of *avayava samsthāna* i.e., a particular arrangement of the parts of an object but it is used here in the sense of universal i.e., common characteristic. Śabara makes it clear by explaining as '*dravyaguṇa karmaṇām sāmānyamātram ākṛtiḥ*' (द्रव्यगुणकर्मणां सामान्यमात्रं आकृतिः) i.e., the common characteristic found in substances, qualities and actions.

Pūrvapakṣin argues that *vyakti* has to be taken as the meaning of the word. He puts forward and following arguments.

i) Vedic injunction enjoin offering a paśu, sprinkling water on rice etc., acts. These cannot

be performed on the ākṛti i.e., the universal paśutva. Vṛhitva etc. These can be acted upon only on the vyakti i.e., the object. Therefore, vyakti has to be taken as the meaning.

ii) There are certain injunctions such as, 'six cows be given' 'twelve cows be given' 'twenty four cows be given.' These numbers cannot be of ākṛti, nor so many ākṛtis of cows can be given. Ākṛti is one in all.

iii) It is stated that if a paśu duly taken for the sacrifice escapes another has to be taken. Now, if ākṛti is the meaning, there is no another ākṛti to replace.

These arguments are based on the assumption that when ākṛti is taken as the meaning vyakti is not at all conveyed in any other way. However, ākṛti and vyakti are invariably associated. When two items are invariably associated with each other, the cognition of one provides the cognition of the other.

It is our experience that when a word is heard the vyakti is also comprehended. Now, the question that is to be settled is, whether the vyakti is comprehended from the word or through the ākṛti conveyed by the word. This can be settled by anvaya and vyatireka i.e. positive and

negative verifications. A person who cognises ākṛti even without words, cognises vyakti also. On the other hand a person who hears the word but is unable to recall the ākṛti conveyed by it will not be able to cognise vyakti. This clearly reveals that the word does not convey vyakti but it is ākṛti conveyed by the word that helps to cognise the vyakti as per the maxim 'when an item related with another is cognised it provides the cognition of the other. It cannot be urged that let us take vyakti-viśiṣṭa-ākṛti as the meaning. This will prevent using the same word with reference to another vyakti, since, that is not conveyed by this word. The driving point of this discussion is that ākṛti is the meaning of the word and vyakti is conveyed because of its association with ākṛti but not as the meaning of the word. Since vyakti is also conveyed the objections raised by pūrvapakṣin do not apply. Taking ākṛti as the meaning of the word does not come in the way of implimenting the vedic injunctions such as 'paśum ālabheta' 'vr̥hīn prokṣati' etc. Since, vyakti is also conveyed as associated with these.

The Nyāya holds the view that the word conveys vyakti qualified by jāti. They argue that the vyakti has to be conveyed by the word by the power of denotation only. It should not be

considered as conveyed by lakṣaṇā or ākṣepa. The lakṣaṇā has to be resorted only when there is some ground for it. When vyakti can be included in the scope of the meaning of the word in a natural way, there is no reason to exclude it. The only objection for the inclusion of vyakti in the scope of the meaning of the word is that the word which conveys a particular vyakti cannot be used with reference to other vyaktis. A separate word has to be thought of for each vyakti. There are innumerable other vyaktis of the same class. Hence, innumerable words have to be envisaged. These objections are technically designated as vyabhicāra and ānantya. These objections are answered by Nyāya by pointing out that a word is capable of conveying all the members of the class on the basis that these belong to that class. That is why the meaning is stated as that of vyakti qualified by jāti.

It should be noted here that according to Nyāya jāti and vyakti are distinct while according to Mīmāṃsā, these have tādātmya relation. Therefore, Nyāya has to envisage the denotation of both vyākti and jāti while for Mīmāṃsā it is sufficient if one of them is denoted. The other is also cognised because of tādātmya between the two.

Vyākaraṇa considers both vyakti and jāti as the

meaning. Śabara quotes the view of Vyākaraṇa mahābhāṣya in this respect. It is stated in Mahābhāṣya that ākr̥ti may be taken conveyed as an adjective and vyakti as substantive. Jāti is not conveyed without vyakti and vyakti is not conveyed without jāti, therefore both have to be taken as conveyed by the word. One of them may be taken as main and the other as subordinate depending upon the context of the use. Quoting this view Śabara remarks, there is no need to include the vyakti also in the scope of the meaning of a word since it is cognised as invariably associated with jāti but not as a meaning of the word.

Here, Mīmāṃsakas have to face a problem. If vyakti is not conveyed as meaning, then, syntactical connection between the prātipadika and pratyaya, becomes difficult. This is overcome by accepting nirūḍhalakṣaṇā.

From the above discussion the following points emerge.

i) Mīmāṃsa, Vyākaraṇa and Nyāya are agreed that jāti i.e. universal, is conveyed by the word as its meaning.

ii) Vyākaraṇa and Nyāya hold that the vyakti also should be included in the scope of the meaning

while Mimāṃsa thinks that it need not be included in the scope of meaning as it is otherwise comprehended. They go by the maxim *ananyalabhyāṣabdārthaḥ* i.e. the points comprehended by other *pramāṇa* are not to be included in the scope of the meaning of the word.



44. Modern theories of meaning

In respect of the meaning of a word, there are some modern theories viz. i) Referential theory (ii) Idiational theory (iii) Behavioral theory.

i) When we use the words like 'book' 'courage' 'run' Mr.X we are referring to an object, a quality, an action, and the name of a person. The respective words stand for the respective items. This is known as referential theory. Nobody knows who has fixed this relations. It is handed over from generation to generation.

All speech groups have not fixed the same word (sound unit) for the same item. However, withing a speech group, this relation is faithfully followed.

This referentially has some difficulty. By the word book, which book is conveyed whether a particular book or a class of books. If a particular book is conveyed we need another word for another book, a third word for a third book and so on. On the other hand if a class of book is conveyed by the word book, then, the statement 'bring the book' cannot be implimented. Since the class cannot be brought. These difficulties are the same as raised against the vyakti śakti theory and jāti śakti theory discussed in Indian traditions.

To avoid this difficulty, the modern scholars have introduced the Ideational theory. According to this theory, the word book conveys the idea of the book, through this idea one can grasp the particular book as well as a class of books. This Ideational theory also has its own difficulty. Can we intelibly separate the idea and the word so as to treat one as the meaning of the other? If the idea is a mental image of a particular book or a class of books, the difficulties pointed out in the referential theory will arise here again.

The Mīmāṃsā theory of meaning is closer to referential theory of meaning. However, to solve the difficulties raised against it, the Ideational theory is not resorted. This is because, the concept of 'idea' is not found in Indian Philosophy.

Mīmāṃsa holds the view that the word book conveys the class of books but in actual practice it boils down to particular book. The class characteristic is invariably associated with the particular objects of the class, hence, conveying the class results in conveying the particular object also. Hence, there is no difficulty in implimenting the statement 'bring the book.'

It is interesting find that the theories recently

formulated by modern scholars were formulated and discussed in Indian tradition long back.

The behavioral theory of meaning is a recent formulation after the advent of psychology. According to this theory the stimuli or the response the word invokes is the meaning of the word. This theory seems to have been adopted by Mimāṃsa in respect of the meaning of the injunctive suffix. The injunctive suffix stimulates the person addressed by it to undertake the activity. The import of an injunctive suffix is stated to be *preraṇā* i.e. prompting to undertake activity and generating initiative. Probably such a concept underlies the behavioral theory.



45. The relation between the word and meaning

While explaining the process of learning the language, it was stated that the relation between the word and meaning is *nitya*. It is not brought about by any human or devine agency. Śabara elaborates this point and brings out the *apauruṣeyatva* nature of this relation.

The relation between the word and meaning is stated to be *pratyāyaka* and *pratyāyya* i.e. that which makes it known and that which is made known. If such a relation is natural, then, one should be able to cognise the meaning at the very first use of the word. This does not happen. Even in the course of elder's conversation the boy is able to comprehend the meaning only when the words are employed in different sentences.

This difficulty is answered by pointing out that we have never said that the meaning is to be comprehend in the very first use. This aspect has to be settled on the basis of experience. Observing the use of the words as many times as required to comprehend the meaning is necessary on the basis of experience. It is an aid to comprehend the meaning. The eye is not able to see the objects without the light. This does

not mean that the eye has no natural capacity to see the object. Just as the light is an aid to the eye to play its role the elder's conversation is an aid to comprehend the word meaning.

Answering the above objection Śabara gives the arguments in support of the *apauruṣeyatva* of the relation between the word and meaning.

i) The relation between the word and the meaning is not caused by any human agency. In case it was caused by any one person the people would have remembered him.

It cannot be argued that the people are not interested in remembering the person who fixed the relation between the word and meaning. The meaning of a word remains in circulation only when there is a rapport between the person who fixes the relation and who uses the words. For instance, a person will not comprehend the meaning of the word *vṛddhi* as 'ād aic' without being in rapport with *Pāṇinī*. In the absence of such rapport in the case of vedic words it is better to say no one fixed the relation instead of saying 'some one fixed it but people did not care to remember him. Moreover, even if we grant the possibility of forgetting we cannot think of a person fixing the relation without *pramāṇa*. Not

remembering is a negative evidence. This does not prove the existence of a person who fixed the relation. To prove the existence a positive evidence is necessary.

ii) The arthāpatti in the form 'The words are not found conveying meaning without fixing the relation between the word and meaning. If they could convey the meaning without fixing the relation, then, they would have conveyed on the first hearing only. Hence, we must presume a person who has fixed the relation, is not of any help. Arthāpatti helps only when there is no other way out. It is already stated that the elder's conversation generation after generation reveals the natural relation between the word and meaning.

iii) At no time the words remained without the relation with their meaning. Therefore, the question of some one fixing the relation at some time does not arise.

iv) The person who is supposed to fix the relation must fix it by using some word. The meaning of that word should have been fixed by some other person. That person again must have fixed it by using another word the meaning of which must have been fixed by still another person. This results in infinite regress. Therefore,

it is better to consider that the beginning of this relation cannot be traced. It is anādi. It is comprehended through the elder's conversation.

Vyākaraṇa considers the relation between the word and meaning as tādātmya i.e. identity. This identity is not absolute identity type. the two are distinguishable but not separable. Further this identity is not physical identity but it is an identity of these two when these are objects of cognition. It is technically stated bauddha tādātmya. It is also held by vyākaraṇa that the words have anādi yogyatā or anādi śakti i.e. an inherent capacity to convey the meaning. The vyākaraṇa view is very close to mīmāṃsā view.

Nyāya takes altogether different view. According to Nyāya the relation between the word and meaning is established by men by some kind of convention. We find that such convention is laid down in case of new words conveying new objects. There is no reason to think that a different procedure is followed in the case of the words that mankind has inherited from the past.

However, the problem remains as to who are these persons. Can we trace the first generation of persons who established this convention. Even if these are traced, did these persons fixed the

convention by using the words or by other means. If by other means, then, that stage cannot be stated to be the stage of the use of language. Further, the other means can be considered as an aid to reveal the inherent capacity of the words to convey the meaning that is natural to them like the elder's conversation at a later stage. Thus the concept of natural relation between the word and meaning cannot be avoided.

The aids for comprehending the meaning

It is explained above that the relation between the word and meaning is natural and the meaning of the words is comprehended through the elder's conversation. It is also stated that ākṛti is the meaning and vyakti is also conveyed as it is invariably associated with ākṛti. Now, the elder's conversation provides the meaning of the words of day to day use only. Therefore to enrich the vocabulary of one's speech and writing, other sources are also required. These sources are listed as vyākaraṇa kośa, upamāna, āptavākya, vākyaśeṣa and the commentary. These are accepted as the sources by all including Mīmāṃsā. However, Mīmāṃsā adds its own sources. Before Mīmāṃsā proceeds to explain the sources a very useful general observation is made by Mīmāṃsā viz 'yasya āgame yadupajāyate sa tasya arthaḥ iti gamyate' i.e.

The meaning that occurs when a word is heard is its meaning, that is to say, it is its primary meaning. This primary meaning is conveyed by the primary denotative power designated as *abhidhā* or *vācaka śakti*. The primary meaning is designated as *mukhyārtha* in Sanskrit. Ordinarily all words convey the primary meaning.

The usage of *abhiyuktas* or *śāstrajñas* i.e. learned persons is an important source of comprehending the primary meaning.

The learned men are well aquented with *veda* and the continued tradition of the performance of sacrifice. Their memory is quite strong. Therefore, whenever a word is used in more than one sense, the usage of the learned is more authoritative than the usage of the ordinary people. For instance, the words *yava*, *varāha* and *vaitasa* are used by the learned persons in the sense of *dirgaśuka*, *sūkara*, and *vanjula* cane. The ordinary persons use these words in the sense of *priyangu*, *kṛṣṇa śakuni* and *jambū* cane. The articles conveyed by these words are to be used at the sacrifices, therefore, the meaning of these words should be taken as per the usage of the learned. Śabara quotes the relevant *vedic* passages to substantiate the meaning adopted by the learned.

This guideline is formulated keeping the mīmāṃsā requirement for the performance. The other meanings are also permitted as secondary meanings. Mimāṃsa has high regard for the usage of the people. However, this special guideline is laid down in the context of the requirement of the sacrifice. It is a choice between vidvad-rūdhi and rūdhi. This concept of vidvad rūdhi is fully developed in Dvaita Vedānta.

Tribal people and foriegners are the source to comprehend the meaning of the words adopted from their usage. For instance, the words pika, nema, tamarasa etc words are used by the tribal people. They know the meanings of these words better. Hence, these words should be taken in the same sense. The meaning of these should not be twisted by laboured etymological explanation.

Nigama, Nirukta, Vyākaraṇa etc technical works are another source to comprehend the meaning of the words. Without this it is difficult to comprehend the meaning of these words. For instance the words jarbhārī, turbhārī etc are the names of aśvini deities. These words appear to be un intelligible. However, by appropriate etymological explanation these yeild meaning jarbhārī means yawning, turbhārī means aggressive.



46. Primary and secondary meanings

Two kinds of denotative powers are envisaged for conveying the meaning by the word. These are designated as i) *abhidhā* i.e., direct communication, ii) *Lakṣaṇā* i.e., figurative or extended communication. The meaning conveyed by *abhidhā* is *mukhyārtha* i.e., primary meaning and the meaning conveyed by *lakṣaṇā* is secondary meaning. The primary meaning is of two types, i) *Rūḍha* i.e., the meaning developed by usage, ii) *yaugika* i.e., the meaning developed by etymological explanation. For instance, the meaning of the word *Kamala* as lotus is *rūḍha* meaning and the meaning of the word *pankaja* as lotus is *yaugika*. The latter meaning is obtained by the etymological explanation *panke jātaḥ* i.e. born in the mud. Both these are primary meaning. Large number of words have *rudha* meaning only. A few have *yoga* meaning only. However, some words that have a *rūḍha* meaning could also be given a different meaning by etymological explanation. For instance, the word *Rathakāra* has the *rūḍha* meaning as a person of *Rathakāra* caste. This meaning is by usage. But this word can be explained by etymology as conveying the builder of chariot who may or may not be a person of *rathakāra* caste. In such cases *rūḍha* meaning has to be preferred to *yaugika* meaning.

Lakṣaṇā i.e., the denotative power to convey the secondary meaning is utilised only when the primory meaning is not suitable. Lakṣaṇā is resorted on three grounds i) unsuitability of primary meaning i.e., mukhyārthabādha, ii) Tātparyānupapatti i.e., inability to arrive at the total purport iii) to serve some or other purpose that is not served by mere primary meaning.

In the stock example of gangāyām ghoṣaḥ i.e., there is a fisherman's village on the river gangā, the primary meaning of the word gangā i.e., river, does not suit. There cannot be any village on the river. The secondary meaning i.e., the bank of the river i.e., gangātīra is developed. This lakṣaṇā is based on the ground of mukhyārtha bādha.

According to Bhāṭṭas the word meanings lead to sentence meaning by lakṣaṇā. This is based on the ground of tātparyānupapatti. The words are employed in a sentence to get associated with the injunctive suffix that enjoins action. This purpose cannot be achieved unless the word meanings develop into a sentence meaning. Therefore, these develop sentence meaning by lakṣaṇā.

An important point to be noted in connection with lakṣaṇā is that the lakṣyārtha i.e., the secondary meaning must be related with the

primary meaning. Any other unrelated meaning cannot be adopted as lakṣyārtha.

Anarthākya parihāra i.e., avoiding a word or words in the sentence becoming anarthaka i.e., unsuitable to convey the required meaning is the main purpose of resorting to lakṣaṇā. The contingency of ānarthakya arises because of arthabādha i.e., contradictory nature of the primary meaning of one or more words in the sentence. Such ānarthakya is found mostly in arthavāda passages. Mimāṃsakās have a responsibility to establish the validity of arthavāda passages as that of injunctive statement. For this purpose Mimāṃsakas have developed this unique concept of lakṣaṇā. It is mīmāṃsā contribution to Indian hermeneutics.

Mimāṃsā employs the expressions gaṇī and gaṇārtha for lakṣaṇā and lakṣyārtha more often. Kumārila explains that when sādṛśya is the relation between the primary meaning and the secondary meaning it is designated as gaṇī and when these are related with other relations it is designated a lakṣaṇā. Though mīmāṃsā has developed the concept of lakṣaṇa, it cautions that it should not be adopted when primary meaning is possible.

The relative position of primary and secondary meanings is discussed by Jaimini and Śabara

under the sūtra arthābhidhāna samyogāt (सूत्रार्थाभिधानं संयोगात्). In the statement agniḥ māṇavakaḥ i.e., the boy is fire. The primary meaning of the word agni is fire and the agnisadṛśaḥ i.e., the boy is similar to fire is the secondary meaning. The primary meaning is directly conveyed by the word agni while the same word is applied to the boy on the basis of the similarity between the fire and boy. The primary meaning is designated as mukhyārtha and the secondary meaning is designated as gaṇa or lakṣyārtha. Here, the question arises, since, both these meanings arise from the word agni why not treat them on equal basis. This question is answered by pointing out that the second meaning depends upon the first meaning. Unless and until the first meaning of the word agni viz., fire, is comprehended the second meaning viz., the boy similar to fire, does not arise. While the first meaning can be comprehended without comprehending the second meaning, the second meaning cannot be comprehended without the comprehension of the first meaning. Hence, the two cannot be treated on equal basis.

The primary meaning is superier to secondary meaning.

In the hymn of 'barhiḥ devasadanam dadāmi'

(बर्हिः देवसदनं ददामि) the word barhi conveys barhi kind of grass as primary meaning and similar other grass as secondary meaning. In view of this the hymn has to be recited with reference to barhi kind of grass only. It is that kind of grass that is prescribed in connection with the sacrifice. Therefore that only has to be used and the hymn has to be recited with reference to barhi only. If the secondary meaning is taken the hymn will cease to be an auxiliary of barhi, consequently it will cease to contribute to the performance of yāga and apūrva.

This ruling viz., the word barhi be taken in its primary sense, is designated as barhinyāya. This is an instance of primary meaning being superior to secondary meaning.

There are instances in which the word concerned seems to have two primary meanings. Both cannot be taken as primary meanings in the same context, nor one of them can be taken as secondary meaning. In such contexts the meaning that is most suitable to the context should be taken as its meaning and other meaning should not be taken into account. For instance the word parva used in the context of darśapūrṇa māsa has the meaning 'time' and also the meaning 'a group'. Between these two the meaning 'a group'

suits the context. Therefore the other meaning is not to be taken into account.

ii) In the statement 'sauryam carum nirvapeṭ' the word caru occurs. It has the meaning 'cooked rice' and also the 'the pot in which the rice is cooked'. Between these two meanings the meaning 'cooked rice' has to be taken. It is cooked rice that is connected with the sacrifice as an offering. It cannot be argued that the meaning pot may be taken as primary meaning and the meaning 'cooked rice' as a secondary meaning since, the rice is cooked in the pot. When the primary meaning serves the purpose it is not justified to take a secondary meaning as another meaning. A word conveys only one meaning.

There are instances in which two are words are phonetically same but they have different meanings. For instance, the word mātā means mother and it also means 'a measurer'. In the sentence 'mātā daivatam' it means 'mother' but in 'mātā samah kṣiprah (माता समः क्षिप्रः)' i.e., he measures evenly and quickly the word mātā means a measurer.

It is actually a case of two different words that are phonetically similar but actually different as these are derived from different roots. Hence, the

particular word should be identified to ascertain its meaning.

There is an interesting example in which a word of a general meaning is taken in the sense of a special meaning. At jyotiṣṭoma it is stated agniṣomiyam paśum ālabheta' (अग्नीषोमीयं पशुं आलभेत) a paśu be offered at agniṣomiya. Here, the question arises whether a particular paśu, say chāga i.e., goat, be offered or any paśu. There is a mantravarṇa in this context viz. 'chāgasya vapāyāh medaso anubrihi' (छागस्य वपायाः मेदसो अनुब्रूहि) this helps us to decide that chāga be offered. However pūrvapakṣin argues that the word paśu occurs in the very injunctive statement while the word chāga be offered in mantravarṇa. A word occurring in mantravarṇa cannot regulate the meaning of a word that occurs in the injunctive statement, pūrvapakṣin suggests that to reconcile the mantravarṇa reference to a particular animal i.e., chāga, and injunctive statement reference to paśu in general the word chāga can be taken in its etymological sense as chinna gamana i.e., an animal that moves quickly. This suggestion of pūrvapakṣin cannot be accepted. When a meaning is available for the whole word it is not correct to go to its etymological parts and build a meaning. The etymological meaning i.e., avayava-

śakti cannot set aside the samudāya śakti. The avayavaśakti is designated as yoga and samudāya śakti is designated as rūḍhi. The rūḍhi is superior to yoga. In the case of rūḍhi the meaning is directly and readily available while in the case of yoga one has to arrive at the meaning of the whole word after ascertaining the meaning of the parts.

Further, if the word paśu is taken in the sense of chāga the mantravarṇa in which the word chāga occurs becomes an auxiliary to the act. On the other hand if it is taken in the general sense of paśu the mantravarṇa will go without any referent and will not be an auxiliary to the act.

In this example, the primary meaning is fixed utilising sāmānya viśeṣa nyāya i.e., the maximum of a general word being taken in the special sense.

i) The well known example of rūḍhi prevailing over yoga is the word 'rathakāra'. The statement 'varṣāsu rathakāraḥ ādadhita' (वर्षासु रथकारः आदधीत) prescribes agni ādhana to rathakāra. Here, the question is raised whether the word rathakāra be taken in the etymological sense viz., a person who builds the chariot or in the sense of a person of rathakāra caste.

Taking the word rathakāra in the etymological

sense as a builder of a chariot to rule out a person of rathakāra caste from undertaking agni ādhāna and restricting it to first three varṇas only is not possible. Since, the first three varṇas are prohibited from undertaking the vocation of building chariots etc. The śilpopajivana is prohibited to them. More-over the varṣā season i.e., rainy season, is prescribed as a time for rathakāra to perform agni ādhāna while for brahmaṇa etc., first three varṇas. Vasanta etc., other times are prescribed. Therefore, the word rathakāra should be taken in the sense of a person of a rathakāra caste. This sense is rūḍha sense while taking it in the sense of a builder of a chariot is yoga sense. Here, rūḍha sense has to prevail over the rūḍha sense.

8-6 ii) There are a few interesting examples which were originally yoga words but in due course became rūḍha words. For instance, the word kuśala originally meant a person skilled in cutting the grass but later developed the meaning 'a skilled person in general' similarly, the word praviṇa originally meant a person skilled in playing on viṇā and later developed the meaning 'a skilled person' in general. These are the instances of the words that were originally yoga type but later developed into rūḍha words. In

these cases the original yoga sense is completely ignored.

The Secondary meaning i.e. Lakṣaṇā based on tatsiddhi, jāti sārūpya etc.

We have seen above that the Mīmāṃsakas attach utmost importance to primary meaning and have laid down the necessary guidelines to ascertain the primary meaning. However, there are certain instances in which primary meaning cannot be taken. For instance, there are vedic statements such as 'yajamāṇaḥ prastaraḥ' 'yajamāṇaḥ ekakapālaḥ'. These cannot be taken in their primary sense. Prastara means a handful of grass placed by the side of yajamāna. This itself cannot be taken as yajamāna. Same is the case with kapāla. Therefore, the word yajamāna should be taken as yajamāna kāryakārin. In the absence of yajamāna, prastara is addressed as if it is yajamāna. Ordinarily a person himself discharges all his activities. However, when some one discharges his activities the latter is called by the name or the designation of the former. For instance when a village headman discharges the duties of a king he is called the king. He is called the king only in the secondary sense. The process of obtaining the secondary sense is called lakṣaṇā and the secondary sense is called

Lakṣyārtha. The ground for lakṣaṇā in the above two instance is, one performing the activities of another. This ground is designated as tatsiddhi.

Here, it should be noted that the primary meaning is the basis for the secondary meaning. It is a case of an extension of meaning. No secondary meaning can be developed without the basis of the primary meaning. However mere primary meaning does not suit here. It becomes anarthaka i.e., irrelevant.

There is a vedic statement 'agniḥ vai brāhmaṇaḥ' (अग्निर्वै ब्राह्मणः) In this statement the word agni cannot be taken in its primary sense. Hence, it has to be taken in the sense agnisamānajātīyajanāmā i.e., born in the same manner as agni. Both agni and brāhmaṇa are stated to have been born from the mouth of Prajāpati. Therefore, brāhmaṇa is called agni here in the secondary sense. The common source for birth is the ground here. This ground is called jāti.

There is a vedic statement 'ādityo yūpaḥ'. Here the word 'āditya' cannot be taken in the primary sense. Therefore, it has to be taken in the secondary sense viz. brilliant. Yūpa is praised here as brilliant. Sārūpya i.e., the two being alike, is the ground here.

There is a vedic statement 'apaśavo vā anye gavāsvebyaḥ' i.e., the animals other than cow and horse are not animals. Here the word 'apasavaḥ' cannot be taken in the primary sense that the other animals are not animals. Therefore, the word apamiśavaḥ conveys the secondary meaning that these are inferior animals while cow and horse are superior. Praśamsā i.e., praise is the ground to develop the secondary meaning here.

In the statement 'sṛṣṭiḥ upadadhāti' placing of iṣṭakas by reciting sṛṣṭi hymns is prescribed. Here, the question is raised. Whether only those hymns that have a reference to sṛṣṭi be recited or other hymns also stated in the context be recited. It is ruled that the word sṛṣṭiḥ is used simply because the hymns that have reference to sṛṣṭi are in large number. However, all hymns stated in the context are connected with the sacrifice. Therefore, the word sṛṣṭi be taken to convey both the hymns that make a reference to sṛṣṭi and other hymns stated in the context. The ground for the secondary sense here is bhūmā the mention of majority.

Linga Samavāya i.e., the presence of a prominent indication is another ground. The well-known example for this is 'chatrīṇo yānti' the umbrella holders are moving. Here, the word

conveys both the persons who hold aumbrella and others. Holding umbrella is prominently observed. Therefore, that is only mentioned. But both umbrella holders and all others moving on the road are conveyed as secondary meaning. This example is given by Śabara himself under the sūtra *linga samavāyaḥ*. However it can be brought under *bhūma* i.e., majority also, if majority of persons were holding the umbrella and few were moving without it.

In the above examples, *lakṣaṇā* in *yajamānaḥ prastaraḥ* is intended to avoid *nāmadheyatva* or *guṇavidhitva* of the word *yajamāna*, in *‘agniḥ brahmaṇaḥ’* it is intended to avoid *guṇavidhitva* of *agni*, in *‘ādityo yūpaḥ’* it is intended to avoid *nāmadheyatva* or *guṇavidhitva* in the word *āditya*, in *‘apaśavo vā anye’* it is intended to avoid *guṇavidhitva* of the word *apaśavaḥ*, in *sṛṣṭirupadadhati* it is intended to avoid *guṇavidhitva* of the word *sṛṣṭi*.

From this it is clear that the purpose of *Lakṣaṇā* is not merely to avoid the unsuitability of *mukhyārtha* of these words but to avoid *nāmadheyatva* and *guṇavidhitva* of these words. These are all treated as *arthavādas* by resorting to *lakṣaṇā*. The *arthavādas* are also *pramāṇa*. By treating these as *arthavādas* the contingency of

these statements being apramāṇa is avoided. Since, the lakṣyārtha is based on mukhyārtha, the status of natural relation between the word and meaning is not affected. Ordinarily mīmāṃsa does not like to resort to lakṣaṇā, however, if it is required to protect the authenticity of vedic language, lakṣaṇā is permitted. In majority of cases the arthavādas do need lakṣaṇā. In fact arthavāda conveys prāsastya by lakṣaṇā.

Lakṣaṇa of place, time, attributes and acts.

We will notice a few more instances of lakṣaṇā which relate to the lakṣaṇā of place, time, attributes, act, cause and effect.

Place - Agnau tiṣṭhati i.e., 'stands on the fire.' Here the word fire conveys the secondary meaning viz the place near the fire. In the stock example 'gangāyām ghoṣaḥ' i.e., fisherman's village on the gangā, the word gangā conveys the secondary meaning viz the place near the ganga i.e., bank of gangā. This stock example is quoted by Śabara (7-1-4) It has also another reading gangāyām gāvaḥ. In the same sūtra śabara remarks that ākṛti conveys vyakti also as these are always together.

Time - In the statement Śaṅkhavelāyām āgantavyam i.e., come at the time when conch

blows, the particular time is conveyed. One has to go by that time whether conch blows or not. The blow of conch is only an indication. 'Goraja muhūrta the time when the dust is raised by the returning cows' is another example of kāla lakṣaṇa. Even in modern times we say when ten bells are given, though the bells are no longer in use. The time indicated by the word bell is the secondary meaning of the word bell.

The attributes - 'Agniḥ maṇavakaḥ' 'simhaḥ devadattaḥ' are the examples of attributes of fire and lion being conveyed by the words concerned. The statements 'stenam maṇaḥ' i.e., the mind is a thief 'anṛta vādinī vāk' i.e., the tongue is a liar, also are the examples of lakṣaṇā of attributes.

Act : acts are also sometimes conveyed as secondary meanings. For instance, the words darśa and paurnamāsī have the respective time as their primary meaning. However, these convey the sacrificial acts performed on these days as their secondary meaning. In the instance of kāla lakṣaṇā an event indicates the time while in karmalakṣaṇa the time indicates the act.

The word for cause secondarily conveys the effect and vice-versa.

There is an interesting example wherein the

contingency of lakṣaṇā arises both in pūrvapakṣa and Siddhānta. However siddhāntin ingeniously avoids lakṣaṇā and affirms siddhānta.

In the context of Vajapeya it is stated that 'saptadaśa aratniḥ vajapeyasya yūpo bhavati' (सप्तदश अरत्निः वाजपेयस्य यूपो भवति) the yūpa of vājapeya will be seventeen fore-arms length. However, vājapeya is a somayāga and there is no yūpa in it. Therefore, pūrvapakṣin argues that the word yūpa should be taken in the secondary sense as a long sacrificial vessel and applied to ṣoḍaśipātra. However, siddhāntin points out that there is paśuyāga which is subordinate to vājapeya. This paśuyāga has yūpa. Therefore the length prescribed for yūpa may be taken in its primary sense as an auxiliary of this yāga and lakṣaṇā be avoided. Pūrvapakṣin further argues that though you have avoided lakṣaṇā for the word yūpa. You have taken the word vajapeya in the sense of paśuyāga. This is the lakṣaṇā of the word Vājapeya as paśuyāga. But siddhāntin contends that we have not taken the word vājapeya in the sense of paśuyāga. We have only pointed out that yūpa of paśuyāga can be talked of as that of Vājapeya as the former is subordinate to the latter. Śabara gives an interesting example to bring home this point.

When we say he is the grand son of Devadatta, the grandson is related to the grand father in the primary sense of the word sambandha. Similarity the yūpa that in paśuyāga can be stated as belonging to vājapeya. This will satisfy the expression vājapeyasya. There is no need of any lakṣaṇā.

The above example indicates that the concept of lakṣaṇā is widely utilised to determine the nature of sacrificial acts. Some of the instances given above occur in pūrvapakṣa. However, the nature of lakṣaṇā of these words is not denied in siddhānta but 'whether these support pūrvapakṣa or not is discussed. So far as the instances given in siddhānta are concerned, the support of these is utilised.

In connection with lakṣaṇā the following points have to be noted.

- i) The primary meaning is superior to the secondary meaning. Therefore as far as possible primary meaning only should be taken. Jaimini and Śābara stress this points repeatedly.
- ii) The unsuitability of primary meaning is the main ground to resort to lakṣaṇā.

- iii) The primary meaning is the basis for the secondary meaning. The latter should be related to the former.
- iv) Adopting the secondary meaning should serve some purpose.
- v) Avoiding ānarthakya is the main purpose of resorting to lakṣaṇā.



47. The sentence

Jaimini discusses the nature of sentence in the context of fixing a unit of yajurveda. The unit of Rk can be easily identified since it is in metrical form. A unit of Sāman also can be easily identified as a musical note added to a Rk. However, a unit of yajus cannot be easily identified as it is in a series of isolated words. It is difficult to easily locate the word with which a yajus begins and the word with which it ends. Therefore, a concret basis has to be fixed to work out a unit of yajus. The expression yajus is explained as yajyate it yajus that which assists the yāga is yajus. Such assistance is provided by the yajus by describing the deity, dravya or some other item connected with the yāga. Therefore, a group of words that serve this purpose is a yajus. 'Yāvatā padusamūhena ijjate tāvān pada samuhaḥ ekam yajuḥ.' (यावता पदसमूहेन इज्यते तावान् पदसमूहः एकं यजुः) This unit of yajus is designated as vākya as it speaks of the assistance provided to yāga. 'Yāvatā kriyāyāḥ upakāraḥ prakāśyate tāvad vaktavyatvād vākyam iti ucyate' (यावता क्रियायाः उपकारः प्रकाशयते तावद् वक्तव्यत्वाद् वाक्यं इति उच्यते). This is stated in the sūtra 'arthaikatvāt ekam vākyam' (अर्थैकत्वात् एकं वाक्यम्). A group of words that serve a common purpose constitute a sentence.

Now, the question arises as to how to ascertain whether a particular word in the group of words serves the purpose or not ? To meet this question a condition is laid down in the very sūtra. viz. sākāṅkṣam cet vibhāye syāt (साकाङ्क्षं चेत् विभाये स्यात्) i.e., if that word is taken out the rest will not be able to serve the purpose. They will be in need of the left out word. The expression ākāṅkṣā means 'in need of' 'in expectation of.' Hence, that word has to be taken as part and parcel of the sentence.

The above definition of vākya is illustrated by the passage . 'devasya tvā savituḥ etc. This passage makes a reference to nirvāpa. Its purpose is nirvāpaprakāśana. All words in this passage serve the common purpose of nirvāpaprakāśana. Therefore these constitute one yajus i.e., one vākya. Here, nirvāpāmi is the central word. All other words get connected with it and describe nirvāpa. The procedure of other words getting connected with the central word that conveys action is explained in the sūtra 'tadbhūtānam kriyārtham samāmnāyaḥ' (तद्भूतानां क्रियार्थं समाप्तायः).

The two conditions laid down here viz., i) arthaikatva i.e., serving a common purpose ii) sākāṅkṣatva i.e., being in need of each other are very essential to treat a group of words as a

vākya. This is explained by the following illustrations.

i) In the passage 'bhago vām vibhajatu, aryamā vām vibhjatū (भगो वां विभजतु, अर्यमा वां विभजतु) etc. the purpose served by these statements viz., vibhāga prakāśana is common. Hence, these fulfill ekārthatva condition. However, each of these statements is not in need of the other. Each has no ākāṅkṣā with the other. Therefore these statements cannot be considered as one vākya.

ii) In the passage 'syonam te sadanam kṛṇomi yo'smin sīda' (स्योनं ते सदनं कृणोमि योऽस्मिन् सीद) there is ākāṅkṣa between sadana i.e., place to keep, sīda i.e., be seated. However the purpose of the first part is sadana prakāśana i.e., describing the seat, and the purpose of the second part is to describe the sitting. Hence, the condition of ekārthatva is not fulfilled. Hence, these two statements do not form one vākya.

In the expression 'ekārtha' the word artha does not mean the sense or meaning. It means purpose. This is clear from the objection raised and the answer given in the bhāṣya in respect of the implication of the meaning of ekārtha. The word 'ekārtha' cannot be understood in the sense of a single or a common meaning. Since each

word has its own meaning and the many words in the group have many meanings. The group of words has no separate meaning. The association of these meanings also cannot be considered as one unit as a *vākya*, since, the associations are also different in the case of each word and many. This objection is raised and it is answered by pointing out that the expression *ekārtha* is not used here in the sense of a single meaning but it is used in the sense of a single purpose or common purpose. '*ekaprayojanatvād upapannam* (एकप्रयोजनत्वाद् उपपन्नम्).

However, to achieve this serving of a common purpose by a group of words, one of the words in the group has to play the central role and the other words have to get connected with it. This central word is technically called *mukhya viśeṣya* i.e., the chief substantive word for which the other words are adjectives. This fact of a central word associated with the other words conveying the meaning of the whole group of words is *ekārthatva*. In this explanation the word *artha* in the expression *ekārtha* means the sense or meaning. Keeping this fact in mind the *bhāṣya* remarks '*ekartha pada samūhaḥ vākyaṃ*' (एकार्थपदसमूहः वाक्यम्) can be understood in the sense that a group of words that convey the sense of

a central word associated with the sense of other words is a vākya i.e., sentence. This explanation is also supported by the bhāṣya remark 'ekārtham anekapadam vākyaṃ' (एकार्थं अनेकपदं वाक्यम्) under III-3-14.24

This explanation of arthaikyatva is expressly given in Bhāṭṭakaustubha by khandadeva. The core part of his explanation is, mukhya viśeṣya pratipādaka śabdaikatva (मुख्यविशेष्य प्रतिपादक शब्दैकत्व) i.e. In a sentence, there should be only one mukhyaviśeṣya i.e., central substantive word. This word associated with other words conveying the sense is arthaikya.

This explanation holds good so far as the ordinary sentences are concerned.

However, in the case of some vedic sentences it creates problems.

i) For Mīmāṃsakas mukhya-viśeṣya is bhāvanā. At darśapūrṇamāsa, āgneya etc., are stated by different statements and have different bhāvanā. However, these serve the common purpose of accomplishing darśapūrṇa māsa and have to be treated as ekārtha.

ii) Vṛihi and yava are stated by different statements. These serve the same purpose.

However, these two statements cannot be taken as one vākya.

To avoid the above difficulties khaṇḍadeva expands the scope of the explanation of ekārtha and puts the basis of ekārthatva negatively. He puts the revised explanation as bhinnapratīti viśayāneka mukhya viśeṣya rāhityam (भिन्नप्रतीति विषयानेकमुख्यविशेष्य राहित्यम्). i.e., there should not be more than one central substantive word i.e., mukhyaviśeṣya, each being an object of a separate cognition.

i) In the case of āgneya etc., at darśapūrṇa māsa though there are more than 'one central substantive, these are the objects of a single cognition. Hence, ekārthatva is not violated.

ii) In the case of vṛhi and yava though the cognition of these is separate as these are stated by two statements the mukhya viśeṣya viz., yaga is one. Therefore ekārthatva condition is not violated. But still these two statements are not to be considered as one vākya. Since, these two statements are not sākamkṣa with each other.

Khaṇḍadeva has accommodated both the explanations of the expression arthaikya viz., i) serving a single or common purpose ii) conveying unitary sense, in a very ingenious way. The first

explanation holds good for vedic vākya and the second explanation for both Vedic and laukika vākya. In the context of determining a unit of yajus as vākya it is not always a single grammatical sentence while a laukika sentence is a single grammatical sentence. The scope of a vākya in Mīmāṃsā is much wider than a grammatical sentence. Consequently its nature also is quite distinct from that of a grammatical sentence. (Bh.K. p.120)

Ākāṅkṣa, sannidhi and yogyatā

The clause 'sākankṣam cet vibhāge syāt' (साकाङ्क्षं चेत् विभागे स्यात्) states an important requirement of a vākya. Different words employed in a sentence must be in need of each other. These must have reciprocal need for each other. For instance, in the sentence 'bring the cow' the verb 'bring' is in need of the object 'cow' and the object cow is in need of the action bring. This kind of mutual need or expectancy is technically called ākāṅkṣā. The absence of one of these makes the sentence incomplete. The nature of ākāṅkṣā is explained as pratiyogini jijñāsā i.e., seeking the counter part. It is also explained as pratipattuḥ jijñāsā i.e., seeking of the counter part by the person who has to comprehend the sentence meaning. Seeking something is primarily an attribute of a person.

Therefore ākāṅkṣā has to arise in the seeker's mind only. However, since he seeks the padārthas and the padārthas are conveyed by the words, the words and the meanings are also stated to be sākāṅkṣā. This ākāṅkṣā at the word level may be explained as a capacity of the words to convey the meaning that is needed by its counter part. 'jijñāsītārtha pratipādana योग्या' (जिज्ञासितार्थ प्रतिपादनयोग्या).

Ākāṅkṣā is also explained as abhidhāna aparyavasāna i.e., incompleteness statement. When a required word is not included in the statement, then, the word already stated is in need of it. For instance, if the word dvāram is stated without the word close or open, there is abhidhāna aparyavasāna i.e., incompleteness of the statement. By providing the word pidhehi i.e., close, it is complete and the ākāṅkṣā is satisfied.

It is also of the nature of abhidheya aparyavasāna i.e., incompleteness of the items to be conveyed. To satisfy this type of ākāṅkṣā appropriate items have to be brought in by the relevant words and statements. For instance, the statement 'visvajitā yajeta' conveys kārya i.e., the task to be accomplished. The kārya cannot be accomplished unless there is a niyojya i.e., a person who under takes it . Such persons only

undertake it who have a desire for its result. Thus, there is the ākāṅkṣā for the a result, a person who desires it and who undertakes this act of viśvajid yāga. All these items have to be brought in to satisfy the akāṅkṣā arising out of the incomplete statement 'viśvajitā yajeta'. It is incomplete in respect of the items required to impliment the statement.

Another example of abhidheya aparyavasāna is, 'sauryam carum nirvapet brahmavarcasakāmaḥ' (सौर्यं चरं निर्वपेत् ब्रह्मवर्चसकामः). Here, the result and niyojya and adhikārin, i.e., the person who desires it are stated. But the karaṇa and karaṇopakāraka padārthas (करणोपकारक पदार्थः) are not stated. Hence, there is abhidheya aparyavasāna to that extent. These have to be brought in to make the statement 'sauryam carum nirvapet' complet. This is the explanation of ākāṅkṣā according to Prābhākars.

The ākāṅkṣā operates in an orderly way. conveying kārya is the central purpose of a sentence. This kārya i.e., the task to be accomplished needs an object i.e., viśaya. This is yāga, and therefore, the ākāṅkṣā arises for yāga. Then, there arises ākāṅkṣā about niyojya i.e., performer, then, about the auxiliaries. In this way all the requirements to accomplish kārya are

elicited by *ākāṅkṣā*. This procedure of the operating of *ākāṅkṣā* is laid down by *prabhākaras* keeping the *anvitābhidhāna* theory of sentence meaning.

Sannidhi or *āsatti* i.e., proximity, *yogyatā* i.e., compatibility, are two more criteria that assist a group of words to develop into a sentence. Even when two words in a group of words have *ākāṅkṣā* for each other but are not pronounced with reasonable proximity, then their association is not comprehended by the listener. In such cases the group of words cease to be a sentence for him. Hence, proximity of the words that have *ākāṅkṣā* is laid down as one of the requirement for the formation of the sentence and the comprehension of the meaning of the sentence.

This requirement is not directly laid down in *Jaimini sūtra*. However, in the context of his discussion of *anuṣaṅga* i.e., sifting a part of the sentence to other related sentence, the concept of *sannidhi* i.e., proximity is discussed.

The question of *anuṣaṅga* i.e., sifting a part of the sentence to another related sentence is raised in connection with the passage 'yā te agne ayāśaya tanūḥ varṣiṣṭhā' (याते अग्ने अयाशय तनूः वर्षिष्ठा) 'yā te agne rajāśayā' (याते अग्ने राजाशया) 'Yā te agne

harāśayā' (याते अग्ने हराशया) to be recited at jyotiṣṭoma. Here, the question is raised whether the part of the sentence 'tanūḥ varṣiṣṭhā' occurring in the first sentence be sifted to other two related sentences 'yā te agne rajāśaya' (याते अग्ने राजाशय) and 'ya te agne parasaya' (याते अग्ने पराशय). It is ruled that as there is ākāṅkṣā of this part of the first sentence with the other two sentences this part of the first sentence be sifted and recited while reciting the other two sentences. such sifting of a part of the sentence is called anuṣaṅga.

Here the question arises whether a part of the sentence could be sifted to another sentence when that is intervened by another sentence merely on the ground that it has ākāṅkṣā with the former, should it not be immediately after the first sentence. In the present instance 'yā te agne harāśaya' does not occur immediately after 'ya te agne ayāśaya tanūḥ varṣiṣṭha' etc. it is intervened by 'yā te agne rajāśaya'. Raising this question Śabara answers that the intervention by a related expression will not hurt the proximity. The ground for the necessity of proximity is to have the sanskāra of previous expression alive to connect it with the following expression. This will not be hurt if the two expressions are intervened

by a related expression. Sambandhi pada vyavāye hi sambandhādeva pūrva sanskāra na apaiti. (सम्बन्धि पद व्यवाये हि सम्बन्धादेव पूर्व संस्कारो न अपैति) From this reply of the śabara it is clear that the proximity between two sākaṅkṣā words or passages is necessary for the formation of the sentence, and the comprehension of the sentence meaning.

In explaining the nature of sannidhi i.e., proximity, the Bhāṭṭas and prābhākaras differ. According to Bhāṭṭas there are two requirements of sannidhi viz.

i) The words that convey the meanings should be pronounced with proximity.

ii) The objects concerned should be presented by words only but not by any other means. For instance, if the words 'cow' and 'bring' are pronounced with a long gap of time, the requirement of proximity is violated. Similarly a horse standing nearby has no proximity with the action of bringing conveyed by the word 'bring' as it is not presented by the word.

Prābhākaras explain the nature of sannidhi differently.

When a word is heard and its meaning is

comprehended the meaning of a related word that has ākaṅkṣā and yogyatā with it is presented to the mind. Such presentation is sannidhi i.e., proximity. It is not necessary that the word itself should be presented.

The sannidhi also takes place in an orderly way.

The third requirement of a vākya viz., yogyatā is also not specifically mentioned by Jaimini or Śabara. However, it is implied by their observations in many places. In the sūtra IV-3-11 Jaimini remarks The words the meanings of which are not compatible do not get connected even if they have proximity 'asamarthānām ānantaryepi asambandhaḥ.' (असमर्थानां आनन्तरायेऽपि असम्बन्धः) Under the sūtra III-1-12 Śabara remarks 'na hi vacana śatenāpi anārabhyo arthaḥ śakyo vidhatum' napi brūyād udakena dagdhavyam agninā kleditavyam. (न हि वचनशतेनापि अनारभ्यो अर्थः शक्यो विधातुं नापि ब्रूयादुदकेन दग्धव्यं अग्निना क्लेदितव्यम्) No statement can be made with the words of incompatible meanings. Nobody will say burn with water and clean with the fire. From these observations it is clear that yogyatā, i.e., compatibility is taken for granted as a requirement for the formulation of the sentence and the comprehension of the sentence meaning.

Prābhākaras define *yogyatā* as *sambandhārhatā* i.e., suitability to get connected with the relevant other word. In the statement *agninā sincati* i.e., sprinkles with fire. Sprinkling is not suitable to be connected with the fire. Such a course is *pramāṇa viruddha* i.e., opposed to our experience. Keeping this in mind it is also explained as *arthābādha* i.e., non-contradiction of the sense proposed to be conveyed. It is also negatively explained as the absence of the unsuitability.

This requirement of *yogyatā* in the sense of suitability to be connected creates a problem for Prābhākaras. According to prābhākaras all word meanings in an injunctive sentence have to get connected with *kārya* i.e., *apūrva*, conveyed by the injunctive suffix. This *apūrva* is not cognised by any other *pramāṇa* other than the vedic injunction. To know the suitability of this *apūrva* to be connected with the meanings of all other words in the injunctive sentence its knowledge is necessary. However, it cannot be known before the connection. This difficulty is solved by Prābhākaras by pointing out that on the basis of experience of the suitability of all word meanings in a sentence being connected with the action in the ordinary sentences, the connection of all word meanings with *kārya* or *apūrva* can be envisaged

in a general way and the comprehension of connection with a particular apūrva will take shape when the relevant word meanings are actually connected.

In the application of ākāṅkṣā, sannidhi and yogyatā criteria and syntactically connecting words in a sentence, propriety also has to be taken into account. For instance, in the sentence 'ayam eti putraḥ rājnaḥ puruṣo apanīyatām' (अयं एति पुत्रः राजः पुरुषो अयनीयताम्) i.e., the son of the king is arriving, push aside the person. Here, though the word king has proximity and ākāṅkṣā with both the words 'son' and 'person' it gets connected with the word son but not the person to be pushed aside. Once the word king gets connected with the word son, its ākāṅkṣā is satisfied and need not be connected with the word person.

Meaning of Sentence

In respect of sentence meaning there are four prominent views held by Vyākaraṇa, Nyāya, Bhāṭṭamīmāṃsā and Prābhākara mīmāṃsā.

1) Vyākaraṇa considers sphoṭa as the import of a sentence. The expression sphoṭa is explained as 'sphuṭati asmāt arthaḥ iti sphoṭaḥ' (स्फुटति अस्मात् अर्थः इति स्फोटः).

2) According to Nyāya the words convey the sentence meaning through their meanings. The words are the means to convey the sentence meaning, and the word meanings are a kind of vyāpāra i.e., the process. The words are assisted by

i) ākāṅkṣā i.e., expectancy on the part of each word in the sentence to seek the syntactical connection with the relevant other word.

ii) Sinnidhi i.e., the proximity with the word with which it is to be connected.

iii) Yogyatā i.e., compatibility or suitability to be connected.

3) According to Prābhākaras the words convey their meanings as connected with the meaning of the relevant other word.

The concept of sphoṭa is a unique concept and the process of its conveying sentence meaning is quite different. Therefore we will consider it separately. So far as the other three views are concerned there is a common point viz., word meanings constitute the sentence meaning. It looks simple. However, it raises the following questions.

i) Whether each word separately gives rise to the sentence meaning.

ii) Whether the group of the words in the sentence gives rise to the sentence meaning.

iii) Whether the word meanings give rise to the sentence meaning.

For instance, whether the meaning of the sentence 'agnihotram juhuyāt svargakāmaḥ' (अग्निहोत्रं जुहुयात् स्वर्गकामः) arises from each word separately, or by the group of three words or by the meanings of these three words.

The first alternative is against our experience. The second alternative, is also not possible. Since, the group is not a separate unit. The three words convey their respective meanings only. There is nothing more to convey the notion of a group. The third alternative viz., the word meanings convey the sentence meaning is also not possible. Since there is no relation between the word meanings and the sentence meaning. If the word meanings convey the sentence meaning without any relation between the two, then, any word meanings should be able to convey any sentence meaning, since, no particular sentence meaning is related with any particular word meanings.

The driving point of these arguments is that since, the word meanings do not help to arrive at the sentence meaning a separate denotative

power has to be envisaged for the sentence itself to yield the sentence meaning. This means a *sanketa* i.e., convention has to be fixed for the sentence to convey its meaning. This has to be done by a human agency. This means *apauruṣeyatva* of Veda will break down at the sentence level. As a result in spite of the permanent nature of *śabda* and *artha* and their natural relation, the permanent nature of the sentence and the sentence meaning has to be given up. This means that vedic injunctions are not absolutely authoritative. This is stated by Jaimini by way of *pūrvapakṣa* in the *sūtra*.

Utpattau vā avacanāḥ syuḥ arthasya tannimittatvāt (उत्पत्तौ वा अवचना स्युः अर्थस्य तन्निमित्तत्वात्) i.e., in spite of the permanent nature of *śabda*, *artha* and their relation (*utpattau vā*) the vedic injunctions will not be authoritative i.e., *avacanāḥ*. Since the sentence meaning arises from the sentence only which has to be fixed by a human agency.

Stating the *pūrvapakṣa* position as stated above Jaimini declares.

'Words are employed in a sentence to convey their meanings associated with the action conveyed by the verb. The word meanings constitute the sentence meaning. *'tadbūtā nām kriyāthratvena*

samāmnyāyaḥ arthasya tannimittatvāt' (तद्भूतानां क्रियार्थत्वेन समाम्नायः अर्थस्य तन्निमित्तत्वात्).

The words do not convey the sentence meaning individually separately. Nor there is a group of words as a separate entity. It is the association of the meanings of the words or the associated meanings of the words that is sentence meaning. 'vākyaṛthaḥ padārthānām sansargaḥ, pādārthānām anvitāvasthā vā' (वाक्यार्थः पदार्थानां संसर्गः पदार्थानां अन्वितावस्था वा).

In this explanation of the nature of the sentence meaning the only point that needs to be explained is, by what the association is conveyed. The task of the words is over as soon as their meanings are conveyed. This is answered by Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakā that it is conveyed by lakṣaṇā i.e., the secondary denotative power of words to extend the meaning. By this processes the very meanings of the words convey their association with other words which constitutes the sentence meaning.

Padāni svam artham abhidhāya nivṛtta vyāpārāṇi, atha idānīm padārthāḥ avagatāḥ santah vākyaṛtham avagamayanti. (पदानि स्वमर्थं अभिधाय निवृत्त-व्यापाराणि, अथेदानीं पदार्था अवगताः सन्तः वाक्यार्थं अवगमयन्ति)

The method of Lakṣaṇā here is quite distinct

from the lakṣaṇā in the stock example of gangayām ghoṣaḥ i.e., there is a fishermen's village on the bank of the river gangā. The primary meaning of the word gangā is gangāpravāḥ i.e., the flowing water of the river gangā. The secondary meaning is the bank of the river gangā. In this stock example the primary meaning i.e., the flowing water, is incongruent with the presence of a fisherman's village on it. Therefore, the secondary meaning viz., 'the bank' is resorted. The primary meaning is set aside.

The Bhāṭṭa mīmāṃsakas explain the basis of lakṣaṇā here differently. The words are not employed in a sentence, merely to know the word meanings. The word meanings are already known. Therefore, the purpose of employing them is to enable us to know that is yet to be known. This is the association of word meanings, or associated words meanings. This requires the extension of word meanings to their association to the relevant other word meanings in the sentence. This has to be done by way of lakṣaṇā. This ground for lakṣaṇā is designated as tātparya anupapatti.

Mukhya Viśeṣya - the centre of semantic organisation

The question of the centre of semantic organisation in a sentence is debated by Nyāya

Vyākaraṇa and Mīmāṃsa. Whether the verb is more important in a sentence or the noun is an old dispute. When a person says 'the clock fell on the ground' is it the clock that is the centre of semantic organisation or is it the act of falling that is the centre of semantic organisation. Normally we think that it depends upon the context. On hearing a loud noise, if one is asked as to what fell down, then the clock will be the centre of semantic organisation. On the other hand if one is asked to what happened to the clock, then, the centre of semantic organisation will be the action of falling. But this is a subjective arrangement. However, Nyāya, Vyākaraṇa and Mīmāṃsā think of fixing a uniform centre of semantic organisation for all sentences. Nyāya holds that the Agent is the centre of semantic organisation. Vyākaraṇa holds that action i.e., dhātvartha is the centre of semantic organisation.

Mīmāṃsā holds that the ākhyātārtha i.e., bhāvanā i.e., motivating to undertake activity is the centre of semantic organisation. These theories are designated as:

- i) Prathamāntamukhyaviśeṣyaka theory.
- ii) Dhātvarthamukhyaviśeṣyaka theory.
- iii) Bhavanāmukhyaviśeṣyaka theory.

The Nyāya insisting on agent and vyākaraṇa

insisting on action have no special significance. But Mīmāṃsā insisting on bhāvanā i.e., motivating to undertake the activity, to be the centre of semantic organisation has a significance for their whole programme of organising the sacrifice, ethics, and epistemology.

According to Mīmāṃsakas, the central word meaning with which the other word meanings, are to be associated is akhyātartha i.e., meaning of the verbal termination. This is indicated by the phrase kriyārthena samāmnāyaḥ in the sūtra. In this respect there are three different views.

i) Bhāṭṭa and prābhākara mīmāṃsā hold that ākhyātartha i.e., the meaning of the verbal termination is the central meaning i.e., mukhya viśeṣya in the sentence. This central meaning is bhāvanā according to Bhāṭṭas and kārya or niyoga according to Prābhākaras.

ii) Vaiyākaraṇas hold the view that dhātvartha the meaning of the dhātu i.e., verbal root is the central meaning. The other word meanings appropriately associated with it constitute the sentence meaning.

iii) The Nyāya holds the view that in those sentences where in there is a word in nominative case suffix the meaning of that word is the

central meaning. In a few cases dhātvartha i.e., verbal root meaning is the central meaning. In some cases akhyātārtha i.e., the meaning of the verbal termination is the central meaning. In other cases nipātārtha is the central meaning. Nyāya takes a pragmatic view and does not insist that only one of these is the central meaning. It depends upon the importance given to some or the other item in the actual use of the language.

Mīmāṃsā takes its stand on the statement in Nirukta of yāska viz., 'bhāva pradhānam ākhyātam' (भावप्रधानमाख्यातम्) i.e., the bhāvanā conveyed by the verbal termination is the central meaning. The words with the case suffixes accusative, instrumental etc., are in need of a verb to convey their meaning as connected with the action. This indicates that the verb provides the central meaning. The verb consists of the verbal root and the verbal termination. Between these, the verbal termination is more important. The meaning of verbal termination is bhāvanā i.e., preraṇa i.e., impelling to undertake activity. This is the central meaning i.e., mukhya viśeṣya. The verbal termination conveys the time, number and the agency i.e., kartṛtva also. However, these get connected with bhāvanā only. The meaning of the words get connected with bhāvanā.

The other words also consist of stem i.e., prātipadika, and nominal suffixes. Between these two also suffix is more important than the stem. The meaning of the stem is associated with the meaning of the suffix. This unit gets connected with bhāvanā.

This works out in case of the words that are in accusative, instrumental etc., kāraṇa words. However, in the case of the words that are in nominative case suffix, the question arises whether there is any need of a verb. The statements like 'chaitraḥ panditaḥ' 'aham panditaḥ' that are descriptive, there seems to be no need of any verb. However, on the authority of kātyāyana's statement 'astiḥ bhavanti paraḥ aprayujya manopi asti' (अस्तिः भवन्ति परः अप्रयुज्य मनोऽपि अस्ति). The verb 'is' or similar required verb has to be envisaged in all such cases.

In the case of the words in the nominative case suffix a special point to be noted is that the meaning of the nominative suffix is kartṛtva. Though the kartṛtva is conveyed by the verbal termination, it is conveyed by it in a general way. The nominative case suffix in the words chaitra particularly conveys it. The stem conveys the person chaitra and the nominative case suffix conveys him as agent. This agency of chaitra connected with chaitra by the

relation of ādheyatā gets connected with bhāvanā conveyed by the verb.

Mīmāṃsā considers kartṛtva as akhaṇḍadhārma but not anukūlakṛtyāśrayatva. When one or more explanations of a characteristic do not suit all the instances, it is designated as akhaṇḍadhārma. Instead of considering different kinds of characteristics as kartṛtva to suit each context it should be considered as one characteristic taking into account its basic function. Kartṛtva is considered as such an akhaṇḍa dharma since the nature of the agency differs in different instances. This also helps to consider the kartṛtva of yajamāna and his wife as joint i.e., vyāsajyavṛtti.

Prābhākaras also consider ākhyātārtha i.e., the meaning of the verbal termination as the central meaning. However, this meaning is not bhāvanā. It is kārya or niyoga. It is also designated as apūrva in the sense that it is not conveyed by any other pramāṇa than vedic injunction. All other words convey connected meaning only. Mere association is not the sentence meaning but the associated or connected meaning is the sentence meaning. The connection or association is not obtained by lakṣaṇā but it is an essential part of the word meaning. Words convey their meaning as connected with the meaning of the

relevant other word. The scope of the meaning of a word includes its connection with the relevant other meaning also. Prābhākaraś interpret the Jaimini sūtra 'tadbhūtānām' etc., and Śābara's remark on it accordingly.

In this context we may briefly note the views of Vyākaraṇa and Nyāya.

Vyākaraṇa interprets the Nirukta statement 'bhāvapradhānam akhyātam' (भावप्रधानं आख्यातम्) conveys that the verbal root meaning is the central meaning. The expression bhāva is interpreted as dhātvartha i.e., verbal root meaning. The statement in Mahabhāṣya viz., 'kriyāpradhānam akhyātam' (क्रियाप्रधानं आख्यातम्) the root meaning kriyā i.e., action, is more important. A sentence consists of nouns and verb. The nouns are subordinate, the verb is principal. Within the verb the root is principal and its termination is subordinate. The statement the suffix i.e., pratyaya, that is more important than the stem i.e., prakṛti, applies only to nouns. So far as the verbs are concerned the root meaning is more important than the meaning of the verbal suffix. Therefore it is the root meaning viz., action, that is the central meaning but not bhāvanā i.e., the meaning of the verbal termination as contended by Mīmāṃsakas.

Under the Nyāya sūtra 'te vibhaktyantaḥ (II-2-57) Nyāyavārtika kāra remarks that kriyā-pradhānam akhyātam. This indicates that the old Naiyāyikas agreed with Vyākaraṇa in considering the root meaning as the central meaning in the sentence.

If one goes by the later Nyāya theory viz., the meaning of the word in the nominative case suffix is the central meaning in a sentence, there will be difficulty in the following instances.

i) The statements 'pacati bhavati' in the sense 'the action of cooking takes place' given in Mahābhāṣya has no noun but still it is considered as a sentence.

ii) The statement 'paśya mṛgo dhāvati' (पश्य मृगो धावति) will have to be treated as two sentences i) mṛgo dhāvati, ii) tvam paśya 'the mṛga has 'dhāvanānu kula kṛti' (धावतानुकूल कृति) and 'darśanāśrayaḥ tvam' (दर्शनाश्रयस्त्वम्) if noun is taken as the central word.

In case the verb is taken as the central word the meaning of the above sentence may be paraphrased as 'mṛgakartṛka dhāvana karmaka darśana' (मृगधावनकर्मकदर्शन) i.e., the act of seeing the running of deer.

In this explanation the running of the deer is conveyed by the statement *mṛgo dhāvati* and the seeing of the running is conveyed as an object of the act of seeing. These two form the contents of one sentence.

The Nyāya holds the view that the meaning of noun in the nominative case suffix is the central meaning in the sentence. Naiyayikas quote a number of sentences where in there is no verb. We may notice a few from a fine poem.

- i) Śaśi divasa dhuṣara (शशी दिवसधूसरः) i.e., the moon dull during the day.
- ii) Saraḥ vigatavārijam (सरः विगतवारिजम्) i.e., the lake without lotuses.
- iii) Prabhuḥ dhana parāyaṇaḥ (प्रभुः धनपरायणः) i.e., an employer interested only in profit.
- iv) Satata durgataḥ Sajjanaḥ (सततदुर्गतः सज्जनः) i.e., a virtuous person always in difficulty.
- v) Nṛpāṅgaṇagataḥ khalah (नृपाङ्गणगतः खलः) i.e., a cunning person close to the king.

None of these sentences has a verb. In these sentences the meaning of a noun in nominative case suffix is the central meaning.

The statement of kātyāyana that in such sentences the verb 'asti' should be understood even if it is not expressly stated is not binding.

The Vaiyakaraṇins also have accepted the sentences 'nīlam idam na raktam' (नीलं इदं न रक्तम्) etc., without the verb 'asti'.

The sentence devadattaḥ paktā i.e., devadatta is a cook is accepted as a valid sentence without the verb.

The statement sup-tiñantā cayo vākyaṃ (सुप् तिङन्ता चयो वाक्यम्) is interpreted as subanta caya and tiñanta caya by manjūṣā in order to consider the sentences without verb as valid.

In view of this the meaning of the noun in the nominative case suffix has to be accepted as the central meaning.

This does not affect ekavākyaṭa of paśya mṛgo dhāvati.

The sentence 'mṛgo dhāvati' is avantara vākya i.e., a sentence within a sentence. Dhāvana viśiṣṭa mṛga is conveyed by this sentence. This can be the object of the act of seeing i.e., paśya. The sentence meaning can be the object of another action. There are a number of instances of this type.

- i) Jānāmi sītā janaka prasūtā (जानामि सीता जनक-प्रसूता) i.e., I know that sītā is the daughter of Janaka.

- ii) Deva ākarṇaya sangrāme asāditaḥ śarah (देव आकर्णय सङ्ग्रामे असादितः सरः) O, king listen! the arrows are kept ready at the war.
- iii) Śrutvā ca etanmāhātmyam tathā ca utpattayaḥ śubhāḥ (श्रुत्वा च एतन्माहात्म्यं तथा च उत्पत्तयः शुभाः).

Hearing this glory and the sacred incarnations.

In these instances the sentence meaning is used as an object of another verb.

The explanation of kartṛtva as kṛtimatva is also sustainable. In the case of yajamāna and his wife also it can be explained as yāgakriyākṛtyāśraye as applicable to both.



48. The Abhihitānvayavāda and Anvitābhīdhānavāda theories of sentence meaning.

When a person hears the sentence 'the clock fell on the ground' does he go on grasping the meaning of the words 'clock' 'fell' 'down' 'on' 'ground' separately and then semantically organises them into one unit of thought or is the thought 'the clock fell on the ground is grasped. In the latter case also the words contribute to the formulation of the whole thought which is sentence meaning. However, the meaning of the individual words is not separately communicated in isolation. The first view is known as abhihitānvaya theory held by Bhāṭṭa school of pūrvamīmāṃsā. The second view known as anvitābhīdhāna theory is held by Prābhākara school of pūrvamīmāṃsā.

According to abhihitānvayavāda i.e., words convey their meanings and these meanings duly associated constitute the sentence meaning. According to Anvitābhīdhānavāda, the words do not merely convey the objects referred to by them but their association with the relevant other objects conveyed by the other words in the sentence. These connected word meanings constitute the sentence meanings.

The expression 'abhihita' refers to the word meaning expressed. The word 'anvita' refers to the connected word meaning. Anvaya i.e., the association of word meaning is necessary for constituting the sentence meaning in both the theories. However, they differ on the point whether the association is included in the scope of the meaning of the word itself or it is developed by the word meaning by way of lakṣaṇā i.e., extended meaning. The abhihitānvaya theory is adopted by Bhāṭṭa mīmāṃsā, Nyāya and Advaita Vedānta and the anvitābhidhāna theory is adopted by Prābhākara mīmāṃsā. Viśiṣṭādvaita vedānta and Dvaita Vedānta. The arguments advanced for and against these views give deeper insight into the Indian theory of language.

Generally it is said that the abhihitānvaya theory considers the word as a unit of verbal communication and anvitābhidhāna theory considers the sentence as the unit of verbal communication. However, on closer examination we find that both consider the sentence as a unit of verbal communication. They differ only in respect of the formulation of the sentence meaning. It is also generally said the Jaimini sūtra 'tadbhūtānām kriyārthena' etc, particularly Śabara's explanation of it supports abhihitānvaya

theory. However, on closer examination it will be found that these can as well support anvitābhīdhāna. Therefore the matter has to be settled by closely checking the sūtras and the bhāṣya remarks in relevant all other places. We will elaborate these points after summarising the arguments for and against these two theories.

Anvitābhīdhānavādins raise the following objections against abhihitānvaya vāda.

i) The contention of the abhihitānvayavādin that the words convey their meanings and these meanings convey the sentence meaning i.e. connected word meanings, involves the envisaging of a three tiered denotative power viz.

i) a denotative power for the words to convey the word meanings ii) a denotative power for the word meanings to convey the sentence meaning iii) Another power to the words to invest the word meanings with the power to convey the sentence meaning. But if we go by anvitābhīdhāna theory a single denotative power to denote the connected word meanings which is the sentence meaning is sufficient.

ii) At the time of learning the language by the youngsters the import of the sentence is comprehended for the sentence as a whole by

observing the activity following the statement. Individual word meanings are comprehended only later. For instance, an eldest person asks the elder person to bring the cow. The elder person brings it. The boy who observes this comprehends the import of the whole sentence as the act of bringing the cow. He does not understand the meaning of the words 'cow' and 'bring' separately. Later when he listens to another sentence 'bring the horse' he sorts out that the word *aśva* conveys the horse, and the word *ānaya* conveys the act of bringing. In this way he goes on comprehending the import of the sentence consisting of unfamiliar words and sorts out the meanings of the individual words as and when these occur in different sentences. This clearly shows that connected word meanings are the basis of sentence meaning but not mere word meanings. Therefore, primary denotative power conveys the connected word meaning. That is to say the *anvaya* i.e. syntactical connection, has to be included in the scope of the word meaning.

The word meanings refer to the objects concerned. The association of these objects cannot constitute a sentence and a comprehension of this cannot be considered as sentence meaning. In this connection the example given by Bhāṭṭa to

establish that the word meanings can constitute the sentence meaning is analysed and the idea is rejected.

A person sees some object that is white. He hears heṣa i.e. neighing sound. He also hears the sound of the foot-steps. Then he states 'śveto aśvo dhāvati' (श्वेतो अश्वो धावति) a white horse is coming running. Here, he has comprehended the padārthas i.e. the objects only, connected them appropriately and comprehended the sentence meaning viz a white horse is running. By this example the Bhāṭṭas try to prove that the padārthas develop the association and lead to the sentence meaning. However, on closer examination we find that this is a cognition not produced by words at all but obtained by other means. There are two ways of understanding it.

i) The heṣa i.e. neighing, and the sound of foot steps are found in some white object. Since, these are the special features of a horse, this white object is a horse that is running. This knowledge is obtained by the inference.

ii) The white object, the heṣa, and the sound of foot step are cognised without any common locus. But there must be some common locus. That is a running horse. This is arthāpatti.

Therefore, this cognition is either inferential or arthāpatti. It is not a verbal cognition at all. Hence, it cannot be an instance of word meanings constituting the sentence meaning.

If the word meanings are the means of sentence meaning the sentence meaning will cease to be a verbal communication. The cognition that arises from the words only is verbal communication. The word meanings refer to objects. Therefore, a cognition that may arise by envisaging a relation among them is not verbal cognition. (T.B. p.110)

The Bhāṭṭas claim that the words employed in a sentence remind the respective objects referred to by them. These objects presented in the memory aided by ākāṅkṣā, योग्यता and sannidhi enable to comprehend the sentence meaning.

This claim is rejected by pointing out that the objects presented in the memory by words will not necessarily lead to coherent sentence meaning. For instance a person who remembers the palace of a city without remembering the particular city will not be able to associate these with another city. Remembering merely the objects conveyed by words will not help to comprehend the sentence meaning unless their association is also conveyed by the words.

A number of objections are raised against anvitābhīdhāna theory also. We quote below some of these with the answers given in Prakaraṇa Pañcikā, Tarkatāndava and other texts that support anvitābhīdhāna theory.

i) Objection- According to anvitābhīdhāna theory in the sentence 'bring the cow' the word cow conveys the cow connected with the action bring, and the word bring conveys the action 'bring' connected with the object cow. This amounts to conveying the same thing by these two words. Therefore these words may have to be treated as synonyms. This is absurd.

Answer- Though the contents are same there is a difference in the manner in which these are stated. The first states the object connected with the action and the second states the action connected with the object. These cannot be treated as synonyms. A person is a father from his son's point of view and a son from his father's point of view. Therefore both the words son and father are used with reference to him. However, these words father and son cannot be considered as synonyms.

ii) Objection- A word is used in a number of sentences. It has to have different connections

with different words in all these sentences. This means it will have to have a number of denotative powers to convey these connections. This leads to ānantya i.e. infinite denotative powers for each word.

Answer- The words employed in a sentence convey the connection of their meaning with the aid of ākāṅkṣā, yogyatā and sannidhi. The connection is conveyed with the relevant other word which satisfies these criteria. Therefore, there is no need of different denotative power to convey the connection with different other words in different sentences. Just as one and the same eye gives the cognition of different object as and when these are presented to the eye, one and the same denotative power of a word conveys the connection of its meaning with the meaning of the relevant other words as and when these are employed in a sentence with it.

iii) Objection- A word is expected to convey its meaning as connected with the meaning of the other word. This means that the meaning of the other word has to be known earlier. The other word also has to convey its meaning as connected with the meaning of this word. This means that the meaning of that word has to be known earlier. Thus these are dependent upon

each other. Hence, both will not be able to play their role. This drawback is techically known as annyonyāśraya.

Answer- The words employed in a sentence remind the object referred to by them in the forst instance. Then only these proceed to convey the connection of their meaning with the meaning of the other relevant word. The object referred to by the other word is also already reminded. Hence, there is no question of any interdependence. (Pr.P. 40,67)



49. Interpretation of the sūtra tadbhūtānām kriyārthena Samāmnāyaḥ arthasya tannimitatvāt

It is interesting to note that both abhihitānvayavādins and anvitābhīdhānavādins claim that their viewpoint is stated in Jaimini sūtra and Śabara bhāṣya. We state below their interpretation.

Abhihitānvaya vādin's interpretation of the sūtra :

*Tadbhūtānām kriyārthena samāmnāyaḥ arthasya
tannimitatvāt.*

(तद्भूतानां क्रियार्थेन समाम्नायः अर्थस्य तन्निमित्तत्वात्)

The words employed in a sentence convey their meanings to accomplish the action. The word meanings constitute the sentence meaning.

Remarks of the Śabara bhāṣya

i) na anapekṣya padārthān pāṛthagarthyaena vākyam arthāntara prasiddham (न अनपेक्ष्य पदार्थान् पार्थगार्थ्येन अर्थान्तर प्रसिद्धम्)

Apart from word meanings there is no distinct sentence meaning.

ii) Padāni hi svam svam artham abhidhāya nivṛttavyāpārāṇi, atha idānīm padārthāḥ avagatāḥ santaḥ vākyārtham gamayanti. (पदानि हि स्वं अर्थमभिधाय निवृत्तव्यापाराणि अथ इदानीं पदार्थः अवगन्ताः वाक्यार्थगमयन्ति)

Samāmnāyaḥ arthasya tannimittatvāt

The words convey their respective meanings. Their purpose is over. Then, word meanings duly comprehended convey the sentence meaning.

The word *kriyā* is explained as *sādhya* *sādhaneetikartavyatā* *viśiṣṭā* *bhāvanā* (साध्य साधनेति कर्तव्यता विशिष्टा भावना) i.e. the *bhāvanā* qualified by *sādhya* i.e. *bhāvya* i.e. the result, *sādhana* i.e. *kāraṇa* i.e. the means, *iti kartavyatā* i.e. the auxiliaries.

Anvitābhidhāna vādin's interpretation of the sūtra

Tadbhūtānām teṣu padārtheṣu anviteṣu vartamanānām kṛiyārthena samamnayaḥ, arthasya tannimittatvāt. (तद्भूतानां तेषु पदार्थेषु अन्वितेषु वर्तमानानां क्रियार्थेन समाप्तायः अर्थस्य तन्निमित्तत्वात्) The words employed in a sentence convey the connected meaning to accomplish the action. The connected word meanings constitute the sentence meaning.

Bṛhati and Pañchikā interpretation of the sūtra

Tadbhūtānām teṣu padārtheṣu anviteṣu vartamānānām kṛiyārthen samamnāyaḥ arthasya padārthasya anvitasya tannimittatvāt anvaya nimittatvāt.

i) The word *kriyā* primarily means *kārya* or *niyoga*. It also means ordinary activity in *laukika* sentences.

ii) The word anvaya means vākyaārtha (Bṛhati p.391-392)

Interpretation of Śabara's 'remarks by anvitābhidhāna vādins

i) Padāni anvitam abhidhāya nivṛtta vyapāraṇi na anvayam prthak abhidadhati. (पदानि अन्वितं अभिधाय निवृत्त व्यापाराणि न अनन्य पृथक् अभिदधति)

The words convey connected meanings. Since their purpose is over they do not convey the connection separately.

ii) atha idānim anvitāḥ pratitāḥ anvayamapi pratītam sampādayanti. (अथ इदानीं अन्वितः प्रतीतः अन्वयमपि प्रतीतम् संपादयति)

As these are comprehended as connected, the connection is also comprehended.

iii) Bhāṣyakāraḥ vākyaārtha śabdena anvayamāh. (भाष्यकारः वाक्यार्थशब्देन अन्वयमाह)

The Bhāṣyakāra has used the expression vākyaārtha in the sense of anvaya.

iv) Vede tu apūrvātmā anvitāḥ vākyaārthaḥ (वेदे तु अपूर्वात्मा अन्वितः वाक्यार्थः)

Vedic injunctions convey apūrva i.e. kārya connected with karaṇa, niyojya etc.

When one goes through these two interpretations of the same sūtra and the bhāṣya remarks on it, one feels that the Prābhākara interpretation is a little laboured while Bhāṭṭa interpretation is closer to the wordings of bhāṣya. However, the theory of learning the language through the elders conversation which repeatedly utilised in bhāṣya supports anvitābhīdhāna theory. Even Bhāṭṭas concede that in the early stage of learning language the meaning of a sentence as a whole is comprehended. Later only isolated word meanings are comprehended. This amounts to accepting anvitābhīdhāna theory as a primary theory of verbal communication.



50. Criticism of Abhihitānvaya theory

The Bhāṭṭas explain the sentence meaning by abhihitānvaya theory. According to this theory, the words in a sentence remind their meaning. These word meanings aided by ākāṅkṣā, yogyatā and sannidhi form sentence meaning. This procedure is not acceptable to Dvaita. The following drawbacks of this theory are pointed out.

i) The words remind the padārthas that belong to the past and future times also. Therefore the cognition of the syntactical association that has to take place at the present time cannot be achieved by them.

ii) It cannot be argued that it is the remembering of padārthas produced by the words that leads to the formulation and the comprehension of the sentence meaning. Remembering is nirvyāpāra i.e. actionless. Hence, it cannot cause anything. Remembering the denotative power cannot be considered as vyāpāra. Since the padārthas have no denotative power. Words only have the denotative power but not the word meanings.

iii) If the remembering words meanings leads to the sentence meaning, then, even a group of words like ghataḥ karmatvam, ānayanam kṛti

which also remind the word meanings should have led to the sentence meaning.

iv) The stock example of abhihitānvaya vādins viz. śveto aśvo dhāvati' to demonstrate that the padārthas lead to vākyārtha is either arthāpatti or anumāna. It is not verbal communication at all.

v) When the language is learnt through elder's conversation, it is through the sentence meaning of the nature of connected word meaning but not through the isolated word meanings.

On these grounds abhihitānvaya theory is rejected by Dvaita.

Justification of Anvitābhīdhāna

Dvaita Vedānta adopts anvitābhīdhāna theory on the following grounds :

i) Anvaya i.e. the connection of the word meanings with the meanings of the relevant other words has to be conveyed by the words. If it is obtained by any other means it will cease to be verbal communication.

ii) Even abhihitānvaya vādins have accepted anvitābhīdhāna in the case of the meanings of prātipādika and pratyaya, and Khandavākya and Mahāvākya.

iii) Anvaya is a kind of link between the word meanings. If it is also not conveyed by the words it cannot be a link between the two that are conveyed by the words.

iv) If anvaya i.e. the connection, is not conveyed in a general way right at the time of conveying the word meaning, there will be no initiative to ascertain the specific relation between the word meanings to form the sentence meaning.

On these grounds anvitābhīdhāna has to be accepted.

Dvaita and Prābhākara agree in adopting anvitābhīdhāna theory. However there is a difference of opinion on the point whether it is sāmānya anvitābhīdhāna or viśeṣānvitābhīdhāna.

Udayana has raised a number of objections against anvitābhīdhāna. The objections of anyonyāśraya, paryāyatva and vaiyarthya were already raised and answered by Śālikanātha. But still Udayana repeats them. Tarkatāṇḍava answers them. A few more objections such as 'anvitasya anvayah' 'anvayāmśe anvayah' etc., stated by Udayana are also answered.



51. The import of the injunction

Indian philosophers debate a good deal on the import of the injunction. The optative suffix i.e. *liṅ* conveys the injunction. Bhāṭṭamīmāṃsakas consider that *preraṇā* i.e., impelling to undertake activity is conveyed by the injunctive suffix *liṅ*. This *preraṇā* is of the nature of *iṣṭasādhana* i.e., a means for achieving the desired object. For instance in the injunctive statement 'darśapūrṇa māsābhyāṃ svargakāmo yajeta' (दर्शपूर्णमासाभ्यां स्वर्गकामो यजेत) the injunctive suffix *liṅ* in the verb 'yajeta' conveys that the performance of the sacrifice is *iṣṭasādhana* i.e., is a means for achieving the desired result. The expression *svargakāma* specifies this result as *svarga* and the expression *darśapūrṇamāsa* specifies the activity to be undertaken. The whole injunctive statement conveys that the performance of *darśapūrṇamāsa* is a means for the desired object i.e., *svarga*. It is *iṣṭa sādhanatva* of *yāga* that is conveyed by the injunctive suffix in the verb *yajeta*. Later writers of Bhāṭṭa school, particularly, *khandadeva* is of the opinion that *preraṇā* i.e., impelling to undertake the activity, is the primary meaning of the injunctive suffix. From this *iṣṭasādhana* is inferred. It need not be included in the scope of the meaning as its cognition is available by the inference.

Prabhākaras consider that kāryatā i.e., this is a task or duty to be undertaken by me 'mama idam kāryam' is the import of the injunctive suffix. This kāryata is also designated as niyoga i.e., a direction to undertake activity. It is also called apūrva as it is not conveyed by any other pramāṇa other than Vedic injunction.

The concept of kāryatā of prabhākaras is explained as kṛtisādhya and kṛtipradhāna i.e., that which is to be accomplished by kṛti i.e., initiative, and the goal of the kṛti.

Tarkatāṇḍava points out that this prādhānya or the fact of being the goal is possible only if it is envisaged as iṣṭasādhana. A person aims at something as a goal only if it is iṣṭasādhana i.e., means of a desired object. Even the Prabhākaras have taken iṣṭasāadhanatā as a ground for kāryatā.

Since iṣṭasāadhanatā is sufficient to prompt the activity there is no need of a separate concept designated as kāryatā. In fact iṣṭasāadhanatā itself is kāryatā in the sense that it prompts to undertake activity.

There is another important aspect of the concept of kāryatā. Kārya which is stated to be the import of the injunction attains the status of apūrva when the kārya is accomplished by

performing the sacrifice. This remains until the result svarga is realised. The sacrifice which is perishable and does not continue until the realisation of the result is not able to procure the result for the performer. Therefore something that endures until the result is obtained has to be envisaged. This is apūrva.

Tarkatāṇḍava does not agree with this contention. It is pointed out that the optative suffix neither states the yāga as direct cause nor a cause through an intermediary. It only states that it is a cause. It only requires a sādhana i.e., a means to achieve the result. That by not undertaking which the result is not obtained is the means of it. It need not immediately precede it. A means that is not present immediately before, need not be considered as not a cause. Firewood is considered as a cause of cooking. Similarly eating ghee is stated to be the cause of good health. Here also the act of eating ghee does not precede the good health. The argument that there is an intermediary process between the eating of ghee and developing the health. Though the presence of such an intermediary processes is not observable, its absence is also non-observable. This is sufficient to envisage the cause and effect relation between the two' does not help the

present case. Here, the so called apūrva is beyond the sense perception. Hence, its presence or absence cannot be ascertained.

In view of the above, immediate precedence is not the ground for something to be the cause. But invariable presence before the effect is the ground to be a cause, or to have a potency to produce the effect is the ground to be a cause.

Further, there may not be any objection to envisage apūrva to explain the cause and effect relation between yāga and svarga by way of arthāpatti but to consider apūrva as an import of the injunction is unwarranted.

It is also difficult to envisage the denotative power for the optative suffix to convey apūrva. The apūrva is stated to be achieved by kṛti, it is permanent, and it provides the result. There is 'no ground to say that an entity of such features is conveyed by the optative suffix. Even if it is conveyed there is no means by which it could be comprehended. It cannot be comprehended by elder's conversation as it is supposed to have been conveyed by vedic injunction only.

The chief role of an injunction is to prompt to undertake an action. This is designated as cikīrṣā in Sanskrit. As soon as one hears the statement

'svargakāmo yajeta' he is prompted to undertake the sacrifice to obtain svarga. The act of prompting by the optative suffix is designated as pravartanā or preraṇā. The desire to undertake yāga produced by this preraṇā is cikīrṣā. Now, this prompting to act will not automatically produce the desire to act merely by its cognition. It should also convey that the action enjoined leads to a desired object. It is iṣṭasādhana i.e. a means to get a desired object. Therefore, the injunctive suffix has to convey this also and this has to be included in the scope of the meaning of an injunctive suffix.

Further, the action enjoined to be undertaken should be within the capacity of the person to whom the injunction is addressed. If a person is asked to go and fetch the moon he will not act as it is beyond his capacity. Therefore, kṛtisādhyaṭva i.e. the undertaking of the act being within the capacity of the person concerned has also to be conveyed by the injunctive suffix and this also should be included in the scope of the meaning of injunctive suffix.

Even after one knows that the enjoined act leads to the desired object and it is within his capacity, if he come to know that it leads to some strong adverse effect, he will not undertake

such an act. Therefore, the injunctive suffix should also inform him in a general way that the act enjoined does not lead to any strong adverse effect. For instance, the 'statement consume the poison' will not be acted upon since it is harmful. In view of this another requirement viz. *balavadaniṣṭānanu bandhitva* i.e. not affected by any strong adverse effect has to be included in the scope of the meaning of the injunctive suffix.

From the above discussion it emerges that an injunctive suffix has to convey i) *Iṣṭasādhana* i.e. the act leads to the desired object ii) *kṛti sādhyatva* i.e. the act is within the capacity of the person concerned iii) *balavadaniṣṭānanubandhitva* i.e. the act does not lead to any strong adverse effect. Therefore these three are to be included in the scope of the meaning of an injunctive suffix. This is the import of a *vidhi* i.e. injunction. To convey these three, the injunctive suffix need not have three denotative powers. Since the purpose of these three is one viz. *pravartanā* i.e. prompting to undertake the act, these can be conveyed by a single denotative power. This view is held by Nyāya.

However, on closer examination it will be found that the second and the third need not be included in the scope of the meaning of an

injunctive suffix. i) Kṛtisādhyatva i.e. the act being within the capacity of the person concerned, is laid down to prevent the contingency of enjoining to bring the moon. However, when the person concerned does not act, he does so because he realises that he will not get the desired result. Hence, there is the breakdown of iṣṭasāadhanatva that is required to undertake the act. In the example 'bring the moon' the realisation of the fact that the person concerned will not get the desired object i.e. moon has prevented him from undertaking the act. Therefore, there is no need to include kṛtisādhyatva in the scope of the meaning of the injunctive suffix. (TT. p.339)

Balavadaniṣṭānanubandhitva (बलवदनिष्ठानुबन्धित्व) i.e. not leading to any strong adverse effect also need not be a meaning of the injunctive suffix. The knowledge that the act to be undertaken leads to an adverse effect may prevent the undertaking of the act but the knowledge of the absence of any such adverse effect is not necessary to undertake the act. Therefore, this also need not be included in the scope of the meaning of the injunctive suffix. For example the statement 'Eat the poison' is not acted upon because it leads to strong adverse effect. But the statement, 'bring the cow' does not wait to get it cleared that it does not lead to any adverse effect.

Hence, iṣṭasādhanatva only remains as an import of an injunctive suffix.

Vyākaraṇa and Bhāṭṭamimāṃsā accept iṣṭa-sādhanatva as the import of injunctive suffix. The import of an injunctive suffix is explained in the Pāṇini's sūtra 'vidhi-nimantraṇa āmantvaṇa adhiṣṭa sampraśna prārthaneṣu liṅ.' (विधिनिमन्त्रणामन्त्रण अधीष्ट-संप्रश्नप्रार्थनेषु लिङ्) In this sūtra six meanings are assigned to an injunctive suffix.

i) Vidhi i.e. prompting a person to act who is not equal or superior.

ii) nimantraṇa i.e. prompting a person to act pointing out the adverse effect if he does not act. For instance, asking the daughter's son to be a brahmaṇa at the ceremony of his maternal grand father. If he does not agree he will incur pratyavāya.

iii) āmantraṇa i.e. prompting to undertake the act or not to undertake at his option.

iv) adhiṣṭam - prompting a superior person to undertake the act with respect.

v) sampraśna i.e. asking whether one likes to undertake the act.

vi) prārthanā i.e. appeal to undertake the act.

Among these six meanings the first four are of the type of pravartanā i.e. prompting to undertake the act. Therefore, making margin for these shades of meanings pravartanā can be taken as a common import of the injunctive suffix in all these cases. Vākyapadiya makes this position clear by the remark 'asti pravartanārūpam anusyūtam caturṣu api.' (अस्ति प्रवर्तनारूपं अनुस्यूतं चतुर्षु अपि) This pravartanā is of the nature iṣṭasāadhanatā. The injunctive suffix conveys iṣṭasāadhanatva and prompts to undertake the act. Therefore it is called pravartanā. This approach is endorsed by Maṇḍanamiśra

pumsām na iṣṭābhyupāyatvāt kriyasu anyah
prevartakah

(पुंसां न इष्टाभ्युपायत्वात् क्रियासु अन्यः प्रवर्तकः)

Pārthasārathi Misra also holds the same view.

Khandadeva does not consider iṣṭasāadhanatva as the meaning of the injunctive suffix. He considers that pravṛtti prayojaka vyāpāra i.e. a function of the injunctive suffix that prompts to undertake the action is conveyed by the injunction. This is designated as pravartanā. It is not the same as iṣṭasāadhanatā. The iṣṭasāadhanatā has to be inferred from it.

As soon as one hears an injunctive statement

he is prompted to undertake the act. Such prompting is a vyāpāra i.e. a function of the injunctive suffix. Such a function is observed both in vedic injunctions and also laukika injunctions. As it arises from the word it is designated as śabdibhāvanā. The pravṛtti i.e. the initiative to undertake activity generated by it is designated as ārthi bhāvana. These two are conveyed by the injunctive suffix.



52. Prābhākara's concept of Kārya as the import of Injunction

The Prābhākaras differ from Bhāṭṭas. They do not consider iṣṭa sādhanatā as the import of the injunctive suffix. They have developed a unique and new concept viz. kārya i.e. the task to be accomplished. The injunctive suffix conveys kārva. As soon as an injunctive statement is heard the person concerned comprehends that he has to accomplish a kārya, i.e. 'mame idam kāryam.' (ममेदं कार्यम्) The particular subject of this kārya is provided by yāga. The objective i.e. svarga, gives the clue of the person who has to accomplish this kārya. He is called niyojya i.e. the respondent.

A person interested in obtaining svarga is adhikārin i.e. eligible person. He is niyojya. The niyoga enjoins the accomplishment of kārya by performing yāga by the niyojya person. The performer is called adhikārin as he is interested in obtaining the result i.e. svarga. He is called niyojya, since he responds to niyoga, ordinarily the performer is both adhikārin i.e. eligible person, and niyojya i.e. respondent. In fact to be a niyojya it is necessary to be adhikārin. However, there are one or two exceptions wherein the performer is only adhikārin. In the example 'darśapūrṇa māsābhyām svargakāmo yajeta.' Svargakāma i.e. a person

interested to obtain svarga is adhikārin and niyojya, darśapūrṇamāsa is the subject as well as the means to accomplish kārya. The import of the injunctive suffix is kārya i.e. the task to be accomplished by performing yāga. Niyojya, Viṣaya and Kārya duly associated achieve kārya. In view of this the kārya is described as vākyārtha. In fact it is the entire vedārtha. Since the central theme of the veda viz. dharma, is of the nature of accomplishing kārya by performing the sacrifice described in veda.

The chief role of the import of an injunctive suffix is to prompt to undertake the activity. Excepting Prabhākaras all others broadly agree that it is iṣṭasāadhanatājñāna i.e. the knowledge that the act to be undertaken leads to the desired result. But the Prabhākaras argue that it is kāryatā i.e. the realisation that it is a task or duty to be accomplished by me that prompts the person to undertake the act.

Now we have to examine the relative claim of iṣṭasāadhanatā and kāryatā to be the ground to prompt to undertake the activity. Ordinarily it appears that one proceeds to act on comprehending that the act concerned leads to the desired result. However, it is only an incentive but not the final ground. Even when one knows that something is iṣṭasādhana he will

not proceed to act unless he thinks that this is a task that he has to accomplish. The knowledge of iṣṭasāadhanatva is a stepping stone to develop the interest in considering the task as a task to be accomplished. Since both iṣṭasāadhanatā and karyatā are present in majority of cases people are not able to distinguish the role of the two.

In the course of the discussion of the concept of pravartanā of Bhāṭṭa's we have already noticed that Khaṇḍadeva does not consider iṣṭasāadhanatā as the import of the injunctive suffix. He has said that it is only inferred. Maṇḍana Miśra identifies iṣṭasāadhanatā with pravartanā. In Dvaita Vedānta tradition Kāryatā is identified with iṣṭasāadhanatā. When we say that pravartanā is prompting to undertake the activity, the prompting has to generate a sense in the mind of the respondent that it is a task to be undertaken by him. This means that the element of kāryatā has to be there. Therefore, the only question that has to be settled is that which of these two is to be considered as the import of the injunctive suffix and which supports it. This issue has a bearing on another important issue viz. kārye vyutpatti and siddhe vyutpatti i.e. whether the sentence meaning is conveyed with action as a central meaning or an object as a central meaning.



53. The concepts of Śābdibhāvanā and Arthibhāvanā

Mimāṃsā texts explain the procedure of an injunctive statement enjoining dharma i.e. yāga as follows. The statement 'yajeta svargakāmaḥ' enjoins yāga for obtaining svarga. The verb yajeta contains the verbal root yaj and the verbal termination liṅ i.e. optative termination. This optative suffix has two aspects viz. verbal termination in general and optative termination in particular. Both these aspects convey bhāvanā. The expression bhāvanā is a technical term in Mimāṃsā used in two senses i) preraṇā i.e. prompting, directing or creating interest. ii) pravṛtti i.e. initiative, effort.

In the first sense it is called Śābdibhāvanā and in the second sense it is called arthibhāvanā. The first is conveyed by the optative i.e. in aspect of the verbal termination and second is conveyed by the general verbal termination aspect. As soon as a person hears a statement containing a verb that is in optative, he understands that he is directed to undertake the activity mentioned by the verb. Ordinarily such direction is given by a person. However, in the case of vedic statement there is no person behind it. Therefore, the optative suffix itself is taken as giving this

direction. Therefore, bhavāna i.e. prēpraṇā i.e. the direction given here is taken as given by the optative suffix itself.

Consequently, this aspect of bhavanā is designated as Śābdibhāvanā. This direction generates initiative on the part of the listener to undertake the activity mentioned in the statement. This initiative is designated as ārthibhavanā. The word ārtha means the objective, the purpose. Since, this initiative is intended to achieve the objective i.e. svarga it is designated as ārthibhāvanā.



54. The formula of the organisation of the sacrificial programme

According to Mīmāṃsā to impliment a direction and an initiative, there are three requirements.viz. i) an objective ii) an instrument iii) certain aids. This are termed as bhāvya, karaṇa and itikartavyatā. These are elicited by raising three questions i) kim bhāvayet i.e. what is the objective to be achieved ii) kena bhāvayet i.e. what is the means or instrument to achieve it. iii) katham bhāvayet i.e. what are the aids to carry out the action, in other words, the manner in which the activity is to be carried out.

This is a sound formula for programme organisation. Though it is evolved in the context of ritual organisation, it can be utilised for any programme organisation. While undertaking a programme it is very important to clearly envisage the result to be achieved, the means to be adopted or the instrument to be provided and the manner in which the programme is to be carried out. Many programmes fail in the absence of such clear formula.



55. Formula for the application of vedic injunction

The Mimāmsakas apply this formula to the very role of the vedic injunction. viz. an injunctive termination prompting the sacrificer to undertake initiative to perform the sacrifice.

The objective of Śābdibhāvanā i.e. prompting or generating interest, is to enable the sacrificer to undertake the initiative. Undertaking initiative is ārthibhāvana. Therefore generating ārthibhāvanā is the objective of Śābdibhāvanā. This Śābdibhāvanā is the import of the optative termination liṅ. Therefore the knowledge of this liṅ is the instrument. Mere cognition of liṅ and the comprehension of its import i.e. preraṇā is not sufficient to produce initiative. It requires to be supported by the information that the activity enjoined for undertaking is a worthy activity. This is generally provided by the arthavādas mentioned by the side of the injunctive statement. These arthavādas or eulogy convey prāśastya i.e. worthiness of the recommended activity. This is an aid i.e. itikartavyatā to make the preraṇā i.e. Śābdibhāvanā effective. Thus, Śābdibhāvanā plays its role with the objective of generating initiative i.e. ārthibhāvanā, with the instrument of the cognition liṅ i.e. optative termination, and with the support of prāśastyajñāna i.e. worthiness of the recommended activity.

*Śābdabhāvanāyāḥ ārthibhāvanā Sādhyatven
anveti, Liṅādijñānam
karaṇatvena anveti, prāśastyajñānam
itikartavyatatvena anveti*

(शब्दभावनायाः आर्थीभावना साध्यत्वेन अन्वेति, लिङादिज्ञानं
कारणत्वेनान्वेति प्राशस्त्य ज्ञानम् इति कर्तव्यत्वेन अन्वेति)

“Ārthibhāvanā accords with the śābdibhāvanā in respect of the purpose, knowledge of liṅ, etc., accords in respect of the cause, while worthiness of the recommended action accords in respect of what is to be undertaken.”

These three viz. the objective, instrument, and the aid are worked out for ārthibhāvanā also. For ārthibhāvanā i.e. initiative, the objective of performance of the sacrifice viz. obtaining svarga i.e. welfare is the objective. The performance of the sacrifice itself is the instrument, and prayāja etc auxiliaries are the aids.

Śābdibhāvanā is a linguistic and psychological level function while the ārthibhāvanā is the level of actual activity. To execute a programme effectively one has to prepare oneself at psychological level and at the level of actual programme. This formula is evolved by Bhāṭṭa Mimāṃsakās.



56. The formula envisaged by Prābhākaras

It is interesting to find that the Prābhākara School of Pūrvamīmāṃsā does not accept this formula and evolves its own formula to enable the sacrificer to undertake the sacrifice.

Prābhākaras reject the concept of Śābdibhāvanā on the ground that there is no evidence to say that the injective suffix has a vyāpāra designated as preraṇā i.e. prompting that causes the initiative. The initiative does not necessarily follow on hearing an injunctive statement. Consequently the idea of arthībhāvanā i.e. the initiative, being the result of Śābdibhāvanā also cannot be accepted.

Similarly to conceive the idea of prāśastyajñāna as an aid also does not work. The idea of worthiness of an activity can be an aid to a person but not to a Śābdavyāpāra called Śābdībhāvanā to play its role. Hence, the Bhāṭṭas concepts of Śābdībhāvanā and ārthībhāvanā cannot be accepted.

Prābhākaras explain the process of an injunctive statement playing its role and enjoining the performance of a sacrifice as follows:

The injunctive termination *liṅ* conveys *Kāvya* i.e. a duty or a task to be accomplished. It also conveys *kṛti* i.e. initiative. The *Kāvya* is also called *niyoga* i.e. a direction to accomplish the task. The *niyoga* needs a *niyoga* and *kartā* i.e. a person to respond to this direction and act. To accomplish a task or duty a programme has to be identified. This is *yāga*. This *yāga* is both the subject and the instrument.

The *yāga* provides itself as subject for accomplishing a task or duty. It is also an instrument to accomplish the task conveyed by the injunctive suffix. It is a *karaṇa* since the initiative to achieve the task is operated on it. It is not *Karaṇa* in the sense that it produces *apūrva* but it is *karaṇa* in the sense that it is elevated to the status of *Kāvya*. This *Kāvya* is designated as *apūrva* as it is conveyed by vedic injunction only but not by any other *pramāṇa*.

The role played by *Śābdibhāvanā* and *ārthibhāvanā* to elicit the performer, the performance and the result of the sacrifice according to Bhāṭṭa's formula is played by *kāvya* i.e. *niyoga* according to Prābhakaras. This difference, is not merely a difference of methodology in the interpretation and application of the injunctive statement but a vital difference

in respect the import of the injunction. Bhāṭṭas hold the theory that Iṣṭasādhanaṭva is the import of the injunctive suffix while the Prābhākaras hold that Kāvya i.e. niyoga is the import of the injunctive suffix.



57. The import of prohibition

The purpose of prohibitive statements is to prompt a person to withdraw from undertaking the prohibited act. In the prohibitive statements the negative particle 'na' is added to the verb to convey this. This particle 'na' is syntactically connected with the *liṅ* aspect of the injunctive suffix and conveys *nivartana* i.e. withdrawal. It is the nature of the negative particle 'na' to convey the opposite. Since the *liṅ* conveys *pravartana* in the normal course, the opposite position of it viz *nivartana* is conveyed when the negative particle is added to it. For instance, the statement 'na kalanjam bhakṣayet' (न कलजं भक्षयेत्) conveys the withdrawal from eating the uncooked meat. According to those who hold that the *liṅ* conveys *iṣṭasāadhanatva*, with the addition of the negative particle it conveys *aniṣṭasāadhanatva*.

In certain cases such as *abrāhmaṇa* and *adharma*, the negative particle conveys the meaning 'tadanya' i.e. other than that. The expression *abrāhmaṇa* means 'other than *brāhmaṇa*' and the expression *adharma* means other than *dharma*. When a negative particle is added to a substantive word i.e. *nāma* or a verbal root it conveys the sense 'other than that.' It conveys withdrawal only when it is added to

an injunctive suffix. The scope of the negative particle is neatly stated as 'tadanya-tadviruddha tadabhāveṣu na' (तदन्य तद्विरुद्ध तदभावेषुन) i.e. the negative particle conveys the meanings 'other than that' 'opposite of that' and the 'absence of that.'



58. The concept of Paryudāsa

The implication of the use of a negative particle is explained in another interesting way. There is a vedic statement 'na anuyajeṣu ye yajāmahaṃ' karoti' (न अनुयजेषु ये यजामहं करोति) i.e. ye yajāmaha is not recited in anuyajas.

This is a negative statement. A negation can be made of only such items that have a positive scope. For instance, the presence of a person can be denied only if such a person exists. In the present case, the statement 'yajatiṣu ye yajāmahaṃ karoti' (यजतिषु ये यजामहं करोति) provides the positive side. Now, since both the negative statement and the positive statement are vedic statements, none of them could be discarded. Hence, the contingency of considering them as vikalpa i.e. alternates like vṛhi and yava arise. Considering any two items as alternates is a drawback. It results in the aprāmānya of each item when the other item is adopted. Therefore, an interesting new technique of interpreting such negative statements is evolved. This is designated as paryudāsa. In paryudāsa the negative particle 'na' gets syntactically connected with a noun or verbal root.

According to this technique negative particle 'na' has to be taken with anuyāja and assigned the meaning anuyāja vyatirikta i.e. other than

anuyāja. Now, the whole sentence means, 'yeyajamah' be recited in other than anuyāja. This is exclusion but not direct negation. There is no conflict between 'yajatiṣu ye yajāmaham karoti' (यजतिषु ये यजामहं करोति) and anuyāja vyatirikteṣu ye yajāmaham karoti.' (अनुयाज व्यतिरिक्तेषु ये यजामहं करोति) Hence, there is no need of vikalpa. In this example a negative statement is converted into a positive statement making provision for the negation within the statement by exclusion. This process is designated as paryudāsa.

'Na ikṣeta udyantam ādityam' (न ईक्षेत उदयन्तं आदित्यम्) i.e. a brahmachārin should not look at the rising sun is another example of paryudāsa. This statement occurs along with other items of the code of conduct to be followed by a brahmachārin. The statement of the code of conduct commences with the remark tad-vratam i.e. the following must be acted upon. The expression 'na ikṣeta' (न ईक्षेत) cannot be taken in the sense of the absence of looking. The absence cannot be acted upon. Therefore, something that is opposite of ikṣaṇa which can be enjoined has to be taken as the meaning of the expression 'na ikṣeta.' This something is envisaged as anikṣaṇasankalpa i.e. a decision not to look at the sun. This is a positive act. It can be

enjoined. Here also a negative statement is converted into a positive statement making provision for the exclusion of the item that has to be denied by the negative particle. Here, it is not for avoiding *vikalpa* but to bring unity with the positive statement at the commencement.

In the instance of 'atirātre sadasinam grhṇāti' (अतिरात्रे षोडशीतं गृह्णाति) 'na atirātre śodaśīm grhṇāti.' (न अतिरात्रे षोडशीतं गृह्णाति) There is direct opposition. Hence, *paryudāsa* cannot be managed and *vikalpa* has to be accepted. However, since both are vedic statements, there will not be any adverse effect if *śodaśi grahaṇa* is not done. The negation only indicates that the sacrifice concerned will lead to the expected result even without *śodaśigrahaṇa*. On the other hand if *śodaśigrahaṇa* is made taking into account the positive statement, the performer will get increased results.

However negation of *śodaśigrahaṇa* conveys that the sacrifice concerned will be complete even without *śodaśi grahaṇa*. However, if *śodaśi grahaṇa* is made it will lead to the increased result.

In the instance 'vapāyām hutāyām dikṣitasya annam aṣṇiyat' (वपायां हुतायां दीक्षितस्य अन्नं अश्नीयात्) there is no need of conveying *iṣṭa sādhanatva*. Since, eating food is a natural course. However, in another

statement 'na dikṣitasya annam aśniyāt' (न दीक्षितस्य अन्नं अश्नीयात्) taking food offered by dikṣita was prohibited. Therefore, the statement that states to take the food at a particular time offered by dikṣita conveys that the aniṣṭa sādhanatva conveyed by the earlier statement is not applicable to taking food as per this statement.

From the above discussion it is clear that the injunctive suffix normally conveys iṣṭasādhanatva, however, in certain instances it conveys aniṣṭa sādhanatvābhāva. When a negative particle is added to convey prohibition, it conveys aniṣṭa sādhanatva, in the case of partial negation kratu śādgūṇya without it and so on. Pravartanā and Nivartanā are the primary meanings of injunction and prohibition.

The Prābhākaras do not accept any result for nitya, naimittika and niṣedha. In all these cases the injunctive suffix conveys kāryatā. Even in the case of kāmyakarmas also the injunctive suffix conveys kāryatā only. The mention of the result in kāmyakarmas is intended to provide adhikārin. In the case of nitya and naimittika adhikārin and niyojya are available on other grounds. Therefore, there is no need to envisage the result in any form for these. Prābhākaras do not accept iṣṭasādhanatva as the import of injunctive suffix.



59. The status of Śyenayāga

There is an interesting discussion about śyena yāga. This discussion deals with three questions.

- i) Whether iṣṭasādhanaṭva is conveyed by the injunctive suffix in the statement 'śyenena yajeta.'
- ii) Whether śyena yāga is dharma or adharma.
- iii) What is the difference between the paśu himsā at agniṣōmiya sacrifice and the himsā of the enemy by śyena yāga.

The first question is answered that iṣṭasādhanaṭva is conveyed by the injunctive suffix as in the case of all other injunctive suffixes. However, it is aniṣṭasādhana also. Its aniṣṭa sādhanaṭva is not conveyed by the injunctive suffix but by the very nature of the act of himsā which is prohibited by the vedic statement 'mā himsyāt sarvabhūtāni.'

The second question is answered that śyena yāga is adharma. The definition dharma 'codanā lakṣaṇaḥ arthaḥ dharmah' (चोदना लक्षणार्थः धर्मः) has two clauses viz codanā lakṣaṇa i.e. enjoined by vedic injunction, and artha i.e. that leads to welfare. In the case of śyenayāga the second clause is isolated. Therefore it is not dharma. On

the contrary it is adharma, since, himsā is prohibited by a vedic injunction.

Third question is a little ticklish, from the ordinary point of view both agniṣomiya paśuhimsā and killing of enemy by śyenayāga are himsā and both are connected with yāga. However, there is a distinction in which these are connected with yāga. Paśuhimsā at agniṣomiya is a part of the sacrifice as an aṅga, it is kṛtvārtha. Hence, it does not attract the general prohibition 'mā himsyāt'.

On the other hand the himsā generated by śyena yāga is a result of the yāga. The result is desired by puruṣa. It is rāgatah prāpta i.e. due to the desire of a person but not śāstraprāpta. Hence, it attracts the prohibition 'mā himsyāt.' Not performing śyena yāga does not lead to any religious adverse result. While not offering paśu at agniṣomiya will adversely affect the performance of the sacrifice. That is why agniṣomiya paśuhimsā is excluded from the scope of the prohibition. Further, prayaścitta i.e. expiation, is prescribed for śyena yāga while no such prāyascitta is prescribed for agniṣomiya paśuhimsā. Therefore these two are not on par. Paśuhimsā at agniṣomiya is dharma while śyena yāga that results in the death of the enemy is

adharmā. We may compare these two act of himsās to the himsā at the battle field as a duty by the soldier and the same soldier killing his neighbour for personal enmity.

In the course of this discussion Tarkatāṇḍava gives an interesting information viz originally śyenayāga was envisaged to destroy the foriegn enemies.



60. Vākyabheda i.e. one statement leading to two injunctions

A vedic statement should be interpreted as enjoining one action or one item. If it is taken as enjoining more than one, then it results in two statements. This is a technically designated as vākyabheda. This is great drawback. It is a greater drawback than lakṣaṇā. Śabara puts it briefly as nahi vidheḥ vidheḥ ca ekavākyatā bhavati (न हि विधेश्च एकवाक्यता भवति) i.e. two injunctions cannot make one statement or one sentence. In view of this the vedic passages are interpreted all along the bhāṣya as conveying only one injunction and the passages that appear to enjoin more than one item are suitably interpreted to have ekavākyatā with the injunctive statement. Avoiding vākyabheda and identifying one injunction is a major methodology adopted in the bhāṣya for interpreting the vedic statements. This has helped to sort out the injunctive passages and non-injunctive passages.

We will notice a few examples of avoiding the contingency of vākyabheda.

In the statement 'nivītam manuṣyāṇām pracī-
nāvītam pitṛṇām upavītam devānām upavyayate
devalakṣmameva tatkurute.' (निवीतं मनुष्याणां प्राचीनावीतं

पितृणां उपवीतं देवानां उपव्ययते देवलक्ष्ममेव तत्कुरुते) The modes of wearing the sacred thread are stated as upavīta, prācīnāvīti and nivīta. While performing the rituals connected with men the sacred thread should be worn in nivīta style, connected with manes in prācīnāvīta style and connected with deities in upavīta style. If this statement is taken as enjoining these three modes of wearing the sacred thread, it will result in three injunctive sentences, that is to say, one sentence is treated as three sentences. This is vākyabheda. This should be avoided. Therefore, it should be taken as enjoining the upavīta mode for the deities. The other two modes meant for men and manes are stated here only to praise the upavīta style. Therefore, that part of the statement is arthavāda. It is not vidhi.

At Jyotiṣṭoma eleven yūpas are prescribed. With reference to these yūpas it is stated that 'yūpasya antike agnīn mathitvā yūpāhutim juhōti' (यूपस्य अन्तिके अग्नीन् मथित्वा यूपहुतिं जुहोति) preparing the sacred fire near the yūpa the āhuti be offered. Here, if both the preparation of the sacred fire and preparing it near the yūpa are taken as enjoined it will result in vākyabheda, that is to say, one statement leading to two injunctions. Hence, it is ruled that manthana i.e. preparing the sacred fire

is enjoined here. Normally the āhuti is offered at āhavanīya. When it is enjoined that a sacred fire be prepared for offering āhuti for yūpa it follows that it has to be near yūpa. Therefore, no specific injunction is necessary to indicate the place. Moreover, the expression antika i.e. close, is vague. If it is very close, the yūpa will be burnt. Therefore, it cannot be enjoined. It should be left to the convenience of the sacrificer. Further, instead of taking the preparation of sacred fire for yūpāhuti, the antikatva i.e. closeness of offering āhuti is enjoined, the āhavanīya itself will be required to be brought to the place of āhuti. This is not possible. Therefore, manthana i.e. preparing the sacred fire only is enjoined by this statement. Hence, there is no vākyaabheda. (S.B. 11-2-26)

At jyotiṣtoma avabhṛta yāga is prescribed. In connection with this yāga it is stated that 'apsu tṛṇam prāśya āghāram aghārayati.' (अप्सु तृणं प्राश्य आघारं अघारयति) If this statement is taken as enjoining tṛṇaprasāna i.e. spreading the grass, and also offering āghāra it will result in vākyaabheda. Therefore, it has to be taken as enjoining tṛṇa prāsana only, āghāra is the auxiliary of avabhṛta. Hence, there is no need to separately enjoin it.

While discussing the eligibility to perform the

sacrifice, a question is raised whether such persons who are not able to carry out all the details of a sacrifice are eligible to perform the sacrifice or not. For instance, a lame person is not able to perform Viṣṇukramaṇa, a blind person is not able to observe ājya avekṣaṇa. Are these persons are eligible or not? Pūrvapakṣin suggests that the injunction Svargakāmo yajeta may be taken as enjoining the full details for those who are able and without such details for those who cannot perform them. However, this will result in vākyabheda, since, it enjoins different ways of performance for different person. This cannot be allowed. (S.B. 6-1-6)

At Kundapayinām ayana two sacrifices are enjoined as 'māsam agnihotram juhat' (मासं अग्निहोत्रं जुहुयात्) and 'māsam darśapūrṇamāsābhyām yajeta' (मासं दर्शपूर्णमासाभ्यां यजेत) here the question arises whether, the auxiliary of a month's time is enjoined for these two sacrifices or two separate sacrifices of the same name the duration of which is one month are enjoined. To settle this question we have to take into account an earlier remark viz upasadbhiḥ caritvā i.e. after performing the upasads. There are no upasads at the well-known agnihotra or darśapūrṇamāsa. Hence, maṣāgnihotra and māṣa darśapūrṇamāsa have to

be considered as separate sacrifices. Now, pūrvapakṣin argues that upaniṣads also may be taken as enjoined. This is not possible. Enjoining two items by one and the same statement will result in taking it as two sentences and two injunctions. This is not justified. For a sacrifice that is already enjoined two subordinate items cannot be enjoined by a single statement, while a new sacrifice can be enjoined together with more than one subordinate item.

There is an interesting example wherein vākyabheda is avoided by viśiṣṭavidhi. The statement 'soṇam ānaya' appears to enjoin the bringing of tawny colour. The colour being a quality it cannot be brought. To avoid this difficulty if the horse that has tawny colour is also taken as enjoined it will result in two injunctions and vākyabheda. This is avoided by considering that a tawny coloured horse is enjoined here.

The above examples reveal that avoiding vākyabheda is a major methodology to correctly identify the exact nature of the main and subsidiary acts of sacrifices.

In connection with vākyabheda an important point to be noted is that there can be no

syntactical unity between two injunctions, two subordinate items, and between a mantra and brāhmaṇa passages. These support each other in organising the sacrifice but do not form one syntactical unit.

In the above presentation an attempt made to cover all important aspects of the semantics of Pūrvamīmāṃsā. Examples are mostly drawn from Pūrvamīmāṃsā area. The views of Vyākaraṇa and Nyāya are quoted and compared. Mīmāṃsā has a special approach in some respects. This is highlighted. Critical comments are added from inter disciplinary point of view. There is much scope for inter-disciplinary approach with a modern perspective in this subject.



6 1. Atideśa, Transference of auxiliaries from Prakṛti to vikṛti

The sacrifices are grouped into two categories prakṛti i.e., original or primary, vikṛti derived. The sacrifices that are self contained, that is to say, have all the auxiliaries duly stated are prakṛti while such sacrifices of which all auxiliaries are not stated but need to be transferred or adopted from prakṛti are vikṛti. For instance, darśapūrṇamāsa, nityaagnihotra are prakṛti and agniṣomaya and māśāgnihotra are vikṛti. The latter require the adoption of some auxiliaries from the former. The process of such adoption is designated as atideśa. This is discussed in the seventh and eighth chapters of Jaimini sūtra and explained in Śābarabhāṣya. The nature of atideśa is briefly stated as

*Prakṛtāt karmano yasmāt tatsamāneṣu karmasu
Dharmopaveśo yatra syāt so atideśa iti smṛtaḥ*

प्राकृतात्कर्मणो यस्मात् तत्समानेषु कर्मसु ।
धर्मोपवेशो यत्र स्यात् तैऽतिदेशः स्मृतः ॥

The criterion to adopt the auxiliaries from a particular prakṛti to a particular vikṛti is the similarity between the two. This similarity is indicated in four ways

i) common name e.g. māṣāgnihotra. This has a common name with nityāgnihotra, hence, the auxiliaries of nityāgnihotra are adopted in māṣāgnihotra

ii) Direct statement e.g., 'Iṣunā abhicaran yajeta' (इषुणा अभिचरन् यजेत) 'syenena abhicaran yajeta' (श्येनेन अभिचरन् यजेत). Here after giving a few auxiliaries of Iṣu sacrifice, it is stated that 'itarat syen vat.' Here, the auxiliaries of śyena yāga are adopted into Iṣu Yāga because of direct statement.

iii) Presumed injanction. In saurya sacrifice, the auxiliaries of āgneya are to be adopted by presumed injunction. The statement 'Sauryam carum nirvapet brahmavarcasakāmaḥ' (सौर्यं चरुं निर्वपेत् ब्रह्मवर्चसकामः) merely states the sacrifice. The required auxiliaries are not stated. However, the sacrifice cannot be performed without auxiliaries. Therefore, a statement to get the auxiliaries from agneya has to be presumed and the auxiliaries be brought from āgneya.

iv) Name of Sanskāra. It is stated above that on the basis of the common name of prakṛti and vikṛti the auxiliaries of prakṛti be adopted in vikṛti. Similarly by common name of a samskāra also a samskāra stated in prakṛti can be brought to vikṛti eg. avabhṛta bath is prescribed in

agniṣtoma sacrifice with certain auxiliary details. It is a samskāra. The Soma is prescribed in varuṇa praghāsa. It should be noted that the auxiliaries of any prakṛti yāga cannot be adopted to any vikṛtiyāga indiscriminately. The adoption is primarily guided by the similarity and the similarity has to be ascertained by the above criteria.

It should also be noted that there is no atideśa of the result, the special provisions, the sacrificer, and the collectivity i.e., phala, niyama kartṛsamudāyanām ananvayaḥ. (फलनियमकर्तृसमुदायानां अनन्वयः) For instance, for agnihotra the svarga is stated as the result, he who desires svarga is stated as agent there is a special provision that the sacrifice should be repeated so long as the sacrificer is alive, it is also stated that āgneya etc be performed as a group, all these cannot be transferred or adopted in saurya etc., vikṛti yāga.

With this background we may notice few more instances of atideśa i.e., transference or adoption.

It is already stated that the auxiliaries of nitya agnihotra are to be adopted in māśāgnihotra as there is a common name.

However, in the case prāyāñīya though it is given as a name of the first day in dvādaśāha

and also the first day of gavāmayara, the auxiliaries of one should not be adopted in the other. On closer observations it will be found that it is not a name but only an adjective of the first day. From this it is clear that Jaimini is very carefull in distinguishing the words as names or adjectives.

In darśapūrṇamāsa, the statement 'camasena āpaḥ pranayet' 'go dohena paśukamasyā' (चमसेन आपः प्रणयेत्, गोदोहेन पशुकामस्य) occur. The first statement says 'the water be brought in camasa type of vessel.' The second statement says 'a person who desires to obtain paśu should bring it in the vessel used for milking.' Here, the question is raised whether the latter is allowed in the vikṛti also. It is pointed out that only kṛtvartha items are borrowed from prakṛti to vikṛti. Bringing water in the vessel used to bring the milk is puruṣārtha as it serves the purpose of obtaining paśu for the person concerned.

It should be noted here that all puruṣārtha items are barred from atideśa.

When there is smilarity in respect of the deity of prakṛti and vikṛti and the similarity in respect of dravya also, the question arises which of them be preferred for the purpose of adopting the

Prakṛti to vikṛti

auxiliaries of prakṛti into vikṛti. It is ruled that the similarity in respect of dravya be preferred. Though both deity and dravya give a form to the sacrifice, dravya is more important than deity. It is the offering of dravya that constitutes the core part of the yāgas.

In the statement 'āgneyam payah' both the deity and dharma are stated. Therefore, the question arises whether 'sannāya dharmas' are to be adopted or puroḍāśa dharmas. Sannāya dharmas have similarity in respect of the deity and puroḍāśadharmas have similarity in respect of dravya. As per the above ruling the dravya dharmas have to be preferred.

In this instance, the relative position of deity and dravya in a sacrifice is made clear.



62. Ūha-Modification

After explaining atideśa i.e., transference of auxiliaries from prakṛti to vikṛti, Jaimini takes up the discussion of ūha i.e., modification to be introduced in certain auxiliaries to suit the requirement of Vikṛti. As a preliminary to it he raises the question whether the auxiliaries are meant for accomplishing apūrvā or meant for the dravya and deity with which these are associated. In the second alternative the auxiliaries associated with dravya need not be performed in vikṛti, since, the same dravya and same deity are not adopted in the vikṛti but a substitute is adopted. If we go by the first alternative, then, since, these are meant for accomplishing apūrvā, these have to be performed in vikṛti also. For instance, if avaghāta i.e., thrashing of rice is meant for rice, then, it need not be done for nīvāra grain etc., by Ūha. But if it is taken as meant for apūrvā it has to be performed for nīvāra also to accomplish apūrvā.

Further, if the auxiliaries are meant for the yāga but not for apūrvā, then. Since all yāgas are enjoined by the common expression yajati, the auxiliaries prescribed for prakṛti yāga may have to apply to vikṛti yāga by way of upadeśa only. Consequently, there will not be any need of

atideśa. However, if the auxiliaries are meant for accomplishing apūrva, then, the apūrva of vikṛti being distinct from that of prakṛti the auxiliaries of prakṛti have to be brought by atideśa.

Ūha i.e., modification, will be required in respect of three items viz., i) Mantra i.e., the hymn to be recited in favour of the deity ii) Sāman i.e., the mode of chanting of the hymns iii) Sanskāra i.e., certain types of refinement to be effected on dravya, vessels etc., For instance the hymn 'agnaye justam nirvapāmi' (अग्नये जुष्टं निर्वपामि) prescribed to be recited at prakṛtiyāga i.e., āgneya yāga is borrowed to vikṛtiyāga viz., saurya yāga. Now, this has to be recited in favour of sūrya who is the deity at vikṛti yāga. Therefore, agnaye has to be substituted by sūryāya. This is an instance of ūha in mantra. The mantra is brought by atideśa and the name of the deity is substituted by the process of ūha.

Sāman i.e., the mode of recitations.

Sanskāra - refinement of dravya etc. The statement 'vrihīn āvahanti' (व्रीहीन् आवहन्ति) enjoins avaghāti i.e., thrashing of rice in prakṛtiyāga. However, when nīvāra grain is used in vikṛti the sanskāra of thrashing has to be brought by atideśa of thrashing has to be brought by atideśa

and has to be effected on nīvāra grain. This is atideśa of ūha of sanskāra.

In the context of discussing the question whether the auxiliaries are meant to accomplish apūrva or the dravya. deity etc., with which these are associated, an interesting question is raised. In darśapūrṇa sacrifice, two hymns viz., i) 'aganm suvaḥ suvaragam.' (अग्रं सुवः सुवर्गम्) We obtain happiness we go to heaven. ii) 'agneraham ujjitim anujjeṣam' (अग्नेरहं उज्जीतिं अनुज्जेषम्). I attain prosperity by the prosperity of the sacred fire. Whether these are meant to describe the nature of svarga and agni and therefore, the recitation is meant for them or the recitation of these hymns is meant to accomplish apūrva the svarga and agni are only subordinate items. This question is answered by pointing out that this these hymns cannot lead to any result by merely describing the svarga or agni deity. These can lead to the result only when these are taken as meant for the accomplishment of apūrva. Hence, these are meant for apūrva, consequently the svarga and the deity are to be considered only as subordinate items (Bh.s IX-1-4,5)



6 3. The deity

While discussing this question, pūrvapakṣin argues that the deity can bestow the result i.e., svarga. This leads to the discussion of the very nature of the deity. We will briefly notice the pūrvapakṣin's arguments and siddhantin's reply to it. Pūrvapakṣin argues.

i) All sacrifices are meant for deities. Havis offered in the sacrifices is a kind of food offered to them.

The dravya and the act of yāga are subordinate to the deity. These are meant for him. He is something like a respected guest.

ii) The deity has a body and he eats food. His eating is not like ordinary eating. He enjoys only the essence like honey bees sucking the essence. In view of this we find the food offered to him intact.

iii) We find the description of Indra as holding vajrāyudha, Varuṇa as having pāśa, Yama with stick. These clearly indicate that the deities have a form.

iv) The deities own the property from which they can bestow the needs of the persons who worship them. Indra is described as the lord of the entire earth, mountains, water etc.

v) The deities are described as bestowing the wealth, cattle, progeny etc., for those who worship them.

vi) The above points are supported by *smṛti*, *ācāra* and the other details given above.

Siddhāntin points out that all these evidences are based on *smṛti*. Nowhere in the *śruti* these are explicitly stated. More-over if the deities with body etc., are accepted as described above the very eternal nature of Veda will be adversely affected. The so called benefits stated to be bestowed by the deities are really the results of the sacrifice, but not the favours bestowed by the deities.

This point is discussed as side issue while discussing *ūha*.

We will note a few instances of *Ūha*.

i) At *darśapūrṇamāsa*, with reference to *prastara praharaṇa* the hymn 'ayam yajamānaḥ asau āyurāśāste' (अयं यजमानः असौ आयुराशास्ते) is to be recited. This hymn is taken by *atideśa* in the *satrayāga*. The word *yāgamānaḥ* that is in singular has to be modified as *yājamanāḥ* in plural as there are many *yājamānas* in *satra*. This is an instance of the *ūha* in a mantra in respect of the number conveyed by the suffix.



64. In respect of sāmān some special points are to be noted

i) sāmāns are arranged in three parts, (a) yoni-grantha i.e., the hymns that are sources for applying sāmāns. (b) Ūha grantha i.e., a set of three three hymns each sung with a sāmān. (c) Uttarāgrantha i.e., the hymns arranged in three Ṛks each. These three parts together are called chandograntha.

ii) The sāmāns are a sanskāra for Ṛks. Hence, these are auxiliaries.

iii) The sāmāns arranged in ūha granthas are pauruṣeya.

iv) Each Ṛk in the set of (Bh.S.9-2-1-3) three should be sung with the sāmān concerned.

v) There are a thousand branches of sāmaveda, In the course of the singing of sāmān there are variations in respect modifying the pronunciation of syllable, separations of them, extending the pronunciations, repetition, pausing and introducing the supporting syllable that have no meaning.

Here, the question arises whether the variations prevalent in different branches be applied by all or the respective branches should adopt the respective modes. It is concluded that the

purpose of these variations is to make the singing perfect. Since, by adopting the mode of the respective branch this purpose can be achieved, there is no need to try the other modes and produce a mix-up.



6 5. Bhādha-Exclusion

After the discussion of atideśa and ūha, Jaimini takes up the discussion of bādha i.e., exclusion. Atideśa provided the transfer of auxiliaries from prakṛti to vikṛti. The purpose of transferring has been to provide the necessary auxiliaries required to accomplish the apūrva of vikṛtiyāga, since, all required auxiliaries will not have been stated in vikṛti. These transferred auxiliaries have to serve the same purpose that was served in prakṛti. However, in some cases that purpose will not be relevant or required in vikṛti. In such cases the transfer of the concerned auxiliaries is not made. In other words these are excluded from the scope of vikṛti. This process is designated as bādha. The word bādha literally means prevention or rejection. The auxiliary that was awaiting transference from prakṛti to vikṛti is prevented from being transferred as the purpose to be served by it is not required or not relevant.

For instance, with reference to the kuśa grass to be used at prakṛti, it is stated that these are to be cut and brought for the sacrifice while in vikṛti it is stated that the kuśa grass that has fallen by itself be used. Here, the auxiliary i.e., cutting has become unnecessary at the vikṛti. This act of cutting served the purpose of apūrva of prakṛti through the grass.

Now, it is not necessary to serve the purpose of the apūrva of vikṛti.

At Kamyestikāṇḍa which is vikṛti caru of a hundred pieces of gold put in ghee is prescribed. In the prakṛti caru is made by vṛhi i.e., rice and thrashing it is prescribed as an auxiliary of it. However, thrashing is not needed for gold pieces. Hence, this is excluded.

Similar exclusion is not to be made for cooking the gold pieces, since, it is expressly stated that these gold pieces be cooked in ghee i.e., ghr̥te srapayati (घृते स्रपयति). It is true that putting in ghee will not have the effect of cooking on gold pieces. But still as it is expressly stated by a vedic statement its observation will contribute to apūrva. No such express statement is found in respect of thrashing at vikṛti level.

The bādha i.e., exclusion is made on three grounds viz.,

i) arthalopa i.e., absence of scope to serve the purpose for which the auxiliary concerned is stated in the prakṛti

ii) pratyamāna i.e., providing something else in the vikṛti in place of the auxiliary to be transferred from prakṛti

iii) Pratiṣedha i.e., the negation of the auxiliary concerned by a direct statement.

The two examples cited above come under the first group. In the first example the auxiliary of cutting the kuṣa grass stated in the prakṛti lost its purpose, since, in the vikṛti the kuṣa fallen by itself is prescribed. In the second example, the auxiliary viz., the thrashing prescribed for the rice lost its purpose since kṛṣṇala i.e., gold pieces do not need thrashing. These two categories come under arthalopa group.

Pratyāmnān i.e., providing something else in vikṛti in place of the auxiliary to be transferred from prakṛti.

At soma raudra sacrifice, it is stated 'śaramayam barhiḥ bhavati' (शरमयं बर्हिः भवति) the śara grass be spread. This is a vikṛti yāga. In the prakṛti yāga kuṣa grass is prescribed for this purpose. Here, if the word śaramaya is understood in the sense of plenty of śara grass, taking the mayat suffix in the sense of prācurya i.e., plenty, it amounts to saying that a few kuṣa grass that are prescribed in prakṛti be mixed with plenty of Śara grass and spread. However, Śaramaya cannot be taken in the sense of plenty as per the Pāṇini rule. Therefore, this statement

conveys that the śara grass be spread. Consequently, the spreading of kuśa grass that was to be transferred from prakṛti to vikṛti is prevented. Since, the transfer is prevented here by providing another auxiliary it is a case of bādha by pratyāmnāna.

Pratiṣedha i.e., the negation of an auxiliary by direct statement. In cāturmāsya sacrifice at mahāpitṛ sacrifice. It is stated that 'no arṣeyam vṛṇīte, na hotāram.' Here, vṛṇīte means invites to participate in the sacrifice. In Prakṛti all priests concerned are invited including the two mentioned here. As they are stated to be invited at prakṛti and not to be invited here, it gives a choice either to invite or not invite. Such a choice is normally not allowed. If it is allowed the vedic prescription will be offended in two ways:

i) When they are invited, the statement not to invite is offended. ii) When they are not invited the statement to invite is offended. Hence, a choice is not allowed unless it is very much unavoidable. In the present case there is a way out. The statements 'na ārṣeyam vṛṇīte na hotāram' (नो आर्षेयं वृणीते न होतारम्) be interpreted that all other than ārṣeya and hotā be invited. In this way there is a partial bādha i.e., exclusion of a part of the auxiliary. This is paryudāsa type of niṣedha.

A number of instances, coming under these three groups are quoted by Jaimini and Śābara.

Bādha is also grouped into two groups viz. i) Prāptabādha (ii) aprāptabādha. Exclusion of such auxiliaries that were normally eligible to be transferred by atideśa but prevented from transfer on the above three grounds is prāptabādha.

(ii) exclusion on the ground that they were not at all expected to serve the purpose is aprāpta bādha. Parthasārathi Miśra has designated them as i) prameya apahāralakṣaṇa i.e., whose role to convey their purpose is taken away.

(ii) Mulaccheda lakṣaṇa i.e., whose very basis is cut away.

The prāpta bādha type of bādha is further classified into several types such as i) nitya to be set aside by naimittika

ii) Samānya to be set aside by viśeṣa iii) nitya to be set aside by kāmya iv) pūrva by para v) sāvakāśa by niravakāśa and so on.



66. Nitya is set aside by naimittika

At darśapaurṇamāsa the singing of fifteen sāmans is prescribed. However, at a sacrifice to be performed by a vaiśya the recitation of seventeen is prescribed. Here, the fifteen prescribed at nitya sacrifice is set aside by seventeen prescribed at naimittika sacrifice. Further, if this sacrifice is undertaken for specific result viz., pratiṣṭhā, then, the recitation of twenty one sāman is prescribed. This sets aside both fifteen and seventeen of both nitya and naimittika. It is kāmya sacrifice. Kāmya sets aside both nitya and naimittika. It should be noted here that in prakṛti only eleven ṛks are stated. These are made up into fifteen by reciting the first and the eleventh thrice. The same procedure should be followed here to get fifteen out of eleven and six more be added to make up twenty one.

The Sāmānya is set aside by Viśeṣa

At Jyotiṣṭoma in the context of purchase of soma it is stated that 'pade juhōti' (पदे जुहोति) i.e., offers homa at the foot step. In the context of moving towards havirdhāna place it is stated that 'vartmani juhōti' (वर्तमनि जुहोति) offers homa on the path. However, there is a general injunction that homas have to be offered at āhavanīya. This general provision is set aside by the special provision. It is not a total rejection of general provision, since, the general provision has the scope in other instances.

67. Vikalpa and Samuccaya

i.e. option and combination

Instances of Vikalpa i.e., option between that which is to be transferred from prakṛti and that which is stated in vikṛti.

At Darśapūrṇa, ajyabhāgas are prescribed for the yāga for agniṣomau. This has to come to paśuyoga by transference. However, there is expressed statements at vikṛiti that 'na tau paśau karati' (न तौ पशौ करति) these i.e., ājyabhāgas are not to be performed at paśu. Hence, the performance of ajyabhāga at paśu is optional.

At a particular rite of jyotiṣtoma two opposite statements are found 'atirātre ṣoḍasinam grhnāti' (अतिरात्रे षोडशिनं गृह्णाति) i.e., he takes ṣoḍaśī at atirātra 'na atiratre ṣoḍasinam grhnāti' (न अतिरात्रे षोडशिनं गृह्णाति) i.e., he does not take up ṣoḍaśī at atiratra, since, these statements directly conflict, and since both are vedic statements taking ṣoḍaśī has to be treated as optional. When it is not taken, the sacrifice is not hurt, because, the vedic negation is honoured. When it is taken then the sacrifice is supported because, the positive vedic statement is implemented.

At upāmśuyāga the deity is not mentioned.. This does not mean any deity may be taken. The deity that is stated for prakṛtiyāga should be taken.

At prakṛti three deities viz., prajāpati, viṣṇu and agniṣomau are stated. Therefore, these have to be adopted optionally.

The instance of combining the prākṛta auxiliaries with the auxiliaries of vikṛti.

In a few instances, the prākṛta auxiliaries are not set aside. These are implimented along with vikṛti auxiliaries. We will notice a few such instances.

In gavāmayana sacrifice at Mahāvrat it is stated that 'duṇḍubhayo nadant' (दुन्दुभ्योनन्दन्) i.e., the drums produce the sound 'patnyaḥ upagāyanti' (पत्नयः उपगायन्ति) i.e., the wives sing supporting it. 'Kāṇḍa vīṇābhiḥ upagāyanti' (काण्डवीणाभिः उपगायन्ति) i.e., it is supported by vīṇās. In the prakṛti yāga the supporting singing is made by the priests. Therefore, the question arises whether the supporting singing by the priests is to be set aside and substituted by the singing of wives or both have to be observed. Pūrvapakṣin argues that since the supporting songs are now to be given by wives the purpose of supporting is served by them as provided by vikṛti level itself. Therefore, the providing of supporting songs by priests prescribed at prakṛti level has to be set aside. However, siddhāntin points out the expression upagāna should not be taken in the

sense of supporting the sound of dundubhi but in the sense of a separate song that enhances the total effect. such enhancement could be done both by the priests as prescribed in prakṛti and also by wives as prescribed at vikṛti.

At a satra of forty-nine days, anointing the body with guggulakaṣāya at the time of morning rituals anointing with vaituśrava at mid-day ritual and with saugandhika at evening ritual is prescribed. This is a vikṛtiyāga. In its prakṛti anointing with butter is prescribed. Here, the question arises whether the anointment with butter stated in prakṛti be set aside, since, anointment by some other items is prescribed at vikṛti. However, the anointment with butter is prescribed at the time of dikṣā while that with guggula etc., is prescribed on the day of sutyā since, these two have to take place on different days there is no conflict. Hence, one need not set aside the other. Each serves the purpose of apūrva on observing at the time when it is prescribed.

At Mahāvṛta it is prescribed that yajamāna wears an wollen cloth and his wife wears the cover prepared by darbha grass. This is a vikṛti yāga. In its prakṛti it was prescribed that both yajamāna and his wife wear fresh new clothes.

Here, the question arises since both serve the purpose of covering the body whether the use of the fresh new cloth prescribed at prakṛti be set wide. However, wearing the new cloth is intended to cover the private part of the body while the woolen garment and darbha grass garment is intended to cover the upper part of the body. Hence, wearing of the new cloth prescribed in prakṛti need not be set aside by the garment prescribed in vikṛti.

At Vājapeya the wood of Khādira tree is prescribed. The wood of palāśa tree is stated as an alternative. However, in the vikṛti khādira only is stated. Therefore the question arises whether the palāśa also be brought at vikṛti as an alternative. It is ruled that since khādira is expressly stated here, palāśa is not to be brought here as an alternative. The khādira and palāśa would have come as alternates from prakṛti if one of them was not specially mentioned. Since one of them viz., khādira is mentioned at vikṛti the other need not be brought by transference as an alternative.

When a separate dravya is mentioned at Vikṛti, the dravya of prakṛti is not to be brought from prakṛti by way of transference. The same applies to deity also.



68. Tantra, the technique of one performance serving the purpose of many

Avāpa-the technique of helping by repetition.

The expression tantra is explained 'sakṛtkṛtam bahūnām upakāri tantram' (सकृत्कृतं बहूनां उपकारि तन्त्रं) i.e., one performance of an item serving the purpose of many is tantra. For instance, at darśapūrṇamāsa, three main sacrifices are prescribed on pūrṇamāsa day at three on darśa day. For these prayāja etc., a number of auxiliaries are prescribed. Here, the question arises whether prayāja etc., auxiliaries are to be performed for each main sacrifice separately or one performance of these on pūrṇamāsī one on amāvāsya is sufficient. Applying the technique of tantra it is ruled that one performance of all auxiliaries is sufficient to accomplish the apūrva. In this connection the attention is drawn to the fact that the performer of all six main sacrifices is one, the place is one, and the time of the performance of the two units of three main sacrifices is one. Hence, one performance of all auxiliaries will serve the purpose of all. By this ruling it should be presumed that the rule that the auxiliary should be repeated at every main sacrifice is not applicable here.

There is an instance wherein though the deity is one at two sacrifices and the dravya to be offered is also the same tantra is not allowed. This is in connection with a kāmya paśu sacrifice to be performed by a priest who competes to get the assignment of the position of a priest. Here, it is prescribed that a Kṛṣṇagrīva type of paśu be first offered to agni, then, a babhru type of paśu to soma then again a kṛṣṇagrīva type of paśu to agni. Here, the question arises whether the kṛṣṇagrīva paśu to be offered at the first and the third steps should be offered once only following the tantra method or should be offered separately at these two steps. It is ruled that the kṛṣṇagrīva paśu be offered separately. It would have been a case of tantra if the two sacrifice, were consecutive. But a sacrifice in favour of another deity i.e., Soma, and another dravya i.e., babhru type of paśu intervene. This rules out the application of tantra.

For darśapūrṇamāsa sacrifice which consists of six pradhāna yāgas. The time, place and the agents are prescribed. Here, the question arises whether the agent for each pradhāna is different or one and the same person has to perform the six pradhāna sacrifices. It is ruled that one and the same person should perform the entire

sacrifice. Similarly the place and time are also common. This ruling is based on the guidelines of tantra.

At agniṣomiya paśuyāga erecting eleven yūpas is prescribed. It is prescribed that āhuti be offered near yūpa. Here, the question arises whether āhuti be offered for each yūpa separately or once only applying the method of tantra. It is ruled that it is sufficient if it is offered only once.

Ordinarily the auxiliaries are performed at the same place and at the same time where the main is performed. However, there are a few exceptions.

For instance, Vedi i.e., the sacrificial altar has to be prepared a day earlier as per the statement 'pūrvedyuh amāvāsyāyam vedim karoti' (पूर्वेद्युः अमावास्यायां वेदिं करोति). The vartana home has to be performed at the footstep as per statement 'pade juhoti'.

At Jyotiṣtoma three paśus are prescribed. For one of these three viz., agniṣomiya paśu a yūpa is stated. Here the question arises whether this yūpa be utilised for the other two paśus also or a separate yupa has to be erected for each paśu. It is ruled that one yūpa only be used for the three paśus since it is not particularly stated that

it is meant for one only. This ruling is also based the method of tantra.

Similarly the question whether the chopping the wood of yūpa, drying it and sprinkling water on it etc., sanskāras are also have to be performed once only (11-3-5).

A Piece of wood is taken out from Yūpa to anoint the paśu. This piece of wood is called svaru. Here, the question is raised whether three pieces of wood be taken separately to anoint the three paśus or one is sufficient. It is ruled that one is sufficient. The some piece of wood be used to anoint the three paśus by tantra.

Ādhāna i.e., setting up of the sacrificial fire is an important item. With reference to this programme the question arises whether it has to be done for each sacrifice separately or the sacrificial fire first set up by a person when he starts his daily agnihotra can serve the purpose of all sacrifices undertaken by him later. It is ruled that the agni ādhāna first set up can serve the purpose of all other later sacrifices. Therefore, there is no need to set the fire again and again.

There is another interesting example of tantra At jyotiṣṭoma, yajamāna is advised to have a horn of a black deer to scratch the body if there

is sensation to scratch the body. He is also advised to throw it later. The ahargaṇa has to be performed for two or three days. Here, the question arises whether horn has to be thrown away on the first day itself or to be retained till last day and then only thrown. It is ruled that it should be thrown away on the last day only.

Sruk, Sruva etc., sacrificial vessels are prescribed for performing the sacrifices. The question arises whether these vessels are to be prepared separately for each sacrifice or these have to be used all along for all sacrifices. It is ruled that these have to be used all along the life of the sacrificer. These should be put in the fire along with the body of the sacrificer when he dies.

At darśapūrṇamāsa, for thrashing of rice, recitation of the hymn 'ava rakṣo' etc is prescribed. Here, the question is raised whether the recitation of hymn is to be repeated at each step of thrashing or once only in the course of thrashing. It is ruled that recitation once for the whole act of thrashing is sufficient to accomplish the apūrva.

Instances of āvāpa 'i.e., repetition

We have quoted above ten instances of tantra. Now, we will mention a few instances of āvāpa.

At jyotiṣṭoma, puroḍāśa is offered at prataḥ savana etc., different times. At these puroḍāśa hymn has to be recited. Here, the question is raised whether the recitation of this hymn at one time is sufficient or it has to be repeated every time the puroḍāśa is offered. It is ruled that the recitation of the hymn has to be repeated. The recitation of the hymn is intended to make a reference to the puroḍāśa offered. Since, each time the puroḍāśa offered is different the recitation of the hymn to refer to it has to be repeated.

At jyotiṣṭoma four pits designated as uparava are to be dug. While digging these pits the hymn 'yakṣaḥaṇa balagahana vaiṣṇavān khanasi' (यक्षहण बलगहण वैष्णवान् खनसि) has to be. Here, the four pits are given a common name. Hence, it appears that the recitation of the hymn concerned once is sufficient. However since the pits are dug one after the other and these are four different pits, the recitation of the hymn has to be repeated while digging each pit.

At darśapūrṇamāsa four nirvāhas of handful rice, spreading of five hand full of darbha grass on the altar, taking ghee on juhu vessel four times are prescribed. For these acts appropriate hymns are prescribed. Here, the question is

raised whether it is sufficient if the respective hymn is recited at the time of the respective act once only or it is to be repeated when each handful of rice, darbha grass or ghee is placed in the respective place. Since, the items i.e., rice darbha and ghee are one though these are taken in different handful quantity for placing, it appears that the recitation of the respective hymns once is sufficient. However it is ruled that the recitation be repeated while placing every handful of rice etc., since, the recitation of the hymn is a *sanskāra* for each quantity.

At Rājasūya, the rituals at which different corns are offered are to be performed. While thrashing these corns the recitation of hymn is prescribed. Here the question arises whether it is sufficient if the hymn is recited when the first variety of corn is thrashed or it has to be repeated for each type of corn. It is ruled that the recitation of the hymn has to be repeated since this *sanskāra* has to be effected on each kind of corn.

At *Aśvapratigraha* *iṣṭi*, offering of as many *puroḍāśas* as the number of horses gifted is prescribed. These *puroḍāśas* have to be offered in four pots. Here, the question is raised whether all *puroḍāśas* are to be put in four large pots or each *puroḍāśa* is to be put in four pots

separately. It is ruled that each puroḍāśa has to be put in four pots separately. The sanskāra viz., cooking has to be effected on each puroḍāśa separately.

Prasaṅga - extended application

The process of auxiliaries performed with reference to one main serving the other main also is prasaṅga i.e., extended application. In the case of tantra also the same guide line was laid down. However, if the application of the auxiliaries to many is intentional it is tantra. But in the case of prasarga serving others is a by product.

It is like a lamp put to light the building also serving to light the road. We will notice a few instances of prasanga below.

At Jyotiṣṭoma offering of agniṣomīya paśu is prescribed. Offering of paśupuroḍāśa is also prescribed. Prayāja etc., auxiliaries are prescribed for agniṣomīyapaśu the question is raised whether these serve the purpose of paśupuroḍāśa also or these have to be performed again. It is ruled that the auxiliaries performed for agniṣomīyapaśu also serve the purpose of paśupuroḍāśa. Hence, these need not be performed again. This ruling is based on the application of the method of prasanga.

For Jyotiṣṭoma a sacrificial alter is erected, after performing agniṣṭoma sacrifice if one desires to perform iṣṭi whether the same altara be utilised or a separate alter has to be erected. This question arises because the altar has to be utilised at these two rituals for different purposes. It is ruled that no separate alter is necessary. The same altar that is utilised for pracāra at the agniṣṭoma, can be utilised for placing the havis at the Iṣṭi by the application of the method of prasanga.

Dikṣaṇiya etc Iṣṭis are prescribed as subsidiaries to soma sacrifice. Anvadhāna is prescribed for soma sacrifice. The enkindling of the fire taken out from gārhapatya is designated a anvādhāna. Here, the question is raised whether such anvādhāna is to be performed for the Iṣṭis also. It is ruled that it is not necessary to perform it repeatedly. The anvādhāna performed for soma sacrifice also serves the purpose of Iṣṭis by applying the method of prasanga. The fire can be kept alive by continuously putting ghee in it.

For the three sacrificial acts viz., ātithyā, upasad, and agniṣomiya, the barhi grass is prescribed. For this grass sprinkling with water, cutting on the two sides etc., auxiliaries are prescribed. Here, the question is raised whether

these auxiliaries be performed separately for the barhi grass required for each of the sacrificial acts stated above or once only for the whole set of barhi brought for the purpose. It is ruled that one performance of the auxiliaries viz., sprinkling water etc. for the whole set of barhi grass is sufficient. This ruling is based on the application of the method of prasāṅga. Though the three sacrificial acts are different. The barhi grass on which the prokṣaṇa etc., sanskāras are to be effected is one. Hence, the guideline of prasāṅga applies here.

We will now notice a few instances in which prasāṅga method is not applicable.

At darśapūrṇamāsa, ārambhaniya istī is prescribed. This is performed at the commencement of the first performance of darśapūrṇamāsa. It is a sanskāra for the sacrificer. The second and third etc., darśapūrṇamāsa performances are only distinct prayogas but not distinct karmas. Therefore, ārambhaneṣṭi need not be repeated at each prayoga i.e., performance. However, in the Vikṛti yāga like saurya, ārambhaniya has to be performed for each vikṛti separately. The prasāṅga methodology is not applicable here.

At jyotiṣṭoma, the soma plant is kept in two carts and carried to the Mahāvedi place. Puroḍāśa etc., other offerings also are to be carried. Here, the question is raised whether puroḍāśa etc., other offerings also could be put in one of the two carts by which soma is carried. It is ruled that it cannot be carried by one of these carts. The soma plant is to be taken to Mahāvedi place while puroḍāśa etc., offerings are to be taken near gārhapatya fire. Since the place of the two are different, puroḍāśa should not be carried in the cart meant to carry the soma plant. The criterion of prasanga is not applicable here.

For the paśu puroḍāśa etc., at soma sacrifice the vessels such as graha, camasa etc., are prescribed. For the iṣṭi, juhu etc., other vessels are prescribed. Here, the question is raised whether the vessels prescribed for paśu puroḍāśa etc., could be used for iṣṭi also. It is ruled that since, separate vessels are prescribed for these two, the vessels of one cannot be used for the others.



69. The yāgas that are to be performed on behalf of the dead

There is one day sacrifice designated as sarvasvāra. At this sacrifice the yajamāna offers himself into the fire at the time of the third savana when the recitation of ārbhava hymn is recited. He requests the other priests to complete the sacrifice. Here the question arises whether the others are eligible to complete the remaining part of the sacrifice. This depends upon the realisation of the result. The deceased yajamāna cannot have the result since he is deceased. The other priests cannot have it since they have not undertaken the sacrifice on their own. Here, it is ruled that deceased Yajamāna will have the result since he has offered himself into the fire as a part of the sacrifice. The other priests are the agents as they are directed by yajamana to complete it. However, such of the items that are to be performed by yajamāna alone need not be performed. The items that are required for the accomplishment of sacrifice must be performed. Further, the hymn that seek life for him should be recited, since, he has to live upto the time of his offering himself into the fire.

The above instance is an instance of voluntary death. But there is an instance wherein the

contingency of the unexpected death in the middle of a sacrifice arises.

When a satra yaga is going on if one of the yajamāna unexpectedly dies, it is prescribed that his bones be preserved for an year, then a ritual called asthiyajña be performed. The statement that prescribes it states 'asthīni yājayeyuh' (अस्थीनि याजयेयुः) the asthis i.e., bones, be made to perform the sacrifice. Here the question arises whether this sacrifice be performed by the very dead person represented by the bones or by some living person keeping the bones by his side. It is ruled that a living person should perform it.

However, if the other option of making the bones to perform the sacrifice is adopted such of the auxiliaries such as cutting the hairs and nails etc that cannot be even nominally performed should be dropped and others be performed.



70. Dakṣiṇā i.e., Fee to the priests

At the sacrifice dakṣiṇā i.e., fee is offered to the priests to encourage them to participate in the sacrifice and play their assigned role. In connection with dakṣiṇā some interesting provisions are made and interesting observations are also made keeping in mind the human nature and human interest by Jaimini and Śābara. We will notice some of them.

The paṇḍarika sacrifice, is to be performed for eleven days. At this sacrifice the dakṣiṇā of ten thousand cows and eleven thousand horses is prescribed. The question is raised whether these many cows and horses be given every day or for the whole programme. It is ruled that since the services of the priests are requisitioned for the whole programme, the dakṣiṇā prescribed has to be given only once. It is the entire programme that leads to the result. Dakṣiṇā is an auxiliary of the sacrifice through the total performance of the sacrifice. It is not an auxiliary of each day's work and participation. It is not day based but it is total programme based.

The next question is, whether payment of the whole of dakṣiṇā is to be received in one lump or daily?

In this connection there is a direction that 'pratyaham dvādaśa śatam.' (प्रत्यहं द्वादश शतम्) Hence, dakṣiṇā has to be received everyday. Dakṣiṇā is meant to encourage the priests. The daily payment will keep them in good spirit.

At the agni ādhāna when it is first performed certain dakṣiṇā in terms of giving cow etc is prescribed. For those who long for prosperity, fame and wealth a second round of ādhāna is enjoined. At this certain other items such as a chariot that is repaired and rebuilt, a cloth that is repaired and restitched are prescribed as dakṣiṇā. Here, the question arises whether both the dakṣiṇā viz., that which is prescribed at both the first and second performance be given or one of them or optionally one of them. It is ruled that since, the purpose served at the second performance is quite different from the first performance, both need not be given. The dakṣiṇā prescribed for the second performance only be given at the second performance.

At āgrāyaṇa a calf and a cloth are offered as dakṣiṇā. This sets aside the anvāhārya dakṣiṇa to be offered at prakṛti. However, certain auxiliaries of anvāhārya have to be continued. Cooking is one of the auxiliary of anvāhārya. However this should not be implemented on the calf. Calf is

prescribed as dakṣiṇā but not its flesh. Therefore, the auxiliary of cooking is not to be implemented.

At Jyotiṣṭoma the dakṣiṇā of cows, horses, goats etc., animals and rice, barley, oil seeds etc., food grains is prescribed. The quantity is stated as twelve hundred. Here, the question arises whether this quantity applies to all items or only animals, that too cows only. It is ruled that it applies to cows only.

The next question is, whether this dakṣiṇā be duly divided and given or the whole is to be given. It is ruled that it should be duly divided and given.

This raises the further question whether it should be equally divided or on the basis of their work load or on the basis of their designation i.e., samākhyā. It is ruled that it should be divided on the basis of their designations. These designations are not their normal designations as brahmā, adhvaryu, hotā etc., but the designations i) ārdhinaḥ i.e., those who are entitled for half of brahmā etc., main priests, ii) tṛtiyaṇaḥ i.e., those who are entitled for one third share iii) pādinaḥ i.e., those who are entitled for one-fourth of the share.

At one day vikṛti-yāga designated 'bhūh' one

cow is prescribed as dakṣiṇā. It is a vikṛti of jyotiṣṭoma. At jyotiṣṭoma twelve hundred cows, horses etc., other animals and vṛhi etc food grains are prescribed as dakṣiṇā. Now, since a separate dakṣiṇā is prescribed at vikṛti the prākṛti dakṣiṇā has to be set aside. Here, the question arises whether the whole of prākṛtidakṣiṇā consisting of cows, horses, food-grains etc., has to be set aside or only giving twelve hundred cows is to be replaced by giving one cow. The ruling given is that the whole of prakṛta dakṣiṇā is to be set aside and only one cow has to be given at vikṛti though in prakṛti many items are stated as dakṣiṇā all these form one unit of dakṣiṇā. Therefore the whole of one unit of dakṣiṇā to be given at prakṛti has to be replaced by one unit of dakṣiṇā consisting of one cow.



7 1. Pratinidhi - Representative

In the sacrifice when a prescribed item is not available a substitute or a representative has to be adopted to complete the sacrifice successfully. The selection of a substitute or representative should be based on its suitability to play the role of the item for which it is a substitute and the need of providing such a substitute. Keeping these two guidelines in mind a few cases of substitution are discussed by Jaimini and explained by Śabara.

At the outset it is made clear that in the case of the deity, the sacred fire such as āhavanīya, the hymn to be recited in favour of a deity or on an item, and the acts like performing prayaja, sprinkling water on paddy, no substitute is possible or permitted. The role of these cannot be played by any other. For instance, in the āgneya yāga of the sacrificer does not remember the name of Agni at the appropriate time he should not be substituted by the name Viṣṇu. The purpose to be achieved by addressing Agni cannot be achieved by addressing Viṣṇu the āhavanīya fire should not be substitute by ordinary fire. The hymn to be recited at a particular sacrifice should not be substituted by any other hymn. These substituted fire and hymn

cannot serve the purpose intended to be served by the sacred fire or the particular hymn. Similarly, the prayāja etc auxiliary acts and prokṣaṇa etc sanskāras cannot be substituted by any other auxiliary. These produce their own apūrva which cannot be produced by any other act or sanskāra. A substitute is expected to play the role of the original. If the original is such that its role cannot be played by any other and the sacrificer is not able to perform the original the sacrifice has to fail. If the sacrificer does not remember the name of the deity, the hymn to be recited or he is not able to perform the prescribed auxiliary act or sanskāra his sacrifice has to collapse.

Further the yajamāna i.e. sacrificer himself cannot be substituted by another sacrificer after the commencement of the sacrifice. If a sacrificer dies or gets attracted by another activity and leaves the sacrifice undertaken, a substitute yajamān cannot be taken. The yajamāna is the appointing authority for other priests but yajamāna himself is not appointed by any other. He has voluntarily undertaken the sacrifice. To perform the voluntary act of one person another person cannot be substituted in the middle of the act. A person to participate in the sacrifice, has

to be appointed by the sacrificer. In the absence of the original sacrificers no person can be appointed by any other. The result of an act started by one cannot be obtained by another intervener. The sacrifice concerned has to be considered as failed.

After discussing the instances wherein a substitute is not allowed we will take note of the instances wherein a substitute is allowed and the manner in which it is allowed.

i) When a substance to be offered is not available in the middle of the sacrifice, another substance similar to it should be substituted. However, when another similar substance is already prescribed as an alternative, that should not be taken as substitute. Different similar substances should be taken. For instance, when *vṛihi* i.e. rice is not available another grain i.e. *nīvāra* similar to it should be substituted. A similar grain is that which contains the large number of the particles of *vṛihi*. However, *yava* grain which is enjoined as an alternative and which is also similar to *vṛihi* should not be taken as a substitute in a sacrifice in which *vṛihi* is used to start with, but some other grain that is similar to *vṛihi* should be taken as a substitute. Similarly, in a sacrifice in which *yava* grain is

used to start with, if yava is not available another grain similar to it should be taken as a substitute but not vṛihi. The concepts of pratinidhi and vikālpa are distinct. The provision of an alternate is quite distinct from the provision for the substitute.

The instance of soma and pūtika is quite different. Pūtikā is not enjoined as an alternate to soma but it is enjoined as a substitute. Hence, when pūtikā is also not available a plant similar to soma has to be substitute.

Similarly when nīvāra grain that is taken as a substitute for vṛihi is not available another grain similar to vṛihi only should be taken but not that which is similar to nīvāra. However if vṛihi itself is again available then, the sacrifice be completed with that only.

When a substitute is taken at the start only in the absence of the original, but later the original is available, the original should be taken instead of continuing with the substitute. For instance khadira wood is prescribed for yūpa but if it is not available right at the start, kaḍāra can be taken as a substitute. However if khadira is made available before the paśu is joined with yūpa that has to be taken, since, it is originally prescribed.

Cutting the wood etc sanskāras that were earlier effected on kādara should be effected on khādīra which is now taken. The fact that the sanskāras earlier effected on kādara have become a waste should be over looked.

Even if the originally prescribed item viz khādīra is weak and cannot stand cutting etc the original item viz khādīra itself should be used. Between the item and its sanskāra, the item is more important than its sanskāra. However, if it is very weak and cannot be utilised at all, then the substitute should be adopted.

Even if the original item cannot stand certain sanskāras, a substitute should not be adopted in its place. Between the item and the sanskāras the item is more important than sanskāras. For instance, if only a few and very small size vṛhi grains are available, then a number of sanskāras such as cutting into four pieces will not be possible but still the vṛhis only be utilised but not its substitute nīvāra.



72. The role of Arthavāda, Mantra and Nāmadheya in organising the sacrifice

Arthavādas have been a challenge to the Mimāmsakas and also a source for developing some new linguistic concepts and the canons of interpretation.

i) The arthavāda passages are full of contradictory statements, the statements that cannot be sustained by *pramāṇa*, irrelevant, and meaningless. If these are considered as a part of Veda, the very authoritativeness of Vedas will collapse.

ii) The dharma-the central theme of Veda is enjoined by an injunctive statement. In fact that is the very definition of dharma. Every Vedic statement should either convey a sacrificial act or something connected with it. However, arthavādas are not of the nature of injunctive statements nor state anything connected with the sacrificial act. Therefore, these are irrelevant to the central theme of *Pūrvamīmāṃsā* viz., dharma.

Śābara quotes a number of arthavāda passages to substantiate the above objections. We will notice a few.

i) Smoke was seen during the day but not the

flames of the fire. The flames were seen during the night but not the smoke.

ii) Prajāpati took out his marrow i.e., vapā, and put it in the sacrificial fire.

iii) Rudra wept and hence he is called Rudra.

iv) The deities were confused about the east, west etc., quarters.

v) The mind is a thief and the speech is liar.

vi) A person who performs Aśvamedha sacrifice will conquer death, will overcome the sin of killing a brāhmaṇa.

vii) The sacrificial fire should not be set up on the earth nor over the sky.

viii) There was a person called babara the son of pravaṇa.

The first statement states something that is contradicted by our perception.

The second statement states something that is impossible. No person can take out his marrow and be alive to put it in the fire.

The third statement states something that has nothing to do with the sacrifice.

The fourth statement talks of a confusion but does not state anything positive.

Stealing and lying stated in the fifth are the attributes of a person but not of the mind and speech.

The claim made in the sixth that the performer of Aśvamedha sacrifice will conquer the death etc., gives too many results to one act of the sacrifice. This is superfluous.

The prohibition of the setting up of sacrificial fire

over the sky is unwarranted, since, no fire can be set up over the sky.

The statement that there was a person babara son of pravahana cuts the very root of anāditva i.e., beginning-lessness of Veda. Since the person mentioned also cannot be anādi.

These arthavāda passages suffer from two drawbacks

i) aprāmāṇya i.e., absence of validity ii) ānarthakya i.e., not serving the purpose of sacrificial act.

Śabara introduces three important linguistic concepts viz.,

i) vākya śeṣā, ii) ekavākyatā, iii) guṇavāda to meet these objections.

i) The statements that are not of the nature of injunctive statement but occur close by are designated as vākyaśeṣa i.e., supplementary statements. All arthavāda passages come under this category.

ii) These supplementary statements get associated with the injunctive statements and serve the purpose of the sacrificial act. This process is designated as ekavākyata i.e., functioning as one statement. These two concepts answer the objection ānarthakya i.e., not serving the purpose of sacrificial act. By this technique of ekavākyatā the arthavāda serves the purpose of sacrificial act as much as the injunctive statements. In other words these are as much kriyārtha as the injunctive statements. These are not anarthaka.

Now, to answer the other objection that the arthavāda passages are contradictory, against the pramāṇas etc., Jaiminī and Śābara have developed the concept of guṇavāda i.e., the words concerned should be taken in the secondary sense, that is to say, on the basis of common attributes between the two their equation should be

comprehended. For instance the statement 'ādityo yūpaḥ' the sacrificial pole is lustrous like Sun. Simho māṇavakah bōy is as valiant as lion. Apart from solving the conflicts in this way, a total purport of the entire arthavāda passage is envisaged as prāśastya. i.e., eulogy. Whenever an injunctive statement has arthavāda passage by the side of it that passage glorifies the sacrificial act enjoined by that injunction. This process applies to prohibitions also. The arthavāda passage by the side of the prohibition censures the prohibited act. Keeping this role in mind the arthavādas are grouped into two groups viz., i) Stuti arthavādas (स्तुति अर्थवादाः) and ii) Nindā arthavādas (निन्दा अर्थवादाः).

From another point of view arthavādas are grouped into three.

i) Guṇavāda i.e., based on the attribute e.g. ādityo yūpaḥ i.e., the sacrificial pole is lustrous like son.

ii) Anuvāda i.e., statement of that which is already known by other pramāṇa. E.g. agniḥ himasya bheṣajam (अग्निः हिमस्य भेषजम्) i.e., the fire wards off the cold.

iii) bhūtartha vāda i.e., statement of an event of the past. e.g. Indro vṛtrāya vajram udayacchat

(इन्द्रो वृत्राय वज्रं उदयच्छत्) i.e., indra threw the vajrayudha.

All these statements do not convey any sacrificial act. However, these are connected with the nearby injunctive statements by the process of ekavākyatā and serve the purpose of sacrificial act.

There are two other groups of arthavāda viz.,
i) Parakṛti i.e., statement of an act performed by a distinguished person e.g., agniḥ vā akāmayata (अग्निर्वा अकामयत्) i.e., agni himself desired.

ii) Purākalpa i.e., statement of a mythological event as narrated in a gāthā, śloka or an episode.

Parakṛti and purākalp type of arthavādas are something like folk literature. These contain the myths, legends, gāthās i.e., proverbial statements and verses popular among common people and inherited from the hoary past. Probably, originally these were not associated with the sophisticated sacrificial Institution. These contain a rich prehistoric cultural thoughts, beliefs, costumes and practices. References are also found to animals, birds, trees, plants etc., with which early man was friendly. Mīmāṃsakas did not take much interest in this aspect of arthavādas. They were only

interested in considering this portion of brāhmaṇa also as authoritative by connecting it with the injunctive statements. For this purpose Śabara has quoted only a few arthavādas. Only such arthavāda passages that are close by an injunction are handled by the Yājñikas and Mīmāṃsakas. However, the arthavāda literature is very rich. There seems to have been a folk literature tradition along with a priestly literature tradition. Priestly tradition must have accepted it as a part of vedic tradition and related it with the sacrificial programme. Under the sūtra 'tulyam sāmpradāyikam' (तुल्यं सांप्रदायिकम्) (I-2-8) Śabara raises the objection that arthavāda portion is likely to be a pramādapath i.e., interpolation. The sūtra replies that the arthavāda portion as much belongs to a continued tradition as the injunctive statements. So far as their traditionality is concerned it is common. This reveals that both priestly tradition and folk tradition were considered as equally old, and priestly tradition accommodated it without prejudice to the apauruṣeyatva of Veda.

In any case a detailed study of the arthavāda portion of brāhmaṇas is essential to link the Śrauta tradition and Sūta tradition which later grew into Itihāsa pūraṇa tradition.

The role of Mantra i.e., Vedic hymns in the sacrifice.

The very definition of a mantra given by Jaimini viz., Those portions of the Veda that describe the items employed in the sacrifice are designated as mantra i.e., *tacchodakeṣu mantrākhyā* (तच्चोदकेषु मन्त्राख्या) explains the role played by Mantra in the sacrifice. (Bh.S.II-1-32) In this sūtra 'tat' refers to the sacrificial items. Codaka means describe or convey. The hymns are employed in the sacrifice to describe the deity, *dravya* i.e., the offering, and the procedure etc. These hymns contain a reference to these items and in a way announce the performance of these as and when these are performed in the sacrifice. It is a kind of running commentary on the process of the sacrifice.

Since these hymns serve this observable purpose, these need not be considered as *aḍṣṭārtha*.

After defining the Mantra in general Jaimini defines the hymns of three Vedas viz., Rik, yajus and Sāman separately.

- i) The hymns that are in the metrical form are Rks.

ii) The hymns that are in prose form are yajus.

iii) The hymns that are sung with musical notes are Sāmans. The very Rks of Rgveda are sung with musical notes.

An important point to be noted is that these hymns should be recited only at that place and that time when the particular item announced by these hymns takes place. If the item is sifted to another place on appropriate grounds, the hymn concerned also should be recited at that place. For instance, the recitation of puṣanumantraṇa is sifted from darśapūrṇamāsa to pūṣayāga. Another point to be noted is that the words in the hymns should be taken in their primary sense only.

Nigadas i.e., statements of addressing such as 'Indra! āgaccha' 'agnīda! agnīn vihara' (इन्द्र! आगच्छ अग्निद! अग्नीन् विहर) are included under yajus. These are not separate group.

Ūha i.e., substituted words viz., Sūrya for Agni in vikṛti yāga, pravara i.e., recitation of the names of three sages, and nāmadheya i.e., the titles of the sacrifice are not a part of the hymn.

For the convenience of the understanding the hymns of both Rgveda and Yajurveda are

grouped into twenty eight groups on the basis of the subject described in them.

The hymns gain authoritativeness as they describe the deity, dravya etc performed at the sacrifice and contribute to the generation of apūrva. This is a general ground for their prāmāṇya. Mīmāṃsā bālaprakāśa quotes, the views of Pārthasārathi. Bhaṭṭanārāyaṇa and Someśvara in respect of the prāmāṇya of Mantras.

i) According to Pārthasārathi, the hymns that are employed to convey the main and auxiliary relations by śruti līṅga etc are to be considered as padārthas that get associated with mahāvākya of prayogavidhi by the process of vākyaika vākyaṭā. In this way they contribute to apūrva and attain the status of prāmāṇya.

ii) According to Bhaṭṭa Nārāyaṇa, the above explanation will make them pramāṇa as padārthas like vṛhi etc articles but not as Śabda-pramāṇa. Hence, their prāmāṇya has to be based on yathārthya like Smṛti.

iii) According to Bhaṭṭa Someśvara regular prāmāṇya has to be granted to Mantras. He mentions a number of contingencies that require prāmāṇya for mantras.

(i) the deity is envisaged for a sacrifice on the basis of the mention of a deity in the hymn (ii) the use of ātmanepada in the hymn shows the relation of the item concerned to yajamāna. (iii) The order of certain items in the mantra supercedes the order mentioned in brāhmaṇa (iv) The paśu mentioned in a general way is taken as chāga i.e. goat, as it is mentioned in mantravarna. (v) Ūha i.e. substitution is made for the words in mantra, all these will be possible only if the words of the mantra are taken as conveying the meaning and the regular prāmānya is assigned.

Even the hymns that are utilised for japa i.e. holy repetition of sacred words convey the meaning as all hymns are declared as praising pariplava as per the statement i.e. sarvāḥ rcaḥ sarvāṇi yajūṁśi vacastomam' pāriplavam prasamsanti (सर्वाः ऋचः सर्वाणि यजूंषि वचष्टोमं पारिप्लवं प्रशंसन्ति).

From the above discussion, it is clear that the mantras play an important role in the programme of the sacrifice.

Nāmadheya

Nāmadheya is considering certain words in the injunctive statement as a title of the sacrifice.

Certain words in the injunctive statements are

considered as nāmadheya i.e. titles, on four grounds. We will notice the same below.

i) Matvarthalakṣaṇabhayāt (मत्त्वर्थलक्षणभयात्) i.e. to avoid assigning the secondary meaning to the word by taking it in the sense of matvartha.

e.g. 'Udbhidā yajeta paśukāmaḥ' (उद्भिदा यजेत पशुकामः)

A person desiring to have paśu should perform a sacrifice with udbhit i.e. sprout of a plant.

Here, both the enjoining of a yāga for obtaining a paśu and the enjoining sprout as an auxiliary to yāga cannot be conceived, since, it will result in vākyabheda i.e. that is to say, one statement being taken as two injunctions. To avoid this if the word 'udbhid' is taken in the secondary sense udbhidvat envisaging matup suffix to it and the injunction is treated as viśiṣṭavidhi i.e. an injunction that enjoins a complex of the sacrifice and an auxiliary of it together, then, its primary meaning will have been given up. Resorting to secondary meaning should be avoided as far as possible. Hence, it is better to take the word udbhid as the name of the sacrifice rather than an auxiliary of yāga and try to enjoin both. If both are enjoined matvartha lakṣaṇā cannot be avoided.

Here, a question is raised that matvartha lakṣaṇā is accepted by Mīmāṃsakas in the instance of 'Somena yajeta' (सोमेन यजेत) envisaging it as 'somavatā yogen iṣtam bhavayet' (सोमवता यागेन इष्ट भावयेत्) and viśiṣṭavidhi i.e. an injunction of the complex of the sacrifice and its auxiliary is accepted. Therefore, why not follow the same procedure here.

This objection is answered by pointing out that the word soma is a rūdha word, that is to say, its meaning is fixed by long usage. Therefore, it cannot be taken as a name of the sacrifice while the word udbhid i.e. sprout, can be etymologically explained as an act of sprouting and can be applied as a name to a sacrifice that sprouts the result. Hence, the two cases are different.

Vākyabheda bhayāt (वाक्यभेदभयात्) i.e. to avoid one statement leading to two injunctions.

e.g. Citrayā yajeta paśukāmaḥ (चित्रया यजेत पशुकामः). He who desires paśu should perform the yāga with citrā.

Here, the yāga with citrā as auxiliary cannot be enjoined. The Yāga is already enjoined with a number of other auxiliaries such as dadhi, madhu, gḥṛtam, dhāna etc. The auxiliary citra for yāga and yāg for the result cannot be enjoined, since,

this will result in vākyabheda i.e. taking one statement as two injunctions. Therefore, the word citrā should be taken as a title of the yāga and the yāga for the result only be enjoined.

The difference between the earlier and this example is that in the earlier example there was scope for avoiding vākyabheda by resorting to matvarthalakṣaṇā. However, matvartha lakṣaṇā being equally a drawback, it was avoided by considering the word udbhid as a title of the sacrifice. But in this example, there is no scope for viśiṣṭavidhi by resorting to matvartha lakṣaṇā, since, the yāga is already enjoined with certain other auxiliaries. Hence, the only way out is to enjoin the auxiliary citrā for yāga and yāga for the result. This will result in vākyabheda. This is avoided by considering the word citra as a title of yāga.

The common point of these two instance is that a word that appears to convey an auxiliary is considered as a nāmadheya i.e. the title of the sacrifice.

Tatprakhyā śāstrāt (तत् प्रख्या शास्त्रात्) i.e. since the required auxiliary is already enjoined.

e.g. 'Agnihotram juhōti' here the word agnihotra cannot be taken either in the sense that the

sacred fire is a place for offering or the deity Agni for whom the offering is to be made, since both these are already enjoined. Hence, the word agnihotra has to be taken as a name of the sacrifice.

If the compound word agnihotram is explained as agnau hotram taking the word agni in the locative case suffix it refers to the sacred fire as a place for offering. On the other hand if it is taken as agnaye hotram taking the word agni in the dative case it refers to the deity agni for whom the offering is to be made. However, these two viz. āhavanīya fire and Agni deity are already enjoined by other injunctions. Therefore the word Agnihotra cannot be taken as enjoining one or both of these two. Hence, it has to be taken as a namadheya i.e. the title.

iv) tadvyapadeśāt (तद्व्यपदेशात्) i.e. as it is stated as upamāna.

e.g. 'Śyenena abhicaran yajeta' (श्येनेनाभिचरन् यजेत)
A person who desires to destroy his enemy should perform śyenayāga.

Here, the question is raised whether the word śyena refers to the object i.e. bird, to be offered or it is only a name of the sacrifice. In the arthavāda given for this injunction there is a

comparison of the act of śyena bird with the result of this sacrifice. If the śyena bird itself is the object to be offered the comparison should have been with something else. Hence, the word śyena should not be taken in the sense of śyena bird as the object of offering but only as a name of the sacrifice.

Conclusion

In the above presentation of the central theme of Pūrvamīmāṃsā i.e. Dharma, an attempt is made to cover all important aspects of the performance of the sacrifice, following the plan of Jaimini sūtras and Śābara bhāṣya. The Sūtra, and Bhāṣya go into many details of each aspect. It will be tedious to the readers who are not regular students of Pūrvamīmāṃsa to be lost into these details. To cut down the details fully also will not help the readers. They have to have a fairly good understanding of the plan and purpose of the sacrificial programme and the various aspect of it. Therefore, a middle path is followed in this presentation.

Another feature of the presentation is that the technical terms of pūrvamīmāṃsā are sparingly used with an explanation of their import in English. Many of the technical terms cannot be translated in English. Moreover, a student of pūrvamīmāṃsā has

to familiarise himself with a few technical terms and mīmāṃsā vocabulary. Otherwise he will not be able to grasp the spirit of mīmāṃsā thought.

Apart from the sacrificial programme, there are some social and ethical aspects of the mīmāṃsa thought. While discussing the question of eligibility, the eligibility for women and śūdras is raised. On this question some critical observations are made.

Similarly while discussing śyena yāga the question of the difference between the killing a goat at the sacrifice and killing an enemy by a sacrifice is raised. Why one is dharma and the other is adharma is raised. Both are enjoined by vedic injunction. In this connection attention is drawn to the expression artha i.e. that which leads to the welfare, in the definition of dharma.

Many other interesting topics like the quantum and distribution of dakṣiṇā i.e. fee to the priests, the question as to when a representative is allowed, a substitute is allowed etc. are also discussed.

On going through this essay the reader will not only understand the methodology adopted for the organisation of the sacrifice but he will also realise that this methodology can be successfully applied to any other programme organisation.



73. Śrī Śaṅkara and Pūrvamīmāṃsā

Both pūrvamīmāṃsā and Vedānta derive their tenets from Vedas. Pūrvamīmāṃsā derives its tenets mostly from Brāhmaṇa portions while Vedānta derives from Upaniṣads. Therefore, both are interested in the interpretation of Vedas. Pūrvamīmāṃsā has evolved certain guidelines for the interpretation of Vedas. These are mostly accepted by Vedānta. However, their central doctrine and the goal are different. Pūrvamīmāṃsā is concerned with Dharma, i.e., ritual programmes, while Vedānta is concerned with Brahman. Therefore, they differ in respect of their goal and the means to achieve it.

Śaṅkara refers to Pūrvamīmāṃsā by the name Prathamatantra, Pūrvakāṇḍa, Pramāṇa-lakṣaṇa etc. He refers to Śābarasvāmin and Upavarṣa. He utilises the Pūrvamīmāṃsā guidelines of interpretation such as Upakrama, Upasamhāra etc. and also śruti, liṅga etc. He quotes Pūrvamīmāṃsā Nyāyas. Brahmasūtrakāra himself refers to Jaimini. Many Pūrvamīmāṃsā terms and the names of sacrifices like Agnihotra, Dvādaśāha etc. are referred to in Brahmasūtra. But in respect of the central doctrine and the goal Vedānta differs from Pūrvamīmāṃsā. Some of their differences are fundamental in the areas of epistemology,

metaphysics, and ethics. Śaṅkara discusses these in his Brahmasūtrabhāṣya and Upaniṣad-bhāṣyas. It is not possible to collect the entire material in this respect in one paper and analyse the same. Therefore, some crucial points that deserve special attention are noticed in this paper.

In the very introduction to his Brahmasūtrabhāṣya, i.e., Adhyāśabhāṣya, Śrī Śaṅkara raises the question as to what is the scope of the authority of Vedic injunctions, prohibitions etc. that constitute the source of authority for the Dharma of Pūrvamīmāṃsā. He clearly states that these are authoritative within the field of Avidyā as in the case of perception, inference and other pramāṇas. The knowledge of Dharma, i.e., ritual programmes, given by Vedic injunctions, prohibitions etc. is not helpful to achieve Brahmajñāna; on the contrary it is opposed to Brahmajñāna as it involves the differentiation of agent, object, results etc. The ritual programme of Pūrvamīmāṃsā falls within the field of Avidyā and therefore, that portion of Veda that conveys this has authority only within that field.

The question of the difference in the scope and the objective of Pūrvamīmāṃsā and Vedānta is again raised under the first Sūtra while discussing the import of atha.

Atha means after. This raises the point after what? Śrī Śaṅkara clearly states that it cannot be taken as 'after karmajñāna or dharmajñāna'. In support of this stand he gives three reasons:

(1) The object of enquiry of Pūrvamīmāṃsā and Vedānta are different and unrelated. Dharma and Brahman. constitute the object of enquiry of these two respectively. These are not related as main and subordinate so as to warrant a consideration of one after the other. No such sequence is warranted on any other ground also. One can undertake the enquiry of Brahman before Dharmajñāna or after it, or even without it, since Dharmajñāna is irrelevant for Brahmajñāna. In fact, it is opposed to it.

(2) The goals of the two are different. Dharma is meant for the prosperity within the field of avidyā while Brahmajñāna is intended to cross over avidyā.

(3) The nature of Dharma is such that it has to be performed while that of Brahman is to be realised. Further, Dharma has to be accomplished in future while Brahman is ever present. Therefore the two are totally different and unrelated. Thus Śrī Śaṅkara clearly demarcates the areas of Pūrvamīmāṃsā and Vedānta.

Under Janmādhikaraṇa (I.1-2) another interesting point is mentioned in respect of Dharma and

Brahmajñāna. Śruti is the source and it communicates Dharma. Whatever śruti informs us as Dharma that has to be taken as Dharma and performed. But in case of Brahman śruti has to lead to the experience. It is the experience or the realisation of Brahmanhood that is important. As Dharma is communicated through verbal communication, the classification of communicated matter as injunction, prohibition, etc. is possible and meaningful. The arrangement as general, exception, and alternate is also possible and meaningful. But in case of Brahmajñāna the process of communication does not end by mere verbal communication, it has to lead to the experience and realisation. Therefore, Brahmajñāna is definitive. Further, Dharmajñāna is of the nature of Parokṣajñāna (mediate knowledge) while Brahmajñāna is aparokṣajñāna. (immediate knowledge).

Here an important epistemological point is made. According to advaita Vedānta, even verbal communication can lead to direct perception. The example that is generally quoted to bring home this point is 'adaśamaḥ tvam asi.' (अदशमस्त्वमसि) The Śruti passage 'atat tvam asi' (अतत्त्वमसि) leads to such direct perception. Thus śruti helps to obtain the experience or realisation of Brahman. As soon as śruti leads one to such an experience its

purpose is over. This is how the śruti that belongs to the field of avidyā enables one to cross over Avidyā.

It is in the Samanvaya-adhikaraṇa (I.1-4) that an issue on which Pūrvamīmāṃsā and Vedānta fundamentally differ is discussed.

The Mīmāṃsā holds that the Vedas communicate only in terms of injunction. No passage that does not communicate an injunction or something that is connected with it can be considered authoritative. Therefore, Brahman as such cannot be communicated by Vedas. However, if the passages that refer to Brahman are construed as injunctions of meditation, then, Brahman can be treated as communicated as an object of an injunction. Another way of getting Brahman communicated through vedic passages is to treat these passages as conveying a deity connected with the rituals. In any case Brahman alone cannot be communicated without relating it with an injunction. No Vedic passage is meaningful or authoritative unless it conveys an injunction.

This position of Mīmāṃsā is not acceptable to Vedānta.

Śrī Śaṅkara refers to a number of śruti passages that refer to Brahman but do not contain any

injunction. From this it is clear that Brahman as such can be communicated without injunction.

Śrī Śaṅkara also rejects the plea that Brahman can at least be treated as an object of the injunction to know it. The contention of those who somehow want to bring the communication of Brahman within the scope of an injunction is that the Vedic communication should lead to either Pravṛtti or Nivṛtti i.e. that is to say, either prompting to undertake something or to withdraw from something. This can be managed only by injunctions and prohibitions. Descriptive passages do not prompt either undertaking or withdrawing. Therefore, the passages that describe Brahman have to be treated as injunctions to know Brahman. In some of the passages that deal with Brahman injunctive verbs and potential participles are employed.

This contention is not acceptable to Vedānta. It is not necessary that every passage should lead to Pravṛtti or Nivṛtti. Nor it is necessary that either upādeya or heya be communicated. Brahman is neither upādeya nor heya. Brahmahood is ever present. It neither needs obtaining nor rejecting. It has to be only realised. Therefore, mere communication of it so as to enable to realise it is sufficient. No injunction to know it is necessary.

Knowledge is not an activity. For instance, the knowledge of the fire as fire is not an activity. Therefore, it cannot be enjoined. It can only arise. The verbs in potential mood, and potential participles in some of the Vedic passages that communicate Brahman are intended to communicate the withdrawal from other objects rather than enjoining to know Brahman. It is the cessation of all activity that is a precondition of Brahmajñāna. As regards the statement of Jaimini to the effect that no Vedic passage that does not communicate an injunction is meaningful or authoritative, it applies only to such passages as do not communicate Brahman. In conclusion Śrī Śaṅkara remarks that if Brahman were also to be communicated through codanā or an injunction, it would have been a sub-topic of Dharma and no separate treatment of Brahman enquiry would have been necessary.

The above discussion makes it clear that Mimāṃsā and Vedānta fundamentally differ on the issue of the mode of verbal communication. Their respective stands are very vital to their respective doctrinal positions. This issue of the mode of verbal communication has been a major issue in Indian epistemology. These two theories of verbal communication are known as kāryavyutpatti and siddhavyutpatti theories. Apart from Advaita

Vedānta a few other systems also go by siddhavyutpatti theory. But the special point of Advaita in verbal communication is that it can lead to direct experience or immediate experience. The passages like 'tat tvam asi' (तत् त्वमसि) lead to immediate experience or realisation of Brahman according to Advaita.

The problem of the relative position of Karma and Jñāna in achieving human goal has been a matter of controversy between Mīmāṃsakas and Vedāntins. Mīmāṃsakas are reluctant to give an independent position to jñāna in this respect while Vedāntins consider karma only a sahakārin for jñāna but not a direct means for achieving final goal. This point is raised under many adhikaraṇas of Brahmasūtras and Vedāntin's position is made clear by Śrī Śaṅkara.

Under Kartradhikaraṇa and Takṣādhikaraṇa (II.3.33-40 and II.3.40) the very basic question whether Jīva is Agent or not, and if he is an Agent, whether his Agency is real or super-imposed is raised. Śrī Śaṅkara agrees that Jīva is agent but he states that this agency is not real but it is super-imposed. Jīva is Agent within the field of Avidyā. When he crosses the bound of Avidyā he has no separate identity and therefore, there is no question of any Agency.

The Vedas issue injunctions and prohibitions. These will be meaningful only when there is an Agent to translate them into action. Therefore, Jīva has got to be an Agent. At the same time, his true nature is, i.e. he is nityaśuddhabuddhamukta-svabhāva. (नित्यशुद्धबुद्धमुक्तस्वभाव) Therefore, there cannot be any real Agency on the part of Jīva. These two positions can be reconciled only by envisaging super imposed agency on the part of Jīva. This stand of Vedānta naturally relegates the entire sacrificial activity of Mīmāṃsakas to the field of Avidyā.

That the Vedic injunctions are meant for avidvān, while the Vedic teachings of Brahman or Ātmaikya are meant for vidvān is another way of putting the same thing.

Śrī Śaṅkara points out that the Vedic injunctions do not cause the real Agency but only enjoin certain duties with reference to the Agency that is there. It is irrelevant for this purpose whether such an Agency is real or super-imposed.

Under Puruṣārthādhikaraṇa (III.4-1-17) the question whether jñāna is an independent and direct means of puruṣārtha or subordinate to karma is specifically raised. Mīmāṃsakas naturally take the view that it is subordinate to karma. Ātman is the

agent to perform karmas. Therefore, he is connected with Karma. Hence, Ātmajñāna is also connected with the karma. Therefore, whatever it achieves that is achieved through karma only. It has no independent goal. The results of Ātmajñāna such as freedom from sorrow etc. that are mentioned over and above the results of karma are only of Arthavāda nature. That is why it is found that even brahmajñānins like Janaka took to karma. It is specifically stated in śruti passages like 'āyadeva vidyayā karoti tadeva vīryavattaraṁ bhavati.' (आयदेव विद्यया करोति तदेव वीर्यवत्तरं भवति) This clearly shows only the supporting role of jñāna. Passages like 'akurvanneveha karmāṇi' (अकुर्वन्नेवेहकर्माणि) make the performance of karma obligatory. Therefore, the Mīmāṃsakas argue that jñāna is not an independent means of Puruṣārtha.

This contention of Mīmāṃsakas is opposed in Puruṣārthādhikaraṇa. By Ātman the Mīmāṃsakas have understood saṃsārī Ātman here. He is, no doubt, connected with karma as Agent. But when śruti talks of Ātmajñāna it is Paramātman who is bereft of Agency etc. who is meant. He is not connected with karma not subordinate to karma. Therefore, Ātmajñāna in the sense of Brahmajñāna is nor subordinate to karma. It is an independent means of Puruṣārtha.

Here, by Puruṣārtha Mīmāṃsakas understand, svarga etc., while Vedāntin understands liberation. Therefore, for Mīmāṃsaka karma is the means for svarga etc., while Jñāna may support karma to some extent. For Vedāntin it is jñāna that is the real means for liberation. Karma that involves the Agent, the object etc. i.e. bheda-prapañca, is actually opposed to liberation.

However, Vedāntins do accept Karma as saha-kārin to jñāna. This question is raised in Sarvāpekṣādhikaraṇa. It is true that jñāna is an independent and direct means to liberation. Karma does not directly contribute to this end but karma assists in obtaining knowledge through cittaśuddhi. Performance of Āśramakarmas and Nityakarmas does help to obtain cittaśuddhi and knowledge. This point is also discussed under Āśramakarmādhikaraṇa particularly under the Sūtra 'sahakāritvena ca' (III.4.33). Even kām्यakarma when performed bereft of kāmā does assist jñāna. Agnihotra and other nityakarmas are stated to be Ārādupakāraka to liberation under the Sūtra.

Vedāntins do not reject the utility of karma within the field of Avidyā. In fact they defend sacrifice within this field. Under the sūtra 'āsuddhamiti cet na śabdāt' (आशुद्धमिति चेत् न शब्दात्) performance of sacrifice and offering paśu in a

sacrifice is defended. The results to be obtained by sacrifice are accepted as valid within the field of Avidyā. But Karmas cannot lead to liberation. These also cannot prevent liberation once the knowledge is obtained. The knowledge will nullify the effects of the karmas. This point is discussed under Tadadhigamādhikaraṇa (तदधिगमाधिकरण) and Itarāsamśleṣādhikaraṇa (इतरसंश्लेषाधिकरण) (IV.1.13-14). The point raised here is : How can karmas remain without producing their result simply because one has obtained jñāna ? Karmas have the potency to produce their results and, therefore, they must lead to the respective results irrespective of one obtaining Ātmajñāna. This line of argument is not acceptable to Vedāntins. According to them Ātmajñāna cuts the very roots of karma. The notions of Kartṛtva and Bhokṛtva are the basis of karma. Ātmajñāna cuts these very notions and hence the effects of karma are nullified by jñāna.

Finally, the Vedāntins do not accept the Mimāṃsaka's contention that karma leads to its results through Apūrva. The very concept of Apūrva is not acceptable to Vedāntins.

This question is raised under Phalādhikaraṇa (III.2.38-41). Here, the question whether karma leads to its results or Īśvara bestows the results of karma is raised. Mimāṃsakas take the view that

karma produces Apūrva which ultimately leads to the results. This view is rejected here. Apūrva being jaḍa (non-intelligent) cannot lead to the results by itself. The concept of apūrva in between karma and its results is not warranted since Īśvara bestows the result taking into account the karmas of jīvas. This is probably the biggest blow to the Mīmāṃsakas. Though early Mīmāṃsakas are silent about Īśvara, later Mīmāṃsakas like Kumārila do accept Īśvara. Therefore, they cannot argue that since there is no Īśvara, Apūrva is necessary.

Under Devatādhikaraṇa (I.3.26-33) an interesting point on which Vedānta and Mīmāṃsā differ is raised. Mīmāṃsakas are of the opinion that the deities have no vigraha or form. Mīmāṃsakas do not accept vigraha or form to the deities for two reasons :

(1) Many persons will be performing the same sacrifice at different places at the same time. It would be difficult for

Indra and other deities to be present at all places if they have vigraha or form.

(2) The forms of the deities, if any, will be perishable. The deities are mentioned in Vedas. The Vedic words and their meanings are eternally connected. However, if one of them, say, meaning

is perishable, then the very relation between the Vedic word and its meaning will be perishable. This will ultimately affect the very doctrine of Vedanityatva.

This line of argument is not acceptable to Śrī Śaṅkara. One and the same deity can assume many forms and be present at all sacrifices wherever he is involved at the same time. Further, it is not their physical presence that is necessary. The offerings are meant for them wherever they are.

As regards the second reason, Śrī Śaṅkara makes it clear that the meaning of words is not vyakti but ākṛti.²² Ākṛti is nitya. Therefore, even if Indravvyakti is perishable Ākṛti is not perishable. Hence, neither the nityatva of the relation between word and meaning is affected nor Vedanityatva is affected.

Incidentally Śrī Śaṅkara discusses two other important questions here :

(1) Whether there is any need to accept the doctrine of sphoṭa or varṇas constitute a word.

(2) What is exactly meant when it is stated that the whole world arises from Śabda? He rejects the concept of sphoṭa and subscribes to the Mīmāṃsā view that varṇas constitute word. In this connection, he quotes the views of Upavarṣa who had

commented on both Mīmāṃsāsūtras and Vedāntasūtras. As regards the second point, Śrī Śāṅkara points out that when it is stated that the world arises from 'śabda,' it is not intended to convey their upādāna upādeya-bhāva (उपादान-उपादेय-भाव) (relation) as in the case of Brahman and the world but it only means that words connote the objects. The problems of Vedanīyatva and Vedāpauruṣeyatva are also discussed under this Adhikaraṇa. Vedānta supports Pūrvamīmāṃsā on these two issues.

The Pūrvamīmāṃsā guidelines to determine the purport of a śruti passage viz. Upakrama, Upasaṃhāra etc. tātparyaliṅgas are fully utilised by Śrī Śāṅkara all along his Brahmasūtrabhāṣya and Upaniṣadbhāṣyas. Sūtrakāra himself mentions these in his sūtras. In many cases the agreement between Upakrama and Upasaṃhāra is utilised to determine the purport of a passage. Abhyāsa and Apūrvatā are shown to determine the purport in a few cases.

Śruti, Liṅga, Vākya etc., the guidelines for determining the meaning, are also utilised. The Jaimini-Sūtra that states the relative priority of these is quoted in Liṅgabhūyastvādhikaraṇa (लिङ्गभूयस्त्वाधिकरण) (III.3.44) But there is one important difference in the application of these between Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta. In Mīmāṃsā these

are aṅgatvanirṇāyaka while in Vedānta these are arthanirṇāyaka.

Mīmāṃsā guidelines of karmabheda are utilised to decide saṃuṇopāsana vidyābheda (सगुणोपासन-विद्याभेद). The Jaiminisūtra that lays down these guidelines is quoted in Śabdādibhedādhikaraṇa (III.3.58). The guidelines for determining some vidyās that are mentioned in more than one śākhā as one Vidyā, and sifting the material from one śākhā to another śākhā in case of such vidyās are also utilised. It is stated that just as Dravya and Devatā constitute the central point of a sacrifice the object to be meditated upon constitutes the central point of a saṃuṇopāsana vidyā. The passages that describe upāsanaś like Udgīthopāsanaś are treated as injunctions. Even the distinctions like yajamāna-karma and Ṛtvikkarma are introduced in the case of some saṃuṇopāsanaś. Thus, the Mīmāṃsā technique and terminology are considerably utilised in Vedānta. So far as the field of Avidyā is concerned the Pūrvamīmāṃsā programme is a respectable field of activity. But when it comes to the stage of Brahmajñāna and realisation of Ātmaikyā the ritual programme stands rejected.



74. Nyāyavaiśeṣika and Pūrvamīmāṃsā

Consider both space and time as primary and categories of being. These are considered as eternal entities. The experiences past, future, etc are due to the conditioning factors of creation of an object, occurrence of an event, initiation of an action etc. Similarly the demarcation of space as east, west etc is also due to the conditioning factors of the position of Sun. Thus the space and time that are eternal and primary categories of being, serve the purpose of practical usage of past, present, future and east, west etc under certain conditions. The eternal aspect as well as the conditioned aspects are real. Space and time are all pervasive in the sense that these are co-extensive with the entire matter, all events, and actions. The term used for all pervasiveness in this sense is a newly coined term i.e. Vibhu. The expressions Ananta (eternal) aparichchinna (boundary-less) are not used. The terms Dik and Kāla are used for space and time respectively. The term Ākāśa used in Nyāyavaiśeṣika in the sense of a substance that is the locus of Śabda or sound. It is not used in the sense of space. In Pūrvamīmāṃsā it is used in the sense of a substance that is the very evolute of Śabda. The term Ākāśa is not used in the sense of space in both the systems. As regards the

epistemological process of the experience of space and time, Nyāyavaiśeṣika considers both of them as inferred. But Mīmāṃsā holds that both are perceived through senses. Each sense along with the object perceived groups space and time also according to Pūrvamīmāṃsā. In the Sāṃkhya systems there are two views prevalent in this respect. 1. One view is, there are no space and time at all either as separate categories of being or as aspects of Prakṛti or matter. Beyond the so called conditions of space and time there are no space and time. As such Prakṛiti or primordial matter undergoes its course of evolution. Objects, events, activities occur. These occurrences involve the notion of extension and duration. Beyond these occurrences there is no such entity or aspect such as space or time. This is one view.

2. The other view is there are two levels of space and time viz. Akhaṇḍa one continuous block of space, and one block time, Sakhaṇḍa divisible space and time the first one's are the aspects of prakṛti or primordial matter, the second are the comprehension of Ākāśa under certain conditions. The conditions are same as stated by Nyāyavaiśeṣikas. For the divisibility of space & time. The first view viz there are no space and time at all is very revolutionary. Sāṃkhya hold the

evolution theory of causation. In this theory the evolution and change involve extension and duration as a part of the very process of evolution and therefore, there is no need to consider them as separate entities or separate aspects. These extensions and durations marked as east, west etc or as past, present etc under certain conditions given rise to the notions of space and time, in day to day life. Strictly speaking there are no such separate entities or separate aspects. The second view of Akhaṇḍakāla or Sakhaṇḍakāla is held by Vijñānabhikṣu a later Sāṃkhya writer who is not always faithful to Sāṃkhya tradition. His Akhaṇḍakāla is not a separate entity but only an aspect of it is same as Nyāyavaiśeṣika concept of Kāla accepting prakṛti. That it is not a separate entity. The Sakhaṇḍakāla follows the pattern of Nyāyavaiśeṣika concept of Sopādhikāla. But an important point is that the three concepts of dik, kāla and Ākāśa are brought under one viz. Ākāśa. Another point to be noted is both Akhaṇḍa and Sakhaṇḍa are real. The Sāṃkhya the Nyāyavaiśeṣika and Mīmāṃsa are realists. Therefore, they will consider both eternal space and time, and the conditioned space and time, and the conditioned space and time as real. Since Sāṃkhya has only one primary category of matter viz. prakṛti or primordial matter, the eternal space

and time are either ruled out or treated as its aspects. The sakhaṇḍa or conditioned space and time are considered as derived states of Ākāśa which itself is derived. Nyāya-vaiśeṣika and Mīmāṃsā admit more than one primary and separate category of matter. Therefore, they have no difficulty in accepting space and time as separate and primary categories. Thus, it is clear that their respective metaphysical positions have influenced their concepts of space and time.

Among the Vedānta schools, Dvaita and Viśiṣṭādvaita are realist schools. These two schools aspect prakṛti or primordial matter as a basic category of being so far as the matter is conceded. However, Dvaita considers space as a separate category and treats time as a category derived from prakṛti. On the other hand Viśiṣṭādvaita considers time as a separate category and considers space as a category derived from Prakṛti. The name given to space in Dvaita is Avyakritsa. This is of the nature of a great void. East, west etc are its natural aspects are not caused by any conditioning factors nor mere appearances. Talking of east west etc with reference to the position of sun is merely a device of convenience. These are relative statements and may vary from situation to situation like the

relative expression father and son. The natural east, west, etc are fixed and natural. Thus diks are natural divisions of Avyākṛtākāśa or space according to Dvaita. In Viśiṣṭādvaita Ākāśa which is an evolute of Śabda also serves the purpose of space. They hold that there no need to hold dik and Ākāśa as two separate entities. Ākāśa can serve both the purpose of being a base for sound, and being space.

Kāla or time is a primary and separate category of being. There are two levels of time Akhaṇḍa and Sakhaṇḍa. The former is eternal and all pervasive. The latter is derived from the former under certain conditions. Time is perceived through the senses.

Dvaita does not accept Akhaṇḍakāla or time has divisions such as Kṣaṇa, lava etc. There is a beginningless and endless flow or succession of these moments. This flow of time is eternal. The moments of time are derived from prakṛti or primordial matter. Each moment is all pervasive. But it is not eternal. Every moments perishes. What is eternal is, the successions of these moments. This view of time postulates three important points.

1. Time is derived from prakṛti or primordial matter.
2. Time is endless flow of moments
3. Each moment is all pervasive during its presence

and perishes to make room for the next moment. From these points it is clear that time or duration is envisaged as a close associate of continuous evolution of primordial matter. Its demarcation, of course, can be worked out with reference to the occurrence of events, objects, actions etc.

In Advaita also two views are held in respect of space and time. According to one view, these two are the effects of Avidyā and according to the other these are aspects of Avidyā. There is also a view that it is an aspect of Brahman. In Advaita, since Avidya and its effects are not real, time and space are not real. This is only from ultimate stand point. So far as empirical affairs are concerned. These have empirical or practical reality.

From the above brief sketch of the concept of space and time in Indian philosophy, the following points emerge;

1. Early Sāṃkhya does not accept space and time at all either as separate entities or as aspects of matter.

2. Nyāya Vaiśeṣika, and Pūrvamīmāṃsā consider space and time as separate and primary categories of being.

3. Dvaita considers space as separate category

and time as a derivative of prakṛti while viśiṣṭādvaita considers time as a separate category and space as a derivative of prakṛti.

4. Advaita considers both space and time as the aspects Avidya. Later Sāṃkhyā also considers these as aspects of prakṛti.

5. Dvaita considers time as a flow or succession of moments. These moments perish but their succession is eternal.

A re-appraisal of these postulates in the light of modern make take the implications of these implication nearer the modern thought and even help to chisel modern thought.



75. The concept of Mokṣa in Pūrvamīmāṃsā

The study of the concept of Mokṣa has to cover three areas viz. i) The nature of the liberated state ii) The means of liberation iii) The result of the liberation.

The nature of liberated state is envisaged in three ways i) A state of supreme bliss ii) A state of complete absence of sorrow

iii) A state of the absence of both bliss and sorrow.

The vedānta schools adopt the first view. Nyāya adopts the second view sāmkhya adopts the third view. The third state is known as Kaivalya state.

There is no difficulty in considering the first view of Mokṣa as Puruṣārtha i.e. the goal life. All living beings like to be happy. These will strive to achieve happiness. The second view also claims that its concept of Mokṣa is Puruṣārtha. They argue that no amount of happiness or bliss will satisfy man. He will go on seeking more and more. As there is no end to it he will be unhappy.

Therefore, blissfulness or happiness cannot be a satisfying goal of life for man. On the other hand freedom from sorrow can be a better goal of life.

The third view of Mokṣa viz. the absence of both happiness and sorrow also claims that its concept of Mokṣa can be Puruṣārtha i.e. the goal of life. To undergo the pain and pleasure is a routine matter. These experiences cannot be avoided so long as one is involved in worldly activities. Therefore, man longs for the freedom from both these. The experiences of pleasure and pain is bhoga while freedom from these is apavarga.

These three views give psychological dimension of the concept of Mokṣa. Mokṣa has mystical, spiritual, ethical and even easthetic dimensions.

II

The Mimāṃsā concept of Mokṣa comes under the third category. Pārthasārathi describes the state of Mokṣa as 'svastha', state i.e. remaining unto himself. The original nature of ātmā consists of the potency of cognition, and existence as a substance. At this stage not only the pleasure and pain are eliminated

but all other qualities such as desire, initiative, religious merit etc are also eliminated.

The vaiśeṣikas also describe the liberated state in the same way.

Pārthasārathi argues that there cannot be any

experience of bliss during the liberated state as there is no manas at that state. The bliss is not svaprakāśa, so as to provide its experience without the help of Manas. Further, if the bliss that is supposed to be experienced at the liberated state is same as that of sansāra state, then, it means sansāra has continued. If it is different and generated at the liberated state, then, this will not be permanent and enduring. This makes the very liberation a temporary state.

Further, mere presence of bliss will not make it a puruṣārtha. The ātman who is supposed to possess it should cognise it. However, there will not be any cognition during the liberated state.

Kumārīla also argues that if the enjoyment of bliss in the liberated is envisaged, then, it will be same as svarga and will be temporary.

III

Now, let us examine the means of liberation. In this respect; there are three main views viz., jñāna is the means of liberation

ii) Both Jñāna and Karma are the means of liberation iii) Karma nivṛtti i.e. withdrawal from the Karma is the means of liberation.

The nature of jñāna required for liberation differs

from school to school. The Vedānta schools go by Brahmajñāna. Sāṃkhyas go by Prakṛti-Puruṣa viveka jñāna. The Nyāya vaiśeṣikas go by padārtha tatva jñāna. Bhakti and Vairāgya are considered as supporting means in Vedānta. Vairāgya i.e. non-attachment to the worldly affairs is considered as a first step to seek freedom from worldly involvement by all.

Pūrvamīmāṃsā goes by the third view viz. withdrawal from the kāmya sacrificial activity and prohibited activities. However, it is not total withdrawal from Karma. Nitya and Naimittika Karmas have to be performed.

Pārthasārathi explains the process of the means of the liberation as follows :

i) The elimination of the pleasure and pain is achieved by the elimination of dharma and adharma.

ii) The dharma and adharmā already accrued to the credit of a person have to be eliminated by the experience of the consequences of the same.

iii) By withdrawing from the performance of kāmyakarmas the generation of dharma from these has to be stopped.

iv) By performing Nitya and Naimittika Karmas

and by avoiding the prohibited acts, the generation of adharma has to be prevented.

iv) When dharma and adharma are eliminated, there will be no ground for assuming further births. When the present body is left the ātman attains *svastha* state.

Mīmāṃsakas describe *prapañca sambandha* as *bandha* and *prapañcasambandhaviḥaya* (प्रपञ्चसम्बन्ध-विलय) as *mokṣa*. The body, senses and the objects constitute *prapañca*.

Getting rid of the contact with these three is liberation.

Suffering from the pleasure and pain by the contact with these three is bondage.

Mīmāṃsakas do not introduce the concept of *ajñāna* or *avidyā* as the basis of bondage, nor do they seek the help of *Jñāna* to get rid of it. They do not seek *paramātmajñāna* for liberation. However, they do mention *ātmajñāna*. The role of the *ātmajñāna* is stated in Mīmāṃsā terminology as *kratvartha*. The knowledge of ātman as distinct from the body enables a person to undertake the sacrifices that yield the results beyond this world and beyond this birth. In this way *ātmajñāna* is helpful to the sacrifice. Therefore, *ātmajñāna* is

kratvartha. Beyond this role, the ātmajñāna does not contribute to his liberation in any other way.

Ślokavārtika makes it clear.

The ātmajñāna referred to here is not Paramātmajñāna. It is the knowledge of the true nature of oneself. In tantravārtika on arthavādādhikaraṇam. Kumāriḷa makes it clear that the ātmajñāna described in Upaniṣads is kratvartha. Yetena kratvarthakartṛpratipādanadvāreṇa upaniṣadām nairākāṅkṣyam vyākhyātam. (एतेन क्रत्वर्थकर्तृ-प्रतिपादनद्वारेण उपनिषदां नैराकाङ्क्ष्यं व्याख्यातम्)

This ātmajñāna is not paramātmajñāna but svanityajñāna, dehādayatiriktajñāna (देहाद-व्यतिरिक्तज्ञान).

The paramātmajñāna is not introduced by Kumāriḷa as a requirement for the liberation in the sambandhākṣepa section of ślokavārtika.

IV

There is a controversy whether Mīmāṃsakas accept Īśvara are not. In any case the role normally assigned to Īśvara is not assigned to him by Mīmāṃsakas. The roles to assigned to Īśvara are :

- i) He is creator and destroyer of the world.
- ii) He is the author of Veda.

- iii) He is the bestower of the results of good or bad deeds.

For Mimāṃsakas Īśvara is not required for these purposes. In the context of Mokṣa also neither Īśvara, nor Īśvarajñāna has any role to play.

V

However, certain remarks of Kumāriḷa in Vyākaraṇādhikaraṇa give a different picture. In Vyākaraṇādhikaraṇa a question is raised whether employing the correct words is sufficient while using vedic language to perform dharma or the knowledge of the correctness of these words through Vyākaraṇa is a necessary requirement. It is concluded that the vedic words have to be used with the knowledge of their correctness through vyākaraṇa. Incidentally another question is raised whether the knowledge of the correctness itself is sufficient or the actual use of the words with the knowledge of their correctness is necessary. In this context Kumāriḷa remarks that correct knowledge of the words is merely a *sanskāra*. Therefore, it cannot lead to any result viz., dharma.

Stating this position of Jñāna, Kumāriḷa makes an exception in the case of ātmajñāna.

He further states that ātmajñāna is both

kratvartha and puruṣārtha. We have already noticed that it is kratvartha. But the idea that it is also puruṣārtha is introduced here. Kumāriḷa quotes Upaniṣadic passages like 'ya ātmā apahata pāpmā' (य आत्मा अपहतपाप्मा) 'satyakāmaḥ satyasankalpaḥ' (सत्यकामः सत्यसङ्कल्पः) 'sa anveṣṭavyaḥ sa jigñāsītavyaḥ' (स अन्वेष्टव्यः स जिज्ञासितव्यः) 'ātmā namupāsīta' (आत्मा नमुपासिते) etc. and says jigñāsāmananasahitātma-jñāna (जिज्ञासामननसहितात्मज्ञान) is enjoined here. Therefore, the abhyudaya stated in the śruti passages 'sa sarvān lokānāptoti, sarvān kāmān āpnoti' (स सर्वान् लोकानाप्नोति सर्वान् कामानाप्नोति) has to be brought here as a result of ātmajñāna. Similarly, niḥsreyasa stated in the passages like 'na sa punarāvartate' (न स पुनरावर्तते) indicating paramātmaprāpti has also to be brought here as a result of ātmajñāna. This ātmajñāna naturally is paramātmajñāna. This makes ātmajñāna a puruṣārtha. One and the same ātmajñāna can be both kratvartha and puruṣārtha as per the samyogaprathaktvanyāya (संयोगप्रत्यक्तवन्याय).

In this context Kumāriḷa raises another question whether considering ātmajñāna as a means for liberation comes in the way of Karma being the means of liberation. He answers that the purpose served by the two are different, the approach of the two is different, therefore both are required to achieve the liberation. One of them does not

supercede the other, these two cannot be considered as alternate means, nor as main and subordinate. Hence, these are the means of liberation without prejudice to each other.

In this account of the concept of liberation, Kumāriḷa makes two important additions viz. i) He introduces the concept that ātmajñāna as a means of Puruṣārtha and widens the scope of ātmajñāna to include paramātmajñāna. ii) He introduces the idea that jñāna is also a means of liberation.

From this it is clear that Kumāriḷa's concept of liberation has become positive here and it is closer to Vedānta concept.

The earlier account of Kumāriḷa's concept of liberation given in sambandhākṣepa section of ślokavārtika has been negative and closer to sāmkhya and vaiśeṣika concept of liberation. It is difficult to reconcile these two views.

The basic differences between these two positions are as under.

i) In the first account Kumāriḷa declares that in the liberated state the ātman remains in the svastha state, the dharma, adharma, etc. attributes are eliminated and he is without pain and pleasure. In the second account he states that ātman attains abhyudaya and niśreyasa.

All his desires will be fulfilled. Kumāriḷa quotes the Upaniṣadic passage *sarvān kāmānavāpnōti* (सर्वान् कामान् अवाप्नोति). This reveals that the nature of liberated state is quite different in the two accounts.

ii) In the first account he declares that withdrawal from Kāmya karmas and Niṣiddha karmas is the means of liberation. He does not mention jñāna as the means of liberation. In the second account he adds jñāna also as a means of liberation. This reveals that the means of liberation are quite different also in the two accounts.

iii) The concept of Puruṣārtha is not introduced in the first account while in the second account it is given a prominent place.

It may be noted that the first account is in a proper context while the second is merely an appendage in *vyākaraṇādhikaraṇa*.

Pārthasārathi gives a full exposition of the first account and merely mentions conclusion of the second account in *śāstra dipikā*.

In *nyāyaratnākara* he explains the expression *ātmajñānam* as *dvidvidham hi ātmajñānam dehād vivekajñānam*. *Upāsanātmakam jñānam*. He says the latter cannot be taken as *kratvartha*. It has to be treated as *Puruṣārtha*. He draws our attention to Kumāriḷa's observations in *Vyākaraṇādhikaraṇa*.

He is aware of the two accounts and makes room for the second account by this explanation of the term Ātmajñāna. However, the conflict between the two accounts is not resolved.

VI

The first account seems to be true to the general thinking of Mīmāṃsā school. Strictly speaking Mīmāṃsā is not interested in liberation. Performing karmas faithfully is a way of life as well as a goal of life for Mīmāṃsakas. The performance of Kāmyakarmas is voluntary and performance of nityanaimittikakarma's (नित्यनैमित्तिककर्म) is obligatory. A man should find fulfillment of his life in discharging these duties.

An active life is a way of life as well as a goal of life for Mīmāṃsakas. Probably, Mīmāṃsakas did not envisage the idea of liberation on their own. However, due to the impact of other systems of Indian philosophy and a general trend for the concept of liberation in Indian culture, they formulated the concept of liberation. They worked out its means in such a way that nityanaimittikakarma's are not given up till last, and not considered as a hindrance to the liberation. They did not see any charm in the liberation. They saw life as active and liberation as idle. The svastha

state described as liberated state is in a way an idle state. It is envisaged as an opposite of active life. That is why it is not stated as *puruṣārtha* in the first account. The *svastha* state may be claimed as *puruṣārtha* in the sense that it provides freedom from the routine life of pain and pleasure. As stated by Kumāriḷa himself, introducing the concept fulfilment of desire i.e. *abhyudaya* in liberation is designating *Svarga* itself as *Mokṣa*. Therefore Mīmāṃsaka's made it a state of freedom from the pain and pleasure of routine life. Mīmāṃsakas do not envisage any transcendental bliss as in *Vedānta*. Therefore, they envisaged the state of liberation as a state of complete rest which they designated as *svastha* state. Therefore, we may conclude that the first account of the concept of liberation given by Kumāriḷa fits better in Pūrvamīmāṃsā scheme. The second is probably given to be in tune with *Vedānta* thought.



76. Khaṇḍadeva's Bhāṭṭarahasya

I have great pleasure in associating myself by way of this small introduction with the publication of Bhāṭṭarahasya of Khaṇḍadeva with the commentary Khaṇḍadeva Bhāvaprakāśa newly written by Pandit Peri Suryanarayana Shastry of Rajamahendri.

Khaṇḍadeva's life and works :

Khaṇḍadeva himself informs us in his Bhāṭṭakaustubha that he is the son of Rudradeva. In his Bhāṭṭadīpikā he further informs that he was a desciple of Viśveśvara. This Viśveśvara is Gāgābhāṭṭa the author of Bhāṭṭachintāmaṇi. Jagannātha Pandita mentions that Khaṇḍadeva was the Guru of his father Perubhāṭṭa. Khaṇḍadeva refers to Śrī Appayya Dīkṣita as Mīmāṃsaka Mūrdhanya. From all these it is clear that Khaṇḍadeva was a younger contemporary of Śrī Appayya Dīkṣita and lived between 1575 A.D. to 1665 A.D. He seems to have assumed sannyāsa under the name Śrīdharendra in the last phase of his life. He was probably a Dākṣiṇātya.

Khaṇḍadeva has three works to his credit viz. Bhāṭṭakaustubha, Bhāṭṭadīpika and Bhāṭṭarahasya. Among these, Bhāṭṭakaustubha is an elaborate commentary on Jaimini Sūtras from second pāda of

first adhyāya upto Balābalādhikaraṇa of third pāda of third adhyāya. (I.2 to III.3.7). This work though appears incomplete covers all major issues of Pūrvamīmāṃsā occurring even in later chapters. His second work Bhāṭṭadīpikā is a running commentary on all twelve chapters covering all adhikaraṇas and interpreting all sūtras. Though it is modelled on Śāstradīpikā, Khaṇḍadeva, differs from Śāstradīpikā in a number of adhikaraṇas. A doubt is expressed regarding the genuineness of Tarkapāda portion of Bhāṭṭadīpikā (I.1) His disciple Śambhubhaṭṭa has not commented upon this portion while later commentaries viz., Bhāskarārya and Vancheśvara have commented upon the same. In his above two works on Mīmāṃsāsūtras Khaṇḍadeva set a new trend. He introduced pariṣkāra style of Navyanyāya. He criticises Bhāṣyakāra, Vārtikākāra and Pārthaśārathi Miśra in interpreting certain sūtras and differently interprets them. He also applies certain Pūrvamīmāṃsā maxims differently. Thus he initiated a Navīna school of Pūrvamīmāṃsā within Bhaṭṭa School, though it is not as fully developed as Navyanyāya or Navya Vyākaraṇa.

Bhāṭṭarahasya of Khaṇḍadeva

Khaṇḍadeva's third work i.e. Bhāṭṭarahasya is a unique work in a number of ways. It is exclusively

devoted to the discussion of the problems of syntax and semantics. These problems are discussed in Sanskrit under the heads Śabdabodha, Vākyaarthabodha, Vyutpatti etc. These problems are arranged under Vidhyārtha, Lakārārtha, Dhātvartha, Vibhāktiyārtha etc. and the specific import of each and their inter-relation with each other are fully discussed. The problem as to what is the unit of verbal communication? Whether it is a word of a sentence is elaborately discussed by Sanskrit linguists. Within a sentence the question whether it is a noun or verb that is the centre of semantic organisation is raised and heatedly discussed. The question whether verbal communication is optative or merely factual is discussed. Thus the entire range of the theory and practice of verbal communication is handled by Sanskrit linguists in the work especially written for this purpose. Bhāṭṭarahasya is one such work representing the views of Bhāṭṭa school of Pūrvamīmāṃsā.



77. Theories of Śābdabodha

The problems connected with Śābdabodha or Vākyaarthabodha are discussed right from Yāska's Nirukta. Pāṇini has incorporated certain special sūtras for this purpose. Patanjali discusses these issues elaborately. Bhartrihari's Vākyaapadīya which discusses the entire philosophy of language, naturally discusses these problems in its own way. Some of the Jaimini's sūtras deal with the problems in its own way. Some of the Jaimini's sūtras deal with the problems of semantics for interpreting certain vedic passages and to lay down certain general rules of interpretation. The Nyāya works also discuss these problems while dealing with Śābdapramāṇa. Verbal communication being a major source of knowledge in Indian tradition, and the interpretation of sacred texts being an important tool of such communication, Indian thinkers have bestowed a good deal of thought on the theory and practice of verbal communication. In this connection some major works exclusively devoted to this problem representing different theories were composed during 16th & 17th centuries. These are :

1. Manjūsā of Nāgeśabhaṭṭa and Bhūṣanasāra of Kaundabhaṭṭa representing vyākaraṇa views.

2. Vyutpattivāda of Gadādhara and Śabda Śakti Prakāśikā of Jagadīśa representing Nyāya views.

3. Bhāṭṭarahasya of Khaṇḍadeva representing Mimāṃsā views. Later, Padaratna, Vibhaktyarathanirṇaya (विभक्त्यर्थनिर्णय) etc. more works were written. It is in these works that the Śābdabodha theories of Nyāya, Vyākaraṇa and Mimāṃsa are fully discussed. Bhāṭṭarahasya holds a unique position among these works.

Nyāya theory of Śābdabodha

The main issue in respect of the theory of Śābdabodha or Vākyārthabodha is as to what is the centre of semantic organisation in a sentence? Whether it is a noun or verb? The Nyāya school holds that it is a noun with a nominative suffix. Such a noun happens to be the subject or agent in an active sentence and it is an object in a passive sentence. However, in a passive sentence without an object known as bhav constructions in Sanskrit it is the action indicated by the verb that is the prime centre of semantic organisation. Sentences like Chaitra goes to village, the village is reached by Chaitra and slept by chaitra are the stock examples. In first two sentences chaitra and grama which are nouns in nominative are the prime centres. In the third sentence 'slept by chaitra' which is a passive sentence without an object,

neither subject nor object is available to be the prime centre of semantic organisation. Hence the action itself is the prime centre. In a negative sentence like 'Bhūtale bhatona' it is the meaning of the negative particle 'na' that is the prime centre.

Thus, the Nyāya school though goes by the theory of noun in nominative being the prime centre of semantic organisation in a sentence, does not insist on any uniformity in this respect in all types of sentences. It goes by the practical approach of each on its own situation. Taking into account its approach in a majority of sentences the Nyāya theory is described as Prathamanta Mukhya Viśeṣyaka theory or the theory that holds that the noun in nominative case is the prime centre of semantic organisation in a sentence.

Meaning of a word

The question as to what is the meaning of a word whether it is an individual entity, attribute, class-notion or function is discussed by Sanskrit linguists. Different theories are advanced in this connection but two theories are very prominent viz.

1. It is class-notion.
2. It is an individual entity as belonging to a class.

These two theories are held by Mīmāṃsa and Nyāya respectively. Since this question is not particularly discussed in Bhāṭṭarahasya we need not go into further details of this problem.

Abhihitānvaya and Anvitābhīdhāna theories of Syntax

The question whether word is a unit of verbal communication or the sentence is a unit of verbal communication is another important question. These two views are known as Abhihitānvayavāda and Anvitābhīdhānavāda respectively. The Bhāṭṭa school holds the first view while the Prābhākaras hold the second view. The Vyākaraṇa and Nyāya also go by the first view. According to the first view each word in a sentence conveys its meaning first and then by the processes of syntactical connection the sentence meaning is conveyed. The second view thinks that no purpose is served by the communication of the meaning of individual words in an isolated way, nor it makes any sense. Words in a sentence always convey their meaning involving a reference to their syntactical partners. Torn of sentences they cannot communicate. Therefore, sentence is the unit of verbal communication. This question is also not specifically discussed in Bhāṭṭarahasya. Abhihitānvaya theory of Bhāṭṭas, of course, is the

basis of all discussion here but the theory itself is not specially discussed. Therefore, we need not go into further details here. We just briefly mentioned here the two questions viz. 1. What is the meaning of a word? 2. What is the unit of verbal communication whether it is a word or sentence? Because these two are vital problems in the context of the discussion of syntactical and semantical problems with which Bhāṭṭarahasya is concerned. Strictly speaking the difference between Abhihitānvaya Vāda and Anvitābhīdhāna Vāda is only in respect of the process of the Development of syntactical relation. According to both it is the sentence that is the unit of verbal communication. Individual word conveying its meaning before developing syntactical relation in Abhihitānvaya Vāda is only a step in verbal communication and it is not complete at that state.

The Vyākaraṇa theory of Śābdabodha

According to Vaiyākaraṇas dhātvartha or action is the prime centre of semantic organisation in all sentences. Whether the sentence is active passive, or passive without an object, it is the action that is uniformly the prime centre of semantic organisation. The action is the meaning of verbal root employed in the sentence. It is dhātvartha. Therefore, Vyākaraṇa theory is known as

Dhārvarthamukhya Viśeṣyaka theory or theory according to which action the meaning of the verbal root is the prime centre of semantic organisation. In all the three types of sentences it is the action that is the prime centre of Semantic organisation. Keeping this approach in mind the Śābdabodha of all other sentences like 'chaitraiva maitro gachchati' (चैत्रैव मैत्रो गच्छति) chaitra eva gachchati' 'bhūtale ghato na' (भूतले घटो न) etc. are suitably explained. For this theory they claim the statement of Yāska viz. Bhāvapradhānam ākhyātam (भावप्रधानं आख्यातम्) as the main authority. Several statement of Sūtra, Vārtika, Bhāṣya etc. are also quoted. Among the Vaiyākaraṇas there are certain differences in a few details such as to what exactly is the meaning of the verbal root? Whether it is mere action or action leading to result and so on. However, all are agreed that it is dhātvartha or verbal root meaning that is the prime centre for the semantic organisation in a sentence.

The Mimāṃsā theory of Śābdabodha

The Nyāya and Vyākaraṇa theories really represent the old dispute among the Sanskrit linguists recorded in Nirukta whether it is noun that is important or the verb. We see the extreme effort of deriving every word from a root by the verb importance theorists.

The Mīmāṃsakas concern themselves more with the result of the verbal communication for deciding as to what is the prime-centre of semantic organisation in a sentence, rather than mere structure of the sentence or this or that part of speech in the sentence. They ask the question as to what follows the verbal communication? Naturally some or other activity follows the verbal communication. Therefore, giving direction to such an action should be the chief purpose of the sentence. This they call Pravartana or Bhāvana. This is the prime-centre of semantic organisation in a sentence. The meanings of all other parts of speech get connected with it so as to make it fully meaningful and effective. This bhāvana is not the meaning of either nouns or the verbal root. This bhāvana or pravartana has two aspects viz. direction to initiate action and initiative to take an action. These two stages are known as Śābdibhāvana and Ārthibhāvana. In the sentence of day to day usage these represent the desire to direction the part of the speaker and the consequent desire to act on the part of the listener.

Śābdibhāvana is the desire of the speaker and ārthibhāvana is the desire of the listener. In vedic sentences however, there is no speaker. Therefore, the power to direct is rooted in the verbal suffix

itself. That is why it is called śābdibhāvanā. Thus for Mīmāṃsakas the centre of semantic organisation in a sentence is that which directs action following the verbal communication. This is bhāvana or pravartana. It is conveyed by verbal suffix. The verbal suffix has two aspects. It is a verbal suffix in general, and it is a verbal suffix indicating certain tense or mood. The standard sentence in this connection is a sentence that contains a verb with optative suffix. The optative element (or lintv) conveys śābdibhāvana or the desire to direct, and the general verblity element (ākhyātatva) conveys arthibhāvanā or the initiative to act. According to Mīmāṃsakas all sentences are action oriented and an element of optative force is present in all sentences. This śābdabodha theory of Mīmāṃsakas is named as bhāvana mukhya viśeṣyaka (भावन मुख्यविशेषक) theory or the theory of śābdabodha according to which bhāvana is the prime centre of semantic organisation in a sentence. Khaṇḍadeva fully discusses this theory and establishes it criticising the śābdabodha theories of nyāya and vyākaraṇa.

Criticism of Vyākaraṇa and Nyāya theories

The Vyākaraṇa view is mainly based on the authority of Nirukta i.e. bhāvapradhānam ākhyātam. However, Khaṇḍadeva points out that in this

statement bhāva does not mean dhātvartha, nor the term ākhyāta means a dhātu. Therefore the Vaiyākaraṇas have erred in seeking the support from this statement for their theory of dhātvartha mukhya viśeṣyakatva. He also points out that the statement 'dhātvarthah kevalah śuddhah bhāva ityabhidhīyate' (धात्वर्थः केवलः भाव इत्यभिधीयते) does not fix the meaning of the word bhāva as dhātvartha in all contexts and in a general way but it only fixes in the limited context of the use of the word in sūtras such as bhava ghan as this statement is of the nature of a paribhāṣa. Further in the sentences like 'tad adhite tad veda' (तदधीते तद्वेद) the theory of dhātvarthamukhya viśeṣyakatva is abandoned by Vaiyākaraṇas themselves.

The Nyāya theory is bad because it has no uniformity. If the verbal communication through different types of sentences goes on differing in respect of Mukhyaviśeṣya or prime centre of semantic organisation there will be no end to the formulation of Kāryakāraṇabhāva in this respect. Khaṇḍadeva points out these draw-backs and also the difficulties in explaining vākhyārtha in a number of sentences. He particularly points out the defects in a sentence like 'paṣya mrigo' dhāvati' (पश्य मृगो धावति) which has to be treated as two sentences if one goes by Nyāya approach.



78. Dharmalakṣaṇa, Vidhyārtha and Lakārārthas

Khaṇḍadeva begins his Bhāṭṭarahasya with the definitions of dharma and adharma. He clarifies that though these terms have wider application he is concerned with the Do's and Don'ts enjoined in Veda. Whatever is enjoined Veda as the means of good or iṣṭasādhana that is dharma and whatever mentioned as leading to bad or aniṣṭasādhana in Veda that is adharma. He is not concerned with the good and bad in the general sense, or in purely ethical sense. His definitions of dharma and adharma are in the context of vedic rituals and sacrifices, and Do's and Don'ts mentioned in Veda. He considers Jñāna Brahman etc. outside the scope of his definition of dharma since these are not activities that could be undertaken. He considers the ticklish example of Śyenayāga as both dharma and adharma from different angles. So far as the sacrifice of Śyena is concerned it is considered as dharma since it is recommended by a vedic injunction. But its result viz., the destroying of enemy comes under the vedic prohibition viz. none should be killed. Hence it is adharma.

Then he proceeds to discuss vidhyārtha. Vidhi is optative mood. Its meaning is discussed in great details in Vyākaraṇa, Nyāya and Mīmāṃsa. Vedic

injunctions are communicated through optative sentences. These have to lead to activity. Therefore, such a meaning has to be conveyed by *vedhi* or optative suffix which can stipulate activity. The optative suffix is called *lin*, in Sanskrit. Therefore, this discussion is known as *vidhyārtha vichāra* (विध्यर्थविचार) or 'lin' artha vichāra. (लिङ्गर्थविचार)

Nyāya theory of Vidhyārtha

The Nyāya theory of Vidhyārtha takes the stand that the motivation for activity on the part of an individual can arise when three conditions are fulfilled viz. 1. The proposed activity should be *iṣṭasādhana* or capable of fulfilling his some or other desire. 2. It should be *kṛtisādhya* or within his capacity to undertake. 3. It should be *balavadaniṣṭānānubandhi* (बलवदनिष्ठानानुबन्धि) or not leading to any strong adverse consequences. Only when these three requirements are fulfilled one proceeds to undertake an activity. Therefore, *vidhi* or optative suffix whenever it leads to the intended activity on the part of the listener will have conveyed these three requirements to him. Therefore, these three constitute the meaning of *vidhi* or optative suffix.

Criticism of Nyāya theory

The above theory is not acceptable to Khaṇḍadeva. Firstly this raises the question

whether these three meanings are conveyed by one power or śakti or by three powers belonging to the same optative suffix. The Naiyāyikas are divided on this issue. The old school holds one śakti view while the new school holds three śakti view. Further *bālavadaniṣṭānubandhitvajñāna* (बलवदधिष्ठानु-बन्धित्वविज्ञान) or the awareness of some strong adverse consequence may prevent the undertaking and therefore its absence may be a necessary factor to undertake the activity. But it cannot be considered as one of the factors for motivating the activity. It is merely a negative element. Further, the very concept of *aniṣṭānubandhitva* or leading to adverse consequences differs from person to person and varies in different circumstances. Its intensity, presence or absence could be ascertained only after taking or not taking the action. Hence this cannot be included under the pre-requisites to be conveyed by the optative suffix. Kalanja Bhakṣaṇa may be taken as *aniṣṭānubandhi* by one and as not so by another who has a temptation for it. Similarly *Kṛtisādhyatva* also could be ascertained by other means. Whatever information could not be obtained in other ways in a given context that is only conveyed by the words.

Vyākaraṇa view

As regards *iṣṭasādhana* or the fact of

proposed undertaking being a means of full-fulfilling the desire, the Vaiyākaraṇas and a section of Mīmāṃsakas also hold it to be the meaning of optative suffix or Vidhyartha. As this leads to the undertakings of the activity, they call it pravartana. Iṣṭasādhanaṭā is equated with pravartana or bhāvanā by this section of Mīmāṃsakas. However, Khaṇḍadeva does not agree with them. In sentences like 'Āchārya preritah aham gām ānyāmi' (आचार्यप्रेरितः अहं गां आनयामि) there is pravartana but not iṣṭasādhanaṭā. Therefore these two cannot be equated is the view held by him. The view that iṣṭasādhanaṭā is pravartana was held by Maṇḍana Miśra, Pārthasārathi etc. Mīmāṃsakas. The difference between the Navīna Vyākaraṇa view and Pārthasārathi's view is very slight while Navīna Vaiyākaraṇas consider iṣṭasādhanaṭva alone as the meaning of Vidhi. As Mīmāṃsakas consider iṣṭasādhanaṭva alone as the meaning of vidhi, the Mīmāṃsakas consider iṣṭasādhanaṭā rūpa pravartana (इष्टसाधनतारूपप्रवर्तन) as the meaning of vidhi. As Mīmāṃsakas they naturally like to give emphasis on pravartana aspect mere iṣṭasādhanaṭa aspect, Khaṇḍadeva goes a step ahead and makes the pravartana alone the meaning of Vidhi. This is nothing but bhāvanā. He also points out that among the six meanings given in Pāṇini Sūtra for lin viz., vidhi nimantraṇa etc. four have an element

of pravartana. The Prābhākaras are more radical and they make niyoga or the command to be meaning of Vidhi. Thus, it is clear that the Nyāya approach is an approach of practical considerations, the Vyākaraṇa and early Mīmāṃsaka approach is a psychological approach and the approach of Khaṇḍadeva and Prābhākaras is that of imperative or duty concept. However, the duty concept here is not so much ethical but it is theological and scriptural. In fact the very expression vidhi stands for enjoined assignment. Niṣedha naturally means prohibited.

After discussing Vidhyārtha or linārtha, Khaṇḍadeva takes up the discussion of the meaning of all other lakaras or verbal suffixes and points out how all of them could be connected with bhāvana.

Vibhaktyārtha or the meaning of case suffixes

The Khaṇḍadeva proceeds to discuss vibhaktyārtha or the meaning of case suffixes from nominative to locative. He examines the meanings assigned to these by Naiyāyikas and Vaiyākaraṇas, and differs from them considerably. He quotes all the Pāṇinī sūtras connected with the explanation of the meaning of case suffixes and interprets them in support of the meanings assigned by him to different case-suffixes. Case-suffixes play a vital

role in syntactical and semantical organisation of a sentence. They convey the kāraka relations. Though broadly a certain case suffix can be considered as indicating a certain kāraka relation, for instance, accusative case indicates Karmatva or objectivity, there are many exceptions, variations, and secondary usages in case of each case suffix. Man is capable of manipulating the language in innumerable ways for communication. As the language and culture develop, the manipulation of language also develops. However, grammarians try to codify these usages from time to time and try to formulate certain uniform rules to achieve precision in language and thought. Sanskrit has been fortunate to have great codifiers of languages and great linguists from time to time. Khaṇḍadeva is one such linguist who is bold and original. His handling of the meaning of case suffixes or vibhaktiyartha has two main objectives. 1. To define the nucleus meaning of a case suffix in such a way that all possible shades of this meaning are included in it. The chief characteristic of this nucleus meaning is called akhaṇḍopadhi by him. Akhaṇḍopadhi is a characteristic that indicates any given shade of that nucleus meaning in the given context but cannot be reduced to that alone. The particular shade, of course, is determined by the particular context. But such of the meanings of a

case suffix which cannot be brought under this nucleus meaning have to be considered as secondary usages or lākṣaṇika prayogas 2. The meanings of all case-suffixes in a sentence are to be related with bhāvana. With these two objectives, Khaṇḍadeva discusses the meanings of all case-suffixes. He criticises Nyāya views and the views of Navīna Vyākaraṇa also in some cases. He interpretes the relevant Pāṇinī sūtras afresh and points out that his approach is supported by Pāṇini sūtras. He mentions Kātyāyana's views and explains the same suitably. He quotes Mahābhāṣya usages. Thus, the work is more a linguistic document than a mere mīmāṃsā document. With a view to understand his originality and fresh approach we will notice only one or two special points in the case of each case-suffix.

Meaning of Nominative case

Firstly, he opposes the contention that the nominative case suffix has no particular meaning and it is employed only to fulfil the maxim 'no stem be used without a suffix and no suffix without a stem.' By itself the nominative has no particular meaning. Against this Khaṇḍadeva argues that in case of Sambodhana at least one has to accept abhimukhikaraṇa as the meaning and there is no harm if the meaning of prātipadika is taken

as the meaning of nominative case also. The nominative case conveys it in a general way while the particular Prātipadika conveys it particularly. This meaning of nominative, of course, is to be connected with Bhāvana.

Meaning of accusative case

As regards accusative, he discusses various definitions of Karmatva given in Nyāya and Navīna Vyākaraṇa works and shows that how some or other usage beffles them. He proposes the concept of Akhaṇḍopādhi here. Karmatva is Akhaṇḍopādhi with a nucleus meaning of objectiveness and all shades of objectiveness come under this. He disagrees with the distinction of Iṣita and Anīṣita as two varieties of Karmatva. He considers the use of accusative case suffix as secondary in a number of instances wherein Karmatva is not found and gives the other meanings such as uddesatva, nirupitativa etc. admissable in those instances. The Karmaṇyavachanīya usages also come under such secondary usage.

Meanings of third and fourth case suffixes

Karṭṛtva and Karaṇatva constitute the meaning of the third case suffix. This meaning is to be related with bhāvana in a sentence. These are akhaṇḍopādhis. The definition of Karṭṛtva and Karaṇatva given by Nyāya and Navīnavyākaraṇa

are inadequate and therefore, akhaṇḍopādhitva is the only solution. Similarly sampradānatva is the meaning of dative case. This is to be related with bhāvana and it is an akhaṇḍopādhī.

Meaning of the fifth case

The meaning of the fifth case is apādāntva. But in the instances like 'Vṛkṣāt Vibhajate' it is avadhitva by way of Lakṣaṇā. Similarly pratiyogitva, Janyatva, etc. are also the meanings of the fifth case suffix by way of Lakṣaṇā. There need not be any anugama or bringing under a common group in case of lakṣaṇā. The meaning of the fifth case is also to be related with bhāvanā and apādānatva is also akhaṇḍopādhī. While discussing fifth case suffix khaṇḍadeva points out that many of the sūtras are superfluous as their purpose is served other-wise.

The meaning of the sixth case is śeṣa or relation in general. When particular kāraka relations such as karmatva kārāṇatva etc. are to be conveyed, accusative, instrumental etc. case suffixes are employed to convey the same. But when relations not covered by these, such as sva-svāmibhāva etc. are to be conveyed śaṣṭhi is to be employed. But the special point of Mīmāṃsā is even the meaning of śaṣṭhi is to be related with bhāvanā. They do not agree with the view of others that in case of

śaṣṭhi its meaning is to be connected with the adjoining noun only.

The meaning of the seventh case is adhikaraṇatva. This is also akhaṇḍopādhi and is to be related with bhāvanā. Khaṇḍadeva concludes that the meaning of all case suffixes is to be related with bhāvana only. His vehement asertion of akhaṇḍopādhi concept in respect of the meaning of case suffixes tempts one to call him Akhaṇḍadeva.

This discussion of the meaning of case suffixes is rich with a variety of sentences and the analysis of their meanings. It is a fascinating study of language with a variety of usages. It can compare very richly with the most modern study of language applying the logical and psychological canons of the analysis of language. It is also a good re-appraisal of Pāṇini's sūtras and in many cases, Khaṇḍadeva shows that the Navīna vaiyākaraṇas have erred and gone against Sūtra and Vārtika.

Editions of Bhāṭṭarahasya

Bhāṭṭarahasya was first published at Kanchipuram nearly sixty years ago with the help of five manuscripts by Pandit Anantacharya. It was reprinted again after about 10 years. Recently, Pandit A. Subrahmanya Shastry brought out

another edition in 1970 with detailed introduction in Sanskrit and with short commentaries of his own called Vishamagranthibhedini. (विषमग्रन्थिभेदिनी) In his learned introduction in Sanskrit he summarises the main issues discussed in Bhāṭṭarahasya with a historical and comparative perspective. His short commentary elaborates some brief references in Bhāṭṭarahasya particularly pertaining to Mīmāṃsā topics and maxims. However no full-fledged commentary was written on Bhāṭṭarahasya so far. As the study of this work needs a good knowledge of Vyākaraṇa, Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā a commentary by a scholar who is well-versed in those subjects was necessary.



79. Bhāṭṭarahasya bhāvaprakāśikā

of Peri Suryanarayana Shastry

The need of a good commentary is admirably fulfilled by Pandit Peri Suryanarayana Shastry of Rajamahendri. Sri Shastry is a very distinguished contemporary Vyākaraṇa scholar. He is also well-versed in Nyāya and Mīmāṃsa. He was born on 20.08.1910 at Pedanandipalli Agraharam - Vizianagaram District in Andhrapradesh. He studied Vyākaraṇa Śāstra under Peri Venkateshwara Shastri, Vizianagaram and Tata Subbaraya Shastri deeply. He joined the oriental college, Rajamahendri as Vyākaraṇa Paṇḍit. He taught a number of batches for over thirty years. He participated in a number of Vidvat-sadas at different centres of learning viz. Sringeri, Mantralaya, Advaita Sabha, Oriental Conference Kurukshetra, Pune, Jaipur etc.

I have personally observed his Vākyārtha in Vyākaraṇa Śāstra at the Vidvat sadas in Mantralaya and was struck by his deep scholarship, presence of mind, clarity and conviction. It is a feast to listen to his Vākyārtha. Bhāṭṭarahasya though counted as a mīmāṃsa work, is more a Vyākaraṇa work than Mīmāṃsā work. Only a scholar who is very versed in Vyākaraṇa can handle this work. Sri Peri Suryanarayana Shastry who has already written a commentary on Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇasāra

of Kaundabhaṭṭa and Laghumanjūśa of Nagesha Bhatta which handles the same problems that are handled in Bhāṭṭarahasya was a most competent scholar to write a commentary on this work and we are fortunate that he has full-filled our expectations. He has fully utilised his Vyākaraṇa scholarship in his commentary.

There are three special features of this commentary. 1. Firstly it is elucidatory. All important statements of Khaṇḍadeva are fully elucidated in the fashion of Mallinātha's commentary on Kāvyaś and no ambiguity left. Such elucidatory commentaries are rare on śāstra works. 2. Secondly, whenever, passages and points are quoted from Mahābhāṣya, Kaiyaṭa, Haradatta, Bhartṛhari etc. the context and implications of those are fully explained, and it is pointed out how and why Khaṇḍadeva has utilised them. This helps a good deal a reader whose knowledge of Vyākaraṇa is limited and also those who need authentic references.

3. He takes his own observations on the merit of Khaṇḍadeva's conclusions and offer his own critical comments on the issues raised. Though he himself is a Vaiyākaraṇa, he does not show any bias in favour of Vyākaraṇa view wherever Khaṇḍadeva is critical of Vyākaraṇa views. He knows that as a commentator he has to give an exposition of Khaṇḍadeva.

With a view to bring to the notice of the scholars his scholarly expositions, I draw the attention of the readers to his discussion of 'kriyā-grahanam kartavyam iti vārtikam pratyakhyātam' (क्रियाग्रहणं कर्तव्यं इति वार्तिकं प्रत्याख्यातम्) (page 244 to 246) 'divah karma cha' (page 228-229) 'kartrikarmanoh kriti (page 314-322) Mahābhāṣya views (page 159-160) and so on in respect of Vyākaraṇa aspect of the exposition. The Nyāya aspect of exposition can be seen in the discussion of pratiyogitva (page 339) kāraṇtvā (page 223) and so on. His scholarly expositions of Mīmāṃsa points can be seen in the discussion on 'natirātre ṣoḍaśim grinhati' (नातिरात्रे षोडशीं गृह्णाति) (page 50) 'Pravartanatva' (page 30) and so on. Thus, Pandit Suryanarayana Shastri's detailed commentary is full of Shastric discussions. As a lucid commentary it is useful to students and as a commentary of discussion of Śāstric points it is useful to scholars and researchers. I venture to suggest that Sri Suryanarayana Shastriji who has covered Vyākaraṇa and Mīmāṃsa in the field of Śabdabodha by his commentary on Vaiyākaraṇa Bhūṣaṇa sāra and Bhāṭṭarahasya should now write on Vyutpattivāda of Nyāya school and complete the circle. I pray Lord Venkateshwara to bestow on him long life to render this service.



80. A brief Account of the Doctrines of Prābhākara

The two schools of Pūrvamīmāṃsā viz. Bhāṭṭa and Prābhākara are well known. Both claim Jaimini sūtras and Śābarabhāṣya as their sources. Some scholars have tried to trace some of the concepts of Prābhākaras to Bādari whose views are quoted in Jaimini sūtra. Attempts are also made to identify Bhavadāsa and Bhartṛmitra as the pre-cursors of Prābhākara view. References are also found to some old Prābhākaras as Cirantana Prābhākara and Jarat Prābhākara. Their views are quoted on two important topics viz. on the number of categories and the nature of akhyāti. Prameya Pārāyaṇa portion of Prakaraṇa Pañcikā is not available. However, its commentator Nārāyaṇa lists eight categories mentioning samkhyā and sādṛśya as seventh and eight. However, the view of the old Prābhākaras quoted by Vidyāraṇya in Vivaraṇaprameya Sangraha mentions viśeṣa and niyoga in place of samkhyā and sādṛśya. In respect of akhyāti also the old Prābhākaras had slightly different explanation than the one commonly given. Their view is quoted in Iṣṭasiddhi of Vimuktātman. From this it is clear that the Prābhākara thought had an early base and Prabhākara only rejuvenated it.

It is difficult to ascertain whether Śābara bhāṣya

mainly supports Bhāṭṭa or Prābhākara. The most important sūtra 'Tadbhūtānām Kriyārthena Samāmnāyaḥ' (तद्भूतानां क्रियार्थेन समाम्नायः) etc. and Śābara's remarks on it seem to support anvitābhidhāna theory of sentence meaning. Śālikanātha quotes half a dozen adhikaraṇas to establish kāryānvita procedure. All these seem to support this theory. However, a detailed scrutiny of the entire Bhāṣya with the help of computer has to be made to find out Śābara's support to one of them entirely or partially. Prābhākara was a younger contemporary of Kumārila. He quotes Kumārila's views in a number of adhikaraṇas, such as Guṇakāmādhikaraṇa, Abhikramaṇādhikaraṇa, Balābalādhikaraṇa. (गुणकामाधिकरण अभिक्रमणाधिकरण बलाबलाधिकरण) His only one work i.e. Br̥hati a detailed commentary on Śābara bhāṣya is available.

The literature of Bhāṭṭa school is quite large. There are only seven works of Prābhākara school. Br̥hati of Prabhākara, R̥juvimala, Prakaraṇa Pañcikā, and Bhāṣyadīpa of Śālikanātha Nayaviveka of Bhavanātha, Tantrarahasya of Rāmānuja and Prābhākara Vijaya of Nandiśvara. Among these Śālikanātha's Prakaraṇa Pañcikā is the central text. It discusses all important issues and concepts of Prabhākara school in detail. Two Vārtikakāras are quoted in it. One is quoted in support of

Prābhākara view, the other who is an opponent of Prābhākara view. The latter is Kumārila bhāṭṭa. The first one seems to be an old Prābhākara writer.

Apart from the eight works of Prābhākara school, there is another source to know the Prābhākara thought. The works that criticise Prābhākara thought constitute this source. The earliest among these are the three important works of Maṇḍana Miśra. His Vidhiviveka, Vibhramaviveka and Bhāvanāviveka examine Prābhākara concept of Kārya and their akhyāti theory in detail. These were composed before Śālikanātha. He answers the objections raised in these works. Vachaspati Miśra's commentary on vidhiviveka quotes Śālikanātha's answers and shows the drawbacks from Maṇḍana's point of view. Pārthasārathi Miśra's Śāstradīpikā, particularly, tarkapāda portion and his Nyāyaratnamālā review the important issues of Prābhākara system. This tradition of reviewing Prābhākara thought is continued in later Bhāṭṭamīmāṃsā works.

Important writers of Nyāyavaiśeṣika and Vedānta schools also quote Prābhākara's theories and criticise. The kāryatāvāda, anvītabhidhānavāda and akhyātivāda are particularly criticised. Nyāya works like Nyāyamanjarī of Jayanta, Kusumāñjali of Udayana, Tatvacintāmaṇi of Gaṅgeśa review

Prābhākara views. These works give a clearer picture of Prābhākara thought and constitute an important source. Modern scholars also have written good many works in English on Bhāṭṭa school by way of translations, studies and reasearch papers. There are very few on Prābhākara system. Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā by Ganganatha Jha and by Paśupatinātha Shastry are two important works on Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā. The long introduction to Tantra-rahasya by K.S. Ramaswamy is quite informative. The papers on niyoga and Prābhākaras old and new by M. Hiriyanna and on Karma by Halbfass give an insight into Prābhākara thought. Prof. Kuppuswamy Shastry's two papers on old Prābhākaras give valuable information about early Prābhākaras.

The criticism of Prābhākara views is two fold : i) criticism of the import of the injunction and the issues connected with the organisation of the sacrifice. ii) The issues connected with the epistemology and the theory of knowledge. In the first area it is mainly a fight between Bhāṭṭas and Prābhākaras. In the second area, all other systems of Indian philosophy, particularly Nyāya and Vedānta participate and confront Prābhākaras.

Among the Vedānta schools Viśiṣṭādvaita and Dvaita are a little friendly. Both these have

accepted anvitābhidhāna theory with some modifications. Viśiṣṭādvaita theory of yathārtha khyāti is closer to akhyāti. The concept of difference being an internal attribute of the object is acceptable to Dvaita. In this way Prābhākara thought is preserved more by its opponents than its own literature.

Prakaraṇa Pañcikā gives a detailed account of the Prābhākara system in all aspects. These are given in the exposition along with the relevant portions of text in this study. Here the main issues are presented by way of recapitulation of the exposition of the text. There are eight main issues that require special attention. These are as under :

- i) The concept of kārya or niyoga is the import of Vedic injunction. ii) The theory of anvitābhidhāna,
- iii) Akhyāti theory of perceptual error iv) Rejection of abhāva v) Non-Vedic statements communicate through inference vi) The concept of tripuṭikaraṇa
- vii) The nature of savikalpaka, nirvikalpaka viii) The categories.

The other systems of Indian Philosophy do not agree with Prābhākaras on these issues and have bitterly criticised. A proper understanding of the Prābhākara point of view on these issues will help to meet these criticisms and understand Prābhākara thought more clearly. This is attempted here.

1) The concept of Kārya

The Prābhākaras state that kārya is the import of Vedic injunction. This kārya has three dimensions. i) It is conveyed only by śabdapramāṇa i.e. Vedic injunction, but not by any other pramāṇa. To convey this aspect it is designated as apūrva i.e. mānāntara apūrva. (मानान्तरापूर्व) ii) It elicits an agent who has the entitlement to undertake the kārya. Therefore, it is called niyoga i.e. direction or command. The person elicited is called niyojya, i.e. the person directed to accomplish kārya. iii) It inculcates a sense of accomplishing a task as 'this is my task'. Therefore it is called kārya. It is this kāryatā that is conveyed by the Vedic injunction. Its designation apūrva conveys its epistemological status as conveyed by śabdapramāṇa only. Its designation niyoga conveys the fact that it motivates the person who has the entitlement to undertake the task, and its designation as kārya conveys that it is of the nature of the accomplishment of a task. The task to be accomplished by it i.e. yāga, is conveyed by the root of the verb 'yajeta'. This yāgakriyā is the subject matter of kārya. It is also the instrument i.e. karaṇa. Yāga is both the subject and instrument of kārya.

The injunctive suffix conveys kṛti i.e. initiative also. No kārya can be accomplished without

initiative. Therefore, *kṛti* i.e. initiative, is also conveyed by the injunctive suffix. The initiative has to operate through an activity. Such an activity, in the present context, is *yāgakriyā*. This *yāgakriyā* gives a form to *kārya* conveyed by the Vedic injunction. Therefore, it is its content or *viṣaya*. It is also *kāraṇa*, not in the sense that it produces *kārya* but in the sense that it gives a form to it. The *kṛti* is called *bhāvanā* as it leads to *kārya* which is *bhāvya* i.e. the goal. Keeping this role of *kṛti* in mind *kārya* is defined as *kṛtyuddeśyam kṛtipradhānam kāryam*. (कृत्युद्देश्यं कृतिप्रधानं कार्यम्) This *kārya* is distinct from *kriyā* so far as the Vedic injunctions are concerned. In the case of ordinary injunctions *kriyā* is called *kārya* in the secondary sense. It is already stated that this *kārya* is designated as *apūrva* taking into account the fact that it is conveyed by *śabdapramāṇa* only. For another reason also it is called *apūrva*. When *yāgakriyā* is duly performed, *kārya* is accomplished. In this accomplished state it is something unique. Therefore, it is called *apūrva*. To distinguish the two usages it is called *pandāpūrva* at that stage. It is with this *kārya* that all other items get connected. *Niyojya*, the *yāga*, and *aṅgas* i.e. auxiliaries, get connected with it. The *kārya* connected with all these constitutes *vākyaṛtha* and *vedārtha* for Prābhākaras. In this context it should

be noted that the terms bhāvanā and apūrva are used in Prābhākara system in altogether different senses than Bhāṭṭas system. Bhāṭṭa use the term bhāvanā in the sense of two bhāvanās viz. śābdibhāvanā and ārthibhāvanā envisaged by them. Prābhākaras use it in the sense of kṛti. Prābhākaras do not accept the scheme of śābdibhāvanā and ārthibhāvana as conveyed by the injunctive suffix. The term apūrva is used in the sense of a concept that serves as link between yāga and svarga by Bhāṭṭas while Prābhākaras have made it a designation of kārya to indicate its unique nature. It is not a link between yāga and svarga. It is the goal of the performance of yāga.

Now, we have to find out the role of svargakāmanā, and the position of svarga in this scheme. Svargakāmanā is a qualification that entitles a person to undertake such sacrifices that provide svarga. He is adhikārin i.e. a person entitled, for these kāmya sacrifices. The injunctions of these sacrifices elicit only such persons as niyojya who have a desire for svarga. When he is elicited as niyojya he comprehends it as his kārya and proceeds to perform the sacrifice concerned. It is kāryatājñāna that motivates him. Iṣṭakāmanā only provides him the entitlement i.e. adhikāra, of course he obtains svarga, not as a primary result

but as a secondary result. The primary result is the accomplishment of kārya itself. This kārya provides the secondary result since, this secondary result viz. svarga, had provided entitlement to the niyojya who accomplished kārya. It is something like a master providing maintenance to his servant to serve his own purpose. Iṣṭasādhanaṭā is not the import of the injunction. It is only a ground to acquire entitlement.

This kāryaṭā theory of the import of Vedic injunction is criticised by almost every other system of Indian philosophy. It is criticised on two grounds i) The very nature of kārya cannot be satisfactorily explained ii) As it is not of the nature of happiness or means of happiness it cannot motivate and generate initiative to undertake any activity.

The earliest criticism of the concept of kārya is found in Vidhiviveka of Maṇḍana Miśra. He neatly sums up the concept of kārya or niyoga as proposed by Prābhākaras and examines it clause by clause.

यदपि दर्शनम् — प्रमाणान्तरागोचरः शब्दमात्रावलम्बनः नियुक्तोऽस्मीति प्रत्यात्मवेदनीयः सुखादिवत् अपरामृष्टकालत्रयः लिङ्गादीनामर्थो विधिरिति । (विवि. पृ. ३५)

Two important clauses in this explanation of kārya or niyoga are i) That which is not conveyed

by any other pramāṇa but conveyed by only śabdapramāṇa ii) That which has no reference to particular time. Maṇḍana Mishra argues that since the so called kārya or niyoga is not conveyed by any pramāṇa the very vāchya-vāchakabhāva (वाच्यवाचकभाव) relation between the injunctive suffix and kārya cannot be ascertained. Therefore, śabda also cannot convey kārya or niyoga. Śālikanātha notices this objection as under.

ननु व्युत्पत्त्यपेक्षेषु शब्देष्वर्थाभिधायिषु ।

कथं मानान्तरावेद्यं कार्यमाहुः लिङादयः ॥

Śālikanātha answers this objection by pointing out that the vāchya-vāchaka bhāva relation between the injunctive suffix and kārya is comprehended through elders' conversation as in the case of other words. Vāchaspati Mishra elaborates this answer in his Tattvakaṇikā a commentary on Vidhiviveka as under.

इदमत्र आकूतम् - कार्याभिधायिता तावत् लिङादीनामवगता आचार्यवाक्येषु 'माणवक! समिधमाहर' इत्यादिषु । एतद्वाक्यश्रवणानन्तरं प्रवर्तमानं समिदाहरणे माणवकमुपलभ्य पार्श्वस्थो व्युत्पित्सुः एवमवधारयति । बुद्धिपूर्व्यमस्य प्रवृत्तिः स्वतन्त्रप्रवृत्तित्वात् मदीयप्रवृत्तिवत् । अहं च न क्रियामात्रावगमात् नापि फलमात्रावगमात् नापि फलसाधनत्वावगमात् किन्तु कार्यतावगमात् प्रवृत्तः । न खलु अन्ततः अर्भकः स्तनपानादिकमपि क्रियां कार्यतया यावन्नावगतवान् तावत् न तस्यामपि प्रवृत्तः । (त.क. पृ.३८)

Both Mandana Mishra and Vāchaspati Mishra are not satisfied with this reply and the debate is going on.

The second clause viz. that which has no reference to time is also questioned by Mandana Mishra. He argues that if it has no reference to time, it cannot be an entity. It will be a non-entity i.e. 'asat' like a barren woman's son. It will have no *sattā* i.e. existence. However, Prābhākaras define 'sat' in a different way. They define 'sat' as that which is conveyed by a *pramāṇa*. They do not accept *sattā jāti*. *Sattva* is *svarūpasattva* for them. Even the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas talk of *sattā jāti* for first three categories viz. *dravya*, *guṇa* and *karma* only. The other categories viz. *sāmānya*, *viśeṣa* etc do not have *sattā jāti*. These have only *svarūpa sattā*. *Niyoga* or *kārya* has such *svarūpasattā*. We may note here that even Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas define a category as *prameyatva*. The main objection raised against *kārya* or *niyoga* by its critics is that it cannot motivate to undertake the *tāsk*. To motivate for undertaking activity, the object concerned should enkindle desire. Happiness or the means of the happiness only enkindle the desire to undertake an activity. *Kārya* is neither of the nature of happiness nor it is a means of happiness. Mere *kāryatā-jñāna* does not motivate the activity.

It is iṣṭasāadhanatā-jñāna (इष्टसाधनताज्ञान) that motivates the activity.

This contention is not acceptable to Prābhākaras. They argue that by an analysis of the experience it is found that it is kāryatā jñāna that prompts a person to undertake a task but not mere iṣṭasāadhanatā-jñāna. The latter is only a step to comprehend kāryatā. One will not proceed to act only by the knowledge that something is the means of happiness. He has to consider it as a task to be undertaken by him. The expectation of the desired result only creates interest in the task but the actual undertaking of the task has to be prompted by the sense that now it is my task. That is to say, he has to realise that he is niyojya for that kārya.

Inculcating such a sense of kārya is much more evident in the case of Vedic injunction. Accomplishing kārya conveyed by a Vedic injunction is an end by itself it is not a means to happiness. In the case of kāmya karma, the happiness is only a side product. In the case of nitya i.e. obligatory rites, it is not there even as side-product.

This position of Prābhākaras has a historical background in the Indian cultural tradition. In the Vedic period the rituals were considered as having

their own efficacy. The performance of the rituals itself was a holy act and a value. It gave a satisfaction to the performer. The idea of obtaining any outside happiness is only a later development. Even the kām्यakarmas were performed as if they were nityakarmas. This can be made out by the fact that agnihotra originally was a nityakarma and later was made a kām्यakarma also. Nityakarmas were always considered as superior to kām्यakarmas. The concept of niṣkāmakarma developed later is a rejuvenation of the early concept of karma being a task of accomplishment for its own sake but not for any outside result. This tradition of performance of karma for its own sake is upheld by Prābhākaras. The Bhāṭṭas were influenced by the other viewpoint that the rituals and other activities are meant for deriving happiness. This is at the basis of the controversy whether iṣṭasādhana-tā-jñāna prompts activity or kāryatājñāna. The clause sukhādivat in the explanation of the nature of niyoga or kārya brings out this aspect the problem. The accomplishment of kārya is as much an end as deriving happiness. It is not an instrumental value. It is an intrinsic value.

The kārya is more an ethical concept than a ritualistic concept. Even if it is taken as a ritualistic

concept, it has to be taken out of empirical level and has to be looked upon as a mystical or transcendental value. Achieving such a mystical efficacy of Vedic rituals is the goal of performing Vedic rituals. The other benefits are side products.

The criticism of *kāryatā* theory has a linguistic dimension also. Whether the language is learnt through the elders' conversation by observing their activity or it is learnt by introducing the object as they are is an old controversy. These two approaches are designated as '*kārye vyutpattiḥ*' (कार्ये व्युत्पत्तिः) and *siddhe vyutpatti* (सिद्धे व्युत्पत्तिः). The former makes the action conveyed by the verb the focal point and the centre of semantic organisation in a sentence and the latter makes the noun as the centre of semantic organisations. The latter, naturally opposes the *kāryatā* theory of linguistic communication.

Another aspect of linguistic communication is that whether the linguistic communication is meant just to give knowledge or to prompt action also. For those who hold the first view, it is sufficient if the injunction informs that the sacrifice leads to the desired result. It need not specifically command to accomplish the task. The criticism of the theory of *kāryatā* is based on these controversies.

Further, informing something as the means of happiness is taken for granted as sure means of prompting activity and the other nature of man acting on the urge to accomplish a task is completely ignored.

The critics have also failed to understand the difference between *kriyā* a physical event, and *kārya* an ethical or transcendental touch given to it. To convey this aspect of *kārya*, it is designated as *apūrva*. A modern scholar has remarked that the Prābhākara have carefully avoided mentioning the ontological status of *kārya*. However, it may be pointed out that they have stated *kriyā* as its content. That is its status at empirical level. At ethical and transcendental level the question of its ontological status in the manner of an empirical entity does not arise. It may be noted that the old Prābhākaras had given the status of a separate category to *niyoga*.

2) The *anvitābhidhāna* theory of sentence meaning

It is noticed above that *niyoga* or *kārya* elicits the agent as *niyojya* and *yāga* as *viṣaya*. It also elicits *aṅgas* etc. other requirements to accomplish *kārya*. By eliciting all these *kāryānvita vākyaṛtha* (कार्यान्वितवाक्यार्थ) takes its full shape as the import of Vedic injunction. This means that all requirements

for the accomplishment of kārya are organised into a unit and kārya is accomplished. These do not serve any purpose individually in isolation. These serve the purpose of accomplishing kārya as connected with kārya. This process has to be reflected in the language that conveys kārya as connected with these. Therefore, individual terms conveying different items of this programme have to reflect this connection as a part of their meaning. For this purpose, the Prābhākaras have evolved the anvitābhīdhāna theory of sentence meaning. This theory of anvitābhīdhāna is intimately connected with the concept of kārya centered organisation of sacrificial programme. Śālikanātha clearly states this purpose at the commencement of the exposition of anvitābhīdhāna theory.

अपूर्वमेव वाक्यार्थ इति साधनीयम् । तस्य मूलं पदानाम-
न्विताभिधायितेति तामेव तावदादौ परिशोधयति । (प्र.पं. ३७६)

According to anvitābhīdhāna theory of sentence meaning, a word conveys its meaning as connected with the meaning of the relevant other word. Subordinate words convey their meanings as connected with the meaning of the main word. Such connected meanings of the words is the sentence meaning. Contributing to the evolution of the chief meaning is the purpose of all other

words. That is the import of the whole sentence. Neither the individual words are the means of communication separately, nor the meanings of the individual words are intended to be communicated.

प्रधानगुणभावेन लब्धान्योन्यसमन्वयान् ।

पदार्थनिव वाक्यार्थान् सङ्गिरन्ते विपश्चितः ॥ (प्र.पं. ३७७)

On this theory of anvitābhidhāna two objections are raised by the critics of this theory viz. आनन्त्य and अन्योन्याश्रय.

i) According to this theory each word is expected to convey its meaning as connected with the meaning of the relevant other word in the sentence. This connection is included in the scope of the meaning of the word. The other word will be different in different sentences. Consequently the meaning of a word has to be as connected with the meanings of those many words. This means that each word will have an unlimited number of connections as its meanings. To have śaktigraha of a word with such a large number of meanings of other words is impossible.

ii) The second objection is that when it is considered that a word conveys its meaning as connected with the meaning of relevant other word, is the other word also has to be taken as

conveying its meaning as connected with the meaning of this word or not? In the first alternative it will result in reciprocal dependency i.e. anyonyaśraya (अन्योन्याश्रय).

The first objection does not hold good if the way in which the connection is effected and ascertained is examined. The connection envisaged among the word meanings in a sentence is based on three criteria viz ākāṅkṣā, sannidhi and yogyatā. Among these ākāṅkṣā is very important. A word conveys the meaning connected with the meaning of the relevant other word that has the ākāṅkṣā. This ākāṅkṣā in respect of different words in a sentence does not arise simultaneously or in a disorderly way. The import of the injunction viz kārya i.e. apūrva, is the central meaning of a Vedic injunctive sentence. This needs viṣaya i.e. yāga. It also needs niyojya to perform yāga. Then karaṇopakāras (करणोपकाराः) are needed. All these have an ākāṅkṣā with the central meaning i.e. kārya, and are conveyed as connected with that meaning in the respective order. In view of this orderly connection there is no room for any reciprocal dependency. Nor there is any need to envisage innumerable denotative powers to each word to account for its occurrence in different sentences.

The answers to these objections are succinctly put by Pārthasārathi Mishra himself while summarising the Prābhākaraṃview.

सन्निध्यपेक्षायोग्यत्वैरुपलक्षणलाभतः ।

आनन्त्येप्यन्वितानां स्यात् सम्बन्धग्रहणं मम ॥ ६ ॥

न च सन्निध्यपेक्षत्वे भवेदन्योन्यसंश्रयः ॥ ९ ॥

(न्या.र.मा. ९८-९९)

Pārthasārathi is later than Śālikanātha. These objections are answered by Śālikanātha in detail in Prakaraṇa Pañcikā. The main points of the answer are summarised in the above verses. Pārthasārathi does not rake up these objections further. He has a different objection against anvitābhidhānavāda. He argues that if the word has to convey connected word meaning, then, it has to have two denotative powers viz one denotative power to convey the word meaning and another to convey the connection.

अन्विताभिधायित्वे हि पदानामवश्यमेव विशेषणभूतोप्यन्वयोऽभिधातव्यः । अन्यथा अन्वितप्रतीतेरुत्पत्त्ययोगात् । ततश्चान्वयान्वितविषयशक्तिद्वयकल्पनात् अदृष्टकल्पना गुरुतरा स्यात् ।

This is merely a procedural point. The substantial issue is whether the words are capable of communicating individually in an isolated way or

only as a part of a syntactically knit unit. In other words whether word is a unit of communication or sentence is a unit of communication. Particularly, in the context of communicating the organisation of a sacrificial programme through the Vedic injunction. To protect the unity of the programme, the unity of its communication is essential. This point seems to have been ignored by abhihitānvaya vādins.

3) Ākhyāti theory of perceptual error

In Indian philosophy the theories of perceptual error have played an important role. There are five dimensions of these theories. i) optical ii) psychological iii) epistemological iv) logical and v) metaphysical.

The process of error starts at optical level, the psychological level adds to it. It takes epistemological shape. These three aspects have to be taken into account while analysing the nature of error. the analysis has to satisfy the logical requirement. Different schools of Indian philosophy have different metaphysical views. They have worked out their theories of perceptual error within the framework of their metaphysical systems. Consequently every school has its own theory. These theories are known as khyāti theories. These could be broadly grouped into i) Idealists ii) Realists in the first instance, and within the realists

anyathākhyātivādins and yathārthakhyātivādins. Ātmakhyāti and asatkhyāti come under the idealist view. The anyathākhyāti of Nyāyavaiśeṣikas, viparītakhyāti of Bhāṭṭas and abhinava anyathākhyāti of Dvaita Vedānta come under anyathākhyāti group. Akhyāti of Prābhākara, yathārthakhyāti of Rāmānujas and satkhyāti of Sāmkhyas come under the yathārthakhyāti group. The advaita theory of anirvachanīyakhyāti is a class by itself. It is based on the advaita concept of sadasad vilakṣana (सदसद्विलक्षण) metaphysics. The basic premise of the idealists is that there are no objects outside knowledge. The premise of the anyathākhyāti vādin is that one entity is comprehended as another. The yathārthakhyātivādins hold that the cognition agrees with the entities cognised. There is a good deal of debate on this theory in the major works of these schools. But the chief opponent for the realists is idealist. Among the realists the Prābhākaras have been targeted by all. It is surprising to find that the anyathākhyātivādins have made room for 'asat' element in their explanation which cuts the very ground of realism. Their criticism of akhyāti is more in procedural aspect of their explanation of error than on any substantial basis. The akhyāti theory is narrated below.

The Prābhākaras have adopted akhyāti theory. According to this theory all cognitions are true. *Yathārtham sarvavijñānam'* (यथार्थं सर्वविज्ञानम्) Prābhākaras explain this position as under.

Whatever is presented in a cognition that is its object. That which is presented in the cognition is termed as '*bhāsamāna*' and the object is termed as '*vedya*'. These two always agree. In other words the content of the cognition and the fact conveyed by it always agree.

The knowledge communicated by the statement '*Idam rajatam*' on seeing śukti is the usual example of perceptual error. According to anyathākhyāti theory of perceptual error śukti is the object of this knowledge. However, it is presented as rajata. In other words one is presented as another. 'A' is presented as 'B'. Therefore, it is anyathākhyāti.

Prābhākaras do not agree with this analysis. According to them the statement '*idam rajatam*' represents two cognitions i.e. perception and memory. One who observes śukti i.e. shell, present before him cognises it as *Idam* i.e. this, in a general way without the comprehension of its special features which distinguish it from rajata i.e. silver. Due to the similarity between śukti and rajata he remembers rajata. The cognition of śukti

and the memory of rajata occur in such quick sequence that he does not realise the difference between the two cognitions of the objects conveyed by them.

The contents of both these cognitions agree with the facts conveyed by them. There is no disagreement between the contents of these two cognitions and the objects conveyed.

Though the two cognitions 'idam' and 'rajatam' are true and distinct an erroneous statement is made as '*Idam rajatam*' due to the non-realisation of the difference between the two cognitions and their objects. For the non-realisation of the difference the following factors are responsible. i) The absence of the comprehension of the distinct features of śukti and its comprehension merely as 'idam' in a general way. ii) Remembering rajata due to the similarity between śukti and rajata. iii) Absence of the reference to the past time in the memory of rajata iv) occurrence of the two cognitions in quick succession. These circumstances lead to the non-realisation of the distinction between the two cognitions and their objects. This leads to the statement i.e. vyāvahāra, as '*idam rajatam*'. It is this statement that is bhramā. It is this vyāvahāra that is repudiated later.

The non-realisation of the distinction is termed as viveka agraha and the absence of the reference to the past time in the memory is termed as tattāpramoṣa. Tattā means reference to the past time and pramoṣa means the deletion of it. This analysis of '*idam rajatam*' offered by Prābhākaras is termed as akhyātivāda.

Śālikanātha himself mentions some of the objections raised against ākhyātivāda and answers. These are as under :

i) The so called memory of rajata cannot be classed as memory as it lacks the main feature of the memory viz. reference to the past time ii) Idam and rajatam are stated with sāmānādhikarāṇya. Therefore, the two refer to one and the same. Idam refers to something that is presently observed before. Therefore, rajata also should refer to the same.

iii) Pravṛtti i.e. initiative to fetch the object seen cannot be properly explained in the akhyāti theory. The mere occurrence of the cognitions of '*idam*' and '*rajatam*' in quick succession and the non-realisation of the difference between the two cannot motivate the observer to proceed to fetch rajata. Non-realisation of the difference is a negative factor. It cannot motivate pravṛtti i.e. initiative. The

initiative is possible only if the sāmānādhikaraṇya between idam and rajatam is realised. The sāmānādhikaraṇya between dharma and dharmi has to be brought about. This means śukti has to be comprehended as rajata. This is exactly anyathākhyāti. In the analysis of this cognition by akhyātivādin sāmānādhikaraṇya is not worked out.

iv) If the knowledge represented by the statement idam rajatam is true, then, how is it that it is repudiated as '*na idam rajatam*' later. What is it that is repudiated? Mere realisation of the difference that was not comprehended earlier is not the repudiation.

Stating these objections Śālikanātha answers them as follows :

i) The rajata cognition is considered as memory since it is caused by the impressions of the earlier cognition of rajata. These impressions are roused by the similarity between śukti and rajata. However, the reference to the past time is not roused due to inadequate attention. Producing by the impressions of the past experience is the chief feature of memory. Reference to the past time is incidental.

ii) The purpose of sāmānādhikaraṇya in the case of true rajata is served by the samānarūpatā here. Not only the difference between the cognitions

'idam' and 'rajata' is not realised but also the difference between the earlier cognition of rajata and these two cognitions is not realised. Therefore, there is samānarūpatā (समानरूपता) here. This serves the purpose of sāmānādhikaraṇya (सामानाधिकरणम्).

iii) This samānarūpatā supported by the non-realisation of the difference facilitates the statement i.e. vyavahāra as 'idam rajatam' and motivates the initiative i.e. pravṛtti to proceed to fetch the object.

iv) As regards the bādha i.e. repudiation, it has to be clarified that by the realisation of the difference between the object of the cognition idam i.e. śukti, and that of rajatam i.e. silver, the observer gets correct knowledge of śukti. This enables him to discover that the statement i.e. vyavahāra 'idam rajatam' was not bonafide. It is this statement that is repudiated. It is more a discovery of śukti than the repudiation of rajata.

In spite of these clarifications, the same objections are raised again and again in the works of other schools. While the works of the other schools are produced century after century, there were no works on Prābhākara side. However, it should be said to the credit of these opponents that they kept the Prābhākara theory alive and analysed it more and more to find fault in it. Some

of the new objections not mentioned by Śālikanātha are given below.

i) According to Prābhākaras the difference is an integral attribute of the object concerned, that is to say, it is dharmi-svarūpa. When an object is cognised its attribute i.e. the difference, is also cognised. In the present case, the cognition 'idam' has to be cognised along with the difference it has from the other cognitions and the cognition 'rajatam' has to be cognised along with its difference from the other cognitions. Thus, the cognition of the difference between these two cognitions is part and parcel of the these two cognitions. Therefore, Prābhākara cannot talk of the non-realisation of the difference between the two cognitions.

This objection can be answered as follows : Though the difference is an integral attribute of the object and can be comprehend in a general way as this object is different from all others in a general way, to comprehended the difference from a specific object, the presentation of that object as a pratiyogin is necessary. In the present case, the cognitions 'idam' and 'rajata' are not presented as pratiyogins for each other since these have occurred in quick succession. Hence, their difference is not comprehended.

ii) Non-realisation of the difference is of the nature of abhāva. Prābhākaras do not accept abhāva. Therefore, they cannot make it a ground to explain the error.

This can be answered as follows : Though Prābhākaras do not accept the category of abhāva, they have their own explanation to the situations wherein the cognition of abhāva is claimed by abhāvavādins (अभाववादिनः). The cognition of the object and its attribute the difference is sansrṣṭa viṣaya buddhi (संसृष्टविषयबुद्धिः), and cognising the object alone is ekaviṣaya buddhi. Such ekaviṣaya buddhi is found here in respect of these two cognitions in view of quick succession so far as the attribute difference is concerned. The difference is drśya pratiyogin (दृश्य प्रतियोगिन्) here.

4) The rejection of abhāva and abhāvapramāṇa

The Prābhākaras do not accept the category of abhāva. Consequently, they do not accept abhāvapramāṇa also.

To understand the Prābhākara's stand that the abhāva is not a separate category their concepts of sansrṣṭaviṣaya buddhi (संसृष्टविषयबुद्धिः) and ekaviṣayabuddhi (एकविषयबुद्धि) need to be analysed. When two positive entities are cognised together it is sansrṣṭa viṣaya buddhi while cognising only one

of them is ekaviṣaya buddhi. The latter serves the purpose of abhāva.

For instance, cognising the ground and jar together is sansrṣṭaviṣaya buddhi while cognising ground alone is ekaviṣayabuddhi. In the latter case, abhāvavādins claim that there is the abhāva of jar. What has really happened is that ekaviṣaya buddhi has taken place instead of sansrṣṭaviṣaya buddhi. The absence of jar is not a separate fact. Therefore, no separate pramāṇa is necessary to cognise it.

It cannot be argued that how can ekaviṣaya buddhi arise in respect of the same ground about which there was sansrṣṭaviṣaya buddhi without the cognition of the abhāva of the jar. This is answered by a counter question that how can abhāvabuddhi arise with reference to the same place where in there was bhāvabuddhi of a jar earlier? If the withdrawal of the jar is stated as the ground for abhāva buddhi, then, same may be taken as the ground for ekaviṣaya buddhi.

The jar is designated as dṛśya pratiyogin i.e. an object that could be cognised if it were present. When one cognises the ground without the jar he reflects on the dṛśyapratiyogin i.e. jar, that was present earlier and realises that he is cognising the

ground alone. No additional factor i.e. *abhāva* is cognised. The statement that 'there is no jar' only means that the *sansṛṣṭa viṣaya buddhi* of the ground and jar is replaced by the *ekaviṣaya buddhi* of the ground.

Even in the case of *pradhvansābhāva* (प्रध्वंसाभाव), on the destruction of jar the cognition of jar is replaced by the cognition of its pieces. No additional factor like *pradhvansābhāva* is cognised. The statements like *ghaṭābhāva*, *paṭābhāva* also mean that the respective *sansṛṣṭaviṣaya buddhi* (संसृष्टविषयबुद्धि) is replaced by *ekaviṣaya buddhi*. The reference to the *pratiyogins* is a reference to the respective *dṛśyapratiyogins* i.e. the objects that could be cognised if these were present as a part of the content of the respective *sansṛṣṭaviṣaya buddhi*.

Those who accept *abhāva* as a separate category accept *anupalabdhi* i.e. *pramāṇābhāva*, as the means to comprehend *abhāva*. This is also not acceptable to *Prābhākaras*. *Anupalabdhi* i.e. the absence of cognition by the appropriate *pramāṇa* cannot be the means of cognition by its very presence as in the case of the eye being the means of cognition by its very nature. One has to have the knowledge of the absence of *pramāṇa* as in the case of the knowledge of *liṅga* for *anumāna*. If it is

accepted that *pramāṇābhāva* is *pramāṇa* only when it is known, then, for the knowledge of *abhāvapramāṇa* another *abhāvapramāṇa* will be required and so on. This leads to infinite regress.

Finally, Prābhākaras explain the Śabara's remark अभावोऽपि प्रमाणाभावः नास्ति इत्यस्य अर्थस्य असन्निकृष्टस्य as supporting the rejection of *abhāva*. This very remark is interpreted by Bhāṭṭas as the definition of *abhāvapramāṇa*. Śālikanātha takes pains to interpret it in support of the rejection of *abhāvapramāṇa*. However, his explanation is laboured and not convincing. This is explained in the *Amṛtakalā* section of this text. The question of *abhāvapramāṇa* is discussed in detail both in *Amṛtakalā* chapter and *pramāṇa pārayaṇa* under *abhāva*.

5) Non-Vedic statements communicate through the inference of the speakers knowledge

According to Prābhākaras the *pauruṣeya* statements are not *śabdapramāṇa*. These help to infer the speaker's knowledge and communicate the same. By the statement of a speaker his knowledge of the facts represented by his statement is inferred. His statement plays the double role of serving as a means to infer his knowledge and communicate it to the listeners. In the first role it is a *liṅga* i.e. the means or the ground of the inference. Its second role is verbal communication.

If the meaning communicated by the statement does not represent the knowledge of the speaker of the facts mentioned in the statement it is a defect of its role as a *liṅga*, that is to say, the speaker has not invested it with the knowledge which the statement is expected to communicate. This may be due to the defect or inadequacy of the speaker's knowledge itself or his intention not to communicate his knowledge truly. In any case, it is a case of a defective *liṅga*. This naturally makes the second role of the statement viz verbal communication defective, that is to say, it disagrees with the facts supposed to have been communicated by that statement. In this process, though there may not be any *śabda doṣa*, *puruṣa doṣa* is responsible for the disagreement between the statement and the facts.

It is found that the statements that do not agree with the facts are made for the following reasons :

- i) The speaker's knowledge itself is erroneous.
- ii) He has no intention to speak truly.
- iii) He is out of his mind.
- iv) He formulates the statement defectively as a result of which something different than what he intends is presented in the statement.

In all these instances, the relation between the

knowledge supposed to have been communicated and the statement which is expected to represent it is violated. That is to say, the vyāpti relation between the knowledge to be communicated and the statement is broken. Therefore, the statement fails to play its first role of being the liṅga to infer the knowledge, that the speaker intends to communicate. Consequently it fails in its second role of valid communication.

There seems to be some difficulty in working out the process of the inference of the knowledge of the speaker by his statement. In order to proceed to infer the knowledge of the speaker from his statement the listener has to understand the meaning of the statement. This means that the statement has already communicated to him what it is expected to communicate. Then, the listener need not take the trouble to infer the knowledge through the statement and get it communicated by the same statement.

To solve this difficulty one has to understand the process of the inference in a little more detail.

When a statement is heard the facts referred to by the words are brought to the mind of the listener. Then, he proceeds to sort out as to how these could be meaningfully organised. This process

is termed *vimarśa*. Then, he arrives at an organised sense. From this he infers the knowledge of these facts on the part of the speaker and finally inters the position of the facts. This crystalised position is finally communicated by the statement.

The first stage viz reminding of the facts by the meaning of the words and their organisation is only a step towards inference of the knowledge of the speaker. It is not cristellised final communication. The listener has to go through the process of inference to arrive at the final verbal communication.

The advantage of making the inference of the knowledge of the speaker the ground for verbal communication in non-Vedic speech is to provide a ground for sorting out the true statements and false statements. In Vedic speach there is no question of false statement.

6) The formula of tripuṭikaraṇa

An important contribution of Prābhākaras to the concept of *pratyakṣa* is extending its scope beyond the sense perception. So far as the external objects are concerned the perception is through the senses. However, there are two other items that are directly cognised. These are the knower and the knowledge.

The knowledge produced by senses, inference, sanskāra etc all means is of the nature of perception in respect of the knower and the knowledge itself. All cognitions in which some or other object is presented, the knower is also presented. The objects are not comprehended without the comprehension of the knower also along with them. It is clear from the statement 'I know this' otherwise the statement would have been as 'He knows this.' In case the knower is not comprehended there would not have been any difference between one's own knowledge and the knowledge of someone else.

The knowledge is self-revealing. It does not require another knowledge to reveal it. It is well known that according to Nyāyavaiśeṣikas the knowledge of the objects is known as vyavasāya and the knowledge of this knowledge is anuvyavasāya. Prābhākaras do not agree with this arrangement. Every knowledge conveys three entities viz the knower, the object known, and the knowledge. No knowledge arises without a reference to the knower and the object known. These three are always conveyed together. This procedure is designated as tripūtīkaraṇa.

This formula is evolved to rule out the Buddhist's contention that there are no objects

outside the knowledge. According to this formula, if there were no objects outside, then, the knowledge itself would not have arisen. It is not the knowledge that is to be utilised to ascertain the existence of the objects, but it is the object that gives rise to the knowledge. One cannot think of the existence of knowledge without the existence of the object to be known and the knower.

According to this formula of triputi-karaṇa the ascertainment of the existence of the object and the knowledge does not depend upon either knowledge alone or the object alone. But the two help to ascertain the presence of both jointly.

7) Nirvikalpaka and Savikalpaka perceptions

The Prābhākara's explanation of these two stages of perceptions is quite different from that of Nyāyavaiśeṣikas.

In nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa mere svalakṣaṇa is not presented as contended by Buddhists. Both the substance and attributes are presented in nirvikalpaka. However, these are isolated in nirvikalpaka while in savikalpaka these are organised.

Both general and the particular features of the object are presented in nirvikalpaka. But these are not so realised until some more objects in which

this general aspect is observed or from which particular aspects are contrasted are observed. In the savikalpaka pratyakṣa these aspects are realised.

In the nirvikalpaka though the attributes are comprehended, these are not comprehended as qualifying the object. At that stage the difference between the substance and attributes is not grasped. The difference could be grasped only through anvaya and vyatireka. This anvaya and vyatireka verification does not take place at the nirvikalpaka stage. Consequently these are not organised as qualifications and the qualified. Therefore, there is no viśiṣṭapratyaya at the nirvikalpaka stage. In savikalpaka as already stated these are organised.

Now, a question may be raised here. The perception is caused by sense contact. The sense is in contact with only that object which is actually perceived. It is not in contact with other objects either of the same class or any other. Therefore, it is difficult to agree with the contention that the general and the special aspects are cognised involving a reference to other objects in the savikalpaka stage.

This difficulty is solved by pointing out that the

ātman who is to comprehend the object presented in his perception does comprehend the general and particular aspects with the aid of sanskāra i.e. the impressions of the cognitions of the other object cognised earlier.

According to Prābhākaras, to have viśiṣṭa pratyaya, it is not necessary that viśeṣaṇa also must be present by the perception only. In the case of savikalpaka perception when the viśeṣaṇas are perceived in the cognition of the object concerned, the corresponding viśeṣaṇas of the object seen earlier are brought to the observer's mind by sanskāra.

8) Number and the nature of categories according to Prābhākaras

While explaining the objects that are cognised by the perception Śālikanātha mentions three categories viz dravya, jāti and guṇa and gives the details of four dravyas viz prithvi, ap, tejas and vāyu. He also mentions colour, taste etc sixteen guṇas. The commentator gives full details of the categories.

1) Substance, qualities, motion, universal, inherence, power, number and similarity are the eight categories.

It may be noted here that abhāva is dropped and śakti, sādṛśya are added.

2) The nine substances are same as those of Nyāyavaiśeṣikas. Twenty two qualities are common to Nyāyavaiśeṣikas and Prābhākaras. sankhyā and laghutva are dropped.

3) Motion i.e. karma, represents both ordinary motion and ritual activities. Motion is not perceived. It is inferred.

4) Śakti is present in all positive entities. Samkhyā cannot be considered as substance as it is found in qualities. It cannot be considered as a quality as it is found in many. Sadrśya is a distinct category distinct from the substance, qualities etc.

5) In respect of the concepts of jāti i.e. universal, and samavāya. Prābhākaras have made some improvements in the Nyāyavaiśeṣika position. These answer some of the objections raised against these concepts.



8 1. Kumāriḷa and Buddhism

I propose to present a small paper on Kumāriḷa and Buddhism. I willtake care to introduce sufficient controversial points for discussion for fifteen minutes. The material that could be discussed under this title Kumāriḷa and Buddhism is really very vast; but I will pick up only one or two points by स्थलीपुलाकन्याय.

Among the orthodox systems, three systems viz. Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Pūrvamīmāṃsa and Vedānta are highly critical of Buddhist doctrines. To understand the nature and consiquences of this criticism, one has to understand as to why these systems criticise Buddhistic doctrines? How they criticise? and what are consiquences of such criticism, that is to say to waht extent each side yielded to the other in the bargain. I confine the examination of these three questions with reference to Pūrvamīmāṃsa only.

Though Vedānta sūtras criticise the position of three major schools of Buddhism Sarvāstivāda, Vijñānavāda and Śūnyavāda, there is no direct criticism of Buddhism in Jaiminī Sūtras. But under the sūtra no I-1-5 that is Autpattikasūtra, the Bhāṣyakāra Śabarāsvāmin criticises Vijñānavāda. He uses the expressions Nirālambana and Śūnya. But Śūnya here is not used in the sense of Śūnyavāda.

This is a very brief discussion raised while discussing the question under what circumstances a perception is valid and when it is not valid. It is clear that it is deliberately introduced. He raises the question whether there are any objects to perceive at all.

Commenting on this portion of Bhāṣya, Kumāriḷa has fully discussed Vijñānavāda and Śūnyavāda in as many as 464 verses. He has fully summarised Buddhists arguments and has answered each point. Right at the commencement he states as to why he has to undertaken a critical examination of the Buddhists doctrine of Bhāhyārthabhāva and Śūnyavāda.

विध्यर्थवादमन्त्रार्थनामधेयादिकल्पना ।

कर्मभ्यः फलसम्बन्धः पारलौकिकवैहलौकिकः ।

सर्वमित्याद्युक्तं स्यात् अर्थशून्यासु बुद्धिः ॥

तस्याद्धर्मार्थिभिः पूर्वं प्रमाणैः लोकसम्मतैः ।

अर्थस्य सदसद्भावे यत्तः कार्यः क्रियां प्रति ॥

If the Buddhistic position of the denial of the reality of external world is accepted then the whole scheme of ritualitic culture will lose its foundation. There need be no sacrifices, no heaven or hell, no benefits from these sacrifices worldly or other worldly. Thus Buddhistic doctrines of Vijñānavāda and Śūnyavāda had posed a challenge to the very

Karmakāṇḍa culture of Pūrvamīmāṃsā. Vedānta had already pushed Mīmāṃsā to the background by giving more importance to Jñāna, than Karma during the Upaniṣadic period. But this was a final blow. Mīmāṃsa had to fight both against Buddhist and Vedānta. This explains as to why Śābara and Kumāriḷa fought against Buddhists.

As regards 'how they fought'? Some interesting points need to be noticed. In Vedānta Sūtras, the Buddhist theory of causation viz. pratityasamutpāda (प्रतीत्यसमुत्पाद) theory of causation is chiefly attacked in order to defend Brahmakāraṇavāda.

In Vaiśeṣika sūtra and Bhāṣya, the Kṣaṇabhangavāda is chiefly attacked in the context of defending the concepts like universal and inherent relation (sāmānya and samavāya). In Śābara bhāṣya and Kumāriḷa's Vārtika rejection of the reality of external objects is chiefly attacked. The defence of the concept of Ātman and criticism of any other substitute arrangement for playing the role of आत्मन् is undertaken by all. While Vaiśeṣikas and Vedāntins advance ontological arguments more frequently, the Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā advance epistemological arguments. The Buddhist doctrine of apoha is criticised both from epistemological and ontological points of view. Mīmāṃsā is interested in the stability and reality of both the external world

and Ātman. Other wise its sacrificial culture cannot be surtained. Nyāya being a realist school is also interested in the stability and reality of the objective world and Ātman.

While Vedānta position differs from school to school. Advaita is interested in maintaining the stability and reality of Ātman in the ultimate sense. It grants same kind of secondary reality only to the objective world and individual selves. Dvaita and Viśiṣṭādvaita are interested in the stability and reality of both the objective world and selves.

All kinds of hair-splitting arguments are advanced in support of each one's position. I do not wish to go into those details.

Now, I come to the third question as to what is the consequence of this academic confrontation, who has yielded to whom in the bargain? and what is the impact of this on Indian mind both elite and general public?

Philosophically speaking both have yielded to each other on many points either by modifying their position, or accepting the other position in a conceiled way, or introducing some new concepts and explanations. I quote only one point from Pūrvamīmāṃsa viz. Pūrvamīmāṃsā theory of knowledge. According to Pūrvamīmāṃsā, the

knowledge is not self-revealing or *svayamprakāśa*. It has to be inferred. Objects have a capacity to reveal themselves. This capacity is called *prākātya* or the ability to reveal themselves. When one comes in contact with certain object through senses etc it reveals itself under certain conditions. Then, he infers that he has the knowledge of that object. This is what is called *Jñātātāliṅgakānumāna* (ज्ञाततालिङ्गकानुमान). According to this theory of Pūrvamīmāṃsā ascertainment of the presence of the object is not dependent upon knowledge, but it is the ascertainment of the presence of the knowledge that is dependent upon object. This theory cuts the very roots of Buddhistic arguments that since one has to reach the objects through knowledge only, the knowledge itself can also serve the purpose of the objects, the objects as such can be dispensed with. We may agree with the Mīmāṃsa theory or not but this theory is especially evolved under the pressure of Buddhistic criticism to work out the tenebility of objects independent of knowledge.

Similarly, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika concepts of universal, inherent relation, *avayavi* etc are criticised under the pressure of Buddhistic criticism only. The Advaita Vedānta concept of *vyavahārikasattā* is very close to the Buddhist's

concept of samvṛutisattā. One may be stable during the samsāradaśā the other may be very momentary, but both are appearance. An illusion is an illusion whether it endures for same time changes every moment. The concepts of Ālayavijñāna and pravṛttivijñāna have some paralld in the concepts of mūlāvidyā and tūlāvidyā. These are a kind of double illusion. Brahman and Śūnya are close to each other. Both are positive and indefinable. Mādhyamika Kārika defines Śūnya as

न सत् न असत् न सदसत् न चाप्यनुभयात्मकम् ।

चतुष्कोटिविनिर्मुक्तं तत्त्वं माध्यमिका विदुः ॥

Accepting the fact that Brahman has the content sat, chit, ānanda the basic structure of the two same.

On the Buddhistic side, the concept sāmānyalakṣaṇa is meant to serve the purpose of sāmānya of nyāyavaiśeṣikas. The concept of vāsanā is intended to achieve some kind of continuity of psychic experience and is a substitute arrangement of self, the concept of ālayavijñāna is also meant for this. By accepting all these mechanisms under the preasure of the criticism of orthodox systems, they have considerably moved away from their original position.

Philosophers cannot change the nature of reality, nor can tamper with common sense world. They

only make an attempt to describe the reality on the basis of certain hypothesis. The whole universe being a continuous flux is one hypothesis and it being stable is another. The whole universe being mind or matter or both matter and mind are three other hypotheses. Depending upon the position one takes, the categories of mind and matter, and their relations are worked out. In this process, philosophers develop dialectical confrontations and influence each other. There is no question of any *pracchanna* or *prakāṣa* here. It is a natural consequence. Such reciprocal impact has taken place within orthodox systems as well as between other. A study of each item is a fascinating study.

As regards the impact on general public, people retained the ritualistic culture and also accepted the ethical culture. An average Indian accepts the ethical cultures Buddhists and Jains and also follows his ritualistic culture.

Kumāriḷa and Śaṅkara are accused of banishing Buddhism from India. I do not think, mere academic confrontations banish a whole-some religion. The reasons are likely to be different more complex. Śaṅkara is doubly accused. He is accused of importing Buddhist metaphysical frame work into Vedāntic thought. But so long as the main thesis of Vedānta is sustained. It does not matter much.

To conclude

- i) Buddhism contributed much to the growth of orthodox philosophy by offering a stiff confrontation.
- ii) Kumāriḷa played a leading role in controversy on behalf of the orthodox systems.



8 2. Prof. Hiriyanṇa on Pūrvamīmāṃsā

Prof. Hiriyanṇa's observations on Pūrvamīmāṃsā could be gathered from the chapters on Pūrvamīmāṃsā in his Outlines, Essentials his papers on 'Types of Indian Thought,' 'Six points of view,' 'Mīmāṃsā view of Error,' 'Prabhākara : Old and New,' 'The Doctrine of Niyoga' and his reviews of Bhāṭṭacintāmaṇi, Br̥hatī of Prabhākara and Pūrvamīmāṃsā of Dr. Ganganath Jha. In addition to these specific studies of Pūrvamīmāṃsā, his observations in such other contexts of philosophical discussions that have a bearing on Mīmāṃsā topics for comparison, contrasting or criticism will also give us a peep into his thinking on Pūrvamīmāṃsā doctrines.

It is not proposed to give a full account of his observations on Pūrvamīmāṃsā doctrines here, nor it is possible to do so in a paper of this type. It is only proposed to draw the attention to such of the observations which constitute Prof. Hiriyanṇa's distinct contributions to the understanding of Pūrvamīmāṃsā doctrines either by way of clarifying the precise nature of the concepts or by way of its criticism both from the point of view of its tenability within the scheme of Pūrvamīmāṃsā philosophy and from the logical and empirical points of view in general. Attention will also be

drawn to his unique method of elucidating mīmāṃsādoctrines in comparison with the doctrines of other systems, particularly, Nyāya Vaiśeṣika and Sāṃkhya and his parallel treatment of the two schools of Pūrvamīmāṃsā, viz., Bhāṭṭa and Prābhākara in a comparative and critical way.

In the preface to his *Outlines*, Prof. Hiriyanṇa remarks that 'his aim has been to give a connected account; but interpretation and criticism are not excluded.' It is in these interpretations and criticism that we find the subtlety of Prof. Hiriyanṇa's thoughts and his contribution to the elucidation of philosophical concepts. After reading Prof. Hiriyanṇa one may feel that one could as well have traced those thoughts in the original Sanskrit passages referred to by Prof. Hiriyanṇa. But it is only after reading him.

Explaining his method or treatment, Prof. Hiriyanṇa says that he has given the theory of knowledge first, and then, ontology and practical teaching under each system. It would be convenient to follow the same order to find out his contribution to the understanding of these problems while writing on Pūrvamīmāṃsā, in addition to the above problems, the problems of language, particularly, the rules of interpretation, and the authority of Veda are especially discussed. I shall

presently draw your attention to Prof. Hiriyanna's observations and views on these aspects of Pūrvamīmāṃsā.

I

The distinguishing feature of Mīmāṃsā, Prof. Hiriyanna observes, is its adherence to the Veda as an infallible authority. Veda, though authoritative in its own right comes to us through the medium of words whose interpretation is by no means easy. Hence the need for Mīmāṃsā or the principles according to which the Vedic texts are to be interpreted. Thus the primary aim of Mīmāṃsā is getting back from the expression to the idea behind it, the solving of the important problem of relation of speech and thought.

The view of the language taken in mīmāṃsā is that it is independent of the individual using it. Therefore, the system involves a great deal of discussion relating to social or folk psychology. This psychological inquiry contains much that is valuable for modern science of Semantics. The Mīmāṃsā in this respect serves as a necessary complement to Vyākaraṇa whose treatment of words is mainly formal. The laws of interpretation formulated by Jaimini and his successors are quite general. They are applicable as much to the works

outside Veda as to that ancient text. They are utilised for arriving at a right interpretation of all old texts, particularly legal treatises (Dharma-Śāstra).

These observations of Prof. Hiriyanṇa give us the perspective with which the Mīmāṃsā theories of word, meaning, sentence and the Mīmāṃsāṃrules of interpretation are to be studied and the use to which these theories were put, and could be put even now.

According to Mīmāṃsakas, the relation between a word and its meaning is natural and therefore, necessary and eternal. A varṇa is an articulated sound. It is integral (niravayava) omnipresent (sarvagata) and eternal (nitya). Dhvani is the means of manifesting varṇa which has all along been there. A śabda (word) is two or more of these varṇas and is merely an aggregate (samudāya) and not a whole (avayavin).

As regards the thing, signified by words, we are not to understand the particular facts of experience which come into being and disappear, but the corresponding universals. The significance of the word is general, though when associated with other words to form a sentence, it may come to denote a particular. The word and the meaning being both

eternal-the relation between them also is necessarily so.

Thus explaining the nature of word, meaning and their relation, Prof. Hiriyanna adds that Mīmāṃsā does not reject the conventional element in language, but only assigns a subordinate place (Sahakāri) to it, the purpose it serves being illustrated by that of light to seeing.

The permanance of the relation between a word and its meaning does not establish the eternity of Veda. It is the fixing of the particular order of words (ānupūrvi) in the text of the Vedas that is meant by eternity of the Text. This belief is nothing more than a dogma. This idolatry of scripture appears comparatively late. In this connection, it is instructive to cite the opinion of Patañjali that while sense of the Veda is eternal, the order of the word is not so.

In these observations we see his unreserved criticism of the Vedāpauruṣeyatva concept in the sense of an eternal, fixed text as it is now stretched.

II

Prof. Hiriyanna discusses the theories of truth and error under all systems elaborately. The

Mīmāṃsaka's theory of truth and error under has its own unique features. While Bhāṭṭa's theory is closer to that of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Prabhākara's theory has a distinct approach of its own.

Prabhākara's theory is known as Ākhyāti-vāda. According to this, error is not a unit of knowledge, but a composite of two Jñānas, perception immediately followed by memory. We overlook the fact that there are two Jñānas and fail to notice the separateness of their respective objects. This is negative factor. The positive factor is the partial or incomplete and the other negative for error becoming possible a partial knowledge of the thing presented and a failure to note the distinction between them.

The Bhāṭṭa view is known as Viparīta-Khyāti. This view also splits up the object of error into parts the This (Viśaya) and the What (Prakāra) and explains them separately. The first of them is not sublated when the mistake is rectified; the second (silver in Śukti-rajata-nyāya) though not given here and now, must have been experienced before.

The difference between the two views is that, while according to Akhyāti, error is due to a losing sight of the fact that presentative and representative factors stand spart unrelated

(asaṃsargagraha); in viparīta-khyāti it is ascribed to wrong synthesis of them (saṃsargagraha). In the former case error is due to omission while in the latter it is one of commission.

Analysing these two theories as detailed above, Prof. Hiriyanna makes a significant remark that Bhāṭṭa view no doubt is more in accord with experience which points to the object of illusion as a synthetic whole, but epistemologically it presents a difficulty viz., the inclusion of ideal element within the content of knowledge. As regards the Prābhākara view, he says it is true to realistic postulate in admitting no subjective element whatsoever.

III

Discussing the validity of knowledge, he explains : Mimāṃsāṃpostulates Svataḥprāmāṇya or self-validity of knowledge both in respect of its origin (utpattau) and ascertainment (jñāptau). All knowledge is presumably valid and an explanation is called for only where any particular knowledge fails to be so. The cause of invalidity is some defect in the means or source of knowledge (karaṇa-doṣa).

Mimāṃsāṃdisagrees with Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika in respect of the view it takes of validity of knowledge

(Prāmāṇya). The chief reason for disagreement is the disaccord between the nature of truth as defined in Nyāya Vaiśeṣika and the manner in which it proposes to verify it. Truth is stated to be correspondence with reality, but the test does not, indeed cannot, ascertain that correspondence. What serves as a test (saṁvādi-pravṛtti) is really another experience. Its verification leads to ad infinitum. What the test actually finds out is only whether two experiences cohere, and to accept such a test as adequate is virtually to give up realistic position. That is why Mīmāṃsā advocates Svataḥ prāmāṇya and dispenses with the need for testing it. In these remarks Prof. Hiriyanna has clearly pointed how the Mīmāṃsakas have tried to stick to their realistic position.

Apart from realistic considerations, the Svataḥprāmāṇya doctrine is intended to establish the authority of Vedas. There can be no flaw at the source (karaṇa-doṣa) in respect of Veda. Nor there is possibility of its coming into conflict with perceptual or other form of common experience, for what it teaches refers to the matters empirically un-verifiable. Veda is also not discrepant by teaching one thing here and another there, if we properly Understand Veda. It is for this purpose that of interpretation are laid down.

IV

Among the pramāṇas, Upamāna and Arthāpatti require our consideration.

According to Nyāya, Upamāna, has for its sole object the relation between a word and its meaning learnt under certain conditions. But in Mīmāṃsā it is reciprocal similarity that is known through it. The recollected cow characterised by the resemblance of gavaya is known through Upamāna. This view renders this pramāṇa liable to be classed under inference. But Mīmāṃsaka defends his position by pointing out that the basis for inference viz., a knowledge of inductive relation (Vyāpti) is not needed here. While dealing with this Pramāṇa Prof. Hiriyanna points out that a matter of metaphysical importance here is that similarity is conceived as dual, the similarity of A to B, being distinct from that of B to A.

Coming to Arthāpatti, it is rendering explicit what is already implicit in two truths both of which have been properly tested, but which appear mutually incompatible. The Naiyāyikas class it under Anumāna. However, the result here cannot be represented as reached through inference, in as much as there is no middle term at all to serve as its means. In inference the ground is explained by

the conclusion, here the ground explains the conclusion. Arthāpatti is disjunctive reasoning and is not syllogistic form, the major premise will be negative universal referring to the things beyond the universe of discourse. The Mīmāṃsakas of both the Schools reject the negative universal as a major premise in syllogism. They consider that it can generally be expressed in a positive form. The scope for Arthāpatti is just where it cannot be so expressed.

This analysis of the nature and scope of Upamāna and Arthāpatti gives us the correct picture of Mīmāṃsaka's approach to these pramāṇas.

V

Prof. Hiriyanṇa discusses the nature of ātman, the nature of jñāna, the categories, the relation between dravya and guṇa etc., according to Mīmāṃsakas in detail and offers his critical comments.

Both Kumāriḷa and Prabhākara agree in respect of plurality of ātman. Kumāriḷa's view of ātman is very much like that of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. It is conceived as both as agent (Kartā) and enjoyer (bhoktā). But while Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika admits no action in self-neither change of place (spanda), nor

change of form (pariṇāma)-Bhāṭṭas though deny the former, admit the latter. Though undergoing modifications, the ātman is regarded as eternal, for Kumāriḷa rejects the view that even internal change militates against permanence. Jñāna or knowledge is a mode of the self. It is described as an act (kriyā) or process (vyāpāra). When Jñāna arises in the self relating it to an object, the object becomes illuminated (prakāśaviśiṣṭa). The object being illumined thus (Prākāṣya or Jñātātā) serves as a means for our concluding that Jñāna must have arisen in the self. Thus Jñāna is only to be inferred. While it can reveal other objects, it has no power to manifest itself.

Self is known directly through 'aham-pratyaya' or the I-notion. Self can at once be both subject and object (Jadabodhātmaka). In the example 'I know jar' there are two elements : one comprehending the self (aham-vṛtti) and the other comprehending the object (ghaṭavṛtti). Self awareness is constant and accompanies all states of consciousness, being absent only in deep sleep where no object is known. The self is not known as the subject in the act of knowing. The fact of knowing itself-is not known at the time. But yet the self cannot be unknown, for that would go against the felt personal identity in all experience. It is therefore,

explained as being known then as object of I-
notion. Self to be known at all must at the time
become aware of some object or other.

Prabhākara disagrees with Kumāriḷa in two
important respects in his view of self. He does not
admit that self suffers change. He objects to the
description of self as knowable. Agent and object
can never be the same in any act. Self is a subject
and is revealed as such in all Jñāna. It is not self-
luminous. It is Jaḍa and therefore, requires for its
revelation the presence of some knowledge which
is self-luminous (Saṁvit is Svayamprakāśa). Saṁvit
or knowledge reveals both object and the self
simultaneously with itself. This triple revelation is
described as Tripuṭīkaraṇa.

Mimāṃsā believes in the existence of permanent
dravyas which are substrate of qualities and are
not merely aggregates of fleeting sense-data.

According to Bhāṭṭas, every dravya is eternal and
endures however much its forms or attributes may
change. The dravya endures; its modes alone
appear and disappear. This view of reality exhibits
kinship with the Sāṁkhya-Yoga in general. It is
pariṇāmavāda and the relation between the material
cause and the effect is one of identity in difference
(bhedābheda). One important difference between

Sāṃkhya and Mīmāṃsa is that here the changing dravyas are ultimately many, not only one. Another difference is Mīmāṃsa extends the notion of transformation to the ātman also.

The change that characterizes the physical reality is ever in progress. It never began and is never going to end, the Mīmāṃsā recognising no creation or the dissolution of the Universe as a whole. (न कदाचिदनीदृशं जगत्)

Kumāriḷa accepts all nine dravyas of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and adds two more viz., Tamas and Śabda. Time is perceivable. All perceptual experiences include a reference to time. The first four dravyas and Tamas are atomic. By 'atom,' paramāṇu of Vaiśeṣikas is not meant but the smallest particle which experience acquaints us with. Guṇa, Karma, Samavāya are not entirely distinct from dravyas. The relation between them is identity in difference (bhedābheda). Kumāriḷa's list includes 'Abhāva.' There are five categories in all (excluding Samavāya and Viśeṣa).

Prabhākara accepts Samavāya. This means the rejection of the relation of identity in difference. As a consequence substance and attribute etc. come to the conceived as altogether distinct that the doctrine does not subscribe to Satkāryavāda. Prabhākara discords Abhāva as an independent category.

VI

On the practical side or the teaching of Pūrvamīmāṃsā, the most important aspect is its concept of dharma. It is all the more important because in the absence of recognition of God in this system, many changes constantly taking place in the world have to be accounted on operation of dharma and adharma. The term dharma, generally speaking, stands for Vedic rites or duties of a religious kind; but ethical conduct is not excluded. Vedas will not cleanse the morally impure Dharma many be more than morality but is not less. Dharma is not non-social or purely individualistic as it includes five daily sacrifices and such other virtues as hospitality to guests, etc.

Veda reveals dharma as the subject of mandate (Vidhi or Niyoga) Bhāṭṭa and Prabhākara differ considerably in their view of the motive for obeying that mandate. According to Bhāṭṭa, the Veda not only acquaints us with dharma and adharma but also specifies the desirable results. The Bhāṭṭa School believes that pleasure and pain are the only ultimate motives. But we should not conclude from this, Prof. Hiriyanṇa observes, that Veda commands us either to seek pleasure or to shun pain. Veda merely admits it as psychological fact without pronouncing any judgement on the value of

pleasure or the lack of it is pain. We have here psychological hedonism and not ethical hedonism.

The Prābhākara demure to the admission of a hedonistic aim as necessary for the Vedic imperative to operate. The ideal of dharma should be pursued for its own sake. Dharma is an intrinsic value—a good in itself—and not merely an instrumental one. The reference to fruit found in Veda is intended merely to define the class of persons to whom the behest is addressed. The conception of dharma here resembles the categorical imperative.

The ideal of dharma, but not of mokṣa, seems to have been the aim of Mīmāṃsā earlier (upto Kalpa-sūtra). But the doctrine in its present form replaced it by Mokṣa.

The Mīmāṃsa concept of Mokṣa very much resembles that of Nyāya Vaiśeṣika. The self is eternal and omnipresent. Its empirical encumbrance is threefold : physical body, organs of sense and the world. Separation from these once for all is release. Mīmāṃsa refutes the Vedānta view that the physical world is sublated, or transcended in Mokṣa. The Mokṣa state is described negatively as excluding all pain along with all pleasure. One or two interpreters of Kumāriḷa maintain that it is a state of bliss.

As regards the discipline, the emphasis here is on Karma rather than Jñāna. A consequence of this is the rejection of Saṁnyāsa. Briefly the discipline consists in giving up optional and prohibited deeds and confining to the obligatory ones, whose purpose is the removal of evil. When thus the source of all future births is cut off, there results automatically the restoration to the self of its intrinsic nature.

The above brief account of Prof. Hiriyanṇa's analysis, criticism and elucidation of Pūrvamīmāṃsā doctrines brings out the following points.

- (1) The view of the language taken in Mīmāṃsā is that it is independent of the individual using it. However, Mīmāṃsā does not reject the conventional element in language, but, only assigns subordinate place (sahakāri) to it, the purpose served by it being illustrated by that of light to seeing.
- (2) The Mīmāṃsā theory of Veda-apauruṣeyatva in the sense of our eternally fixed text is not convincing, inspite of their theory of word, meaning and their relation being eternal.
- (3) The Mīmāṃsā rules of interpretation are quite general. They are applicable as much to the works outside Veda as to the Veda.

- (4) Bhāṭṭa theory of error, which points to the object of illusion as a synthetic whole, though, more in accord with experience, epistemologically presents a difficulty viz., the inclusion of ideal element within the content of knowledge.
- (5) Mīmāṃsā disagrees with Nyāya in respect of Prāmāṇya because of the discord between the nature of truth and the manner in which the Nyāya proposes to verify. Mīmāṃsa advocates Svataḥprāmāṇya and dispenses with the need for testing it.
- (6) In Mīmāṃsā reciprocal similarity is known through Upamāna. It cannot be included under Anumāna, since a knowledge of inductive relation or Vyāpti is not needed here, similarity is considered as dual in Mīmāṃsā.
- (7) Mīmāṃsā recognises Arthāpatti as a separate pramāṇa. Since it rejects the negative universal as a major premise in syllogism.

The following are the basic differences between Bhāṭṭas and Prābhākaras :

- (8) The Bhāṭṭa school accepts change or Parināma in ātman. It accepts dravya as

eternal and also as changing. Its view is Parīṇāmapavāda. The relation between cause and effect is bhedābheda. Prābhākaras disagree with all these points.

- (9) Ātman is both subject and object according to Kumāriḷa while it is only subject according to Prabhākara.
- (10) Jñāna is to be inferred according to Bhāṭṭas while it is Svayamprakāśa according to Prābhākaras.
- (11) Bhāṭṭa's theory of Kāryatā may be described as psychological hedonism but not as ethical hedonism.
- (12) Prabhākara's theory of Kāryatā resembles "categorical-imperative."

Prof. M. Hiriyanna, has made these points in the course of his critical summary of Pūrvamīmāṃsā doctrines. Though all these points are implicit in Mīmāṃsā texts, particularly, Śloka-vārtika, Prakaraṇapañcikā and Śāstradīpikā, Prof. Hiriyanna's contribution lies in making these explicit and describing them in unambiguous terms in a comparative and critical way.



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He received Rashtrapati Award in 1989 and Mahāmahopādhyāya title in 1997 from Tirupati Sanskrit University and Sir William Jones Medal from Asiatic Society, Kolkatta in 2005. He has edited about forty Dvaita Vedānta works and ten Pūrvamimāṃsā works. He has translated Principal Upaniṣads into English according to Śrī Ānandatīrtha's Bhāṣya and also Viṣṇutattvavinirṇaya of Śrī Ānandatīrtha. His publications include English Exposition on Prakaraṇa Pañcikā of Śālikanātha and Critical Essays on Vedānta and Veda and some literary works, such as Kāvyañjali, Ravindra Rūpakāṇi and Kavikāvyaadarśana.